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SIXTH DIVISION
July 19, 2002

The plaintiff Jan Metz, brought an action for declaratoryjudgment and administrative review to challenge an order entered bythe director of the Department of Professional Regulation suspending Metz's license to practice as a physician and surgeon. Metzunsuccessfully petitioned the circuit court for a stay of the orderpending administrative review and now brings this interlocutoryappeal to contest the circuit court's decision.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court abusedits discretion by refusing to stay the administrative order suspending Metz's license to practice as a physician during thependency of the administrative review action challenging the order'svalidity.

In 1998, plaintiff Jan Metz, a physician licensed to practicemedicine in Illinois, entered into a consent order (the ConsentOrder) with the Illinois Department of Professional Regulation (theDepartment). The Consent Order recited the following:

"Information has come to the attention ofthe Department that [Metz] has a long historyof alcohol and substance abuse. It is furtheralleged that [Metz] engaged in non-therapeuticself-prescribing of controlled substances andthat he issued prescriptions in the names ofother individuals, appropriating the medication for his own use."

The Consent Order further alleged that Metz had been charged withvarious violations of Illinois law and that each of the charges wassubsequently dismissed. The allegations, if proven true, wouldconstitute grounds for suspending or revoking Metz's licensepursuant to section 22(A) of the Medical Practice Act of 1987 (225ILCS 60/22(A) (West 2000)) and sections 102(u) and 312(h) of theIllinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/102(u), 312(h)(West 1996)). As a result of the allegations, the Department helda disciplinary conference. To resolve the matter, Metz agreed toseveral conditions, as set forth in the Consent Order, and waivedhis right to a hearing and administrative review of the order.

Under the Consent Order, Metz agreed to a six-month suspensionof his physician and surgeon license, followed by an indefiniteprobation period of at least five years. Metz also agreed to thevarious disclosure requirements relating to his participation in adrug treatment program, as well as the following:

"[Metz] shall cause the Department to benotified immediately in the event his treatingphysician determines that he has sustains [sic]a relapse of his substance abuse. If [Metz]sustains a relapse of substance abuse, hisPhysician and Surgeon license shall be indefinitely and automatically Suspended, withoutNotice or Hearing, for a minimum period of one(1) year."

On May 29, 2001, Leonard Sherman, the Department's director,issued an order indefinitely suspending Metz's license to practiceas a surgeon and physician in Illinois (the Suspension Order). TheSuspension Order recited that Metz was subject to the Consent Order(which was attached to the Suspension Order as exhibit A) and tothe above condition regarding automatic and indefinite suspension. The Suspension Order further asserted that Metz "admitted that hefraudulently obtained and used the Controlled Substance Hydrocodene." In support of the last assertion, the director referred toan affidavit from Dan Murphy, a medical investigator with theDepartment, wherein Murphy stated that Metz "admitted to me that hefraudulently obtained and used the Controlled Substance Hydrocodenewhile under the auspices of the Illinois Health Professional Pro-gram." The affidavit was attached to the Suspension Order asexhibit B.

In response to the Suspension Order, Metz filed a two-countcomplaint. Count I was brought under the declaratory judgment act(735 ILCS 5/2-701 et seq. (West 1996)) and sought a declaration as towhether the Department had jurisdiction and/or authority to enterthe Suspension Order. Count II was brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (735 ILCS 5/3-101et seq. (West 2000)) and allegedthat the Suspension Order was contrary to law because it was notbased upon "expert opinion evidence regarding whether [Metz]sustained a relapse of substance abuse," and because Metz was notgiven a presuspension hearing.

Metz also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction and/orstay of the Suspension Order pending administrative review. Metzalleged that the Suspension Order was illegal and that he wouldsuffer irreparable harm if his license was suspended during thependency of the review proceedings.

After a hearing, the circuit court denied Metz's motion citing"public policy considerations." Metz filed a timely notice ofappeal.

