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THIRD DIVISION

Date Filed: December 31, 2002

No. 1-00-0073

PRESIDING JUSTICE HALL delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Claudia Mejia, independent administrator ofthe estate of Luis G. Mejia, deceased, appeals from an order ofthe circuit court of Cook County granting partial summaryjudgment to defendant Volvo GM Heavy Truck Corporation on count Iof the plaintiff's amended complaint.

On January 4, 1993, Luis G. Mejia was killed when thegarbage truck he was operating struck a median, collided with avan, became airborne and landed on its passenger side. Mr. Mejiawas found upside down on the passenger side with his headcrushed.

The truck in this case was equipped with a passenger sidedoor that folded back. It was designed for situations in whichthe person on the passenger-side was in and out of the truckevery 100 or 200 feet. The truck in this case was designed sothat it could be operated from either side of the truck. Thepassenger-drive side was primarily made for low speed operation,in this case for picking up waste.

On August 11, 1999, the plaintiff filed an amended complaintagainst the defendant.⁽¹⁾ Count I alleged that Mr. Mejia waskilled when his seat belt released during the accident, causinghim to be thrown to his right and partially ejected through theright side door of the truck cab. The plaintiff further allegedthat the defendant designed, manufactured, distributed and soldthe truck that Mr. Mejia was operating at the time of his death. The plaintiff alleged that the truck was in an unreasonablydangerous condition, in part, because:

"d) The latch handle on the exterior of passenger side doorof the cab was exposed and unguarded so that incidentalcontact with the handle would release the latch and open thedoor.

e) The latch on the interior of the passenger side door wasexposed and unguarded so that incidental contact wouldrelease the door and cause it to open.

f) The passenger door was flimsy and subject to excessivedeformation so that damage to the door would create anopening for partial ejection or would cause the latch toseparate from the latch plate releasing the door and causingit to open."⁽²⁾

Count II of the amended complaint alleged a survivor action.

On August 27, 1999, the defendant filed a motion for partialsummary judgment addressed to the plaintiff's allegations ofnegligence in connection with the door latches on the basis offederal preemption. On October 7, 1999, the circuit courtentered partial summary judgment for the defendant on count I ofthe amended complaint. The circuit court also granted thedefendant summary judgment as to count II of the amendedcomplaint. On January 4, 2000, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), the circuit court found thatthere was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of itsOctober 7, 1999, order. The plaintiff filed a timely notice ofappeal.

The sole issue on appeal is whether federal law preempts theplaintiff's allegations of negligence with regard to the door andthe latches on the truck.

Prior to turning to the merits of this appeal, we find itnecessary to comment on the circuit court's statement in itsorder of January 4, 2000, to the effect that it was making itsOctober 7, 1999, order a final one by making a finding pursuantto Rule 304(a). Such a statement shows a continuingmisconception as to the nature of final orders for purposes ofappeals pursuant to Rule 304(a).

A Rule 304(a) finding does not make a nonfinal orderappealable; rather, a Rule 304(a) finding makes a final orderappealable where there are multiple parties or claims in the sameaction. Blott v. Hanson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 656, 660, 670 N.E.2d345, 348 (1996). Therefore, contrary to the language of thecircuit court's January 4, 2000, order, it was the finality ofthe October 7, 1999, order that permitted it to be appealedpursuant to Rule 304(a). Our circuit courts are well advised notto grant a Rule 304(a) finding prior to the determination of thefinality of the order to be appealed.

This court reviews the granting of a motion for summaryjudgment de novo. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty MutualInsurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1992).

Pursuant to the supremacy clause of the United StatesConstitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), Congress has theauthority to preempt state law. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 312Ill. App. 3d 1040, 1044, 729 N.E.2d 45, 48 (2000), affirmed, 197Ill. 2d 112, 757 N.E.2d 75 (2001), reversed and remanded on othergrounds, ___ U.S. ___, ___ L. Ed. 2d ___, 123 S. Ct. 518 (2002).⁽³⁾ In determining whether Congress has preempted state law, our taskis to discern congressional intent. Sprietsma, 312 Ill. App. 3dat 1044, 729 N.E.2d at 48. A court interpreting a federalstatute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by statelaw (such as safety) will be reluctant to find preemption. Sprietsma, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 729 N.E.2d at 48. Preemption will be found only in those situations where it is"'"the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' [Citations.]"Sprietsma, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1044, 729 N.E.2d at 48.

Federal preemption of state law can occur in threecircumstances: (1) express preemption, where Congress explicitlypreempts state law; (2) implied preemption, where Congress hasoccupied the entire field (field preemption); and (3) impliedpreemption, where there has been an actual conflict betweenfederal and state law (conflict preemption). Sprietsma, 312 Ill.App. 3d at 1044, 729 N.E.2d at 48.

It is a well-settled proposition in Illinois that decisionsof the federal court interpreting a federal act are controllingupon our state courts, "'in order that the act be given uniformapplication.'" Sprietsma, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 1045, 729 N.E.2d at48, quoting Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 335,662 N.E.2d 397, 403 (1996).⁽⁴⁾

The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act (theSafety Act) was enacted by Congress with the express purpose inmind of trying to "'reduce traffic accidents and deaths andinjuries resulting from traffic accidents.' [Citation.]" Graciav. Volvo Europa Truck, N.V., 112 F.3d 291, 295 (7th Cir. 1997).⁽⁵⁾ In order to accomplish this objective, the Safety Act delegatesto the Secretary of Transportation the authority to establish"'federal motor vehicle safety standards ('FMVSS' or 'safetystandards') that 'shall be practicable, meet the need for motorvehicle safety, and be stated in objective terms.' [Citation.]"Gracia, 112 F.3d at 295. The Secretary has delegated this dutyto the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration(NHTSA). Garcia, 112 F.2d at 295.

The safety standard relevant to this appeal is FMVSS 206,which "specifies requirements for door locks and door retentioncomponents including latches, hinges, and other supporting means,to minimize the likelihood of occupants being thrown from thevehicle as a result of impact." 49 C.F.R.