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                                                                                                                                                              FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                                                                                              November 28, 2005

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

On February 25, 2003, a local option election was conducted inthe 32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward to determine whether the sale ofretail alcoholic liquor should be prohibited. The ballot wasprinted in English, Spanish, and Chinese. The Chinese translation,with respect to the sale of alcohol, used the term xio shòu, asopposed to the term ling shòu. The Chinese translation alsotransposed the precinct and ward numbers, i.e., 48th Precinct and32nd Ward. The ballot also contained a section entitled,"Description of Area to Be Affected," that gave a commondescription, using street boundaries, addresses, etc. to identifythe area affected in nonlegal terms. This description, too, was inEnglish, Spanish, and Chinese.

On March 14, plaintiffs Mashni Corporation, by Farida Mashni,S & T, Inc., by Tae Hwan Han, Charles Jaskiewicz, Michele Parisi,Belinda Ransom, James A. Buckle, Leonard LeCour, Ronnie Lindsey,Sharrod Graham, Sheldon Willis, Ron Ison, Arii Rowling, DonaldSmith, Donna Youmans, Lisa Hunter, Jeffory Baker, William Kelley,John Mitchell, Thomas Nowaczyk, Lisa Ruth and Anthony Macklin,voters and two liquor license holders in the 32nd precinct,⁽⁴⁾ fileda complaint contesting the validity of the election, alleging thatthe ballot was "inherently vague and ambiguous" because itcontained both substantive defects and the form of the ballot wasunlawful and, therefore, failed to comply with section 9-6 of theAct. With respect to the substantive violations, plaintiffsalleged:

"9a. The Board used an English questionthat asks whether alcohol shall be prohibitedspecifically at retail, as the statuterequires, and an invalid Chinese question thatasks whether alcohol shall be prohibitedgenerally, whether at retail or wholesale.

b. The Board used an English questionthat asks whether alcohol shall be prohibitedin the 32nd Precinct of the 48th Ward, as thestatute requires, and an invalid Chinesequestion that asks whether alcohol shall beprohibited in the 48th Precinct of the 32ndWard."

Plaintiffs further alleged that the Board utilized an uncommonChinese language, a simplified version, which is understood only byjunior generations of Chinese people, not senior generations(paragraphs 10 and 11). Plaintiffs also alleged numerous defectsin the form of the ballot, which we need not set forth. Thecomplaint contained a count II that sought to void the election onthe basis that the trial court had ordered the Board to remove theproposition from the ballot on February 14.⁽⁵⁾

On March 26, Stanley and Uhl filed a petition to intervene,which the trial court granted. On April 23, the Board filed itsanswer and affirmative defenses and, on May 2, the Interveners didthe same. The Interveners also filed a motion to dismiss or strikecount II because this issue was pending before the appellate court. The Board was later granted leave to join this motion. Thereafter,plaintiffs responded to it. On May 21, plaintiffs filed a motionto dismiss the Board and Interveners' affirmative defenses. On May30, the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss count II.

On June 13, the Board and Interveners responded, separately,to plaintiffs' motion to strike their affirmative defenses. Thereafter, plaintiffs replied. On July 8, the trial court grantedplaintiffs' motion to strike defendants' affirmative defenses withthe exception of the affirmative defense regarding plaintiffs' lackof standing.

On August 20, 2004, plaintiffs filed a motion for summaryjudgment, contending that two translation errors occurred in theballot which rendered the election invalid as a matter of law. OnAugust 23, defendants filed their joint motion for summaryjudgment, noting that the issues before the court had been limitedby plaintiffs. Specifically, paragraphs 10 and 11 of plaintiffs'complaint were no longer at issue. Additionally, plaintiffsindicated that they would not present evidence with respect toparagraphs 12 to 17 (Brooks issue), but reserved the right to arguethese errors. Thus, according to defendants, two questions of lawwere presented:

"1. Does the translation of the Englishwords 'for sale at retail' using the Chinesecharacter xiao shou, which is literallytranslated as 'for sale,' result in a ballotwhich is invalid as a matter of law andrequires the voiding of the local optionelection?

