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FIRST DIVISION
August 19, 2002

The Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and BenefitFund of Chicago denied Robert Luchesi's application for dutydisability benefits because he failed to have physical therapyfollowing a shoulder injury. On administrative review the trialcourt reversed the board's decision, finding that no law madefirefighter's benefits contingent on receiving medical treatment. The board, on appeal, claims that Luchesi's failure to performphysical therapy constitutes an intervening cause breaking thecausal connection between the shoulder injury and the disability.

We reject the board's argument because no evidence supportsthe conclusion that Luchesi would not be disabled if he hadperformed all prescribed physical therapy. As the injury remainsa cause of Luchesi's disability, the board improperly deniedLuchesi's application for benefits. We affirm the trial court'sjudgment reversing the board's decision.

On March 30, 1998, the Chicago fire department took a firetruck out of service when it broke down. Luchesi and anotherfirefighter tried to move a ladder from that fire truck to afunctioning fire truck that needed a ladder. Luchesi needed tostep backwards with the ladder. As he did so he fell backwardsover an object another firefighter left on the floor. Anambulance took Luchesi to a nearby hospital. The fire station'slog has a notation that Luchesi "fell on his tailbone." The logalso reflected that doctors at the hospital found that Luchesisuffered "lumbar & shoulder contusion."

The doctor treating Luchesi referred him to physicaltherapy. When the shoulder failed to improve after months ofphysical therapy, the doctor ordered a magnetic resonance imaging(MRI) test. The radiologist reported no remarkable results fromthe MRI. Luchesi's treating physician reported "mild progress"from the physical therapy, but with significant limitations. Thedoctor prescribed injections to reduce the pain.

Despite Luchesi's continuing efforts at physical therapy,his shoulder did not heal. In October 1998 his doctor referredhim to an orthopedic surgeon. The surgeon examined Luchesi,reviewed the MRI and X rays, and recommended an arthroscopy. When the surgeon operated in January 1999 he found a partial tearof the rotator cuff, an anterior labrum tear, and a slap lesion. The surgeon performed debridements of both tears, adecompression, and a resection.

Luchesi began a new course of physical therapy following thesurgery, but he attended only three sessions. Although thesurgeon prescribed an extended course of physical therapy,Luchesi refused any further treatment. The fire departmentterminated Luchesi's employment on March 12, 1999, becauseLuchesi missed medical appointments.

On April 1, 1999, Luchesi applied for duty disabilitybenefits pursuant to section 6-151 of the Illinois Pension Code(the Code) (40 ILCS 5/6-161 (West 1998)). Dr. George Motto, aphysician for the board, examined Luchesi.

The board held a hearing to consider the application. Luchesi testified that in the accident on March 30, 1998, helanded on his back and shoulder and he heard his shoulder pop. He had no previous problems with his shoulder.

The board presented a summary of the days Luchesi missedwork due to health problems. The records showed that the firedepartment hired Luchesi in February 1980. Over the next 18years Luchesi missed a total of 172 days for a variety ofillnesses and injuries, none involving the shoulders. A boardmember, James Joyce, used the records for questioning Luchesi. Joyce found that Luchesi lost a year following the March 1998injury for a total of more than 520 days off for health reasonsin 19 years with the department. Joyce said:

"It looks like you average one month a year off work. I find that very unusual.

Then when you get down to your injury it[']sreported as something to your lower back and then itcomes out it is your shoulder and you started rehab butyou quit rehab.

And there is a lot of inconsistencies. Verydifficult to follow your case."

Two of Luchesi's coworkers corroborated his testimony aboutthe accident, but they admitted that they did not see exactly howLuchesi landed. They agreed that Luchesi had not previouslycomplained of inability to do any of the work, and they knew ofno prior shoulder problems.

Dr. Motto testified that the present condition of Luchesi'sshoulder prevented him from performing the duties of afirefighter. He found that atrophy, due to the lack of physicaltherapy following the operation, "would contribute" to thedisabled condition of the shoulder. Motto said that Luchesi"obviously had a serious injury to his *** shoulder," and "thatinjury was operated upon."

