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THIRD DIVISION
June 29, 2001

JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Beverly Mann appeals from numerous orders of thecircuit court granting summary judgment to defendant The UpjohnCompany on counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint, grantingsummary judgment to defendant on count IV of plaintiff's amendmentsto her complaint, granting defendant's motion to dismiss count VIIof plaintiff's amendments to her complaint, denying plaintiff'smotion to amend her complaint, denying plaintiff's motions forcontinuance of the trial date, and denying plaintiff's motion tovacate the dismissal of her complaint for want of prosecution(DWP). Defendant cross-appeals from orders of the circuit courtgranting plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint followingsummary judgment on counts I and II, denying defendant's motion forsummary judgment based on lack of expert testimony on causation,and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff'seconomic loss claims. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Plaintiff, an attorney, filed a pro se complaint againstdefendant alleging that she suffered physical and psychologicalinjuries as a result of her ingestion of a prescription drug,Halcion, from January 1988 to January 1990. Halcion, also known astriazolam, is a member of the benzodiazepine drug class and is asleep aid used to treat insomnia. Defendant manufactures Halcionand the drug received the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA)approval and licensing in 1982. Numerous complaints similar toplaintiff's were filed against defendant across the countryfollowing various news magazine and newspaper articles, as well asa "20/20 Report" detailing adverse side effects of Halcion.

Plaintiff's complaint against defendant was based on claims ofnegligence (count I) and products liability (count II), and allegedthat defendant failed to adequately warn her of the detrimentaleffects of Halcion. Plaintiff's complaint was subsequently removedto the federal district court based on diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff was ordered two times by the district court to answeroutstanding discovery and to sign medical authorizations. InAugust 1992, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her federal complaint,but plaintiff was granted leave to refile it in state court. InOctober 1992, plaintiff retained an attorney who refiledplaintiff's complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. Inaddition to the claims against defendant, plaintiff added asdefendants Dr. John Karesh, the doctor who prescribed Halcion forher, and NorthCare Medical Group, where Karesh worked, allegingmedical malpractice (count III). In February 1996, the courtgranted summary judgment in favor of Karesh and NorthCare based onits determination that the claims against them were time barred bythe applicable statute of limitations, and they are not parties tothis appeal.

In early 1993, the trial court ordered plaintiff to answerinterrogatories on two occasions. In November 1993, defendantfiled a motion for sanctions based on plaintiff's failure to complywith discovery. Although the trial court denied the motion forsanctions, the court ordered plaintiff to answer discovery. In thesummer or autumn of 1994, defendant filed a motion to compelanswers to interrogatories. The trial court's ruling on thismotion is not contained in the record.

In May 1996, defendant filed three motions for summaryjudgment with respect to counts I and II of plaintiff's complaint;one based on lack of evidence of causation, one based on lack ofevidence of loss of income claim, and one based on adequacy ofwarnings. On June 18, plaintiff's attorney was granted leave towithdraw as plaintiff's counsel. During the summer of 1996,defendant filed a motion for relief from plaintiff's personalattacks on counsel. Neither the motion itself, nor the trialcourt's decision, is in the record.

Plaintiff filed her first motion for a continuance of thetrial date on October 22 in order to retain new counsel and toobtain defendant's Halcion database. Plaintiff was ordered on thisdate to answer Supreme Court Rule 213 interrogatories. 177 Ill. 2dR. 213. Thereafter, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion forcontinuance. At the hearing on this motion, the court questionedplaintiff about her discovery efforts and expressed its concernwith respect to her diligence in prosecuting the case. The courtstated that it had serious problems with whether plaintiff had donediscovery and advised plaintiff that this was her "last chance." At this hearing, plaintiff accused defense counsel of beingnotorious for harassing plaintiffs. Plaintiff filed a motion toreconsider, which the trial court granted. The trial was continuedfrom December 9, 1996, to August 21, 1997. Plaintiff was alsoordered to answer Rule 213(g) interrogatories by January 3, 1997.