2. Does the transpositions of the wardand precinct numbers at the top of the ballotand in the text of the proposition result in aballot which is invalid as a matter of law andrequires the voiding of the local optionelection?"

Defendants attached the deposition of their expert, Dr. Richard Gu,to their motion.

On October 6, the trial court held a hearing on the respectivemotions. The trial court concluded that the "at retail" issueinvolved a question of fact since two different experts gavedifferent opinions and, thus, required a trial. With respect tothe transposition issue, the trial court reserved ruling. Thetrial court also indicated that, although it was ready to rule onthe Brooks issue, it would take the matter under advisement untilit ruled on the other issues.

Trial commenced on November 10. Hanelore Mui, a freelanceinterpreter in Cantonese and Mandarin, testified as plaintiffs'expert. According to Mui, the ballot asks: "[T]he sale of liquorin general should it be prohibited in the 32nd, in the 48thPrecinct of 32nd District in Chicago City?" It was Mui's opinionthat the Chinese translation has "omissions of important meaningfulwords" and was not a correct translation. It was further heropinion that the transposition of the ward and precinct numbers"could be easily confusing" because people might think they werelooking at the wrong ballot. However, she acknowledged that if avoter read the description of the area affected, "they can easilysolve that problem." Mui then indicated there were two Chinesecharacters for "at retail," but did not identify what they were. When asked if the character used for the term "sale" in the ballotwould include wholesale sales, Mui responded, "I would assume itdoes."

On cross-examination, Mui stated that she had formal educationin Chinese up to a junior high equivalency and was certified byBerlitz. Mui also stated that the translation was not accuratebecause it left out the term ling shòu, which was a more accurateterm for "at retail." Again, she stated there was another Chinesecharacter for "at retail," but did not identify it. Mui thenadmitted that ling shòu actually means "retail sale," not "sale atretail," but stated it could also mean the latter. Mui furtherstated that "retail" can have multiple meanings, e.g., price,quantity, where sold, and that the same was true with respect tothe term "sale."

Mui indicated that if she was interpreting a legal document, which a ballot is, she would need to provide the exact meaning ofthe original without losing meaning or omission, whether or not thegeneral population would understand the translation.⁽⁶⁾ Mui admittedthat the relevant language here could be translated to xio shòu,but it was her opinion that ling shòu was the better character toshow the difference between retail sales and wholesale. Withrespect to the transposition, Mui admitted that the commondescription in the ballot could easily tell voters what area wasaffected and that the language used in that description wasaccurate and would be easy for Chinese readers to understand. Plaintiffs then rested.

Dr. Richard Gu, who has studied and taught Chinese/Englishtranslation for 11 years at Northwestern and 6 years in China,testified as defendants' expert. According to Gu, a goodtranslation needs to be reliable, loyal to the original language,and enable the readers to understand it. Gu stated that it wasimportant, in translating, to know something about the audiencebecause different terms are used for the general public versusspecialized audiences. It was Gu's belief that plain or simplifiedChinese was preferable for use with the general public. Gu furtherstated that there was always a choice of characters to use intranslating, and it was his belief that one needed to use the best,most suitable for the purpose. It was Gu's opinion that xio shòuwas the best translation for "sale at retail" because the audiencewould understand it. Specifically, Gu indicated that when lookingat the ballot, it would be clear to the voter "it was talking aboutvoters who live in this area who are thinking about whether liquorstores should be closed or not" and that the ballot was referringto sales at retail. It was further Gu's belief that ling shòu wasnot a commonly used Chinese term and that, since xio shòu alreadymeant sale, there was no further clarification needed. Specifically, according to him, the "meaning is clearly therealready. No one would misunderstand it." Gu further stated thatif the word for "retail" was added to the translation, less peoplewould be able to understand it.