On cross-examination Luchesi's attorney specifically askedwhether Motto found that Luchesi's disability resulted solelyfrom the lack of physical therapy. Motto answered:

"No, I am not saying that. What I am saying isthat I can not make a proper determination as to hislevel of [f]unctional [c]apacity; what it would havebeen if he had had the rehabilitation."

Motto also admitted that he saw no evidence of any incident otherthan the accident on March 30, 1998, that would have caused theshoulder injury. Counsel asked whether the present disabilitywas related to the March 1998 accident. Motto said:

"[H]e does have the shoulder injury. *** But hiscondition today is as much a result of the shoulderinjury as the therapy for that injury or the absencethereof.

***

*** I can't say what therapy would have done untilI see the end result of therapy.

***

*** [T]he surgery was for the shoulder injury. The therapy would have been follow-up to the surgery."

On redirect Motto said he was not "rendering an opinion"that the March 1998 accident caused the shoulder injury, althoughhe reiterated that he saw no evidence of any other cause for thatinjury. He concluded again that the lack of physical therapycontributed to the disability.

The board found:

"The Fire Department logs *** prepared at the timeof the alleged injury reveal that the applicant fell onhis tailbone. There is no mention in said FireDepartment logs of any injury to the applicant'sshoulder.

*** The medical records establish that in June,1998 the applicant underwent an MRI examination whichconcluded that 'unremarkable MRI of the left shoulder'[sic]. ***

*** The applicant underwent surgery in January,1999. The surgery revealed a tear in the left shoulderrotator cuff.

*** After the surgery the applicant failed toundertake the prescribed physical therapy. As of thedate of the hearing, the applicant still had notengaged in any physical therapy for his allegedshoulder injury.

***

*** None of the witnesses called by the applicantto testify on his behalf at the hearing testified thatthey actually saw what had happened to the applicantwhen he allegedly was injured. None could testify asto what part of his body had hit the ground.

*** George S. Motto, M.D. concluded that theapplicant is unable to perform his duties as afirefighter in the Chicago Fire Department at thecurrent time.

*** The applicant is unable to perform his dutiesas a firefighter due to the lack of use of hisshoulder, atrophy and severe de-conditioning. Theatrophy in the applicant's shoulder was the result ofhis failure to undergo physical therapy following hissurgical procedure. The applicant failed to undergo astandard prescribed total surgical rehabilitationprogram."

From these findings of fact, the board concluded thatLuchesi failed to meet his burden of proving that "his disabilitywas the result of a specific injury resulting from an act or actsof duty."

Luchesi filed an action for administrative review of thedenial of duty disability benefits. The trial court found thatthe board made erroneous findings of fact, and the record showedthat Luchesi injured his shoulder in the accident on March 30,1998. The court expressly held that section 6-151 of the Code(40 ILCS 5/6-151 (West 1998)) did not disqualify an applicantfrom receiving benefits if the applicant failed to attend everymedical appointment. Accordingly, the court reversed the board'sdecision.

We review the board's decision rather than the circuitcourt's judgment. Thigpen v. Retirement Board of Firemen'sAnnuity & Benefit Fund, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1010 (2000). Theparties disagree about the standard of review we must apply inthis case. Luchesi admits that in most cases on administrativereview, this court should not disturb the agency's findings offact unless the manifest weight of the evidence contradicts thosefindings. Oregon Community Unit School District No. 220 v.Property Tax Appeal Board, 285 Ill. App. 3d 170, 175 (1996). Butthe "deferential standard is not controlling where the [agency]is prejudiced or biased against the claimant and incapable ofgiving him a fair hearing." Danko v. Board of Trustees of theCity of Harvey Pension Board, 240 Ill. App. 3d 633, 641 (1992). Luchesi argues that the record here shows that the board harboredprejudice against Luchesi.

To show bias, the plaintiff must show that members of theadjudicating body had to some extent adjudged the facts as wellas the law of the case in advance of hearing it. Waste Managementof Illinois, Inc. v. Pollution Control Board, 175 Ill. App. 3d1023, 1040 (1988). Luchesi points to the board's erroneousfindings of fact and board member Joyce's antagonistic commentsduring cross-examination of Luchesi as proof of bias.

