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FIRST DIVISION
July 15, 2002

After surgery left Richard McCorry paralyzed, he and his wife,Barbara McCorry, sued the surgeon, Dr. Thomas Hurley, the radiologist, Dr. NihalGooneratne, and Christ Hospital, where Hurley performed the surgery. The trialcourt granted Gooneratne's motion for summary judgment because it found noevidence that Gooneratne's alleged negligence had any causal connection to theinjuries. Plaintiffs appeal from that judgment in docket number 1-00-1954.Christ Hospital moved to dismiss one count of the amended complaint based on thestatute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion, holding that thecount did not relate back to the original complaint. Plaintiffs appeal from thatruling in docket number 1-00-3352. We consolidated the appeals.

Richard had back pain that prevented him from sitting forprolonged periods. The pain steadily worsened through 1993 andearly 1994, to the point that Richard could no longer drive. InJune 1994 Dr. Andrew Kazaniwskyj admitted Richard to ChristHospital for a neurosurgery consultation. Hurley, aneurosurgeon, examined Richard and ordered a magnetic resonanceimaging (MRI) test of the upper part of Richard's spine, the partin his neck. Gooneratne reported that the MRI showed discherniation at two locations.

Hurley performed the surgery on October 27, 1994. WhenRichard awoke after surgery, Hurley tested his condition andfound Richard unable to move his legs. Hurley ordered a new MRI. Although he discussed the possibility of further surgery with plaintiffs, he did not recommend surgery, as he had little hopeof restoring any function to the legs. Richard remainsparalyzed.

Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on October 25,1996, alleging as follows:

"On or about June 15, 1994, NIHAL GOONERATNE,M.D., administered and interpreted diagnostic MRI filmsof RICHARD MCCORRY's cervical spine at CHRIST HOSPITAL

*** HURLEY *** [m]isread and misinterpreted theMRI films of the Plaintiff's cervical spine; [anda]pplied additional and unnecessary pressure to the Plaintiff's spinal cord during surgery ***.

*** GOONERATNE *** [m]isread and misinterpretedthe MRI films of the Plaintiff's cervical spine."

Plaintiffs claimed that Richard's paralysis resulted fromthe negligence. Plaintiffs sought to hold Christ Hospital liablebased on respondeat superior; they alleged no negligence ofChrist Hospital apart from the negligence of the named doctors.

In his deposition Hurley swore that he interpreted the MRIfilms himself when he performed the operation. He did not rely onGooneratne's report. Gooneratne moved for summary judgment, andhe attached to his motion an excerpt from the transcript of thedeposition. Plaintiffs missed the initial date for a response tothe motion and sought an extension of time. The trial courtallowed extra time but added that plaintiffs should respond with"Counter-Affidavits only." After plaintiffs filed theiraffidavits but no brief, the court denied the motion for summaryjudgment because Gooneratne failed to supply all relevantportions of Hurley's deposition.

Gooneratne moved for reconsideration, supporting the motionwith the complete transcript of Hurley's deposition. By orderdated January 28, 2000, the court set the motion for ruling onFebruary 28, 2000. Plaintiffs did not seek leave to respond tothe motion for reconsideration. On February 28, 2000, the courtgranted the motion for reconsideration and entered summaryjudgment in favor of Gooneratne. The court added, "This findingis made pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 3204(a) [sic] thus thereis no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of thisorder."

Plaintiffs moved to reconsider the judgment and fullybriefed the merits of the summary judgment motion. By orderdated April 19, 2000, the trial court denied the motion forreconsideration, stating that the "summary judgment entered infavor of Dr. Nihal Gooneratne on February 28, 2000 stands." OnMay 16, 2000, plaintiffs moved for a finding that the orderdenying the motion to reconsider was final and appealable. Thecourt granted the motion by order dated May 22, 2000. Plaintiffsfiled their notice of appeal for docket number 1-00-1954 on June2, 2000.