In December 1996, plaintiff replied to defendant's motions forsummary judgment, relying on various documentary evidence. InJanuary 1997, defendant filed a motion to bar plaintiff frompresenting expert testimony based on her failure to comply with thecourt's order requiring her to answer Rule 213(g) interrogatories. On February 25, the trial court granted defendant's motion forsummary judgment on counts I and II, and on March 25, it deniedplaintiff's motion to reconsider its February 25 order grantingsummary judgment.

On April 22, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion toamend her complaint, allowing her to add claims for fraud (countIV), negligence (count V), products liability (count VI), andbattery (count VII) based on alleged misrepresentations made bydefendant. Defendant's subsequent motion to reconsider the orderallowing plaintiff to amend her complaint was denied. Defendantthereafter filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amendments to hercomplaint.

On June 18, the trial court granted defendant's motion torequire plaintiff to submit to an independent medical examination(IME). This motion had apparently been pending for over a year. On June 20, plaintiff filed a motion to continue the trial date,contending that the case had been in suspension from February 25(when summary judgment was granted on counts I and II of hercomplaint) until April 22 (when she was allowed to amend hercomplaint). In June, plaintiff filed a motion to compel productionof the Halcion database, which the trial court subsequently grantedon September 23. On July 1, plaintiff filed a motion to continuethe trial date to retain counsel, which the trial court deniedbased on its determination that plaintiff had not been diligent inprosecuting her case and had not demonstrated good cause for acontinuance. At the hearing, the court expressed to plaintiff itsconcern with her discovery efforts over the previous five years. Rather than answer the court's questions with respect to whatdiscovery remained, plaintiff engaged in an outburst and verballyattacked defendant. The court admonished plaintiff that it wouldnot tolerate such conduct. Because of plaintiff's outburst, thecourt continued the matter to later that day. When the hearingresumed, the court indicated to plaintiff that her case was injeopardy and that she had not answered Rule 213 interrogatorieseven though she had been ordered to do so. It then deniedplaintiff's motion to continue.

Sometime during the summer of 1997, the FDA commissioned theNational Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine (IOM) toconduct an independent review of Halcion. On July 9, the trialcourt granted defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's batteryclaim, but denied its motion to dismiss the negligence, fraud, andproducts liability claims. On July 10, the trial court grantedplaintiff's motion to reconsider its order of June 18, requiringplaintiff to submit to an IME. However, on July 22, the trialcourt again granted defendant's motion for an IME. Plaintiff'smotion to reconsider was denied and she underwent psychiatric andpsychological examinations in August 1997. Thereafter, in anemergency motion for an extension of time to file a brief on hermotion to compel production, plaintiff accused one of defendant'scounsel of faking surgery for the purpose of delay.

On July 23, the trial court continued the trial date fromAugust 21 to October 21, 1997, although the court did questionplaintiff as to what discovery she had done and admonished her toanswer the court's questions and cease being unresponsive. Thecourt further indicated that plaintiff was in the position she wasin with respect to discovery of defendant's documents due to her"own doings," e.g., her failure to review the documents when theywere produced in 1992. The court struck those portions ofplaintiff's motion for an extension of time that dealt with attacksupon defense counsel. During the hearing, plaintiff also accuseddefense counsel of lying to the court both at this hearing and onprevious occasions and demanded a transcript of the hearing so shecould respond in writing.

On September 13, the trial court entered an order barringplaintiff from presenting any opinion witnesses except thosepreviously disclosed and deposed, e.g., plaintiff's treatingphysicians. On September 18, plaintiff filed a motion to continuethe trial date based on her need to obtain the IOM report as wellas defendant's 8,500 patient study of Halcion. On September 23,plaintiff filed another motion to continue the trial date based onthe soon-to-be-released IOM report. At a hearing on this date,plaintiff accused defense counsel of lying to the court. The courtwarned plaintiff that it would censure her and told her there wereto be no more attacks in her written memorandum on "how bad"defendant and defense counsel were. Plaintiff was furtherinstructed that she was to cease her accusations that defensecounsel was lying. The court advised plaintiff that it wouldstrike her briefs in their entirety if she continued her conduct. On September 29, plaintiff amended her motion to continue. However, the motion was withdrawn based on plaintiff's pendingmotion to recuse Judge Cox for cause.

