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JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

In the first of these two consolidated legal malpracticecases, plaintiffs David R. Meyers and Frederick C. Meyers (theMeyers) appeal from orders of the Cook County circuit courtgranting summary judgment to defendants Henry J. Underwood, Jr.,and Defrees & Fiske (Defrees), and denying the Meyers' motion toreconsider. In the second case, defendant Vedder, Price, Kaufman& Kammholz (Vedder) appeals from a Cook County circuit courtorder denying its motion to dismiss the Meyers' complaint. TheVedder case is being appealed pursuant to Supreme Court Rule308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)) upon submission by the trial courtof two certified questions.⁽¹⁾ For the reasons set forth below, weaffirm the granting of summary judgment in favor of Underwood andDefrees. In the Vedder appeal, we answer the first of the twocertified questions in the affirmative as to section 13-214.3 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1992)),and we therefore reverse the denial of Vedder's motion to dismissthe Meyers' complaint.

The first of these two consolidated actions, both of whichare for legal malpractice, was filed on October 27, 1995. Inthat action, plaintiffs David R. Meyers and Frederick C. Meyers(the Meyers) brought a complaint against defendants Defrees &Fiske, a Chicago law partnership, and Henry J. Underwood, Jr., anattorney with Defrees. Defendants (hereinafter referred tocollectively as Defrees) had been retained by the board of JoannaWestern Mills (Joanna) allegedly to assist in the sale of Joanna,a closely held, family-owned company in Chicago that manufacturedinterior window coverings. Count I of the complaint sounds innegligence and count II sounds in tort. According to thecomplaint, defendants failed to properly draft sale documents andincorrectly advised the Meyers with respect to the 1986 sale ofJoanna to Kenner & Company (Kenner). As a result, a judgment of$1,626,555 was entered (on September 7, 1994) against the Meyersin a 1987 shareholders suit arising from the 1983 sale of 600shares of Joanna stock to the Meyers. That judgment amount wassubsequently increased to $4,359,900 as a result of an appellatecourt opinion issued April 22, 1997, in Regnery v. Meyers, 287Ill. App. 3d 354, 679 N.E.2d 74 (1997) [hereinafter Regnery II]. In the instant suit, which was filed prior to the decision inRegnery II, the Meyers, two brothers who were officers anddirectors of Joanna, sought damages in excess of $2 million.

The second of these consolidated actions was filed by theMeyers against defendant Vedder, Price, Kaufman and Kammholz(Vedder), a Chicago law firm that was Joanna's corporate counselfrom 1981 through the fall of 1986. The complaint was filed onMarch 17, 1998, but because of a tolling agreement executed bythe Meyers and Vedder on December 16, 1994, that earlier date(December 16, 1994) is the effective filing date. The complaintis brought against Vedder in connection with a 1981 voting trustand the previously mentioned 1983 sale of 600 shares of Joannastock to the Meyers for $500 per share. The complaint,consisting of four counts, alleges that Vedder failed to draftproperly the voting trust and failed to give proper advice as tothe trust and the Meyers' 1983 purchase of Joanna stock. CountsI and III sound in negligence, and counts II and IV allege breachof contract. The Meyers claim damages in excess of$5,289,324.01, which is the amount they paid (on January 20,1998) in satisfaction of the judgment entered in the previouslymentioned shareholder litigation. That amount represents the$4,359,900 judgment resulting from the decision in Regnery IIplus post-judgment interest and costs.

These two consolidated cases arise from the same facts,which are largely undisputed.⁽²⁾ In 1981 Joanna was experiencingsevere financial losses. Following a number of meetings in mid-August to discuss the situation, Joanna President William Regneryresigned. Shortly thereafter, Frederick Meyers was namedpresident of Joanna and David Meyers was named vice president. The August 1981 meetings also led to creation of a voting trustagreement among certain of Joanna's shareholders. The agreementwas drafted by Vedder attorney Robert J. Stucker⁽³⁾ and otherVedder attorneys working under his supervision. FrederickRegnery, Henry Regnery and David Meyers were named the trusteesof the voting trust, which included 3,745 shares, or slightlymore than half the outstanding and issued shares of Joanna stock. Those shares were deposited into the trust by Verla Regnery, oneof Joanna's majority shareholders. (Regnery II, 287 Ill. App. 3dat 357, 679 N.E.2d at 76.)

In 1983, Stucker suggested to Fred Meyers that it would beappropriate for Fred and his brother, David, to be allowed topurchase stock in Joanna for $500 per share, a price that Stuckersaid was consistent with recent sale and purchase transactionsamong shareholders. Stucker was directed by Joanna to advise thecompany on the structure and manner in which the proposed sale ofshares to the Meyers would be presented, approved and implemented, and to draft the necessary documentation. OnSeptember 13, 1983, Joanna's board authorized the issuance of 600shares of stock to be sold to the Meyers at $500 per share, andon September 26, 1983, the sale was approved by the stockholders. All of the shares in the voting trust were counted in favor ofthe sale, even though the voting trust proxy was executed by onlytwo of the trustees, David Meyers and Henry Regnery. FrederickRegnery, the third trustee, did not approve the sale and did notexecute the proxy. Stucker and other Vedder attorneys draftedall of the documentation used to propose and approve the sale ofshares to the Meyers.

According to the Meyers, in 1986 negotiations began for thesale of Joanna. The Meyers allege that in March or April of1986, Defrees was retained as special counsel to Joanna's boardto assist in the sale. Separate proposals for the purchase ofJoanna's stock were submitted by Kenner & Company (Kenner) and bya group that included Frederick Regnery, the voting trust trusteewho did not approve the 1983 sale of shares to the Meyers. OnSeptember 3, 1986, Joanna Chairman Henry Regnery sent a letter toJoanna stockholders informing them that, on August 21, 1986,Joanna had entered into an acquisition agreement calling for theacquisition of all of Joanna's stock by Kenner for $58 million incash. The letter stated that the stockholders would receive$7,766 for each share, of which $7,097 was to be paid to thestockholders at closing and $669.50 was to be held in escrow topay undisclosed company obligations. Attached to the letter weretransactional documents prepared by Defrees, including anagreement of merger, an escrow agreement, an agency agreement,and a consent agreement. On September 12, 1986, the majority ofJoanna's shareholders executed the consent agreement, therebyapproving the Kenner acquisition and (in accordance with theagency agreement) designating Alfred Regnery as the shareholders'agent in connection with the acquisition. The sale closed inOctober 1986.