In Danko the chairman of the board that denied theclaimant's application had supervised the claimant when theclaimant was first suspended, and the chairman had also suspendedthe claimant again, pending termination. The claimant alsotestified that prior to the hearing the chairman told theclaimant the board would "run [him] dry." Danko, 240 Ill. App. 3dat 637. In light of this background, several of the chairman'scomments during the hearing, including calling the claimant aliar, showed that the chairman had in some measure adjudged thefacts prior to the hearing.

Luchesi, on the other hand, presented no evidence that anyboard members knew of Luchesi at all prior to the hearing, orthat they indicated any hostility to Luchesi before the hearingbegan. Here, as in Citizens for a Better Environment v.Pollution Control Board, 152 Ill. App. 3d 105, 112-13 (1987), thestatements during and after the hearing do not constitute clearand convincing evidence that board members entered the hearingwith closed minds. See also Flaherty v. Retirement Board of thePolicemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 311 Ill. App. 3d 62, 68(1999). Because the record does not convincingly demonstrate theboard's bias, we review the record deferentially, and we willdisturb the board's findings of fact only if they contravene themanifest weight of the evidence. If the record sufficientlysupports the findings of fact, we then apply the law to thosefacts. Oregon, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 176. While we givesubstantial weight to the agency's interpretation of law, we mustindependently analyze the law in applying it to the facts. Oregon, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 175-76.

We agree with the trial court that the record contradictsseveral of the board's findings. Although the board found thatthe fire department's log did not mention injury to Luchesi'sshoulder, a review of the log shows that it recorded thediagnosis of Luchesi's injury as a "lumbar & shoulder contusion." On appeal the board makes no effort to defend the erroneousfinding. The record also showed that Luchesi attended threephysical therapy sessions following surgery, although the boardfound he "had not engaged in any physical therapy" followingsurgery.

Due to the manifestly erroneous findings, we follow thereview procedure we outlined in Johnson v. Human Rights Comm'n,318 Ill. App. 3d 582, 587 (2000). First, we look to the factualfindings that are not contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence. If those findings provide a sufficient basis for theagency's decision, we will affirm the decision. If thosefindings, considered alone, cannot justify the decision, wecannot affirm that decision on the basis of the agency'sfindings. We then review the record to decide whether to remandthe case for further proceedings. We cannot evaluate thecredibility of the witnesses or resolve conflicts in theevidence. If we find that differing resolutions of suchconflicts or credibility issues could support differingresolutions of the case, we must remand the case to the agencyfor further findings of fact. But when the record permits onlyone determination, regardless of any credibility issues orconflicting evidence, we may order that resolution of the case.

The record here supports the board's finding that no witnessother than Luchesi himself could say what part of his body hitthe floor in the accident of March 30, 1998. A radiologist foundLuchesi's MRI unremarkable. In January 1999, Luchesi underwentshoulder surgery and the surgery revealed a tear of the rotatorcuff. After the surgery Luchesi failed to follow the prescribedcourse of physical therapy. Motto examined Luchesi and foundthat he could not perform the duties of a firefighter.

According to Motto, Luchesi's failure to follow theprescribed course of physical therapy contributed to theshoulder's condition. This testimony supports the board'sfactual finding that Luchesi's disability resulted from the lackof use of his shoulder.

But a disability may result from multiple causes. Aclaimant need not prove that a duty-related accident is the solecause, or even the primary cause, of his disability. Barber v.Board of Trustees, 256 Ill. App. 3d 814, 818 (1993); Hart CarterCo. v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ill. 2d 487, 494 (1982). Theclaimant must prove only that the duty-related accident is acausative factor contributing to the claimant's disability. HartCarter, 89 Ill. 2d at 494.

The board's factual findings do not expressly include anyfinding that his shoulder injury was not a causative factorcontributing to his disability. Any such finding would becontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, since Motto gavehis uncontested opinion that the shoulder injury remained a causeof the disability. The board did not find that the shoulderinjury might have resulted from a cause other than the accidentof March 30, 1998. Neither did the board find that the accidentof March 30, 1998, occurred outside of the course of Luchesi'sduties. Because the board's sustainable findings do not rule outthe possibility of a duty-related cause for Luchesi's disability,the sustainable factual findings do not provide a sufficientbasis for the board's conclusion that Luchesi failed to producesufficient evidence of entitlement to a duty disability benefit.