On October 3, plaintiff filed an amended motion to continuethe trial date based on the forthcoming IOM report. Plaintiffsupplemented this motion on October 7, alleging a history ofunethical conduct on the part of defendant's attorney, includingfabrication of data for defendant. The trial court grantedplaintiff's motion to continue based on the recent disclosure bydefendant of the IME reports and continued the trial from October21 to November 4. On October 17, the trial court deniedplaintiff's "Motion for Substitution of Judge." On October 24,plaintiff filed an emergency motion to continue the trial datebased on the imminent release of the IOM, which the trial courtdenied. At this hearing, plaintiff again accused defense counselof making false statements to the court. Plaintiff was admonishedabout this as well as the fact that what occurred in other Halcioncases in Cook County and the fact that continuances were granted inother cases, as plaintiff argued, were irrelevant because each casewas to be considered individually. The trial court also deniedplaintiff's subsequent October 27 motion to continue the trial. OnOctober 30, plaintiff advised defendant that she would not proceedto trial on November 4 and would allow the court to DWP her case.

On November 4, plaintiff renewed her motion to continue thetrial date, which the court granted; however, the court noted thatplaintiff had done little affirmatively to work up her case, inparticular, to disclose witnesses to prove up liability. The courtalso transferred the case to Judge Zwick for all furtherproceedings. On November 13, the IOM report was released. OnNovember 20, a status hearing was held at which time trial was setfor February 23, 1998, and discovery was cut off as of December 23,1997. At this hearing, plaintiff again accused defense counsel ofmaking misrepresentations to the court and distorting the truth. Plaintiff demanded that she be allowed to respond in writing. OnNovember 21, plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint to addpunitive damages claims.

Sometime in December, defendant filed a motion for summaryjudgment on plaintiff's fraud claim, apparently on the basis ofpreemption by federal law. Defendant also filed a motion forsanctions against plaintiff based on its contention that sheviolated a protective order entered in the case by sendingdefendant's Halcion database to an attorney in Texas. On December27, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's amendments toher complaint. On December 31, defendant filed a motion to barplaintiff's fact witnesses because they were identified after thediscovery cut off date, their testimony was not disclosed byplaintiff, or they were opinion witnesses.

In December 1997 or January 1998, plaintiff had apparentlyarranged for two different attorneys to act as her counsel. However, both counsel later declined to represent plaintiff basedon time constraints and the state of the record.

On January 9, 1998, defendant filed another motion for summaryjudgment on the fraud count, alleging that plaintiff had noevidence to establish reliance by the FDA on any allegedmisrepresentations by defendant. On the same day, the trial courtdenied plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint, concluding thather proposed claims were based on failure to warn, a claim uponwhich defendant had been previously granted summary judgment.

On January 28, defendant filed a motion to have facts deemedadmitted based on plaintiff's failure to answer defendant's requestfor admissions. On February 13, plaintiff filed an emergencymotion to designate an opinion witness on causation, whichplaintiff was later allowed to withdraw. On February 19, the trialcourt granted defendant's motion to bar fact witnesses. OnFebruary 23, the trial court continued the trial date to April 23. On March 3, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismisscounts IV and V of plaintiff's complaint, but granted defendant'smotion for a bill of particulars as to count IV. On March 6,plaintiff moved to supplement her response to one of defendant'smotions for summary judgment with the November 13, 1997, IOMreport. This request was denied on March 17. On March 27, thetrial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment onplaintiff's fraud count. Plaintiff filed an emergency motion toreconsider the grant of summary judgment to which she attachedvarious documents. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion toreconsider.

On April 21, plaintiff filed an emergency motion to continuethe trial date to retain counsel, which the trial court denied. Atthis hearing, plaintiff accused defense counsel of engaging intactics to keep her from obtaining the assistance of counsel thatshe needed, i.e., that defense counsel had persuaded an attorneywho had agreed to represent plaintiff from representing her. Plaintiff also accused defense counsel of making substantialmisrepresentations to the court. The trial court admonishedplaintiff, warning her to stop her repeated interruptions of theproceedings and interruptions when others were talking, and to stopwith her outbursts. Plaintiff renewed her motion to continue onApril 23, which the trial court again denied. The followingcolloquy then occurred:

"MS. MANN: *** I am not prepared toproceed to trial. So I would assume that thatmeans you will enter a dismissal for want ofprosecution.

