Logemann Holding, Inc. v. Lieber

Case Date: 06/26/2003
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-02-0649 Rel

FOURTH DIVISION
June 26, 2003


No. 1-02-0649

 

LOGEMANN HOLDING, INC., ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
                      Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Cook County
)
                      v. ) No. 95 L 13531
)
ELFRIDE LIEBER, d/b/a Lieber )
Werkzeugmachinenfabrik Lubbecke, a  )
German citizen; OTTO LIEBER d/b/a )
Lieber Werkzeugamaschinenfabrik )
Lubbecke, a German citizen; BAERBEL )
LIEBER, d/b/a Lieber )
Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik; a German )
citizen, LIEBER WERKZEUGMASCHINENFABRIK )
LUBBECKE, a German business entity;  )
and LIEBER MACHINE TOOL COMPANY, an )
Illinois corporation, )
)
                       Defendants-Appellees )
)
(Sheriff of Cook County, ) Honorable
) Thomas P. Quinn,
                       Respondent). ) Judge Presiding.

 

JUSTICE GREIMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Logemann Holding, Inc., obtained a judgmentagainst the several defendants in the United States DistrictCourt for the Eastern District of Wisconsin on January 16, 1992. Thereafter, it sought to register the judgment in the circuitcourt of Cook County on September 13, 1995. Without contest, thejudgment was registered pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement ofForeign Judgments Act (Uniform Act) (735 ILCS 5/12-650 (West1994)).

Eventually, plaintiff discovered a parcel of real estate inIllinois in which the same defendants had an interest. Accordingly, on January 8, 2000, eight years after entry ofjudgment in Wisconsin and 4 1/2 years after registration inIllinois, plaintiff, pursuant to the Uniform Act, delivered adirection to levy that real estate to the sheriff of Cook County. The sheriff, however, declined to execute the levy because thedirection to levy was placed more than seven years after theentry of judgment in Wisconsin. Thereafter, plaintiff sought anorder from the circuit court of Cook County directing the sheriffto proceed with the levy.

The issue before us is whether the life of a foreignjudgment is measured from the date it is entered in theoriginating state or from the date it is registered in Illinois. The trial court held that the laws of the state of originationgovern; however, for the reasons set forth hereafter, we reverse. The Uniform Act, which was adopted in Illinois in 1951, isintended to make easier the enforcement of judgments across statelines.

In coming to our conclusion, we must examine with care thelanguage of the Uniform Act. Section 12-652 provides:

A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the acts of Congress or the statutes of this State may befiled in the office of the circuit clerk for any county of this State. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manneras a judgment of the circuit court for any county of this State. A judgment so filed has the same effect and is subject to thesame procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a circuit court for any countyof this State and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner." 735 ILCS 5/12-652 (West 1994).

In Light v. Light, 12 Ill. 2d 502 (1957), a Missouri statuteprovided for conclusive presumption of payment of a judgmentafter 10 years from the date of entry. Under the Uniform Act,the judgment was filed in Illinois less then 10 years afterjudgment was entered, but enforcement was not sought until afterthe 10 year period had run.

The Light court was clear that the dormancy period beginsupon the registration in Illinois. The court said:

"Under the Uniform Act, unless the registration is set aside after a hearing, it is the registered judgment that becomes the finaljudgment of the Illinois court. [Citation.] Such a provision is essential to the act's purpose of protecting the priority of thecreditor who levies on the foreign judgment. The act thus contemplates that the vitality of the foreign judgment is to bedetermined as of the date that it is registered. And in this case the judgment was registered under the statute several monthsbefore the ten-year period expired." (Emphasis added). Light, 12 Ill. 2d at 508-09.

We are faced with a similar set of facts in the instantmatter. Wisconsin law provides that no execution on the judgmentshall issue after five years of the rendition of the judgment andthen provides a process for reviving the judgment on applicationto the court up to 20 years. Wis. Stat. Ann.