MacDonald v. Hinton
Case Date: 09/30/2005
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-05-0441 Rel
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THIRD DIVISION
Plaintiff Tammy MacDonald appeals from the order of the circuit court of Cook County granting defendant William Hinton's motion to dismiss her complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)). Plaintiff sued defendant, who employed her son Nicholas Michael James until he was murdered by one of his co-workers, convicted murderer David Maust, for damages under the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2004)), the "survival statute" of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2004)), and the family expense statute (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2004)) based on breach of a duty to warn James of the danger posed by Maust. On appeal, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing her complaint because she stated a claim that: (1) defendant breached his duty to warn James that Maust was a convicted murderer; and (2) that "[d]efendants are directly liable for negligently hiring and retaining a violent person known to pose a risk to others, without issuing a simple warning." We affirm. On May 20, 2004, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant. In response, on June 4, 2004, defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, requesting that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2004)) on two primary grounds. First, defendant contended that plaintiff was statutorily barred from asserting such a claim by the exclusive remedy provided in the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2004)). Second, defendant argued that plaintiff sought to impose a duty on employers to warn employees about violent tendencies of other employees and to anticipate their possible criminal acts, which is not required by law. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to defendant's motion. On August 30, 2004, the court declined to grant defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, but directed plaintiff to file an amended complaint by September 27, 2004. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on September 13, 2004. Therein, plaintiff alleged that in May 2003, defendant employed Maust and her 19-year-old son James at his trophy business, Trophies Are Us II, in Dolton, Illinois. Defendant also owned a residential apartment building in Hammond, Indiana, and leased an apartment to James and another to Maust. Occasionally, defendant also employed James and Maust to perform repair work at the apartment building. Maust befriended James at work and frequently provided James with transportation to and from their mutual places of residence and work. Subsequently, Maust assaulted and killed James. Maust buried James's body in the basement of defendant's apartment building. The homicide did not occur while the men were engaged in the course of their employment at Trophies Are Us. Plaintiff alleged that defendant knew that Maust was "a convicted killer who constituted a mortal danger to young men such as [James] with whom he was able to make acquaintance through mutual employment or otherwise." Defendant also knew of the relationship that had developed between James and Maust, and that James was not likely to become aware of the "mortal danger" posed by Maust on his own. Therefore, plaintiff asserted, defendant was negligent insofar as he breached a duty to warn James that Maust was "a convicted killer," whose "previous victims were young males," and that "Maust had established an acquaintance or some other sort of personal relationship with his previous victims prior to killing them *** suddenly, brutally and without warning." Plaintiff concluded that James's death was proximately caused by defendant's breach of duty to warn James about Maust. Accordingly, in count I of the complaint, plaintiff sought damages for James's death pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act (740 ILCS 180/0.01et seq. (West 2004)). In count II, plaintiff sought damages for mental and physical injuries to James leading to his death, as well as damages for "certain items of clothing, valuables and personal effects belonging to [James] [which] were lost or destroyed in the course of Maust's assault," pursuant to section 27-6 of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/27-6 (West 2004)). In count III, plaintiff sought compensation for the expenses of James's funeral and cremation pursuant to the Illinois Family Expense Statute, which is section 15 of the Rights of Married Persons Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2004)). On January 12, 2005, following more briefing and argument, the circuit court granted defendant's motion and dismissed plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. The court specifically found that plaintiff failed to plead any cognizable duty on the part of defendant. Plaintiff filed her timely notice of appeal from that order on February 10, 2005. On appeal, plaintiff first contends that she stated a claim of negligence against defendant based on a breach of defendant's duty to warn James about Maust. Specifically, plaintiff relies on section 471 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency (Restatement (Second) of Agency |
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