THE COURT: I guess I should make thismore formal because I assumed something thatwas not true. For the record, is thedefendant ready to proceed to trial?

MS. WOODBURY [defense counsel]: Yes, yourHonor.

MS. SCHEVE [defense counsel]: Yes, yourHonor.

THE COURT: For the record, is theplaintiff prepared to proceed to trial?

MS. MANN: No, I am not.

THE COURT: Will you be prepared toproceed to trial any time this afternoon?

MS. MANN: No.

THE COURT: This court then has no otherrecourse then if the plaintiff is [un]preparedand unwilling to proceed at trial to dismissthe case.

***

The case is dismissed for want ofprosecution."

Thereafter, the trial court granted defendant's motion for costs. Plaintiff then filed a handwritten motion to vacate the DWP, whichthe trial court denied, stating it would not vacate an order it hadentered just five minutes previously. On May 8, plaintiff filed amotion to vacate the DWP pursuant to section 2--1301 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1301 (West 1998)) and an emergencymotion to withdraw the motion to vacate the DWP she had earlierfiled. On May 22, plaintiff amended her motion to vacate and, onMay 26, she filed a second amended motion to vacate as well as amotion to reconsider the trial court's order denying her motion tocontinue the trial date. On June 8, the trial court deniedplaintiff's motion to vacate the DWP. The next day plaintiff fileda motion to reconsider the June 8 order and, on June 16, she filedan amended motion to reconsider. On June 17, plaintiff filed acorrected amended motion to reconsider, which was denied on June18. On June 19, plaintiff filed a second amended motion toreconsider the order denying her motion to vacate the DWP and,sometime thereafter, she filed a third amended motion. On June 26,the trial court declined to hear plaintiff's third amended motionto reconsider. Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on July 1, whichshe amended on July 7. On July 7, plaintiff again requested thatthe court hear argument on her third amended motion to reconsider,and the trial court again declined to conduct a hearing on it. OnJuly 14, defendant filed its cross-appeal.

Generally, dismissal of a case for want of prosecution is nota final order which can be appealed since a plaintiff has anabsolute right to refile the case within one year of the dismissal. Wilson v. Evanston Hospital, 257 Ill. App. 3d 837, 839, 629 N.E.2d589 (1994). Pursuant to section 12--317 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/12--317 (West 1998)), where a plaintiff'saction is dismissed for want of prosecution, the plaintiff has theoption "to refile the action within one year of the entry of theDWP order or within the remaining period of limitation, whicheveris greater." S.C. Vaughan Oil Co. v. Caldwell, Troutt & Alexander,181 Ill. 2d 489, 497, 693 N.E.2d 338 (1998). A "trial court'sorder denying the vacature of [a] DWP must also be nonfinal andnonappealable since there is an absolute right to refile followingthat order." Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at 840. Similarly, a timelymotion to reconsider the denial of a motion to vacate does nottransform the DWP into a final and appealable order--this is simplya reaffirmation by the trial court of its earlier decision which inno way affects finality of the DWP. Wilson, 257 Ill. App. 3d at840. Only after the one-year period for refiling has expired doesa DWP become final and appealable. Vaughan, 181 Ill. App. 3d at502. Plaintiffs, however, are only entitled to one refiling of acause of action under section 13--217 following a voluntarydismissal. Timberlake v. Illini Hospital, 175 Ill. 2d 159, 164,676 N.E.2d 634 (1997).