Dr. Gu further indicated that the Chinese language has morethan 40,000 characters and only the most commonly used charactersare generally taught, which consists of approximately 3,000. According to Gu, xio shòu was much more commonly used andgenerally taught than ling shòu. Specifically, ling shòu was notgenerally taught to people, not even at the college or graduatelevel. Thus, xio shòu would reach a wider range of people. Gustated that xio shòu was generally understood to mean retail sale. In this regard, Gu indicated there was a Chinese word for "retailstore," but it was not commonly used and people just say "store." The same was true with respect to "retail price." Although Guacknowledged xio shòu could also mean wholesale, according to him,it was not generally understood that way. It was further Gu'sbelief that ling shòu did not more clearly convey the idea ofretail sale because the general public would find that term hard tounderstand.

With respect to the transposition, Dr. Gu agreed that thenumbers were reversed, but did not believe this would causeconfusion to Chinese voters since it was a "very, very commonerror" and "common, common, common practice" in translating betweenEnglish and Chinese. Gu stated that the description included onthe ballot would identify the area being referred to and that whichwould be affected by the vote.

On cross-examination, Dr. Gu indicated that Chinese peoplewere always on guard when numbers were at issue. Gu stated thatwhen a voter would see the numbers on the ballot, they would seethe common problem and look at them longer. However, it was hisbelief that voters would not rely on the official numbers used inthe ballot.

With respect to xio shòu and ling shòu, Dr. Gu stated thatthe frequency of usage was much different. Specifically, xio shòuwas used .00061 times per 10,000 and ling shòu was only used .00038per 10,000. According to him, this was a very large difference. Gu further stated that the failure to use the character for"retail" did not broaden the scope of the ballot proposition, butmerely made it so people could understand it. Again, although headmitted that xio shòu could include both retail and wholesale, Gustated that the general public would plainly understand xio shòuto mean retail sales. According to Gu, when a Chinese reader readthe ballot, he or she would have the same understanding as his orher English counterparts because xio shòu includes the concept ofretail and the general public would not think about wholesale saleswhen reading the question.

The trial court then rendered its decision. With respect tothe Brooks issue, the trial court granted summary judgment in favorof defendants, finding there was substantial compliance with thestatute in the form and layout of the ballot.

With respect to "at retail," the court found that, based onDr. Gu's testimony, the translation substantially complied with thestatute and gave the voter a clear opportunity "to express theiropinion as to whether or not to vote up or down." Thus, the courtconcluded that "the voters were given a clear and meaningful choiceto vote for or against the proposition."

Lastly, with respect to the transposition, the court first setforth the five cases it believed were relevant to the issue, butfound that none of them contained anything stating that averbalization of the area covered "trumps" everything, asdefendants maintained. The court agreed with plaintiffs that noneof the cases stood for the proposition that, if the precinct andward numbers were transposed, that was okay.

The trial court then noted that, while the ballot transposedthe ward and precinct in two different places, it also included averbalization of the proper street addresses. According to thecourt, the question was whether the transposition "put a Chinese-speaking person in a different position *** than it does anEnglish-speaking and a Spanish-speaking person," which according tothe court was "a case of first impression." The court concludedthat the ballot did not substantially comply with section 9-6"based upon *** the transposition of the ward and precinct and thefact that a Chinese-speaking person is put in a different positionbased upon the ballot that was submitted, than the English andSpanish-speaking people[.]" Accordingly, the trial court held theelection invalid and entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. OnDecember 9, the Board and Interveners filed separate notices ofappeal with respect to the trial court's decision in connectionwith paragraph 9(b) of plaintiffs' complaint.