In July 1987, certain former Joanna shareholders, includingseveral Regnery family members (the Regnerys), sued the Meyers,alleging that the 1983 sale of 600 Joanna shares to David andFred Meyer constituted a common law breach of trust and a breachof the express terms of the 1981 voting trust agreement. TheMeyers contacted Alfred Regnery, the shareholders' agent, andrequested that he release them from the shareholders' claimsagainst them pursuant to the agency and consent agreementsprepared by Defrees. Regnery II, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 359, 679N.E.2d at 77. Alfred subsequently filed a declaratory judgmentaction in Cook County circuit court requesting authorization torelease the Meyers from the shareholders' claims in the 1987suit. Regnery II, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 359, 679 N.E.2d at 77. The shareholders' suit and Alfred's complaint were consolidated,and both Alfred and the shareholder plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Alfred'smotion, thus allowing him to release the Meyers from the claims. On appeal, that decision was reversed. The appellate court foundthat the agency agreement did not authorize Alfred to release theMeyers from the shareholders' claims, and it remanded the casefor "entry of judgment for the Regnerys on Alfred's declaratoryjudgment complaint and for further proceedings in the Regnerys'breach of trust action [against the Meyers]." Regnery v.Regnery, 211 Ill. App. 3d 607, 616, 570 N.E.2d 557, 563 (1991)[hereinafter Regnery I].

In its 1994 final judgment order in the 1987 shareholders'litigation (following a bench trial), the trial court found thatthe $500-per-share price the Meyers paid for the stock in 1983was "substantially below its fair value" and that at the timethey acquired the stock the Meyers knew it was worthsubstantially more. The court found that "[t]he Meyers did notdisclose to the Joanna board of directors or the stockholders thefull compensation they had been receiving[,] and the sale wasrepresented to the stockholders as a sale at fair market value.The Meyers also did not disclose to the stockholders theprojected income for Joanna in 1983." The trial court furtherfound that David Meyers breached his fiduciary duty to VerlaRegnery, a depositor in the voting trust, "by using his positionas Trustee of the Voting Trust to effectuate the issuance ofJoanna stock to himself and his brother at a price far below itsactual value." David Meyers also was found to have breached hisduty to Verla Regnery "when he failed to give her notice of hisintended action and when he caused the Voting Trust to vote infavor of the sale to himself and his brother without a unanimousdecision by the Trustees." The court also found that, since thevoting trust was the majority stockholder in Joanna, David hadbreached the "separate and independent duties a majoritystockholder owes to the minority stockholders." In addition, thecourt found that Fred Meyers induced his brother to breach hisfiduciary duties, participated in those breaches, and knowinglyaccepted the benefits from them. The trial court found that theMeyers received $4,359,900 in profit from those breaches, plus$195,000 in dividends from September 1983 through October 1986(when Joanna was sold) on the 600 shares of Joanna stock. Judgment was entered against the Meyers in the amount of$1,626,555, or 35.71 percent of the amounts obtained by them. Theshareholder plaintiffs were 35.71-percent stockholders in Joannaat the time of the breach.

On appeal, the plaintiff shareholders argued that the trialcourt erred when it allowed the Meyers to retain the majority ofthe profits they obtained through their breach of fiduciaryduties. Regnery II, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 359, 679 N.E.2d at 77. The Meyers cross-appealed the trial court's findings relating toliability, including the findings as to breach of fiduciaryduties.

The appellate court upheld the trial court's findings as tothe Meyers' misconduct but found that "the trial court erred inallowing [the Meyers] to retain all but 35.71% of the profits anddividends they received as a result of the breach." Regnery II,287 Ill. App. 3d at 365, 679 N.E.2d at 81. The circuit court wasinstructed "to disgorge [the Meyers] of all profits and dividendsobtained during the period September 1983, through October 1986,on the 600 shares of Joanna stock in question *** and award allplaintiffs, both those who are now parties and those allowed tointervene, their pro rata share of such profits and dividends." Regnery II, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 366, 679 N.E.2d at 81. OnOctober 1, 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave toappeal. Regnery v. Meyers, 174 Ill. 2d 594, 686 N.E.2d 1173(1997). On January 20, 1998, the Meyers satisfied the judgmentagainst them by paying the Joanna shareholders' representative$5,289,324.01, which represents the judgment of the trial andappellate courts, plus post-judgment interest and costs.

As previously noted, the Meyers filed a suit for legalmalpractice against Defrees on October 27, 1995, in connectionwith the 1986 sale of Joanna to Kenner. According to thecomplaint, Defrees negligently drafted documents accompanying thesale, including a consent agreement and an agency agreement, insuch a way that they failed to release the Meyers fromshareholder claims arising from the Meyers' 1983 purchase ofJoanna stock. The complaint also alleges that defendantsimproperly and incorrectly advised the Meyers that all potentialshareholder claims against them would be resolved and that theycould consent to the Kenner sale without fear of suit. Attachedto the complaint is a copy of a letter (dated September 3, 1986)from Joanna Chairman Henry Regnery to the stockholders regardingthe proposed sale of Joanna's stock to Kenner. Also attached tothe complaint are copies of documents prepared by defendants thataccompanied the letter, including a summary outlining the mainfeatures of the Kenner transaction, an agreement of merger, anescrow agreement, an agency agreement, and a shareholder consentagreement. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, but themotion was denied. They then filed their answer and affirmativedefenses.

