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FIFTH DIVISION
December 3, 2004

This is an appeal from a dismissal in the circuit court of Cook County pursuant to section2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). At issue iswhether Shawn Mackie, a former employee of the Vaughan Chapter of the Paralyzed Veterans ofAmerica, Inc. (the Vaughan Chapter), has stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge byalleging he was terminated after reporting what he believed was the theft of chapter propertywhen a member of the chapter's board of directors downloaded the organization's mailing lists foruse by a private business. Because we conclude that Mackie has alleged sufficient facts to state acause of action for retaliatory discharge, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court forfurther proceedings.
 

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Mackie's complaint. Mackie was hired by theVaughan Chapter as a government relations director in January 2000. In September 2000,Mackie discovered what he believed to be the use of the chapter's mailing list for privatepurposes. Mackie suspected that Maurice Valerino, a member of the chapter's board of directors,downloaded mailing lists from the chapter's computers for use by Cybermeds, Inc., his medicalequipment sales business, and also for use by his wife's chiropractic practice. Mackie alleged thathe complained to Gustave Horn, president of the Vaughan Chapter, and to other board membersabout this use of the mailing list, and Horn told him to "[p]lay ball or be left in the dust."

In December 2000, a Vaughan Chapter member complained to Mackie about receivingunsolicited mailings from the businesses operated by Valerino and Valerino's wife. Believing thatthis complaint confirmed his suspicions, Mackie continued to object to this use of the VaughanChapter's resources. In March 2001, Mackie and a coworker filed a complaint with the veteran'sassociation police department, but the department refused to investigate, stating that this was aninternal matter to be resolved by the chapter. After Mackie filed the complaint, he wassuspended, and he and his coworker were subsequently terminated.

Mackie alleged that before the mailing list incident, he met the reasonable performanceexpectations of his superiors. After reporting the alleged misconduct, Mackie began receivingcomplaints about his performance. Mackie was moved from his office into a generaladministration area, his access to the Vaughan Chapter's computers was limited, and his workwas subject to heightened scrutiny.

Mackie filed a retaliatory discharge action in the circuit court of Cook County. TheVaughan Chapter moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code, arguing thatMackie failed to state a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. The circuit court agreed anddismissed Mackie's complaint with prejudice. Mackie appeals, contending he has stated sufficientfacts to assert a retaliatory discharge claim under the "citizen crime-fighter" theory recognized byIllinois courts.

STATING A CLAIM FOR RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

1. General Principles

The tort of retaliatory discharge is an exception to the general rule that an "at-will"employee can be terminated at any time with or without cause. Palmateer v. InternationalHarvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 128, 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1981); Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940F.2d 184, 186 (7th Cir. 1991). This tort balances the respective competing interests of employersand employees in efficient business operations and in earning a living. Belline, 940 F.2d at 186. Courts have recognized a limited and narrow cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Fellhauerv. City of Geneva, 142 Ill. 2d 495, 505, 568 N.E.2d 870, 875 (1991).

To state a claim for retaliatory discharge, an employee must allege that: (1) he or she wasdischarged; (2) in retaliation for the employee's activities; and (3) the discharge was incontravention of a clearly mandated public policy. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 134, 421 N.E.2d at881; Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d at 505, 568 N.E.2d at 875. Although no precise definition of publicpolicy exists, the supreme court stated in Palmateer that "public policy concerns what is right andjust and what affects the citizens of the State collectively." Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421N.E.2d at 878. Further, the matter "must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties,and responsibilities before the tort will be allowed." Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 130, 421 N.E.2d at878-79. Retaliatory discharge cases are generally allowed when an employee is discharged for:(1) filing a worker's compensation claim; or (2) reporting illegal or improper conduct. Lambert v.City of Lake Forest, 186 Ill. App. 3d 937, 941-42, 542 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (1989). Employees'refusal to work in conditions that are hazardous and those that violate standards set by Congresshave given rise to retaliatory discharge claims. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 185,384 N.E.2d 353, 358 (1978); Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 108 Ill. 2d 502, 510, 485N.E.2d 372, 377 (1985).