Pursuant to section 9-6 of the Act, a local proposition to banthe sale of alcohol "shall be in substantially the following form":

--------------------------------------------------------------
: Shall the sale at retail of : : :
: alcoholic liquor (or alcoholic : : :
: liquor other than beer containing : YES : :
: not more than 4% of alcohol by : : :
: weight) (or alcoholic liquor contain-: : :

------------------
: ing more than 4% alcohol by : : :
: weight in the original package : : :
: and not for consumption on the : NO : :
: premises) be prohibited in (or at) : : :
: ...............? : : :
--------------------------------------------------------------

Section 9-1 of the Act provides that the proper name of theprecinct, inter alia, should be inserted in the blank. 235 ILCS5/9-1 (West 2004). After setting forth the statutory form, section9-6 provides that the "proposition ballot shall also contain acommon description of the precinct in plain and nonlegal language." 235 ILCS 5/9-6 (West 2004). "Plain and nonlegal language" isdefined in another section of the Act, involving the petition toput such a referendum on a ballot, as being "by reference tostreets, natural or artificial landmarks, addresses ***." 235 ILCS5/9-4 (West 2004).

When a special statute dictates the form of a ballot, as isthe case here, the ballot must substantially comply, not exactlycomply, with the statutory mandate or the election is deemed void. Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 476. To determine whether there hasbeen substantial compliance, the question is whether the voter had" 'a clear and understandable statement of the alternatives beforehim.' [Citation.]" Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 477. "The focus ison the existence of a meaningful choice for the voters." Krauss v.Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 287 Ill.App. 3d 981, 984, 681 N.E.2d 514 (1997). " 'A ballot is sufficientif the voter has a clear opportunity to express a choice either foror against it.' [Citation.]" Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 477. With respect to the meaning of substantial, it has been stated that

" '[t]he word "substantial," as ordinarilyused, means essential, material, orfundamental. A substantial copy of the formof the ballot designated in the statute mustevidently be one that contains the essence ofthe form in the statute--one giving thecorrect idea, but not necessarily the exactexpressions in the statutory form. The wordsof the statute, "The ballots at said electionshall be substantially in the following form,"necessarily convey the idea that the ballot tobe used or voted by the voters is not requiredto be an accurate or exact copy, but one whichembodies or contains the substance or mainfeatures of the ballot found in the statute. The Legislature evidently did not intend thatevery word of the statutory form should befound in the form furnished the voter, and ifenough of the words found in the statutoryform, coupled with other apt words, areprinted on the ballot furnished to the voterthat will mean the same thing to all of thevoters as the words used in the statutoryform, the statute will be substantiallycomplied with.' [Citation.]" People ex rel.Davis v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R.Co., 48 Ill. 2d 176, 183, 268 N.E.2d 411(1971).

Moreover, it has been held that "[t]he substance of a publicmeasure is adequately set forth if the ballot gives a fairportrayal of the chief features of the proposition in words ofplain meaning, so that it can be understood by persons entitled tovote." Smith v. Calhoun Community Unit School District No. 40, 16Ill. 2d 328, 335, 157 N.E.2d 59 (1959).

Not every deviation from the statutory form will render anelection void; rather, "to have such effect the deviation must bein a matter of substance." Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 181. Moreover, ifthere is a deviation in the ballot, courts consider whether it "wasmisleading or confusing to the voters." Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3dat 477. Where there is no "likelihood that the deviation inwording confused the voters or obstructed them in voting either foror against the proposition, in accordance with their inclinations,"which factors are considered "more relevant than, and preferableto, the elevation of form over substance," no substantial deviationwill be found to exist. Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at 182. In determiningwhether a ballot complies with the statutory form, "we mustultimately be guided by the statutory intent [citations] both indetermining what constitutes compliance with the statute and indetermining the effect of noncompliance." Davis, 48 Ill. 2d at182. The intent of the Act is set forth in section 1-2, i.e.:

"This Act shall be liberally construed,to the end that the health, safety and welfareof the People of the State of Illinois shallbe protected and temperance in the consumptionof alcoholic liquors shall be fostered andpromoted by sound and careful control andregulation of the manufacture, sale anddistribution of alcoholic liquors." 235 ILCS5/1-2 (West 2004).