Gooneratne asks this court to dismiss plaintiffs' appeal forwant of jurisdiction. Supreme court rules narrowly circumscribethis court's jurisdiction. If the appellant fails to comply withthe deadline for appeals provided in Supreme Court Rule 303 (155Ill. 2d R. 303), this court lacks authority to consider theappeal. See Bernhauser v. Glen Ellyn Dodge, Inc., 288 Ill. App.3d 984, 989, 683 N.E.2d 1194 (1997). When the trial court findsno reason to delay enforcement or appeal of a judgment that isfinal with respect to one of multiple parties to a case, theappellant must file the notice of appeal within 30 days afterdisposition of postjudgment motions. 155 Ill. 2d Rs. 303(a)(1),304(a).

Here the trial court purported to enter a final judgment infavor of Gooneratne on February 28, 2000. The court expresslyfound no reason to delay enforcement or appeal, apparentlyrendering the judgment immediately appealable under Supreme CourtRule 304. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a); Reyes v. Compass Health CarePlans, 252 Ill. App. 3d 1072, 1078, 625 N.E.2d 246 (1993). Plaintiffs filed a timely postjudgment motion forreconsideration, tolling the time for appeal. Elmhurst AutoParts, Inc. v. Fencl-Tufo Chevrolet, Inc., 235 Ill. App. 3d 88,90, 600 N.E.2d 1229 (1992). Plaintiffs had 30 days from thedenial of their motion for reconsideration in which to file thenotice of appeal. They did not do so. Instead, they later fileda motion for a second finding of appealability and filed a noticeof appeal after the court granted that motion. Even if weconstrued the motion for a finding of appealability as apostjudgment motion, the appeal filed after that finding wouldnot be timely, because a second successive postjudgment motiondoes not toll the time for appeal. Sears v. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d253, 259, 422 N.E.2d 610 (1981).

Plaintiffs try several different theories to show that therules authorize this court to hear this appeal. First plaintiffssuggest that the order dated February 28, 2000, lacked thefinding requisite for appealability under Rule 304(a). Althoughthe court found no just reason to delay appeal, the court madethe finding pursuant to a nonexistent "Rule 3204(a)." In reApplication of DuPage County Collector, 152 Ill. 2d 545, 605N.E.2d 567 (1992), established applicable standards for Rule304(a) findings. When the judgment dismisses a count of thecomplaint, the court must refer to the judgment's immediateappealability. DuPage County, 152 Ill. 2d at 550-51. Otherlanguage found here is unnecessary surplusage with no effect onappealability. DuPage County, 152 Ill. 2d at 549-50. The courthere made the finding requisite for immediate appealability.

Plaintiffs argue that the order dated February 28, 2000, wasnot a final judgment. Plaintiffs point out that the trial courthere failed to hold a hearing on the summary judgment motionbefore entering the order of February 28, 2000, and court rulesrequire such a hearing.

A judgment is final if it determines the rights of theparties on some definite part of the litigation. CiticorpSavings of Illinois v. First Chicago Trust Co. of Illinois, 269 Ill. App. 3d 293, 296-97, 645 N.E.2d 1038 (1995). The order ofFebruary 28, 2000, granted Gooneratne summary judgment on theonly claim against him, thereby terminating the litigationagainst him. That order constitutes a final judgment unless itis void, and it is void only if the court lacked jurisdiction toenter the judgment (People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 155, 619N.E.2d 750 (1993)), or if a party procured the judgment throughfraud (Terra-Nova Investments v. Rosewell, 235 Ill. App. 3d 330,335, 601 N.E.2d 1109 (1992)).

Plaintiffs have not argued that fraud contributed to thejudgment. Our supreme court in Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197Ill. 2d 514, 531, 759 N.E.2d 509 (2001), held that a judgment isnot void for want of jurisdiction as long as the court has bothsubject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over theparties. Plaintiffs, who sought the circuit court's adjudicationof their claims, do not dispute its subject matter jurisdictionor its personal jurisdiction over them. Accordingly, thejudgment in favor of Gooneratne entered on February 28, 2000, wasa valid final judgment disposing of the claim against him. Anyerror or irregularity in its entry cannot affect its validity asa final judgment. See Miller v. Balfour, 303 Ill. App. 3d 209,216, 707 N.E.2d 759 (1999).