More specifically, retaliatory discharge claims have emerged under two theories: (1) a"clear mandate" action, alleging that the complained-of conduct contravenes a clearly mandatedpublic policy, but not necessarily a law; and (2) a "citizen crime-fighter" theory. Stebbings v.University of Chicago, 312 Ill. App. 3d 360, 369, 726 N.E.2d 1136, 1143 (2000). Citizen crime-fighter cases usually involve an employee terminated for "whistle-blowing" or telling of acoworker's commission of an alleged crime; however, the crime does not have to be work-related. See Belline, 940 F.2d at 187; Vorpagel v. Maxell Corp. of America, 333 Ill. App. 3d 51,56, 775 N.E.2d 658, 662 (2002).

2. Illinois Cases

The tort of retaliatory discharge in this state emerged in 1978 with the supreme court'sdecision in Kelsay, where the plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for filing a worker'scompensation claim. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356. The court reasoned thatworker's compensation law provided efficient and expeditious remedies for injured employees,and threatening to terminate an employee for filing such a claim seriously undermines this scheme. Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 181-82, 384 N.E.2d at 357.

The supreme court further defined the retaliatory discharge cause of action in Palmateer,in which the plaintiff claimed he was discharged after 16 years of employment for supplyinginformation to law enforcement authorities that a company employee might be involved incriminal activities. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 127, 421 N.E.2d at 877. The supreme court held thatthe complaint was improperly dismissed and found that the plaintiff was fired in violation of anestablished public policy that favors citizen crime-fighters. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 132, 421N.E.2d at 879. The court stated: "There is no public policy more important or more fundamentalthan the one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens." Palmateer,85 Ill. 2d at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879. The actual crime that the plaintiff alleged was nevermentioned in Palmateer, and, in response to the employer's argument that the suspected crimecould be a minor offense, the supreme court stated that the magnitude of the alleged offense wasnot an issue, reasoning that the Illinois legislature has decided that even "the theft of a $2screwdriver" is a problem resolved by the criminal justice system. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 133,421 N.E.2d at 880.

The Illinois Supreme Court also recognized a retaliatory discharge cause of action inWheeler, where the plaintiff alleged he was discharged in retaliation for refusing to handleradioactive material as part of his job duties and where the defendant operated in violation ofNuclear Regulatory Commission rules. Wheeler, 108 Ill. 2d at 505, 485 N.E.2d at 374. Infinding that the plaintiff stated a cause of action, the supreme court held that "[t]he protection ofthe lives and property of citizens from the hazards of radioactive material is as important andfundamental as protecting them from crimes of violence." Wheeler, 108 Ill. 2d at 511, 485N.E.2d at 377. Further, the supreme court found that Congress had effectively declared a clearlymandated public policy in the legislation that the plaintiff had cited. Wheeler, 108 Ill. 2d at 511,485 N.E.2d at 377.

In contrast to those cases, our supreme court has not recognized causes of action forretaliatory discharge in Fellhauer, 142 Ill. 2d at 510, 568 N.E.2d at 877 (no public policyviolation existed where plaintiff sued town mayor because state municipal code allowed mayor toremove any officer that he appointed; therefore, allowing plaintiff's claim would frustrate mayor'sdiscretionary authority over appointments), Gould v. Campbell's Ambulance Service, Inc., 111Ill. 2d 54, 58, 488 N.E.2d 993, 995 (1986) (relevant statutory provisions and ordinance failed toshow the existence of a clearly mandated public policy), or Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d520, 527, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357 (1985) (no public policy violation existed because UnitedStates Constitution does not provide protection against private individuals or corporations whoabridge free expression of others).⁽¹⁾

For its part, the Illinois Appellate Court has recognized retaliatory discharge claims underthe citizen crime-fighter test when a plaintiff has a reasonable belief that a law or federal statute isbeing violated. In Stebbings, the plaintiff discovered, while performing a study for the Universityof Chicago, that the study participants were being exposed to a much higher level of radiationthan had been approved and that the United States Department of Energy had issued a stop-workorder. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 363, 726 N.E.2d at 1139. The plaintiff was fired afterinsisting that the radiation exposure be reported to the institution that funded the project, since theUniversity was required by law to "file an assurance that it would do certain things." Stebbings,312 Ill. App. 3d at 371, 726 N.E.2d at 1144. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaintpursuant to section 2-615. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 364, 726 N.E.2d at 1139. On appeal,this court found that the plaintiff stated a cause of action for retaliatory discharge under thecitizen crime-fighter model. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 371, 726 N.E.2d at 1144. The plaintiffbelieved in good faith that the University was violating the law by not complying with federalfiling requirements. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 371, 726 N.E.2d at 1144. Further, the courtreasoned that the fact that the reported conduct did not constitute a criminal act did not diminishthe plaintiff's claim, stating that the tort of retaliatory discharge applies not only where criminalstatutes are violated but also where federal regulations are breached. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3dat 372, 726 N.E.2d at 1145.