Whether there is substantial compliance is a question of law forthe court to determine. Krauss, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 984.

The Board first contends that the trial court erred in findingthat the transposition of the ward and precinct numbers did notsubstantially comply with section 9-6 since it violated the letterand spirit of the Act, imposed a strict, not substantial,compliance requirement, and applied an improper standard, i.e.,"put in a different position." According to the Board, there wasno evidence that the Chinese voters were prevented from exercisingtheir right of suffrage based on the transposition nor that theresult of the election was not fairly ascertained. The Boardfurther maintains that, while the trial court applied the correctsubstantial compliance standard to the "at retail" issue, it failedto apply that standard to the transposition issue. Specifically,the Board argues that the trial court made no finding that thetransposition denied Chinese voters a clear and meaningful choiceto vote for or against the proposition, particularly where thecommon description, which both experts admitted was accurate, wasincluded on the ballot.

The Interveners contend that the trial court's decision withrespect to the transposition was incorrect as a matter of law andinconsistent with the intent of the Act because the trial courtapplied a strict compliance standard and failed to consider whetherthe transposition affected the voters' right to make a choice. With regard to cases relied upon by the trial court, theInterveners maintain that when three of them were decided, section9-6 contained different language and did not require the inclusionof a common description. However, according to the Interveners,subsequent to these decisions, the legislature amended section 9-6and we may presume that this amendment indicated the legislature'sintent to remedy the confusion and vagueness caused by reference toprecinct and ward numbers.

Plaintiffs contend that the trial court properly found theelection invalid on the basis of the transposition error. According to plaintiffs, this error occurred two times on theballot and did not convey the correct information to the votersand, thus, the Chinese voters voted on a different question. Plaintiffs further maintain that the common description did notcure the error.

None of the cases relied upon or referred to by the trialcourt are particularly helpful. Briefly, these cases involved thefollowing facts and holdings. In Havlik v. Marcin, 132 Ill. App.2d 532, 270 N.E.2d 189 (1971), the Act required that the propername of the precinct be inserted in the blank on the ballot and,there, the affected area was identified as " 'this precinct,' "which the plaintiffs maintained was not the proper name. Havlik,132 Ill. App. 2d at 536. The Havlik court concluded that the useof "this precinct" did substantially comply with the statute and"did enlighten the voters as to the proposition before them" and"gave the voter a clear and understandable statement of thealternatives" before them. Havlik, 132 Ill. App. 2d at 536.

In Huguley v. Marcin, 39 Ill. App. 3d 230, 349 N.E.2d 564(1976), the plaintiffs, voters from the 3rd Precinct of the 7thWard, challenged an election banning the sale of alcohol in thatprecinct on the basis the ballot identified the area as the 3rdPrecinct of the 8th Ward. Huguley, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 231. Theballot contained an explanation that the 3rd Precinct of the 8thWard now lies in the 7th Ward, but that the precinct boundaries hadnot changed. Huguley, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 231. The statute at thattime required the precinct affected by the vote to be identified asit "existed as of the last General Election." Huguley, 39 Ill.App. 3d at 231. The court concluded that there were no defects inthe ballot. Huguley, 39 Ill. App. 3d at 233.

In Love v. Marcin, 47 Ill. App. 3d 715, 365 N.E.2d 100 (1977), the plaintiffs challenged a ballot banning the sale of alcohol intheir precinct maintaining that, while the ballot contained thelegal or proper name of the precinct, it failed to include adescription of the precinct. Love, 47 Ill. App. 3d at 716. Thecourt disagreed, noting that the statute did not require that thedescription of the boundaries of the precinct be included, onlythat the legal designation of the precinct be included. Love, 47Ill. App. 3d at 718. In Love, the legal designation, the 40thPrecinct of the 29th Ward, was included on the ballot and,therefore, complied with the statutory form. Love, 47 Ill. App. 3dat 717-18.