Next, plaintiffs claim that they could not appeal until thecourt added Rule 304(a) language to the order denying theirmotion for reconsideration. Rule 303(a)(1) provides that partieshave 30 days from disposition of the posttrial motion in which toappeal. 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). The rules do not require asecond finding of appealability in the order denying anyposttrial motion. Waters v. Reingold, 278 Ill. App. 3d 647, 652n.5, 663 N.E.2d 126 (1996), overruled on other grounds, Niccum v.Botti, Marinaccio, DeSalvo & Tameling, Ltd., 182 Ill. 2d 6, 8-9,694 N.E.2d 562 (1998). The order denying a motion forreconsideration is not itself appealable, and it is not ajudgment. Sears, 85 Ill. 2d at 258. As Rule 304(a) requires thefinding of appealability only for final judgments, the judgmentagainst one of several parties becomes appealable with thedisposition of the postjudgment motion without any separatefinding of appealability for the order concerning thepostjudgment motion. Therefore the lack of Rule 304(a) languagein the order denying the motion for reconsideration had no effecton the time for appeal.

The time for appeal began when the court denied thepostjudgment motion by order dated April 19, 2000. The trialcourt lost jurisdiction 30 days later, on May 19, 2000. In reMarriage of Breslow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 41, 49, 713 N.E.2d 642(1999). But plaintiffs moved for addition of Rule 304(a)language to the order denying the postjudgment motion. The courtentered an order dated May 22, 2000, granting the request forappealability language. Plaintiffs now contend that Gooneratne'scounsel appeared in court and argued the merits in response tothe motion for additional language, without challenging thecourt's jurisdiction, thereby revesting the court withjurisdiction.

The record includes no transcript of the hearing on themotion, and the court's order makes no reference to the argumentsof the parties. Thus, the record does not support plaintiffs'claim that Gooneratne's counsel argued the merits, failed tocontest the court's jurisdiction, or even appeared at thehearing. We cannot presume that we have authority to decide anappeal on the basis of a record insufficient to show ourjurisdiction. See Nenadic v. Grant Hospital, 75 Ill. App. 3d 614,625, 394 N.E.2d 527 (1979).

Moreover, even if Gooneratne appeared and argued against themotion for a finding of appealability, the conduct would notrevest the trial court with jurisdiction. In Sears, 85 Ill. 2dat 256, the trial court entered judgment for Conde Sears andGerald Sears moved to reopen the judgment on grounds that he didnot have notice of a prior hearing that led to the judgment. Thecourt denied the motion. Nearly 30 days later Gerald moved againto reopen the judgment, adding facts not mentioned in the priormotion. Months later the court held a hearing in which theparties presented evidence concerning notice of the priorhearing. The court again denied the motion to reopen thejudgment and Gerald appealed. He argued that Conde revested thecourt with jurisdiction by presenting evidence in the hearingheld months after the court lost jurisdiction. Our supreme courtrejected the argument, noting that the parties did not retry thecase. Nothing in Conde's actions treated the judgment in herfavor as anything less than a valid, binding judgment. Sears, 85Ill. 2d at 260.

Similarly, nothing in Gooneratne's actions treated thejudgment in his favor as anything less than a valid judgment, ashe, like Conde, sought to uphold the validity of the judgment. His participation without raising a jurisdictional objectionhere, like Conde's in Sears, did not revest the trial court withjurisdiction. Because plaintiffs failed to file a notice ofappeal between April 19, 2000, and May 19, 2000, we lackjurisdiction to consider the appeal in docket number 1-00-1954.

In November 1999 the trial court permitted plaintiffs tofile an amended complaint, adding a count addressed specificallyto Christ Hospital. Plaintiffs alleged that the hospital:

"a. failed to have in effect a policy requiring prompttransmittal of radiologists' findings to surgeonsin cases of emergent post-operative MRIevaluations;

c. failed to timely perform and interpret RICHARDMcCORRY's post-operative MRI on 10-27-94;

d. failed to accurately interpret RICHARD McCORRY'spost-operative MRI on 10-27-94."