Similarly, Johnson v. World Color Press, Inc., 147 Ill. App. 3d 746, 754, 498 N.E.2d 575,580 (1986), recognized a cause of action for retaliatory discharge where the plaintiff objected tocompany accounting practices that he believed violated federal securities laws. The courtreviewed the law and the requirement of truthful reporting to the government and found thatpublic policy favors "disclosure, truthfulness and accuracy in the financial reports made bybusinesses to the government and to the public." Johnson, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 750, 498 N.E.2d at578. An employee who reasonably believes that his employer is violating these policies should beprotected when he voices an objection. Johnson, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 750, 498 N.E.2d at 578.

Likewise, in Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp, 111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 509, 444 N.E.2d588, 593 (1982), the appellate court found that the plaintiff stated facts sufficient to survive amotion to dismiss when he was discharged for researching a financial discrepancy that he believedmay have been due to criminal conduct. The plaintiff noticed a discrepancy in the company'sfinancial records and reported it to the president and chief executive officer, who told him topursue an investigation. Petrik, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 503, 444 N.E.2d at 589. The plaintiff warnedthe president that the discrepancy might violate Illinois' criminal laws, and the plaintiff wasdischarged in retaliation for his efforts to uncover the possible embezzlement of corporate funds. Petrik, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 504, 444 N.E.2d at 589. The company argued that because the plaintiffdid not notify public authorities but rather voiced his opinions to company officials, the matterwas an internal dispute, thus rendering Palmateer's holding inapplicable. Petrik, 111 Ill. App. 3dat 507, 444 N.E.2d at 592. The appellate court disagreed, holding that this was "something morethan an ordinary internal dispute," and stating that the public policy considerations underlyingPalmateer, such as enforcing the Criminal Code and protecting citizen crime-fighters, supportedthe plaintiff's conduct. Petrik, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 508, 444 N.E.2d at 592.

In contrast to those cases, no such public policy or illegal or improper criminal conductwas found where a plaintiff reported to his employer, the City of Lake Forest, that a coworkercommitted suicide due to job-related pressures. Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 542 N.E.2d at1221. The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge claim because even thoughthe complaint stated a cause of action, the facts adduced at trial did not support the allegations. Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 542 N.E.2d at 1221. After the suicide, the deceasedemployee's widow sued the city, and the plaintiff's supervisors told the plaintiff and other workersnot to talk to the widow or her attorney. Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 939, 542 N.E.2d at 1217. The plaintiff again told a supervisor that he believed the suicide was work-related. Lambert, 186Ill. App. 3d at 939, 542 N.E.2d at 1217. The plaintiff's next job performance evaluationsconcluded that his performance did not meet expectations, and on two occasions, the city offeredthe plaintiff money to resign, but the plaintiff refused. Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40, 542N.E.2d at 1217-18. The plaintiff believed that his supervisors were asking him to commit perjury;however, the court found this was an internal city investigation and stated that withholding thetruth here "[did] not affect anyone other than the City." Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 542N.E.2d at 1221. The court also did not find that the plaintiff was exposing illegal or improperconduct. Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 542 N.E.2d at 1221. The court held that this actiondid not concern any clearly mandated public policy and that only the city was affected, as opposedto the citizens of the State collectively. Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 542 N.E.2d at 1221. The court reversed a judgment awarding the plaintiff more than $98,000 in damages forretaliatory discharge. Lambert, 186 Ill. App. 3d at 938, 542 N.E.2d at 1217. See also Doherty v.Kahn, 289 Ill. App. 3d 544, 551-52, 682 N.E.2d 163, 169 (1997) (plaintiff failed to state a causeof action for retaliatory discharge when plaintiff alleged conspiracy because public policiessurrounding covenants not to compete and unfair competition do not affect overall welfare ofcitizens; only contractual relationship between employer and employee was affected).