In Quarles v. Kozubowski, 154 Ill. App. 3d 325, 507 N.E.2d 103(1987), a petition to put a referendum on a ballot banning the saleof alcohol was at issue and there was only one sentence in the casewith respect to an alleged error in the description of the precinctboundaries, i.e., that the sides of the street (presuming north orsouth and/or east or west) were omitted. Quarles, 154 Ill. App. 3dat 334. The court found the description sufficient since therecord failed to demonstrate that any one entitled to vote was notable to or that any one not entitled to vote did. Quarles, 154Ill. App. 3d at 334.

Lastly, Armond v. Sawyer, 205 Ill. App. 3d 936, 563 N.E.2d 900(1990), involved the revocation of a person's liquor license based,inter alia, on a void referendum that had taken place in 1974 (thevote at issue in Huguley). Clearly, because the referendum wasruled proper in Huguley, there is nothing in this case with respectto the propriety of identifying the precinct. Certainly, none ofthese cases assist us in addressing the issue before this court.

We find that the trial court erred in invalidating theelection on the basis of the transposition. As noted by the courtin Brooks, relying on the trial court's comment, " '[t]he LiquorControl Act did not take into consideration the possibility ofhaving the proposition translated into another language' " (Brooks,334 Ill. App. 3d at 478) and, therefore, did not set forthstandards for doing so. In any event, the Board is not obligatedto create a "perfect" ballot. Brooks, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 479. There is no question that certain languages are more complex totranslate than others and that errors may, and are likely to, occurin translation, and this is certainly true of Chinese.⁽⁷⁾ If everyinconsistency or irregularity in ballot translation werechallengeable and deemed sufficient to void an election, everyelection in which the Board attempted to aid those individuals notversed in English by translating the ballot into another languagewould be voided and the courts overwhelmed with election cases. Clearly, this is not the intent, nor goal, in providing bilingualtranslations. Moreover, only substantial, not perfect, complianceis required. To allow any and every inconsistency or irregularityin translation to void an election would run counter to the well-settled principle.

Although the transposition here may initially have confused avoter, both Dr. Gu and Mui testified that any confusion wouldeasily be cleared up by the common description, which was accurateand easy to understand. Moreover, we find that effect must begiven to the common description, even over the erroneous legaldesignation, for a number of reasons and that the transpositionerror did not render the ballot invalid as failing to substantiallycomply with section 9-6. First, we agree with the Interveners thatthe legislative intent in adding a requirement to the statute thata common description be included was to clear up confusion causedby precinct and ward numbers. See 80th Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, June 15, 1977, at 83 (statements of RepresentativeCapparelli) ("Also a plain description of the area to be affected*** will be required ***. These measures are designed to reducethe confusion to the voter"); 80th Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings,May 17, 1977, at 180-81 (statements of Senator Kosinski) (samecomment). The amendment occurred after the courts' decisions inHavlik, Huguley, and Love. The legislature itself acknowledgedthat confusion existed and thus mandated a common description. Ifthe legislature did not intend for voters to rely upon the commondescription to aid them in voting, and thus, for this court to giveit effect, there would be no reason to include such a requirementin the statute.

Second, as "all sections and portions of the statute must beread and considered together and as a whole" (Havlik, 132 Ill. App.2d at 534), we can look to the whole of section 9-6, not just thestatutory form to determine whether substantial compliance exists,i.e., we may look to the common description included on the ballot.

Lastly, the common description is more intelligible and morelikely to inform a voter of the area to be affected than the legaldesignation. In Havlik, the court made the following pertinentcomments:

"The important concept to the voter was notthat of the 38th Precinct of the 16th Ward.The question uppermost in the mind of everyvoter would be whether or not the sale ofalcoholic liquor should be prohibited in theprecinct in which that voter lived and voted. ***

*** The court has defined 'precinct' as'a compact geographical unit for votingpurposes in which a single polling place islocated. Voters residing in the precinct mayvote only at the polling place locatedtherein.' [Citation.] Many citizens may notknow or remember the number of their precinctor of their ward." Havlik, 132 Ill. App. 2dat 536.