On November 7, 1997, defendants filed a motion for summaryjudgment claiming that the Meyers' complaint was barred by thetwo-year statute of limitations and the six-year statute ofrepose included in section 13-214.3 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1992)). Defendants alsoalleged that the Meyers had come to court with unclean hands andthat their complaint was barred by Illinois public policy statingthat a court will not aid a party whose cause of action isfounded on illegal, immoral or fraudulent acts to relieve himselfof the consequences of those acts. In making that claim,defendants pointed to the previously mentioned final judgmentorder in the 1987 breach-of-trust suit brought by former Joannashareholders against the Meyers. In that order (dated September7, 1994), which is attached as an exhibit to defendants' motion,the trial court found that David Meyers breached fiduciary dutiesin connection with the Meyers' 1983 purchase of Joanna stock andthat Fred Meyers induced those breaches, participated in them andknowingly accepted their benefits. Also attached to the summaryjudgment motion is a copy of the 1997 appellate court opinionaffirming those findings. Regnery II, 287 Ill. App. 3d 354,679N.E.2d 74 (1997). In addition, a copy of Regnery I, 211 Ill.App. 3d 607, 570 N.E.2d 557 (1991), is submitted with the motion.

On June 12, 1998, the trial court granted summary judgmentfor defendants, holding that the Meyers' suit was barred by thesix-year statute of repose found in section 13-214.3 of the Codeof Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c) (West 1992)). Thecourt found that since the alleged malpractice took place in 1986(when the consent and agency agreements were drafted), thestatute of repose barred any actions filed after 1992. TheMeyers complaint here was not filed until October 27, 1995. OnSeptember 30, 1998, the trial court denied the Meyers' motion toreconsider.

As previously noted, the Meyers' legal malpractice complaintagainst Vedder was filed on March 17, 1998, but because of atolling agreement between the parties, the effective filing datewas December 16, 1994. Counts I and II of the complaint, whichallege negligence and breach of contract, respectively, focus onthe 1981 voting trust agreement. According to those counts,Vedder and Stucker failed to properly draft the voting trust toreflect clearly (1) when a unanimous vote of its trustees wasrequired to approve a sale of Joanna stock, (2) when the trusteeswere required to give the beneficiaries advance notice of theirintended action, and (3) when and under what circumstances atrustee could vote on a matter in which he had a personalinterest. Counts I and II also allege that Vedder and Stuckerfailed to advise the voting trust beneficiaries and trustees asto those and other related matters. Counts III and IV alsoallege negligence and breach of contract, but they focus on the1983 sale of 600 shares of Joanna stock to the Meyers. Accordingto those counts, Vedder and Stucker failed to give proper adviceregarding the appropriate procedures for valuing the 600 sharessold to the Meyers in 1983. Counts III and IV also allege thatVedder and Stucker failed to give proper advice (1) that thevoting trust shares could not be counted in favor of the sale tothe Meyers unless the trustees voted unanimously in favor of thesale, (2) that Joanna's board could have legally approved the1983 sale without the consent of Joanna's shareholders, (3) thatthe sale of the shares to the Meyers, as structured by Vedder andStucker, was subject to a shareholder challenge on the groundthat it was unfair to Joanna's minority shareholders and thevoting trust beneficiaries, and (4) that the sale was subject tochallenge on the basis that the voting trust trustees failed togive the beneficiaries proper advance notice of their intent toapprove the sale.

Attached to the complaint is a copy of the 1981 trustagreement naming David Meyers, Frederick Regnery and HenryRegnery as voting trustees of the trust (which representedslightly more than half of Joanna's shares). Section 4 of thetrust agreement, which lists powers and duties of the trustees,states in pertinent part:

"(5) Disposition of Shares. Before entering intoany agreement for any disposition of any Shares of theCorporation by sale, merger, exchange or otherwise theTrustees shall notify the Holders of the TrustCertificates of their intended action.

***

(7) Operating Procedures and Interest of Trustees.*** If the trustees at any time disagree as to anydecision in which more than one Trustee is authorizedto participate, the decision of the majority of theTrustees shall control, except that any decision of theTrustees regarding a sale of any of the Shares, amerger or consolidation, or a sale of a significantportion of the Corporation's assets, shall require aunanimous decision of the Trustees."

Other attachments to the complaint include: (1) the minutes of aSeptember 13, 1983, board meeting where Joanna's board authorizedthe issuance of 600 shares to be purchased by the Meyers for $500per share, contingent upon stockholder approval of the sale; (2)the minutes of a September 26, 1983, shareholders meeting wherethe proposed sale to the Meyers was approved by a vote of 98.8percent of the shares represented at the meeting; and (3) a copyof a proxy executed on September 20, 1983, by David Meyers andHenry Regnery (as trustees of the voting trust) with the intentof approving the sale. That written proxy and the 3,745 sharesit represented were counted at the September 26 shareholdermeeting as having been voted in favor of the sale to the Meyers. As previously noted, Frederick Regnery, the third trustee, didnot approve the sale and did not execute the proxy.

On May 18, 1998, Vedder moved to dismiss the Meyers'complaint pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1992)). As grounds for itsmotion, Vedder alleged that the Meyers' complaint was time-barredunder either section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/13-205 (West 1992)), the five-year statute of limitationsthat governed legal malpractice claims prior to January 1, 1991,or under section 13-214.3 (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1992)), thetwo-year statute of limitations for legal malpractice claims thatincludes a six-year statute of repose. Vedder also madeessentially the same unclean hands argument that Defrees made inits summary judgment motion, claiming that the Meyers areprohibited from asserting rights growing out of alreadyestablished wrongful conduct and are barred from obtaining relieffrom the consequences of that conduct. Among the exhibitsattached to Vedder's memorandum in support of its motion arecopies of the 1987 shareholder complaint against the Meyers, the1994 final judgment order in that case, and the 1997 appellateopinion (Regnery II, 287 Ill. App. 3d 354, 679 N.E.2d 74 (1997))affirming the 1994 findings as to the Meyers' misconduct.