Christ Hospital moved to dismiss the count, arguing that thestatute of limitations barred the new claims. The trial courtagreed with Christ Hospital and dismissed the count. At plaintiffs' request, the court later added a finding of no justcause to delay enforcement or appeal of the dismissal. Plaintiffsfiled a timely notice of appeal, so Rule 304(a) gives usjurisdiction to decide the appeal in docket number 1-00-3352.

We review de novo the decision to dismiss the count. Shaker& Associates, Inc. v. Medical Technologies Group, Ltd., 315 Ill.App. 3d 126, 131, 733 N.E.2d 865 (2000). Oddly, we would reviewfor abuse of discretion if the trial court had denied plaintiffsleave to amend based on the statute of limitations (see Cochranv. Perry County Road District No. 1, 295 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1094, 695 N.E.2d 65 (1998)), but because the court here permitted theamendment and then dismissed the count based on the statute oflimitations, we review the judgment de novo.

The applicable statute of limitations requires filing of thecomplaint within two years of the date on which the plaintiffsknew or should have known of the injury for which they seekcompensation. 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1994). The limitationsperiod begins to run when a plaintiff has sufficient informationto put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whetheractionable conduct caused the injury, even if the plaintiff lacksknowledge of a specific person's negligent conduct. Walters v.Marion Memorial Hospital, 217 Ill. App. 3d 744, 746, 577 N.E.2d915 (1991). Thus, the limitations period does not begin aneweach time pretrial discovery reveals that unsued persons may beliable or that other theories of liability may apply.

The surgery on October 27, 1994, left Richard paralyzed. Plaintiffs do not allege or argue that they discovered thatactionable conduct may have caused the injury at any later datebefore the filing of the lawsuit. Accordingly, the limitationsperiod for their claims in this lawsuit expired on October 27,1996, two days after they filed their original complaint. Theclaim in the amended complaint, filed in December 1999, came toolate unless the count relates back to the original complaint.

According to section 2-616(b) of the Code of CivilProcedure:

"The cause of action *** set up in any amendedpleading shall not be barred by lapse of time under anystatute *** limiting the time within which an actionmay be brought ***, if the time prescribed or limitedhad not expired when the original pleading was filed,and if it shall appear from the original and amendedpleadings that the cause of action asserted *** grewout of the same transaction or occurrence set up in theoriginal pleading, *** and for the purpose ofpreserving the cause of action, *** an amendment to anypleading shall be held to relate back to the date ofthe filing of the original pleading so amended." 735ILCS 5/2-616(b) (West 1998).

The later claim "grew out of the same *** occurrence" as theclaim in the original complaint if the original complaintprovided the defendant with all of the information necessary forpreparation of the defense for the claim asserted later. Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 222 Ill.App. 3d 559, 563, 584 N.E.2d 257 (1991). The later claim relatesback if the original complaint directs the defendant's attentionto the facts on which the plaintiff bases the later claim.Williams, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 563.

Here, nothing in the original complaint indicated anyproblem in the transmittal of radiologists' findings to surgeons. A defense to the original claim in no way prepared ChristHospital to defend its policies regarding transmittal ofradiology reports. In subparagraphs a and b quoted above fromthe amended complaint, plaintiffs alleged that Christ Hospitalnegligently failed to have a sufficient written policy requiringprompt postoperative transmittal of such reports to surgeons. These allegations involve conduct by different persons at timesdifferent from the occasions of the negligent acts alleged in theoriginal complaint. Because the original complaint did notdirect Christ Hospital's attention to the allegedly negligentconduct of its officers responsible for instituting and enforcingpolicies for transmittal of radiological reports to surgeons, theallegations of subparagraphs a and b in the amended complaint donot relate back to the original complaint. See Weidner v. CarleFoundation Hospital, 159 Ill. App. 3d 710, 713, 512 N.E.2d 824(1987); Kennedy v. King, 252 Ill. App. 3d 52, 56, 623 N.E.2d 955(1993).