We agree that many voters do not know their precinct number. However, as the Havlik court noted, a voter may only vote in his orher precinct and, with respect to local referendums, for issuesthat relate to where he or she lives. In the event of anyconfusion, certainly a common description of the area affectedwould be more meaningful and effectively guide a voter than theprecinct and ward numbers.

We acknowledge that a contrary result was reached on thisidentical issue in Samour, Inc. v. Board of Election Commissionersof the City of Chicago, No. 1-04-3630 (October 25, 2005). However,we respectfully disagree with the Samour court's conclusion for thereasons detailed above. Thus, based on the foregoing, we find,when viewing the ballot as a whole, including the commondescription of the area affected, that the ballot substantiallycomplied with section 9-6 because it portrays the chief features ofthe proposition and what area was to be affected in words of plainmeaning. The correct idea was conveyed to the voters. In otherwords, the transposition error did not deny the voters the clearopportunity to express their choice or obstruct them in voting foror against the ban of alcohol in the area in which they live. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's judgment invalidating theelection.

The Board also contends that the trial court properlydetermined that the use of the term xio shòu rather than ling shòusubstantially complied with section 9-6. Interveners, correctly,do not address this question since it was in their favor. Plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in concluding thatthe use of xio shòu substantially complied since this term means"any sale" and is less clear than ling shòu.

Initially, we address a procedural question. We note that theBoard stated at oral argument before this court that the "atretail" issue was not before this court, contrary to the argumentraised in its brief. However, plaintiffs argue that the "atretail" challenge is an alternative basis to affirm the trialcourt's judgment. We questioned plaintiffs' counsel as to whetherthis issue was properly before this court since they failed to filea cross-appeal. Counsel responded that they need not have filed across-appeal. After reviewing the case law relevant to cross-appeals, we agree. "Our supreme court has held that *** one whohas obtained by judgment all that has been asked for in the trialcourt cannot appeal from the judgment." General Auto ServiceStation v. Maniatis, 328 Ill. App. 3d 537, 544, 765 N.E.2d 1176(2002). "Findings of the trial court adverse to the appellee donot require the appellee's cross-appeal if the judgment of thetrial court was not at least in part against the appellee." Maniatis, 328 Ill. App. 3d at 544. Thus, "[i]t follows thatfindings adverse to the appellee require a cross-appeal if thejudgment was in part against the appellee." Maniatis, 328 Ill.App. 3d at 544. Here, the trial court awarded plaintiffs all thatthey sought--invalidation of the election. Although two of thetrial court's findings were adverse to plaintiffs (appellees), thetrial court's judgment was not in any part against plaintiffs. Accordingly, they need not have filed a cross-appeal to argue thisissue on appeal.

In Krause, the plaintiffs challenged a ballot banning the saleof alcohol in their precinct on the basis that the Spanishtranslation contained in the ballot was "erroneous and nonsensical"and did not substantially comply with the statute. Krause, 287Ill. App. 3d at 986. The court reviewed this challenge under thede novo standard of review. Krause, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 984. Ultimately, the court concluded that the Spanish question did notpresent the same question as presented in English. Krause, 287Ill. App. 3d at 986. The court identified three wrong terms thatwere used in the Spanish translation that had substantiallydifferent meanings than the English proposition. As one example,the ballot used the term "Debida," which means "to owe," ratherthan the term "Bebida," which means "to drink." Krause, 287 Ill.App. 3d at 986. The Board conceded that the Spanish translationwas misleading. Krause, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 986. The Krause courtconcluded that the ballot failed to substantially comply with thestatutory form and held the election invalid. Krause, 287 Ill.App. 3d at 988.