On December 15, 1998, the trial court denied the motion todismiss. The court found that under the six-year statute ofrepose, the reasonable period exception applied, and furtherfound that there was a jury question as to whether the Meyers'claims were filed within a reasonable period. The court alsorejected Vedder's public policy argument that the Meyers'complaint was barred because of the judgment against them in theunderlying shareholders' litigation. The court noted that theMeyers' complaint alleged that Vedder initiated and participatedin the misconduct for which the Meyers were found liable.

The standard of review is the same in each of these appeals. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo,and the same standard applies to a court's decision on a summaryjudgment motion. Epstein v. Chicago Board of Education, 178 Ill.2d 370, 383, 687 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (1997); Simon v. Wilson, 291Ill. App. 3d 495, 509, 684 N.E.2d 791, 800 (1997).

The central question in these appeals is whether the Meyers'claims are barred by the six-year statute of repose formalpractice claims that went into effect January 1, 1991. Thatprovision is included in section 13-214.3 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1992)), which provides that:

"(b) An action for damages based on tort,contract, or otherwise (i) against an attorney arisingout of an act or omission in the performance ofprofessional services *** must be commenced within 2years from the time the person bringing the action knewor reasonably should have known of the injury for whichdamages are sought.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), anaction described in subsection (b) may not be commencedin any event more than 6 years after the date on whichthe act or omission occurred.

(f) This Section applies to all causes of actionaccruing on or after its effective date [January 1,1991]." 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3 (West 1992).⁽⁴⁾

Before addressing the applicability of the statute ofrepose, we must discuss when the Meyers' claims accrued in thetwo actions. If they accrued before January 1, 1991, then thestatute of repose does not apply, and their claims are governedby section 13-205 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 1992)), the five-year general statute of limitationsthat applied to legal malpractice claims prior to 1991. Garciav. Pinto, 258 Ill. App. 3d 22, 24, 629 N.E.2d 103, 104 (1993). However, it is essentially undisputed that the Meyers' claimsaccrued after January 1, 1991. The six-year statute of reposethus applies in each case.

The Meyers argue on appeal that their claim was timely filedunder either the "new" two-year statute of limitations or itsaccompanying six-year statute of repose. The Meyers contend thattheir claim against Defrees did not accrue until September 7,1994, the date of the final judgment against them in theunderlying Joanna shareholders' litigation. The Meyers note thatthey filed suit in October 1995, well within two years after theSeptember 7, 1994, accrual date. They also argue that, contraryto the trial court's holding, their claim was filed within thereasonable period of time exception to the statute of repose. Alternatively, they contend that if their September 7, 1994,accrual date is not accepted, then there is a genuine issue ofmaterial fact as to the accrual date, and summary judgment thuswas improperly granted.

According to the Meyers, September 7, 1994, is the accrualdate for their claims because it was on that date that the Meyerswere found liable for breaches of fiduciary duty, and judgmentwas entered against them in the amount of $1,626,555. The Meyersargue that, prior to that date, they had no actual damagesattributable to defendants' negligence, and therefore had noclaim. See Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel & Stouffer,Chartered, 301 Ill. App. 3d 349, 353, 355, 703 N.E.2d 473, 476,478 (1998) (actual damages are essential element in legalmalpractice claim, and are "entirely speculative" until judgmententered against former client or he is forced to settle). Thusthe Meyers argue that because their complaint against Defrees wasfiled on October 27, 1995, a little more than a year afterSeptember 7, 1994, it was timely under the two-year statute oflimitations in section 13-214.3(b). Defrees disagrees,contending that the Meyers' claims accrued not in 1994 but onMarch 20, 1991, the date the appellate court in Regnery Ireversed the trial court and allowed the underlying shareholders'suit to proceed against the Meyers. According to Defrees, theMeyers knew on March 20, 1991, that the documents drafted by Defrees would not release them from the shareholders' claims, andtherefore the Meyers' claims accrued on that day "when the[y]learned that the 'release documents' did not work." Thus Defrees contends that the Meyers' claims were not timely underthe two-year statute of limitations.

We need not resolve this dispute. Even if we were to grantthat the accrual date was September 7, 1994, that still wouldleave unresolved the question of whether the Meyers' claimsagainst Defrees were barred by the six-year statute of repose,which as we have indicated is the overriding issue in theseappeals. Accordingly, for purposes of our analysis, we willtreat this case as though the Meyers' claims accrued on September7, 1994, although we note that we are not accepting that date inpreference over the 1991 date.

The Meyers argue that the trial court erred when it foundthat their suit against Defrees was barred by the six-yearstatute of repose. The court found that because the allegedmalpractice by defendants took place in 1986, the statute ofrepose barred any actions filed after 1992.

The Meyers contend that where a new statute or amendmentshortens a limitation or repose period, a "reasonable period oftime" is allowed after the amendment's effective date in which tofile an action. Goodman v. Harbor Market, Ltd., 278 Ill. App. 3d684, 692, 663 N.E.2d 13, 19 (1995). Here the "new" statuteshortened the limitations period for legal malpractice actionsfrom five years to two, and added a statute of repose where noneexisted previously. Hence, the "reasonable period" exceptionapplies. Nevertheless, the trial court found that since the six-year repose period did not begin until September 1986, the datethe consent and agency agreements at issue were drafted bydefendants, the Meyers' claims were not reposed until September1992, which gave them 21 months after the statute's January 1,1991, effective date in which to file their action. The trialcourt found that 21 months was "clearly a reasonable time." However, the Meyers contend that the repose period can extend tothe full six years after the effective date, or to January 1,1997, and that because their complaint was filed on October 27,1995, "well within that reasonable period of time," their claimsshould not have been barred. They also argue that under the trialcourt's analysis, their claims were reposed before they evenaccrued, which they claim is "fundamentally unjust." Accordingto the Meyers, their October 27, 1995, filing came within areasonable period after their claims accrued, and therefore thesuit should not have been barred.