Next, we review the uncontroverted evidence in the record todetermine whether any factual issues require further hearingbefore the board. The evidence shows that before March 30, 1998,Luchesi had no problems with his shoulder. On that date he hadan accident in the course of performing duties for the firedepartment. Doctors found shoulder contusions. When physicaltherapy and pain-killing injections failed to improve theshoulder's condition, a surgeon decided to operate. Theunremarkable MRI did not convince the surgeon that Luchesisuffered no injury or that he exaggerated his symptoms. Thesurgeon found the rotator cuff torn, and he found other damage tothe shoulder. Motto agreed that Luchesi's shoulder had beenseverely injured, and he could see no evidence of any event otherthan the accident on March 30, 1998, as a cause of the injury. The record forces the conclusion that a duty-related accident ledto the need for shoulder surgery.

The board contends that Luchesi's subsequent failure toundergo physical therapy constitutes a superseding cause of hiscontinuing disability. For this argument the board relies onMulack v. Hickory Hills Police Pension Board, 252 Ill. App. 3d1063 (1993), which applied two cases interpreting the Workers'Compensation Act (the Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 1998))to the interpretation of the Code. The argument requires anunderstanding of the similarities and differences between theCode and the Act.

The Act and the Code serve similar purposes, and courtsproperly use the Act to aid interpretation of the Code. Mitsuuchi v. City of Chicago, 125 Ill. 2d 489, 493-94 (1988). Our legislature designed the Act and the Code to provideemployees prompt and equitable compensation for their injuries,while protecting employers from the uncertain exposure of suitsat common law from injured employees. Mitsuuchi, 125 Ill. 2d at494. Courts construe both the Act and the Code liberally infavor of the applicant to achieve their beneficial purposes.Wilfert v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity & BenefitFund, 263 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543 (1994).

The Act requires payment of compensation to employees foraccidental injuries "arising out of and in the course of theemployment." 820 ILCS 305/2 (West 1998). The Code requirespayment of duty disability benefits to any firefighter whobecomes disabled "as the result of a specific injury, or ofcumulative injuries, *** incurred in or resulting from an act oracts of duty." 40 ILCS 5/6-151 (West 1998). The Code sectionapplicable to disabled police officers similarly requires paymentof benefits if the disability is "the result of injury incurred*** in the performance of an act of duty." 40 ILCS 5/5-154 (West1998). Courts have interpreted the causal test under the Code assimilar to the test under the Act. O'Callaghan v. RetirementBoard of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 302 Ill. App. 3d 579,583 (1998).

The Act requires the claimant to accept appropriate medicalcare or face a reduction of benefits:

"If any employee *** shall refuse to submit tosuch medical, surgical, or hospital treatment as isreasonably essential to promote his recovery, theCommission may, in its discretion, reduce or suspendthe compensation of any such injured employee." 820ILCS 305/19(d) (West 1998).

While this section of the Act authorizes the reduction orsuspension of benefits based on the refusal of medical care, theAct does not authorize denial of benefits for any injury arisingout of employment. The Code includes no parallel to section19(d) of the Act. Neither the Act nor the Code permits denial ofbenefits for failure to get medical care - as long as the injuryor disability results from acts in the course of employment.

In Joliet Motor Co. v. Industrial Board, 280 Ill. 148(1917), an employee injured his eye in the course of his work andsought compensation under the Act. Doctors recommended operatingon the eye, estimating a 75% chance of full recovery of use ofthe eye. Joliet, 280 Ill. at 149-50. The claimant refused theoperation. Although the uncontradicted evidence showed nopossibility of danger from the operation, the IndustrialCommission awarded the claimant compensation, finding it couldnot force the claimant to have the operation. On the employer'sappeal our supreme court held:

"The fact that the board had no power to force [theclaimant] to submit to an operation did not determinethe question involved, which was whether the total lossof sight was attributable to the accident, which causedthe slow growth of a cataract, or to an unreasonablerefusal of [the claimant] to have the cataract, whichcaused the loss of vision, removed. The statutoryprovision for reducing or suspending compensation if anemployee *** shall refuse to submit to such medical orsurgical treatment as shall be reasonably essential tohis recovery does not apply to an original applicationfor compensation on account of an entire loss of thesight of an eye, where the question to be decided iswhether that loss is due to an unreasonable refusal toremove the cause. The evidence was that the proposedoperation would not be attended with any risk andappears to be such as any reasonable man would takeadvantage of if he had no one against whom he couldclaim compensation, and the board found that it was theduty of [the claimant] to have the operation performed. Under that finding the refusal of [the claimant] wasunreasonable, and the continued total loss of sightshould be attributed to such refusal and not to theaccident." Joliet, 280 Ill. at 151.