We find that the trial court here correctly determined thatthe use of the term xio shòu was in substantial compliance withsection 9-6. Clearly, the trial court found Dr. Gu's opinion wasentitled to more weight than Mui's, which determination is not forus to disturb. Based on Gu's testimony, the use of the term xioshòu gave the correct idea to the voters and what was at issue evenif the term used was not necessarily the exact expression utilizedby the statutory form. There can be no question that, based onGu's testimony, the voters were aware that the referendum relatedto the retail sale of alcohol. The instant case is unlike Krausebecause, there, an entirely incorrect term with a completelydifferent meaning was used in the Spanish translation. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err indetermining that the "at retail" translation was in substantialcompliance with the Act.

For the reasons stated, we affirm, in part, and reverse, inpart, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

Affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part.

CAHILL, P.J., and McBRIDE, J., concur.

1. Although this case should normally be captioned with thelowest consolidated case number, we believe the caption in 1-04-3619 is erroneous. It identifies the plaintiffs as MashniCorporation, by Farida Mashni, S & T, Inc., by Tae Hwan Han,Sheldon Willis, Fred P. Morrow, Steven Heinold, Ronald Ison,Antaneshia Briggs, Charles Jaskiewicz, Eugene Bramlett, Thomas V.Nowczyk, Donna J. Youmans, Judy A. Brown, and Belinda Ransom. However, there is no complaint in the record listing these partiesas plaintiffs challenging the election; the only relevant complaintlists the plaintiffs identified in the 1-04-3631 caption. Theplaintiffs listed in 1-04-3619, with the exception of Morrow,Heinold and Briggs, were the plaintiffs that challenged thepetition to actually put a proposition on the ballot, whichchallenge has previously been appealed to this court. Mashni Corp.v. Laski, 351 Ill. App. 3d 727, 814 N.E.2d 879 (2004). We believethat Interveners mistakenly utilized this caption, with theaddition of the three other individuals, in their notice of appealin this case. We also note that both the Board and theInterveners' briefs utilize the caption of 1-04-3631. Accordingly,we will utilize the caption of 1-04-3631 since those are theplaintiffs identified in the complaint on record.

2. The Board and Interveners will be collectively referred to asdefendants where applicable.

3. The Board, in its brief, also argues that the trial courtproperly concluded that the failure to include the term "at retail"in the Chinese translation on the ballot substantially compliedwith the requirements of the Act and that the trial court properlyconcluded that the ballot otherwise substantially complied with thestatutory form (identified as the Brooks issue based on Brooks v.Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, 334 Ill.App. 3d 472, 778 N.E.2d 173 (2002)). We do not address the Brooksissue since it was not included in the Board's notice of appeal, itwas not a ruling against the Board, the Board states, in its brief,that it is only appealing the part of the trial court's judgmentwith respect to the transposition, the Interveners state that thetransposition issue is the only issue appealed from, and plaintiffsstate that the Brooks issue is not at issue here. With respect tothe "at retail" issue, we address that issue for the reasonsdiscussed below.

4. None of the plaintiffs are able to read Chinese as averred intheir complaint.

5. This order was appealed and, on February 19, we stayedenforcement of the trial court's February 14 order. As such, theelection proceeded. Ultimately, on June 21, 2004, we reversed thetrial court's decision enjoining the election. Mashni Corp., 351Ill. App. 3d 727.

6. This statement is unfathomable given that the entire reasonthe proposition was translated was to enable the general populationof Chinese people to understand it.

7. See, e.g., http://www.lengua.com/chinese-translation.shtml("Chinese is a complex language. That translator, who deals withChinese translations must have deep knowledge skills in thislanguage alongside with great patience. It's one of the mostdifficult languages to deal with because of it's structure. ***That's why, to provide, for instance a good Chinese to Englishtranslation or English to Chinese translation is a difficulttask").