Defrees argues that 21 months was a reasonable period oftime in which to file an action. Defrees also contends that,contrary to the Meyers' argument that it was unfair to reposetheir claims before they accrued, such a result is "part of thevery nature of statutes of repose, which serve to bar actionsthat have not yet been discovered." Thus they argue that theMeyers' claims were barred by the statute of repose, and summaryjudgment was properly granted on that basis. We agree.

The Meyers rely principally upon Goodman in making theirargument, but that case is of little help to them. In Goodman,the plaintiff filed a legal malpractice claim against his formerattorneys in 1993, charging malpractice in connection with apromissory note executed by the plaintiff and his mother- andfather-in-law in April 1985. The plaintiff's mother-in-law filedsuit against him in January 1993 to enforce the note, and theplaintiff filed his third-party action against his formerattorneys on November 8, 1993. The trial court granted theattorneys' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff'scomplaint was time-barred by the six-year statute of repose forlegal malpractice claims (735 ILCS 5/13-214.3(c) (West 1992)). On appeal, the decision was reversed. The appellate court notedthat where an amendment shortens a statute of limitations orrepose, "it will not be retroactively applied so as to terminatea cause of action unless the party has had a reasonable period oftime after the amendment's effective date in which to file anaction." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 663 N.E.2d at 19. Because the alleged malpractice in Goodman occurred in April1985, the plaintiff's claim was reposed as of April 1991, or justthree months after the "new" statute went into effect. Theappellate court stated that three months was not a reasonableperiod within which to discover the injury and file suit, andheld that the plaintiff's action was timely filed. Goodman, 278Ill. App. 3d at 695, 663 N.E.2d at 21. In reaching thatconclusion, the court noted that "the reasonable period of timein which a plaintiff may bring suit for injuries sustained priorto the effective date of a statue of repose can never be morethan the repose period itself, computed from the effective dateof the statute." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 663 N.E.2d at21. The court added that, "[a]pplying this rationale to thefacts in this case, [the plaintiff's] action must be viewed astimely filed. [The plaintiff] both discovered his injury andfiled suit within six years of the effective date of section 13-214.3." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 663 N.E.2d at 21.

From such language the Meyers infer a "two-part test" fordetermining whether their claims were filed within a reasonabletime. According to the Meyers, the first part of this testfocuses on the period between the accrual of the plaintiff'sclaim and the date he filed his action. Second, the plaintiffalso must have filed suit within the repose period itself (here,six years), calculated from the effective date of the statute. The Meyers thus argue that they satisfied both parts of thistest. Their action was filed on October 27, 1995, less than twoyears after their claims accrued, and it was filed "well within"the six-year maximum extent of the repose period, or January 1,1997.

The Meyers' inference of and reliance upon this "test" ismisplaced. Nowhere in Goodman do we find an explicit statementof this "two-part test." Moreover, undercutting the Meyers'implied assertion that the "reasonable period" should be measuredfrom the date of accrual, there is language in Goodman, includingpassages quoted by the Meyers, clearly indicating that thereasonable period is measured from the statute's effective date. Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 693, 695, 663 N.E.2d at 19, 20,21 (party is given "reasonable period of time after theamendment's effective date in which to file an action" (citingPhillips Products Co. v. Industrial Commission, 94 Ill. 2d 200,203-04, 446 N.E.2d 234, 236 (1983)); "reasonable time to whichthe plaintiffs here were entitled did not extend beyond thatprovided by the new repose period, computed from its effectivedate" (quoting Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital, 111 Ill. 2d 416, 422,490 N.E.2d 665, 668 (1986)); reasonable period in which plaintiffmay bring suit "can never be more than the repose period itself,computed from the effective date of the statute" (citing Costellov. Unarco Industries, Inc., 111 Ill. 2d 476, 483, 490 N.E.2d 675,678 (1986))). Other opinions have stated the same thing. M.E.H.v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207, 217, 685 N.E.2d 335, 340 (1997)("Plaintiffs must proceed within a reasonable time following theeffective date of the statute of repose"); Moore v. Jackson ParkHospital, 95 Ill. 2d 223, 233, 447 N.E.2d 408, 412 (1983) ("Theperiod which is scrutinized *** for its reasonableness is thattime between the statute's effective date and the date on whichthe preexisting cause of action would be barred under the newstatute as applied"). The "reasonable period" thus is measurednot from the accrual date but from the statute's effective date. There is no genuine issue of material fact as to that question.

As to the second part of the test, the Goodman court doesnote that the reasonable period "can never be more than therepose period itself." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 663N.E.2d at 21 (citing Costello, 111 Ill. 2d at 483, 490 N.E.2d at678). However, that does not necessarily mean, as the Meyersimply, that so long as the period (measured from the statute'seffective date) does not exceed that limit, it can be calledreasonable. In Kaplan v. Shure Brothers, Inc., 153 F.3d 413(7^th Cir. 1998), a legal malpractice complaint that was filedfive years after section 13-214.3 went into effect was foundbarred by the six-year statute of repose. The allegedmalpractice occurred in 1987, which meant that the plaintiff hadtwo years after the statute's (January 1, 1991) effective dateduring which to discover his injury and file suit. The courttermed such a period reasonable, and thus upheld the trialcourt's finding that the complaint, which was filed in 1996 (lessthan six years after the effective date), did not come within areasonable time after the statute of repose went into effect. Kaplan, 153 F.3d at 423. Hence, a complaint may be barred by astatute of repose even though it is filed within the reposeperiod as measured from the statute's effective date. See alsoSerafin v. Seith, 284 Ill. App. 3d 577, 672 N.E.2d 302 (1996)(legal malpractice complaint that was filed less than three yearsafter section 13-214.3's effective date was found barred by six-year statute of repose).

In the instant case, the Meyers had 21 months after thestatute's effective date before the termination of the reposeperiod, and the trial court found that was "clearly a reasonabletime." A period even shorter than 21 months has also been foundreasonable. In Charles v. Mayer Medical Group, S.C., 96 Ill.App. 3d 275, 421 N.E.2d 334 (1981), which is cited in Goodman,the plaintiff had 14 months from the effective date of theamendment in which to file her action, and the court found thatreasonable. Her suit was filed 19 months after the effectivedate, and the court found that to be "an unreasonable length oftime." Charles, 96 Ill. App. 3d at 278, 421 N.E.2d at 336.