Thus, the court held that the refusal of medical care inthat case constituted the sole operative cause of the claimant'scondition. If the refusal had not been the sole cause of thecontinuing disability, the continuing disability would havearisen out of the accident as well as the refusal, and then,under the terms of the Act, the claimant would have a right tocompensation, reduced or suspended due to the unreasonablerefusal of medical care. The court expressly held that thesection of the Act permitting a reduction or suspension ofbenefits did not apply to the circumstances of that case. Instead, the court held that the claimant's condition did notarise out of the accidental injury.

The court followed Joliet in Mt. Olive Coal Co. v.Industrial Comm'n, 295 Ill. 429 (1920). In that case an employeebroke his arm at work. Due to the manner in which the tendonshealed, he needed a subsequent procedure to restore his hand tofull utility. He refused to undergo the surgery, although thedoctor testified that the simple and safe procedure would correctthe problem. Our supreme court held that the accident entitledthe employee to an award of temporary total disability benefitsunder the Act. However, the court found that "the permanentdisability of defendant in error is due to his refusal to submitto this simple operation and not due to the accident." Mt. Olive,295 Ill. at 433.

The board argues that Joliet and Mt. Olive establish thatany unreasonable refusal of medical care becomes the cause of anydisability, regardless of whether the testimony shows that themedical treatment would likely have completely overcome thedisability. Under that interpretation, Joliet and Mt. Olivewould render section 19(d) of the Act a nullity. Theunreasonable refusal of medical treatment could never presentgrounds for a partial reduction in compensation if it alwaysdemanded a complete denial of compensation. Our supreme courtdid not purport to nullify section 19(d) of the Act. The courtexpressly held that the section did not apply to the facts of thecase. We cannot accept the board's interpretation of Joliet andMt. Olive.

In Mulack the court applied Joliet and Mt. Olive to a casearising under the Code. The police officer in Mulack injured hisknee while chasing a suspect. One doctor recommended operatingon the knee while another recommended physical therapy withoutsurgery. The board awarded the officer temporary disability butrequired him to undergo surgery before it would award himpermanent disability. The officer refused surgery, deciding tostay in physical therapy, and the board terminated disabilitypayments, finding that the refusal of surgery caused thedisability to continue.

The appellate court reversed. First, the court noted thatthe court in Mt. Olive and Joliet held that an unreasonablerefusal of medical treatment may constitute the sole cause of aclaimant's continuing disability. Mulack, 252 Ill. App. 3d at1069. Although the court recognized that the Code lacked anyprovision parallel to section 19(d) of the Act, the court foundJoliet and Mt. Olive applicable to determination of whether aduty injury resulted in a claimant's disability under the Code. But the court held that the record in Mulack did not support theboard's finding that the officer refused surgery unreasonably. In light of the conflicting medical opinions, the court orderedthe payment of disability benefits. Mulack, 252 Ill. App. 3d at1071.

We agree with the court in Mulack that Joliet and Mt. Oliveguide our interpretation of whether a claimant's disabilityresulted from an act of duty, within the meaning of the Code. Inboth Joliet and Mt. Olive the court held that the claimants'unreasonable refusal of treatment constituted an intervening solecause of the claimant's disability. Here, Luchesi unreasonablyrefused to continue in physical therapy following surgery.

But in Joliet and Mt. Olive the evidence supported theconclusion that if the claimant had undergone the recommendedprocedure, he would have regained use of the injured part to theextent that he could fully engage in his former occupation. Thatis, in both cases doctors testified that but for the claimant'srefusal of medical treatment, he would have, more likely thannot, overcome the disability. Thus, in both cases the evidenceshowed not only that the refusal of medical treatment caused thecontinuing disability, but also that the original injury did notcause the disability to continue.