In subparagraphs c and d of the count added to the amendedcomplaint, plaintiffs allege that Christ Hospital's employeesfailed to interpret the postoperative MRIs accurately andpromptly. The original complaint included the charge that agentsof Christ Hospital misinterpreted MRIs. But the originalcomplaint makes no reference to postoperative MRIs, and does noteven assert that Richard had an MRI after the operation. Whileseveral paragraphs in the original complaint refer to "the MRIfilms" without further specification, all such references appearafter the factual assertion that "[o]n or about June 15, 1994,NIHAL GOONERATNE, M.D., administered and interpreted diagnosticMRI films of RICHARD MCCORRY's cervical spine." Thus theoriginal complaint drew the hospital's attention to the June 15MRI and alerted the hospital to the need to defend theinterpretation of that set of MRI films.

Preparation of a defense to the original complaint would nothave included a defense of the interpretation of postoperativeMRI films. The defense can defeat a claim based on thepostoperative MRI by proving that the alleged misinterpretationand delayed transmittal had no effect on plaintiffs' injuries. If Richard suffered irreversible paralysis in the surgery, anymisinterpretation or delay in transmittal of the post-operativeMRIs had no effect on his condition. But if a second surgeryshortly after the initial surgery stood a good chance ofcorrecting the paralysis, the misinterpretation or delay in thetransmittal of the postoperative MRIs might have a causalconnection to Richard's current condition. Nothing in theoriginal complaint suggested that a second surgery might havecorrected Richard's paralysis, and nothing in the originalcomplaint alerted the hospital to the need to search for evidenceconcerning the potential reversibility of the paralysis. Becausethe preparation of a defense to the allegations of delay andmisinterpretation of postoperative MRIs would involve aninvestigation into facts completely irrelevant to the defenseagainst the original complaint, the new allegations do not relateback to the original complaint. See Cammon v. West SuburbanHospital Medical Center, 301 Ill. App. 3d 939, 947, 704 N.E.2d731 (1998).

Plaintiffs claim that McArthur v. St. Mary's Hospital ofDecatur, 307 Ill. App. 3d 329, 717 N.E.2d 501 (1999), andFigueroa v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 288 Ill. App. 3d921, 681 N.E.2d 64 (1997), require a different result. Wedisagree. In McArthur the original complaint includedallegations that several defendants misinterpreted specifiedsonograms and X rays, but the count against the hospital chargedonly a failure to preserve sonograms. The amended complaintcharged the hospital with misinterpreting the same sonograms andX rays identified in the original complaint. The originalcomplaint adequately directed attention to facts concerning thesonograms and X rays and alerted the hospital to the potentialneed to defend the interpretation of those sonograms and X rays. The court explicitly distinguished cases of amended complaintsincluding charges that the plaintiffs had not directed againstany defendants in the original complaint. See McArthur, 307 Ill.App. 3d at 335. The original complaint here did not charge any defendant with misinterpretation of postoperative MRI films, asthe complaint did not mention such films.

In Figueroa the original complaint alleged that the defendant treated theplaintiff's pregnancy negligently,especially after the delivery. The court found the complaintbroad enough to alert the defense to the need to explain all ofits treatment of the plaintiff through the birthing process, bothbefore and after delivery. An investigation into the plaintiff'spostdelivery condition would involve an investigation into thecauses of that condition, including her predelivery condition andthe treatment she received during the birthing process.

As the trial court here observed, the Figueroa decisionappears to reward vagueness in the original complaint. Here,however, plaintiffs specifically identified the June 15 MRI filmsas the subjects of defendants' negligent misinterpretation. Thecomplaint alerted the defense to the need to defend theinterpretation of only the films specifically identified, and thecomplaint did not even mention any other films. The complaintentitled defendants to presume that plaintiffs intended to referback to the films already specified, when plaintiffs in laterparagraphs alleged negligent misinterpretation of "the MRIfilms." Figueroa and McArthur do not require reversal of thejudgment here.

