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FIRST DIVISION
September 15, 2003

Plaintiff, Eugenia Lipscomb, individually and as mother ofNicole Lipscomb, a minor, filed a five-count complaint againstdefendant, Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., d/b/a St.James Hospital and Health Center. The complaint alleged thatdefendant wrongfully suspected Nicole had been sexually abused,which resulted in the wrongful investigation and detention ofNicole, and the emotional distress and defamation of plaintiff. The complaint also alleged that defendant prohibited Nicole fromleaving its premises until she had been "cleared and released" bythe Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).Defendant filed a motion to dismiss all counts of the complaintunder section 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)), claiming that it was immune fromliability under section 9 of the Abused and Neglected ChildReporting Act (Reporting Act) (325 ILCS 5/9 (West 2000)). Section9 grants immunity for certain required reporting duties andinvestigations of abuse under the Reporting Act. On April 18,2002, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss withprejudice. Plaintiff appeals.

We review whether the trial court properly granted defendant'smotion to dismiss de novo. Neppl v. Murphy, 316 Ill. App. 3d 581,583, 736 N.E.2d 1174 (2000). The following background facts aretaken from the complaint and the record.

Nicole Lipscomb, an eight-year-old minor and plaintiff'sdaughter, was a resident of Cook County, Illinois. Defendant is ahospital corporation with principal places of business in ChicagoHeights and Olympia Fields, Illinois. On December 23, 2000,plaintiff brought Nicole to the emergency room at defendant'sChicago Heights "campus" for treatment of a fever. In theemergency room, defendant, through its employees, conducted avariety of laboratory tests on Nicole including a urinalysis.

After the first test, plaintiff was informed that theurinalysis indicated "trace amounts of spermatozoa, moderatebacteria levels, and [pH] of 7.5." Because of the spermatozoafinding, plaintiff was advised that defendant was required to callthe Chicago Heights police and DCFS due to the possibility that thechild had been sexually abused. Immediately thereafter, theChicago Heights police appeared at the hospital and began toquestion plaintiff.

When plaintiff learned of the urinalysis results, she insistedthat defendant had confused Nicole's test results with those ofanother patient, and plaintiff requested that a second urinalysisbe conducted. Defendant repeated the urinalysis and the secondtest revealed, "no spermatozoa present, slight bacteria level, anda [pH] of 6.0."

Defendant then insisted upon performing a vaginal examinationon Nicole. After the vaginal exam, defendant advised plaintiffthat no evidence of abuse was found and that the first urinalysiswas misidentified as being Nicole's. Defendant apologized toplaintiff for the embarrassment, anxiety, and distress caused byits error.

Defendant then informed plaintiff that Nicole's fever couldnot be treated at the Chicago Heights "campus" and that she wouldhave to be transferred to the "campus" at Olympia Fields. Nicolewas then transferred by ambulance to Olympia Fields, where she wasadmitted and brought to a room. Once in the room, plaintiffalleged that defendant's agents began questioning plaintiff andNicole about child abuse. Further, plaintiff claimed thatdefendant's agents insisted on performing multiple and repeatedvaginal examinations on Nicole. Defendant then recontacted DCFSabout possible child abuse and informed plaintiff that she wouldnot be permitted to take Nicole home until DCFS consented to herrelease.

Plaintiff claims that she repeatedly advised defendant'sagents at the Olympia Fields campus that personnel at the ChicagoHeights campus had recognized their laboratory error, had examinedNicole, and had determined that Nicole had not been sexuallyabused. Plaintiff alleged that she encouraged personnel at theOlympia Fields campus to review Nicole's file sent by the ChicagoHeights campus to confirm that the first urinalysis indicating thepresence of spermatozoa had been misidentified as Nicole's.