Here, Motto testified that he could not determine what thelikely result would have been if Luchesi had kept going tophysical therapy. He could not say that physical therapy would,more likely than not, return Luchesi to a condition in which hewould be capable in which he would be capable of performing theduties of a firefighter. Motto clarified that both the shoulderinjury that led to the surgery and the lack of physical therapycontributed to Luchesi's disability.

If Luchesi sought compensation under the Act, rather thanbenefits under the Code, his failure to follow through withphysical therapy would qualify under section 19(d) for thereduction or suspension of compensation. See City of Jennings v.Clay, 719 So. 2d 1164, 1168 (La. App. 1998) (under state workers'compensation statute authorizing reduction of benefits forrefusal of medical treatment, 50% reduction upheld where claimantrefused postoperative physical therapy); Luttrell v. CardinalAluminum Co., 909 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Ky. App. 1995) (under stateworkers' compensation statute authorizing elimination of benefitsif unreasonable refusal of medical treatment prolongs disability,court affirmed reduction in award commensurate with extent towhich refusal contributed to continuing disability). But thatfailure does not warrant the denial of compensation altogether,because the evidence does not show that the refusal of treatmentcounts as the sole cause of his condition. Joliet and Mt. Oliveeliminated benefits, rather than reducing them under the Act,only because the evidence in those cases showed that thedisabilities would not have continued if the claimants had all ofthe recommended treatments.

While the Code largely parallels the Act, it differsmarkedly by the absence of any provision similar to section 19(d)of the Act. The Act authorizes the reduction or suspension ofcompensation when the claimant unreasonably refuses medicaltreatment, but the Code does not authorize such a reduction orsuspension of benefits. From the use of different provisions wemust presume that the legislature intended different results tofollow. In re K.C., 186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50 (1999); Siciliano v.Village of Westchester Firefighters' Pension Fund, 202 Ill. App.3d 964, 967 (1990). The legislature apparently sought to providesomewhat greater protection for police officers and firefightersthan the Act provided for other kinds of employees. While mostinjured employees may have compensation reduced or suspended forfailing to have all necessary medical treatment, the Codeauthorized no reduction, leaving injured firefighters andofficers with full disability benefits, even if they refusedmedical treatment.

Mulack identifies a qualification of the general rule: ifthe refusal of treatment rises to the level of a supersedingcause of continuing disability, then the Code permits the denialof benefits. But where, as here, the record lacks evidence thatthe claimant would have recovered the ability to work as afirefighter or police officer if he had all recommendedtreatment, the refusal constitutes only one of several causes ofthe continuing disability. It does not qualify as a supersedingsole cause of the continuing disability. In such a case Jolietand Mt. Olive would not warrant a complete denial of compensationunder the Act; instead, section 19(d) would allow suspension orreduction of compensation. In the absence of a provisionparallel to section 19(d), the Code permits no such reduction orsuspension of benefits. In accord with the legislative intent toprovide greater protection for police officers and firefighters,we hold that absent proof that Luchesi would have fully recoveredif he had all recommended treatment, his refusal of treatmentdoes not justify any reduction in benefits under the Code. Luchesi here presented evidence that the duty-related accident onMarch 30, 1998, is one cause of his disability, and the boardheard no evidence that his subsequent refusal of physical therapywas the sole cause of his continuing disability.

The board argues that the court must nonetheless affirm itsdecision based upon section 6-153 of the Code, which provides:

"Proof of duty, occupational disease, or ordinarydisability shall be furnished to the Board by at leastone licensed and practicing physician appointed by theBoard. *** The Board may require other evidence ofdisability." 40 ILCS 5/6-153 (West 1998).

The board interprets this statute to mean that if the claimantseeks a duty disability, the doctor the board appoints musttestify not only that the claimant is disabled, but also that thedisability qualifies as a duty disability. Thus, the board'sdoctor must say that the disability resulted from an act or actsof duty within the meaning of section 6-151 of the Code.

Here, Motto found Luchesi disabled by the condition of hisshoulder, and he saw no evidence of any event other than theaccident on March 30, 1998, that caused the initial shoulderinjury. But he specifically answered that he was not renderingan opinion that the incident on March 30 caused the shoulderinjury. According to the board, this answer completely defeatsclaimant's application for duty disability benefits.