Plaintiffs also argue that Christ Hospital had notice of thesignificance of the postoperative MRI films because its doctorsordered the MRI immediately following the surgery, once theyrealized Richard was paralyzed. Christ Hospital's doctorsexamined the MRI to determine what had gone wrong in Richard'ssurgery. Thus, two years before plaintiffs filed the lawsuit,Christ Hospital knew that the postoperative MRIs providedsignificant evidence concerning Richard's injury.

An amended complaint that differs materially from theoriginal complaint may relate back, as long as the defendant hadclear notice of the facts included in the amendment prior to theexpiration of the limitations period. Williams, 222 Ill. App. 3dat 563. Thus, where discovery completed during the limitationsperiod alerts the defendant to facts supporting a new claim, alater amendment including the new claim may relate back to theoriginal filing. Wolf v. Meister-Neiberg, Inc., 143 Ill. 2d 44,48, 570 N.E.2d 327 (1991). The rationale for permitting relationback "is that a defendant will not be prejudiced by an amendmentso long as 'his attention was directed, within the timeprescribed or limited, to the facts that form the basis of theclaim asserted against him.'" Boatmen's National Bank v. DirectLines, Inc., 167 Ill. 2d 88, 102, 656 N.E.2d 1101 (1995), quotingSimmons v. Hendricks, 32 Ill. 2d 489, 495, 207 N.E.2d 440 (1965). That is, the defendant must have notice not only of the operativefacts, but also of the plaintiff's intention to assert a claim onthe basis of those facts. A defendant's investigation outside the context of litigation does not help an amendment relate backto the original complaint, because the investigation cannotinform the defendant of the intention of the plaintiff or anyoneelse to assert liability on the basis of the facts found in theinvestigation.

Here, the hospital's records of a postoperative MRI do notinform the hospital that plaintiffs intend to claim that thehospital misinterpreted the MRIs. Thus, the defendants'postoperative investigation into the cause of Richard's paralysisdoes not make the belated amendment relate back to the originalcomplaint.

Finally, plaintiffs argue that the court should estop thehospital from raising the statute of limitations as a defensebecause the hospital failed to respond promptly to all discoveryrequests, including requests for depositions. "Equitableestoppel arises through a party's voluntary conduct whereby he isprecluded from asserting his rights against another who in goodfaith relied on such conduct and was thereby led to change hisposition to his detriment." Ciers v. O.L. Schmidt Barge Lines,Inc., 285 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1049, 675 N.E.2d 210 (1996). When aplaintiff seeks estoppel of a defendant who asserts that alimitations period bars the claim, the plaintiff generally cannotrely on acts occurring after the period has ended. Ciers, 285Ill. App. 3d at 1049. The plaintiff cannot have relied on suchacts when he delayed presenting his claim.

Here the statutory period ended two days after plaintiffsfiled their complaint, and before plaintiffs began the discoveryprocess. Plaintiffs cannot have relied on the conduct of anydiscovery in delaying amendment of the complaint until theexpiration of the limitations period. The trial court had nobasis for applying equitable estoppel to preclude Christ Hospitalfrom raising the statute of limitations as a defense.

Count III of the amended complaint, concerning ChristHospital's liability for misinterpretation and delay intransmittal of postoperative MRIs, does not arise from the sameoccurrences as those set out in the original complaint. Becausethe amended count does not relate back to the original complaint,we affirm the trial court's decision to dismiss count III of theamended complaint.

We lack jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' untimely appealfrom the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gooneratne. Becausethe original complaint did not provide Christ Hospital with allof the facts needed for preparation of the defense to the claimsasserted in the amended complaint, count III of the amendedcomplaint does not relate back to the original complaint. Thetrial court correctly dismissed count III as untimely. Thereforewe dismiss the appeal in docket number 1-00-1954 and we affirmthe judgment in docket number 1-00-3352.

No. 1-00-1954, Appeal dismissed.

No. 1-00-3352, Affirmed.

COHEN, P.J., and COUSINS, J., concur.