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In June 2001, plaintiff Peter Marzano filed a claim forunemployment insurance benefits with the Illinois Department ofEmployment Security (Department). After his claim was denied,plaintiff filed an application for reconsideration. The Board ofReview affirmed its decision. Plaintiff filed a pro se complaintin the circuit court seeking administrative review of the Boardof Review's denial of his claim. The trial court confirmed theBoard of Review's decision. Subsequently, plaintiff filed a prose appeal.

The record establishes that plaintiff began working forCicero School District 99 (the district) on May 24, 1999, as asubstitute teacher on a day-to-day, as-needed basis. On August26, 1999, plaintiff became a full-time teacher for the schooldistrict for the 1999-2000 school year. However, on March 30,2000, plaintiff received a letter informing him that his full-time teaching services would not be renewed for the 2000-01school year. In August 2000, plaintiff received a letter fromthe school district informing him that it was interested in hisservices as a substitute teacher for the following school yearand requesting an updated teaching certificate from him. Plaintiff performed services for the school district as a day-to-day, as-needed substitute teacher for the 2000-01 school year. Plaintiff's last day of work for the school district was June 8,2001.

In June 2001, plaintiff filed a claim for unemploymentinsurance benefits with the Department. On July 19, 2001, theclaims adjudicator denied plaintiff's claim, finding himineligible for compensation under section 612(B)(1) of theIllinois Unemployment Insurance Act (the Act) (820 ILCS405/612(B)(1) (West 2000)) because plaintiff had not received aletter of discharge from the school district.

Plaintiff filed for reconsideration, arguing that a day-to-day substitute teacher has no assurance of work because "you mustwait for a call to work each morning when school is in session."The claims adjudicator affirmed his decision, finding thatplaintiff did not have a letter of layoff or contract terminationand had a reasonable assurance of becoming employed in the nextacademic year.

Next, plaintiff appealed to a referee for the Department.During a telephone hearing that took place on August 30, 2001,plaintiff testified, among other things, that (1) he never workedsummers; (2) the school district sent him a letter each August,asking him if he was available for work as a substitute teacherthe coming school year; (3) he had received such a letter inAugust 2000 as well as August 2001 and both times he hadresponded that he wanted to work for the school district; (4)summer is a recognized break period in the school district; and(5) no one with the school district ever told him that he waslaid off. On August 31, 2001, the referee who conducted thetelephone interview affirmed the claims adjudicator'sdetermination, finding that plaintiff was disqualified fromreceiving unemployment benefits under section 612 of the Actbecause he had reasonable assurances that he would be returningto work as a substitute teacher in the fall of 2001.

Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Board of Review.Plaintiff noted that as of September 17, 2001, he had not beencalled to work for the school district and that he was "made tolive in fear of a recoup." On November 19, 2001, the Board ofReview affirmed the referee's decision, finding that plaintiffwas ineligible for benefits under section 612 of the Act, wherehe had a reasonable assurance of performing instructional serviceas a substitute teacher for an educational institution in theupcoming school year or term based upon a sequence of previousconduct and practice.

On November 30, 2001, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint inthe circuit court, seeking administrative review of the Board ofReview's decision. On February 20, 2002, the trial courtconfirmed the Board of Review's decision, finding that thedecision was neither against the manifest weight of the evidencenor contrary to law. Plaintiff now appeals from the trialcourt's order.

As a threshold matter, we note that defendants filed amotion to dismiss plaintiff's appeal for his failure to complywith Supreme Court Rules 341 (188 Ill. 2d R. 341) and 342 (155Ill. 2d R. 342), which govern the contents of an appellant'sbrief and appendix. This court took the motion to dismiss withthe case. Defendants are correct that plaintiff's one-pageappellate brief is deficient and not in compliance with SupremeCourt Rules 341 and 342. Such lack of compliance can warrantdismissal of the appeal. E.g., Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill. App. 3d735, 737 (1999). However, because the record before us is shortand sufficient, and because the issues are simple, we willconsider the propriety of the denial of unemployment benefits toplaintiff.

On appeal, plaintiff requests that this court forward"official notice that unemployment compensation paid to himduring the summer of 2001 will never (or for at least five yrs:waiver) be recouped in any way or ever infringe upon any futureunemployment claims as he is basically at poverty level income." Because there is no administrative decision ordering recoupmentof any overpayment of unemployment compensation paid toplaintiff, waiver of recoupment is not before this court.

Plaintiff's next apparent argument is that section 612 ofthe Act does not apply to day-to-day substitute teachers andtherefore he is entitled to unemployment payments. Where, ashere, the issue on appeal involves an examination of the legaleffect of a given set of facts, a mixed question of law and factis involved, and the agency's determination should be affirmedunless it is found to be clearly erroneous. See AFM MessengerService, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d380, 390-91 (2001). This standard is met only where, upon reviewof the entire record, the reviewing court is "'left with thedefinite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. [Citation.]'" AFM Messenger Services, Inc., 198 Ill. 2d at 395.

The pertinent portion of section 612(B)(1) of the Actprovides the following:

"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits, on thebasis of wages for service in employment in an instructional*** capacity ***." 820 ILCS 405/612(B)(1) (West 2000).

The plain language of section 612 does not differentiate betweenfull-time teachers and substitute teachers but, rather, refers toindividuals employed in an instructional capacity. As asubstitute teacher, plaintiff falls under that category.

Plaintiff also appears to argue that he had no reasonableassurance of future work, as is required for application ofsection 612. We disagree. The Department defines "reasonableassurance" as follows:

"an inference or expectation based upon a sequence ofprevious conduct, practice, or course of dealing, *** whichis fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis ofunderstanding that the individual working in one year, term,or season, or prior to a vacation period or holiday recessmay be expected, under normal circumstances, to havecontinued employment in the next year, term, or season,after an 'off-term' or 'off-season' interruption, or at theconclusion of the vacation period or holiday recess." 56Ill. Adm. Code