As noted above, the Meyers also argue that it was"fundamentally unjust" for their claims to be barred before theyeven accrued. They contend that, under the analysis in Lucey v.Law Offices of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chartered, 301 Ill. App. 3d349, 703 N.E.2d 473 (1998), their claims could not have accruedprior to September 7, 1994, the date of the final judgment orderin the underlying shareholders' litigation. The Meyers thusmaintain that any action they might have filed before then wouldhave been dismissed as unripe. They contend that the trialcourt's determination that it was "reasonable" to require them todiscover and file their claims by 1992, two years before thoseclaims existed, was "without a legal or logical basis." However, Defrees contends that such a situation is not unusual wherestatutes of repose are applied. According to Defrees,"[s]tatutes of repose simply presume that causes of action may bebarred before they accrue." We agree.

Statutes of repose generally operate to curtail the "longtail" of liability that results from the discovery rule, underwhich a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff knowsor reasonably should know of his wrongfully caused injury. Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 305, 312, 402 N.E.2d 560,564, 568 (1979). Where a statute of limitations such as section13-214.3(b) incorporates the discovery rule, the limitationsperiod is not triggered until the injury is discovered. Garciav. Pinto, 258 Ill. App. 3d 22, 24, 629 N.E.2d 103, 104 (1993). Without a statute of repose, such a statute of limitations wouldbe essentially open-ended, or "a limitation period without alimit." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 691, 663 N.E.2d at 19. Hence,

"[t]he period of repose gives effect to a policydifferent from that advanced by a period oflimitations; the purpose of a statute of repose is toimpose a cap on the applicability of the discovery ruleso that the outer limit terminates the possibility ofliability after a definite period of time, regardlessof a potential plaintiff's lack of knowledge of hiscause of action. (Emphasis added.) [Citations.] ***The fact that a repose provision may, in a particularinstance, bar an action before it is discovered is anaccidental rather than necessary consequence." Serafin, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 672 N.E.2d at 310(citing Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital, 111 Ill. 2d 416,424, 490 N.E.2d 665, 669 (1986)).

Thus it is not "fundamentally unjust" that the statute of reposehere would bar the Meyers' claims before they accrued. Thesupreme court has held that such a result presents no due processviolation, even though reposing a claim before it is discoveredmight seem "harsh and unfair." Anderson, 79 Ill. 2d at 312, 402N.E.2d at 568.

Moreover, in point of fact there is a way to prevent loss ofthe entire action, at least in cases such as this, in that therewas another option open to the Meyers. They could have brought athird-party action. See Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel &Stouffer, Chartered, 301 Ill. App. 3d 349, 362-64, 703 N.E.2d473, 482-84 (1998). In Lucey, the court noted that anappropriate course of action to take in order to avoid thepossible harshness of the statute of repose is the filing of athird-party action before the repose period terminates. Here, inthe underlying shareholders' litigation, the Meyers were sued in1987 for breach of trust allegedly resulting from the allegedlegal malpractice that is the subject of the appeals at bar. Under section 2-406 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-406(b) (West 1992)), the Meyers could have brought a third-partyaction against anyone "who is or may be liable" to them as aresult of the shareholders' claims against them in the 1987 suit,regardless of whether actual damages in that suit were stillpending. Lucey, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 362-64, 703 N.E.2d at 482-84. Further, the Meyers were not unaware of the third-partyoption. They filed a third-party complaint against FrederickRegnery in the underlying 1987 shareholders' suit. Regnery I,211 Ill. App. 3d at 612, 570 N.E.2d at 560. Thus by use of athird-party action, it was possible for the Meyers to have actedwithin a reasonable time against Defrees.⁽⁵⁾

As noted, the Vedder appeal comes under Supreme Court Rule308(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a)), with two questions certified bythe trial court. Those questions are as follows:

I. Whether 735 ILCS 5/13-214.3, or its predecessor, 735ILCS 5/13-205, or neither of them, bars this cause ofaction where: (i) the alleged acts or omissions of thedefendant attorneys took place in 1981 and 1983; (ii)the plaintiffs were sued in the underlying action in1987, allegedly as a result of the attorneys' acts oromissions; (iii) the statute of repose became effectiveon January 1, 1991; (iv) judgment was entered againstthe plaintiffs in the underlying action on September 7,1994; and (v) plaintiffs effectively filed their legalmalpractice action on December 16, 1994.

II. Whether plaintiffs' conduct, as found by the trialcourt in the underlying action, bars plaintiffs frompursuing a legal malpractice claim under Illinois lawagainst the defendant law firm, taking into accountplaintiffs' allegations regarding defendant'sinvolvement in the conduct and plaintiffs' allegedreliance on defendant's advice in undertaking theconduct.

Thus the issues presented in this action are substantiallyinterrelated with the issues presented in the first of these twoconsolidated actions, the Defrees case. However, unlike theDefrees appeal, in this case, as set forth in the certifiedquestions presented, the alleged malpractice took place in 1981and 1983. Hence, if the six-year statute of repose were appliedrigidly to the Meyers' claims against Vedder, they would bereposed (in 1987 or 1989) before the 1991 statute went intoeffect. But, as previously noted, where (as here) an amendmentshortens a statute of limitations or repose, "it will not beretroactively applied so as to terminate a cause of action unlessthe party has had a reasonable period of time after theamendment's effective date in which to file an action." Goodman,278 Ill. App. 3d at 692, 663 N.E.2d at 19.