3. Federal Cases Applying Illinois Law

Two federal cases interpreting Illinois law have recognized causes of action for retaliatorydischarge when the plaintiffs alleged that their employers committed acts that were either illegalor improper and the plaintiffs were terminated after reporting that conduct. See Belline, 940 F.2dat 185; Tanzer v. The Art Institute of Chicago, No. 02-C-8115 (N.D. Ill. 2003). In Belline, theSeventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee alleged sufficient facts to state aretaliatory discharge claim when the employee believed that theft occurred when a manager hadauthorized her to give merchandise to a local Rotary club and the manager never entered paymentfor the goods. Belline, 940 F.2d at 185. The defendant corporation argued that the manager'sactivities may not have been illegal, given the company's policy of donating goods to charitableorganizations. Belline, 940 F.2d at 188. However, the court of appeals stated that the claimshould not depend on the chance of whether the actions were criminal; rather, public policy favorsthe reporting of activity that is apparently criminal. "That the questionable conduct may laterprove to be authorized and therefore legitimate is not dispositive." Belline, 940 F.2d at 188. In Tanzer, slip op. at 9, the United States District Court for the Northern District ofIllinois, Eastern Division, held that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to survive a motion todismiss. The plaintiff, an employee of the Art Institute of Chicago, alleged in her complaint thather employer committed some type of fraud when she was told to remove names from a donationwall because they were inconsistent with the employer's "one name, one gift" policy. Tanzer, slipop. at 2. This occurred after the plaintiff's supervisors approved the design and the donatingfamily had given money on the condition that the wall would include the names of all familymembers. Tanzer, slip op. at 2. If family members asked about the absence of their names, theplaintiff was instructed to respond that the names "just fell off" of the wall. Tanzer, slip op. at 2-3. The federal district court framed the issue as whether the plaintiff reasonably thought the ArtInstitute's acts were illegal or improper, not whether the acts actually were illegal or improper,and the court concluded that the plaintiff reasonably could have believed that her employer wouldbe committing some type of fraud if she followed her supervisor's orders. Tanzer, slip op. at 8-9. The court clarified that in denying the Art Institute's motion to dismiss, it was not determiningthat the Institute's actions constituted fraud; rather, the court concluded that given those facts, itwas possible that the plaintiff believed that fraud occurred. Tanzer, slip op. at 8.

ANALYSIS

When the legal sufficiency of a complaint is challenged by a motion to dismiss undersection 2-615, the court takes as true all well-pleaded facts and draws all reasonable inferences infavor of the plaintiff; the court must then determine whether these allegations are sufficient toestablish a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. Stroger v. Regional TransportationAuthority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 516, 778 N.E.2d 683, 688 (2002). A dismissal is appropriate onlywhere no set of facts would entitle the plaintiff to recover. Wheeler, 108 Ill. 2d at 505-06, 485N.E.2d at 374.

The Vaughan Chapter contends that the courts in Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill.2d 407, 422, 430 N.E.2d 976, 983 (1981), and in Doherty, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 551-52, 682N.E.2d at 169, exercised an abuse of discretion standard, stating that a trial court's granting of amotion to dismiss would not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. However, the chapterstops short of arguing that an abuse of discretion standard applies here, acknowledging thatStebbings applied a de novo standard of review. Indeed, our supreme court has held that thiscourt's review of a dismissal under section 2-615 is de novo. Wallace v. Smyth, 203 Ill. 2d 441,447, 786 N.E.2d 980, 984 (2002); Stroger, 201 Ill. 2d at 516, 778 N.E.2d at 688. We thereforeobserve the de novo standard of review.

Again, to state a retaliatory discharge claim, an employee must allege that: (1) he or shewas discharged; (2) in retaliation for the employee's activities; and (3) the discharge was incontravention of a clearly mandated public policy. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 134, 421 N.E.2d at881. The parties agree that the first two elements are present. The Vaughan Chapter argues thatunder the third prong, Mackie's claim lacks an important public policy argument. The chapterasserts that the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized the narrow scope of retaliatory dischargeactions and that Mackie's claim represents an unwarranted expansion of the tort.