Section 3-111(a)(1) of the Administrative Review Law gives thecircuit court broad discretion to stay an administrative decisionpending review. 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1) (West 2000). Given thisbroad discretion, our standard of review is highly deferential andthe circuit court's decision to grant or deny a stay will bereversed only upon a finding of abuse of discretion. See Marsh v.Illinois Racing Board, 179 Ill. 2d 488, 498 (1997).

Pursuant to section 3-111(a)(1) of the Administrative ReviewLaw, the circuit court has power:

"with or without requiring bond ***, andbefore or after answer filed, upon notice tothe agency and good cause shown, to stay thedecision of the administrative agency in wholeor in part pending the final disposition ofthe case." 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1) (West2000).

The party seeking the stay must establish "good cause" by showing"(i) that an immediate stay is required in order to preserve thestatus quo without endangering the public, (ii) that it is notcontrary to public policy, and (iii) that there exists a reasonablelikelihood of success on the merits." 735 ILCS 5/3-111(a)(1) (West2000). The trial judge's order recited that he denied Metz' motionfor a stay for "public policy reasons."

Metz argues that "[i]t was an abuse of discretion for thecircuit court to rely upon public policy when there is no referenceto any authority setting such a policy."

"Questions of public policy *** are ultimately left forresolution by the courts." American Federation of State, County &Municipal Employees v. Department of Central Management Services,173 Ill. 2d 299, 318 (1996). To ascertain the existence of apublic policy, we look to our constitution, statutes, and relevantjudicial opinions. See American Federation, 173 Ill. 2d at 308. Illinois courts have recognized our state's public policy ofprotecting the physical health and safety of its citizens. SeeChicago Steel Rule & Die Fabricators Co. v. ADT Security Systems,Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d 642, 647-48 (2002). Our public policy ofpromoting and protecting the health, safety, and welfare ofIllinois citizens has been expressly recited by our legislature. See 70 ILCS 705/1 (West 1998).

With respect to the Medical Practice Act, our supreme courthas noted that "the State has a legitimate interest in regulatingmedical professionals in order to protect the public welfare." Potts v. Illinois Department of Registration & Education, 128 Ill.2d. 322, 330 (1989). Indeed, the purpose of the Medical PracticeAct is to protect the public health and welfare from those notqualified to practice medicine. See Siddiqu v. Illinois Departmentof Professional Regulation, 307 Ill. App. 3d 753, 763 (1999). Tothat end, a physician may lose his license to practice in Illinoisfor, among other things, "[h]abitual or excessive use or abuse ofdrugs defined in law as controlled substances *** which results inthe inability to practice with reasonable judgment, skill orsafety" or "self-administering any drug classified as a controlledsubstance *** for other than medically accepted therapeuticpurposes." 225 ILCS 60/22(A)(7), (A)(17) (West 2000).

Here, the Consent Order recited that Metz has "a long historyof alcohol and substance abuse." The record also contains anaffidavit from a Department medical investigator indicating thatMetz admitted to "fraudulently obtain[ing] and us[ing]" a controlled substance within the period the Consent Order was in effect. In light of this evidence, and in light of the public policy ofIllinois, Metz cannot establish "good cause" for staying thesuspension of his license to practice medicine pending administrative review because to do so would be contrary to public policy. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in denying Metz's motion for a stay.

Because it is sufficient to affirm the denial of Metz's motionfor a stay based on public policy reasons, we need not considerMetz's likelihood of success on the merits in the administrativereview action. In order to establish "good cause," all of theelements recited in the statute must be met. Therefore, even ifthere was a likelihood of success on the merits, that reason alonewould be insufficient to reverse the trial court's denial of thestay as it would not lessen the overriding public policy concerns.

Accordingly, we hereby affirm the trial court's order denyingplaintiff's motion to stay the administrative order suspendingplaintiff's license to practice medicine.

Affirmed.

Gallagher, P.J., and O'Brien, J., concur.