Nevertheless, Vedder argues on appeal that the reasonableperiod exception does not apply to the Meyers' claims. Accordingto Vedder, Illinois courts have applied that exception only tocauses of action where the injuries occurred prior to theeffective date of the statute, but were not discovered untilafter the effective date. Vedder asserts that because the Meyersincurred no actionable damages until the (September 7) 1994judgment against them, they were not injured until then. Thussince their injuries came after the statute's (January 1, 1991)effective date, the reasonable period exception does not apply. The Meyers contend that, under Vedder's interpretation, onlyplaintiffs who suffered actionable damages prior to the statute'seffective date would be entitled to the reasonable periodexception. However, the Meyers argue that the reasonable periodexception applies to plaintiffs who were injured before theeffective date of the statute but whose inchoate claims did notaccrue until afterwards, perhaps because they were not discoveredor because actual damages were not yet incurred.

Vedder points to Lucey v. Law Offices of Pretzel &Stouffer, Chartered, 301 Ill. App. 3d 349, 703 N.E.2d 473 (1998),which was briefly discussed earlier. Lucey held that "[w]herethe mere possibility of harm exists or damages are otherwisespeculative, actual damages are absent and no cause of action formalpractice yet exists." Lucey, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 353, 703N.E.2d at 476-77. Vedder contends that under Lucey, the Meyersdid not suffer any injury (or actual damages) in 1981 or 1983,the dates of Vedder's alleged malpractice, and those datestherefore cannot be considered the dates of injury. Accordingly,Vedder maintains that the Meyers did not suffer injury prior toJanuary 1, 1991, and the reasonable period exception does notapply. We disagree. Vedder's argument appears to conflate theconcepts of injury and accrual (or actionable damages), which arenot necessarily identical. Cf. Highland v. Bracken, 202 Ill.App. 3d 625, 629, 560 N.E.2d 406, 409 (1990) (noting that date ofinjury in third-party action for contribution is not necessarilythe same as date of accrual). The difficulty with Vedder'sargument is that under Lucey, a case upon which Vedder relies,actual damages and accrual are essentially identical. One of themajor points in Lucey is that a legal malpractice claim does notaccrue until a plaintiff both discovers his injury and incursdamages. Lucey, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 353, 703 N.E.2d at 477. If,as Vedder implicitly argues, the Meyers suffered no injury untilthey incurred actual damages (through entry of a judgment againstthem), then that would mean the reasonable period exception wouldapply only to claims that accrue prior to the effective date ofthe statute. However, the relevant case law indicates otherwise.In a special concurring opinion in Moore v. Jackson ParkHospital, 95 Ill. 2d 223, 447 N.E.2d 408 (1983), three supremecourt justices recognized that the reasonable period exceptionshould apply to "inchoate" causes of action accruing "after theeffective date of the amendment" just as it applies to "vested"claims that accrue before that date. Moore, 95 Ill. 2d at 241-42, 447 N.E.2d at 416-17. Further, that portion of theconcurring opinion was cited favorably in Goodman's discussion ofthe reasonable period exception. Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at692, 663 N.E.2d at 19.

Vedder also relies upon Serafin v. Seith, 284 Ill. App. 3d577, 672 N.E.2d 302 (1996), where the court applied the (section13-214.3(c)) six-year statute of repose. However, nowhere inSerafin is there a distinction made between time of injury andtime of accrual, nor is there any indication that the decisionwas premised upon that issue. Indeed, the reasonable periodexception itself is barely mentioned, and then only in thecontext of upholding the constitutionality of section 13-214.3. Serafin, 284 Ill. App. 3d at 588, 672 N.E.2d at 310-11. Vedderhas failed to direct our attention to anything in Serafin orelsewhere that is sufficient to support its conclusion that "therepose statute bars actions based upon pre-statute negligencecausing post-statute injury." Without more, we decline to drawthat inference, and thus affirm the trial court's conclusion thatthe reasonable period exception applied here.

Vedder argues that, even if the reasonable period exceptiondoes apply, the trial court mistakenly held that the exceptionwas satisfied because the Meyers' complaint was filed just a fewmonths after the September 1994 judgment against them. Veddercontends that, "[u]nder Illinois law, the time period to beexamined for reasonableness is the period between the effectivedate of the statute and the time the complaint was filed, not thetime period between the date the plaintiff discovers his injuryand the date the complaint is filed." In response, the Meyerscontend that the trial court correctly applied the (previouslydiscussed) two-part test drawn from Goodman, the first part ofwhich focuses on the time elapsed between accrual of theplaintiff's claim and the time when the complaint was filed. Thus the Meyers argue that their complaint was filed in a timelymanner "once their claims accrued." As noted above, we find nosupport in Goodman for the Meyers' position as to that test, andwe agree with Vedder that the "reasonable period" is measured notfrom the accrual date but from the statute's effective date. SeeMoore, 95 Ill. 2d at 233, 447 N.E.2d at 412 (noting that periodthat is scrutinized for reasonableness "is that time between thestatute's effective date and the date on which the preexistingcause of action would be barred under the new statute asapplied"). The Meyers also contend that the trial courtcorrectly applied the second part of the test when it found thatthe Meyers' complaint was filed well within the full six-yearrepose period as measured from the statute's effective date. Vedder argues in response that the full six-year repose period(as measured from the statute's effective date) does notnecessarily define a reasonable period. Cf. M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2dat 217, 685 N.E.2d at 340 (noting that "[t]here is no fixed rulefor determining what constitutes a reasonable time" and that sucha determination "turns on the particular facts and circumstances*** in each case"). Vedder notes that in other cases, complaintshave been barred by statutes of repose even though they werefiled within the repose period as measured from the statute'seffective date. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Shure Brothers, Inc., 153F.3d 413 (7^th Cir. 1998). Here, too, we essentially agree withVedder's position on this issue. Although the reasonable period(computed from the statute's effective date) "can never be morethan the repose period itself" (Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 695,663 N.E.2d at 21), that does not necessarily mean that so long asthe period does not exceed that limit, it can be calledreasonable.

Vedder next contends that the nearly four-year period thatelapsed from the statute's effective date (January 1, 1991) tothe time when the Meyers filed their complaint (December 16,1994) is too long to be considered reasonable, and the Meyers'claim thus is barred by the statute of repose.