In summarizing the tort of retaliatory discharge, the Stebbings court noted that Palmateerexpanded retaliatory discharge actions to whistle-blowers who were reporting conduct that waseither illegal or improper. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 366, 726 N.E.2d at 1140. Stebbingsdescribed two layers of law that apply to a citizen crime-fighter case. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3dat 370-71, 726 N.E.2d at 1144. First, statutes, constitutional provisions or case law mustmandate a public policy of reporting crime; the Stebbings court notes, however, that sincePalmateer, "there is little question that such a policy has been clearly mandated and so this layerof law will rarely be at issue" in a citizen crime-fighter suit. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 370-71,726 N.E.2d at 1144. Second, a law must prohibit the conduct that the employee reported orrefused to engage in, and the employee must have a good-faith belief that the law prohibits theconduct in question. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 371, 726 N.E.2d at 1144. A plaintiff needonly have a good-faith belief that the defendant was violating the law; the plaintiff need notconclusively show that the law was broken or the regulations in question were violated. Stebbings, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 371, 726 N.E.2d at 1144.

Federal courts have elaborated on this portion of Illinois law as well. The Seventh CircuitCourt of Appeals stated in Belline that it is irrelevant if the illegal act involved an insignificantsum. Belline, 940 F.2d at 188. The court stated: "[A]n employee's retaliatory discharge claimshould not turn on the happenstance of whether the irregular conduct she reports is actuallycriminal," noting that public policy favors the exposure of apparently criminal activity. Belline,940 F.2d at 188. In Tanzer, the federal district court stated that retaliatory discharge claims haveexpanded to cases in which employees reported illegal or improper conduct to their employers. Tanzer, slip op. at 6. The Tanzer court held: "The issue is not whether the acts the Art Instituterequested that Tanzer commit were illegal or criminal. The issue is whether Tanzer could havereasonably thought these requests were improper or illegal acts." Tanzer, slip op. at 8.

In his complaint, Mackie alleged that he believed Valerino used the Vaughan Chapter'sresources for personal profit. Mackie argues that a clearly mandated public policy exists in favorof employees who report potentially criminal activity, and he asserts that he does not have toplead or prove that the reported acts were actually criminal but, under Stebbings, he need onlypossess a good-faith belief that a crime was committed. The Vaughan Chapter responds thatMackie's discharge did not violate a clear mandate of public policy because no established policyprotects citizens from receiving unsolicited mailings. The chapter further asserts that no lawprohibits a board member from using mailing lists of a nonprofit organization for a privatebusiness, and that, therefore, Mackie's claim does not meet the requirement in Stebbings that alaw prohibit the complained-of conduct.

Therefore, this court must determine whether Mackie has alleged that Valerino engaged inconduct that Mackie believed in good faith was prohibited by law. Mackie asserts that the mailinglist was taken without obtaining approval or consent of the Vaughan Chapter or its members andwas used for personal profit. Mackie argues a trier of fact could conclude that he reasonablybelieved that Valerino was engaging in a criminal act.

Theft occurs when a person knowingly obtains control over property by deception. 720ILCS 5/16-1(a)(2) (West 2000). The statute defines property as: written instruments representingrights concerning anything of value, labor or services; documents; computer data; and whole orpartial copies. 720 ILCS 5/15-1 (West Supp. 1993). Because a mailing list can take any of thoseforms, it is a type of property that can be stolen.

In other jurisdictions, misappropriation of a mailing list has been contested in court as atrade secret claim rather than a theft claim. In Town & Country House & Home Service, Inc. v.Newbery, 3 N.Y.2d 554, 559, 170 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332, 147 N.E.2d 724, 726 (1958), thedefendants left the plaintiff's company to form a competing business. The Court of Appeals ofNew York (that state's highest court) ruled that the plaintiff could enjoin the defendants fromsoliciting former customers and could recover damages or lost profits resulting from thedefendants' solicitation of the plaintiff's customers. Town & Country, 3 N.Y.2d at 561-62, 170N.Y.S.2d at 334, 147 N.E.2d at 728. The New York court found that the plaintiff's customer listwas a trade secret because it had taken a great deal of time to create and could not be found inany other public source; therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to injunctive relief. Town & Country,3 N.Y.2d at 561, 170 N.Y.S.2d at 332, 147 N.E.2d at 727.