We disagree. In interpreting section 6-153 we emphasizeagain our duty to construe the statute liberally in favor ofawarding benefits, in accord with the purpose of the Code. Wilfert, 263 Ill. App. 3d at 543.

Section 6-153 follows three separate sections establishingrules regarding duty disability benefits (40 ILCS 5/6-151 (West1998)), occupational disease disability benefits (40 ILCS 5/6-151.1 (West 1998)), and ordinary disability benefits (40 ILCS5/6-152 (West 1998)). The reference to "duty, occupationaldisease, or ordinary disability" in section 6-153 (40 ILCS 5/6-153 (West 1998)) clarifies that the requirements for proof ofdisability in that section apply to all three kinds of disabilitydescribed in the three preceding sections. Section 6-153establishes that a claimant cannot recover benefits under any ofthe three preceding sections unless the board's doctor agreesthat the claimant suffers a disability. See Nowak v. RetirementBoard of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 315 Ill. App. 3d403, 411-12 (2000).

The legislature showed the intent to restrict the reach ofsection 6-153 to proof of disability by specifically authorizingthe board, in that section, to "require other evidence ofdisability." 40 ILCS 5/6-153 (West 1998). Moreover, if thelegislature required medical testimony to establish that thecause of the disability arose from duty, one would expect thelegislature to also require medical testimony that the cause ofdeath arose from duty in those cases in which death benefitsdepend on whether the firefighter died in the performance of anact of duty. We find no requirement of medical testimony toestablish the right of a firefighter's widow to an annuity underthe Code, although the amount of the annuity depends on whetheran act of duty caused the death. See 40 ILCS 5/6-140, 6-141, 6-141.1 (West 1998). Just as the legislature did not require suchtestimony for widows, it also did not intend section 6-153 torequire medical testimony that the performance of a duty causedthe disability. Because Motto testified that he found Luchesidisabled, Luchesi met the proof requirement of section 6-153.

We recognize that other judges have read section 6-153 torequire a claimant seeking duty disability benefits to have theboard's physician furnish proof that an act of duty resulted inthe disability. See Thigpen, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1023 (McBride,J, dissenting). To obviate the need for remand if our supremecourt should reject our interpretation of section 6-153, we findthat on such a remand we would hold that Motto furnishedsufficient proof of duty disability. He unequivocally foundLuchesi disabled, and he testified that Luchesi's disabledcondition was "as much a result of the shoulder injury as thetherapy for that injury or the absence thereof." By so stating,he furnished proof that the shoulder injury was one of thefactors resulting in the disability. He further testified thathe saw no evidence of any event other than the March 1998accident that could have caused the shoulder injury. Thistestimony furnishes proof supporting the conclusion that theMarch 1998 incident resulted in the disability. See Thigpen, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1019-20. The evidence before the board showedthat the injury on March 30, 1998, occurred while Luchesiperformed his duties as a firefighter. Thus, Motto's testimonysupplied the necessary causal connection between the duty-relatedaccident and the continuing disability. Even if section 6-153requires the board's doctor to furnish proof that a duty-relatedincident resulted in the claimant's disability, Luchesi here metthat requirement. Section 6-153 provides no grounds foraffirming the board's decision.

The record before the board flatly contradicted several ofthe board's findings, so the findings are contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence. The uncontroverted evidencebefore the board showed that Luchesi injured his shoulder whileperforming an act of duty as a firefighter and that shoulderinjury is one of the factors that resulted in his continuingdisability. Section 6-151 of the Code entitles Luchesi toreceive duty disability benefits. Section 6-153 requires theboard's doctor to furnish proof that the claimant is disabled;Motto here furnished the requisite proof. If the board wishes toreduce or suspend the benefits payable to a claimant likeLuchesi, who unreasonably refuses medical treatment that mightimprove his condition, the board needs to persuade thelegislature to amend the Code to include a provision similar tosection 19(d) of the Act. Under the Code the legislatureenacted, the evidence before the board demands the conclusionthat Luchesi has the right to receive duty disability benefits. The trial court correctly reversed the board's decision.

Affirmed.

COHEN, P.J. and COUSINS, J., concur.