As noted, in this case the alleged malpractice occurred in1981 (the voting trust) and 1983 (the sale of Joanna shares tothe Meyers). If the six-year statute of repose were appliedwithout any exception, the Meyers' claims here would beterminated in 1987 and 1989. Thus the claims would have beeninstantaneously barred when the new statute went into effect onJanuary 1, 1991. The situation in the Defrees case of course wasdifferent. There, because the alleged malpractice took place inSeptember 1986 (the drafting of the agency and consent agreementsin the sale of Joanna to Kenner), the Meyers had until September1992, or 21 months after the statute's effective date, in whichto file their suit. Nevertheless, for purposes of the reasonableperiod exception, it makes no difference which category we aredealing with: cases where the repose period immediatelyextinguishes the inchoate cause of action, or cases where therepose period merely shortens the time in which to file suit. SeeGoodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 663 N.E.2d at 21. "In eithercategory *** the result is the same: if a reasonable time exists,no additional time will be given[;] if not, plaintiffs will beallowed a reasonable period of time within which to file theiractions." Goodman, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 695, 663 N.E.2d at 21.

Here, Vedder relies upon M.E.H. v. L.H., 177 Ill. 2d 207,685 N.E.2d 335 (1997), a case that is squarely in point. InM.E.H., the plaintiffs, two women in their mid-forties, suedtheir parents in 1994 alleging sexual abuse by their father whenthey were children. The plaintiffs alleged that they hadrepressed their memories of the abuse and were able to recall itonly after receiving psychological therapy. The defendants movedto dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion, holding thatthe claims against the father were barred by a 12-year statute ofrepose.⁽⁶⁾ Under that statute, which went into effect January 1,1991, but was repealed shortly before the plaintiffs filed suit,actions for injuries based on childhood sexual abuse wereprohibited unless filed within 12 years after the person who wasabused turned 18. The appellate court affirmed, as did thesupreme court, which rejected the plaintiffs' argument that areasonable time for them to act should be measured by the full12-year repose period calculated from the statute's effectivedate. The supreme court noted that "[t]here is no fixed rule fordetermining what constitutes a reasonable time," adding that sucha determination "turns on the particular facts and circumstancespresented to the court in each case." M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at217, 685 N.E.2d at 340. The plaintiffs had filed suit on October14, 1994, nearly three years and 10 months after the statute'seffective date, and the supreme court thus held that theplaintiffs "did not act within a reasonable time in prosecutingtheir claims." M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 219-20, 685 N.E.2d at 341. The court in M.E.H. thus rejected the notion that the reasonableperiod should be defined by the length of the repose perioditself measured from the effective date. In the instant case,the Meyers filed their claim on December 16, 1994, three yearsand eleven months after the statute's (January 1, 1991) effectivedate. If the supreme court in M.E.H. found that three years andten months was not a reasonable period, then a fortiori threeyears and eleven months in this case would not be reasonable.

The Meyers attempt to distinguish M.E.H. on the grounds thatit addressed childhood sexual abuse, an "entirely different" areaof the law from legal malpractice, and that the 12-year reposeperiod was "significantly different" from the six-year period inthe instant case. What the Meyers appear to be arguing is thatif M.E.H. had dealt with legal malpractice and a six-year reposeperiod (instead of 12 years), the court would have held thatthree years and 10 months was a reasonable period in which tofile suit and, further, that anything less than six years wouldbe reasonable. We disagree in that we find no meaningfuldistinction between the holding in M.E.H. and the case at bar. We also note that a period far shorter than three years and 10months has been held to be unreasonable. See Charles v. MeyerMedical Group, S.C., 96 Ill. App. 3d 275, 421 N.E.2d 334 (1981)(19 months unreasonable).

Accordingly, the answer to the first of the two certifiedquestions is in the affirmative as to section 13-214.3, and theMeyers' suit against Vedder thus is barred by the section 13-214.3(c) statute of repose. Since the answer to the firstquestion is fully dispositive, the second question is renderedmoot and need not be considered here.

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the granting ofsummary judgment in favor of Defrees in the first consolidatedcase, and we affirm the denial of the Meyers' motion toreconsider. As to the second consolidated case, because ouranswer to the first certified question is in the affirmative, wereverse the denial of Vedder's motion to dismiss the Meyers'complaint, and remand to the circuit court for entry of an ordergranting Vedder's motion to dismiss.⁽⁷⁾

No. 1-98-4013, Affirmed.

No. 1-99-0504, Certified question answered; reversed andremanded with directions.

COUSINS, P.J. and McNULTY, J., concur.

1. ¹The full text of these certified questions is set forth inthe discussion portion of the Vedder appeal below.

2. ²Where the facts are disputed, it is so indicated.

3. ³On or about June 8, 1982, Stucker was named secretary ofJoanna, a position he held through the fall of 1986.

4. ⁴Section 13-214.3 was amended by Public Act 89-7 (effectiveMarch 9, 1995), but that statute was held unconstitutional in itsentirety by the Illinois Supreme Court in Best v. Taylor MachineWorks, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997).

5. ⁵We note that in making this observation we are notsuggesting that the Meyers should have been or were required tofile such a third-party action. We mention the third-partyalternative only in the context of the Meyers' assertion that anyaction they might have filed prior to September 7, 1994, "wouldhave been dismissed as unripe." Clearly that is not the case.

6. ⁶The trial court concluded that the plaintiffs' claimsagainst their mother were time-barred under a differentlimitations provision. M.E.H., 177 Ill. 2d at 212, 685 N.E.2d at338.

7. ⁷Where an appeal involves a certified question, a reviewingcourt has the authority to "enter any judgment and make any orderthat ought to have been given or made" and to make any otherorders and grant any relief that may be required. Hayes v.Wilson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1018, 670 N.E.2d 867, 869 (1996)(quoting Boyd v. Travelers Insurance Co., 166 Ill. 2d 188, 193,652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (1995)); see Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5)(155 Ill. 2d R. 366(a)(5)).