More recently, in Schiller & Schmidt, Inc. v. Nordisco Corp., 969 F.2d 410, 411 (7th Cir.1992), the plaintiff company sued a former employee who created a competing company, claimingthat the former employee misappropriated trade secrets and infringed on its copyright. When thedefendant left the plaintiff company, he took the plaintiff's mailing list and catalog pictures to usein his own competing catalog. Schiller & Schmidt, 969 F.2d at 411. The Seventh Circuit Courtof Appeals held that the use of the pictures was not copyright infringement but awarded damagesof $16,545 for misappropriation. Schiller & Schmidt, 969 F.2d at 411. The misappropriation ofthe mailing list was conceded, and damages were the only issue. Schiller & Schmidt, 969 F.2d at415. The court stated that, "[s]ince the taking of the list was knowing and intentional - it reallywas theft - Schiller could have sued for Nordisco's profit attributable to the theft." Schiller &Schmidt, 969 F.2d at 415. The Seventh Circuit noted, however, that damages would be limited,and possibly nonexistent, because much of the mailing list contained names compiled by a productmanufacturer that could be purchased by any catalog house. Schiller & Schmidt, 969 F.2d at 415.

The Vaughan Chapter contends that no theft occurred because Valerino did not take themailing list away from the chapter and because the information was used in a manner that did notinterfere with the chapter's access to the list or otherwise permanently deprive the chapter ofpossession of the list.⁽²⁾ The chapter argues that thieves do not use, borrow, or download; theytake. However, theft can occur where the perpetrator does not fully dispossess the owner of anyproperty, as illustrated by identity theft, memorizing a secret recipe, copying a combination to asafe, or downloading confidential files to a computer disk. At oral argument, counsel for theVaughan Chapter conceded that the mailing list constituted the chapter's property. According tothe bystander's report included in the record, Mackie argued in the trial court that the mailing listcould be worth between $500 and $1,000. Considering the definition of property in Illinois' theftstatute, it is reasonable to conclude that Valerino's conduct could constitute theft and that Mackiehad a good-faith belief that the downloading of the chapter's mailing list was a criminal act.

The Illinois Supreme Court in Palmateer established a public policy favoring citizencrime-fighters, and courts have interpreted this to mean that public policy favors the reporting ofpotentially illegal or improper conduct. In Palmateer, the plaintiff reported a possible violation ofthe Illinois Criminal Code without any further description of the potential crime, and the supremecourt did not mention the crime allegedly committed or the reasonableness of the plaintiff'sallegation.

Here, Mackie alleged that Valerino committed theft by downloading and using the mailinglist. The definition of theft in Illinois recognizes an offense of obtaining unauthorized control overproperty or deception in control over property. Mackie believed in good faith that Valerino'sdownloading and use of the chapter's mailing list for two privately owned, for-profit businesseswas an unauthorized use of the chapter's resources amounting to theft. Because the citizencrime-fighter approach to retaliatory discharge favors Mackie's reporting what appeared to becriminal conduct, and what Mackie saw seemed to be the theft of the chapter's resources,Mackie's complaint satisfies the third prong of a cause of action for retaliatory discharge.

We note that this case is before us at the pleadings stage. To Mackie's knowledge,Valerino did not have the Vaughan Chapter's approval to use the mailing list. Valerino's use ofthe mailing list may not constitute theft if other circumstances exist, and the Vaughan Chapter willhave the opportunity to present those facts to the trial court on remand. While we express noopinion as to the ultimate validity of Mackie's claim, we find that, having drawn all reasonableinferences in Mackie's favor, his complaint is sufficient to state a cause of action for retaliatorydischarge under the citizen crime-fighter approach.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of Mackie's complaint and remand thiscase to the trial court for further proceedings on his retaliatory discharge claim.

Reversed and remanded.

CAMPBELL, P.J., and NEVILLE, J., concur.

1. In Buckner v. Atlantic Plant Maintenance, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 12, 17, 694 N.E.2d 565, 568(1998), the Illinois Supreme Court overruled the opinion of the Second District Appellate Courtin Fellhauer v. City of Geneva, 190 Ill. App. 3d 592, 546 N.E.2d 791 (1989), that a claim forretaliatory discharge may only be brought against the employer and not against the employee oragent who discharged the plaintiff. However, the supreme court's ruling in Fellhauer on thepublic policy issue was not overturned in Buckner.

2. On page 19 of its appellate brief, the Vaughan Chapter contends that Mackie admittedthat the use of the mailing list did not constitute theft. However, reading the quoted portion ofMackie's brief in context, we note that Mackie was paraphrasing the chapter's position, addingthat the chapter "does not get to decide if such conduct is criminal."