In the instant case, the general rule with respect to thenonfinality of DWPs is not applicable because after the trial courtdismissed plaintiff's case for want of prosecution, plaintiff hadno right to refile her cause of action since she had already hadher one refiling under section 13--217 when she refiled hercomplaint in the circuit court in October 1992 following hervoluntary dismissal of her complaint in the federal court. SeeBryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 105, 672N.E.2d 1207 (1996). Accordingly, when the trial court dismissedplaintiff's entire complaint for want of prosecution on April 23,1998, at plaintiff's voluntary request, and denied her motion tovacate the DWP on June 8, 1998, the dismissal was with prejudiceand rendered the DWP order final. See Danaher v. KnightsbridgeCo., 56 Ill. App. 3d 977, 980, 372 N.E.2d 862 (1978) (order denyingmotion to vacate is final and appealable). In addition, becausethe rights of the parties were ascertained and absolutely fixed atthe time the trial court denied the motion to vacate on June 8, theprior court orders granting summary judgment, dismissing count IVof plaintiff's complaint, and denying plaintiff's various requestsfor continuances, all of which were nonfinal orders that did notcontain Rule 304(a) language, then became final orders. It was onJune 8 that the litigation was terminated upon the denial ofplaintiff's motion to vacate. Thus, all prior orders were subjectto appeal and plaintiff's notice of appeal filed on July 1, 1998,was timely.

Because plaintiff's entire cause of action was dismissed forwant of prosecution, the sole issue before this court is whetherthe trial court properly exercised its discretion in denyingplaintiff's motion to vacate the dismissal of her complaint forwant of prosecution. If the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in denying the motion to vacate, the remaining issuesraised by plaintiff are rendered moot since the DWP order disposedof the entire cause of action.

Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretionin denying her motions to vacate the DWP order by failing toconsider the requisite criteria pursuant to section 2--1301 of theCode of Civil Procedure. According to plaintiff, a review of thetranscripts of proceedings demonstrate that the trial court failedto analyze or state findings upon the required criteria forvacating an order. It is her contention that the overridingcriteria is whether substantial justice was done and that section2--1301, unlike section 2--1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2--1401 (West 1998)), forbids consideration of duediligence. Plaintiff claims that the only thing she could do waslet the trial court dismiss her case because she could not haveproceeded to trial pro se. She contends that she prosecuted hercase to the fullest extent of her abilities.

Pursuant to section 2--1301 of the Code of Civil Procedure,"[t]he court may *** on motion filed within 30 days after entrythereof set aside any final order or judgment upon any terms andconditions that shall be reasonable." 735 ILCS 5/2--1301 (West1998). The plaintiff, as the moving party, has the burden ofestablishing sufficient grounds for vacating the judgment. In reMarriage of Ward, 282 Ill. App. 3d 423, 432, 668 N.E.2d 149 (1996). "The primary concern in ruling on a motion to vacate is whethersubstantial justice is being done between the litigants and whetherit is reasonable under the circumstances to proceed to trial on themerits." Marren Builders, Inc. v. Lampert, 307 Ill. App. 3d 937,941, 719 N.E.2d 117 (1999). However, the court may also considerwhether a meritorious defense exists, due diligence, the severityof the penalty as a result of the judgment, and the hardship to thenonmovant if required to proceed to trial. Marren Builders, 307Ill. App. 3d at 941-42. The trial court should consider all eventsleading up to the judgment. Marren Builders, 307 Ill. App. 3d at943. " 'What is just and proper must be determined by the facts ofeach case, not by a hard and fast rule applicable to all situationsregardless of the outcome.' " Merchants Bank v. Roberts, 292 Ill.App. 3d 925, 932, 686 N.E.2d 1202 (1997), quoting Widucus v.Southwestern Electric Cooperative, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 102, 108,167 N.E.2d 799 (1960). The guiding principle is to preventdismissal when it would be unfair, unjust, and inequitable. Kirkv. Michael Reese Hospital and Medical Center, 275 Ill. App. 3d 170,173, 655 N.E.2d 933 (1995).

"The decision to grant or deny a motion to vacate *** lieswithin the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverseonly if the trial court abused its discretion." Marren Builders,307 Ill. App. 3d at 941. A trial court abuses its discretion "whenit acts arbitrarily without the employment of conscientiousjudgment or if its decision exceeds the bounds of reason andignores principles of law such that substantial prejudice hasresulted." Marren Builders, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 941. "Ifreasonable persons could differ as to the propriety of the trialcourt's actions, then the trial court cannot be said to haveexceeded its discretion." Merchants Bank, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 930. In the instant case, we find that while dismissal is a severepenalty, under the circumstances of this case, existing from thebeginning of the litigation, dismissal was a fair and just result,which did not deny plaintiff substantial justice. The recordclearly reflects a lack of due diligence on the part of plaintiff,a complete refusal to follow established litigation procedures, andthat plaintiff was certainly on notice as early as 1996 that hercase was in jeopardy. From very early on, plaintiff refused tocooperate with discovery. She refused to answer interrogatoriesand requests for production of documents, she refused to signmedical authorizations although ordered to do so at least twice bythe federal district court, and she refused to provide her medicalinformation and records to defendant even though such informationwas crucial to the issues in the case. Defendant was forced tobring several motions to compel as well as motions for sanctionsagainst plaintiff based on her refusal to cooperate with discovery. In fact, plaintiff was ultimately barred from presenting anyopinion witnesses except for her own treating physicians because ofher refusal to answer Rule 213 interrogatories.

Plaintiff's refusal to follow established procedures forpresenting, preparing, and trying her case also supports the trialcourt's decision. Plaintiff advised the court several times thatit was her intent to have the case litigated in a manner that wasdifferent than most products liability cases were litigated. Plaintiff repeatedly refused to answer the trial court's questionsduring oral arguments. Plaintiff ignored the court's comments fromearly on that it was concerned with what efforts she was taking tomove the case forward and that her position was in jeopardy. Asearly as October 1996, the trial court questioned plaintiff'sdiligence and discovery efforts. Such questioning was continuedthroughout the case by the various judges hearing plaintiff'smotions when they expressed their concerns with her discoveryefforts and manner of prosecution of her case. The judges'comments at the various hearings clearly made their concerns knownto plaintiff with respect to the adequacy of her evidence anddiscovery efforts. Additionally, although the trial courtattempted to apprise plaintiff of the procedures she needed tofollow, plaintiff did not follow its suggestions and continued toargue to the trial court that she intended to try this casedifferently than other cases.

The numerous continuances and delays occasioned by plaintiff'sconduct provide additional support for the trial court's decision. Although several of plaintiff's motions for continuances were basedon her request to obtain counsel, we note that plaintiff herselfchose to proceed pro se to protect her own interests and privacy. While we are not saying that plaintiff was not entitled to havecounsel represent her, she voluntarily made the decision toinitially proceed pro se and the case should not be further delayedin light of her insistence that she proceed pro se. See Clewell v.The Upjohn Co., No. 94--2383 (E.D. Pa. November 21, 1995).

Lastly, we find plaintiff's repeated attacks upon defendant'scounsel, both during oral argument and in her written documentsbefore the trial court, very disturbing. Plaintiff was advised bythe trial court that her conduct was improper and she wasadmonished on numerous occasions to cease her conduct. Plaintiffignored the court's admonishments and continued her attacks upondefense counsel. We also admonish plaintiff that such conduct wasimproper, as well as inexcusable.

In summary, the record in this case discloses a lack ofcooperation by the plaintiff in obeying court orders, indifferenceto the trial court's advice and admonishments, repeated attempts todelay the proceedings, and a failure to follow the rules of properprocedure. Plaintiff was the architect of her own predicament, andher complaint now that she was denied substantial justice will notbe heard by this court. Francone v. Weigel Broadcasting Co., Inc.,79 Ill. App. 3d 991, 993, 398 N.E.2d 1114 (1979). The trial courtindulged plaintiff and gave her many opportunities to proceed withher case, yet plaintiff did not avail herself of the court'sindulgence. This case has lingered in the circuit court for sixyears and, after all the delays, refusals, and lack of cooperationby plaintiff, it would not be reasonable to force defendant toproceed to trial. The trial court's decision to deny plaintiff'smotion to vacate its DWP order was reasonably made to preventfurther delays and expenses and to reach an end to this litigation. We conclude that substantial justice was done and that the trialcourt did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion tovacate the DWP order. Because the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion and because all claims were dismissed by the court's DWPorder, the remaining issues raised in this appeal are moot, as arethose raised in defendant's cross-appeal.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuitcourt of Cook County.

Affirmed.

HALL, P.J., and WOLFSON, J., concur.