Even though Nicole's fever had subsided on December 24, 2000,defendant refused to permit plaintiff to take Nicole home. OnDecember 25, 2000, plaintiff expressed concern to Dr. Minor thatDCFS had not yet contacted her about the allegations of abuse. Thedoctor agreed to contact DCFS. When the DCFS hotline wascontacted, a DCFS employee indicated that no record of a casereport had been filed, but that the doctor's call on December 25,2000, would constitute an official report. Because plaintiff wasunwilling to allow Nicole to remain alone at the hospital,plaintiff was forced to stay at the hospital over the Christmasholiday and until December 26, 2000, when Nicole was finally "cleared and released" by DCFS.

On August 28, 2001, plaintiff filed a five-count complaintagainst defendant alleging false imprisonment (count I), invasionof privacy (count II), battery (count III), intentional inflictionof emotional distress (count IV), and defamation (count V). As wenoted above, the trial court dismissed these counts with prejudiceon April 18, 2002. While there is no transcript of the hearing onthe motion to dismiss in the record, the parties agree the trialcourt's basis for dismissing the complaint was that defendant wasimmune from liability under section 9 of the Reporting Act.

We now address whether the trial court properly granteddefendant's motion to dismiss. As pointed out above, the standardfor reviewing a motion to dismiss granted under section 2-619 is de novo. Neppl, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 583. This court has stated:

"In a section 2-619 motion, all well-pleaded allegations in support of the claimare taken as true and all reasonableinferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor. [Citations.] A section 2-619 motion should begranted only if no set of facts can be proventhat would support the plaintiff's cause ofaction. [Citation.]" Nosbaum v. Martini, 312Ill. App. 3d 108, 113, 726 N.E.2d 84 (2000).

Like a summary judgment motion, the trial court can considerthe affidavits and evidence submitted by the parties under section2-619(c). Nosbaum, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 114. Additionally:

"An appeal from such a dismissal is similar toone following a grant of summary judgment. [Citation.] 'The appellate court mustconsider whether the existence of a genuineissue of material fact should have precludedthe dismissal or, absent such an issue offact, whether dismissal is proper as a matterof law.' [Citation.]" Nosbaum, 312 Ill. App.3d at 114.

As background, we note that "parents enjoy an inherent right tothe care and custody of their own children." Lehman v. Stephens,148 Ill. App. 3d 538, 547, 499 N.E.2d 103 (1986). However, "theState, in its recognized role as parens patriae, is the ultimateprotector of the rights of minors." Lehman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at547. Further:

"The State is substantially interested inproviding for [a minor's] health, safety, andwelfare, and may properly step in to do sowhen appropriate. [Citations.] While thisparens patriae interest in promoting thewelfare of the child favors preservation, notseverance, of natural family bonds [citation],the countervailing State interest incurtailing child abuse is also great. Incases of suspected abuse or neglect, the Statehas a clear interest in protecting the child[citation], and may, if necessary, go as faras to separate neglectful parents from theirchildren [citation]. As such, the parents'needs or rights may be considered secondary tothe State's strong interest in protectingchildren where the potential for abuse orneglect exists." Lehman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at547.

To serve this objective, DCFS has been charged with upholding theState's interest in preventing child abuse or neglect. Lehman, 148Ill. App. 3d at 547.

Section 4 of the Reporting Act provides that, among others,any physician, hospital, or personnel engaged in the examination,care, and treatment of persons, "having reasonable cause to believea child known to them in their professional or official capacitymay be an abused child or a neglected child[,] shall immediatelyreport or cause a report to be made to the Department [DCFS]." 325ILCS 5/4 (West 2000).

The definition of "Abused child" in section 3 of the ReportingAct, "means a child whose parent *** commits or allows to becommitted any sex offense against such child." 325 ILCS 5/3(c)(West 2000).

Section 9 of the Reporting Act states, in pertinent part:

"Any person, institution or agency, underthis Act, participating in good faith in themaking of a report or referral, or in theinvestigation of such a report or referral ***or in the retaining a child in temporaryprotective custody *** shall have immunityfrom any liability, civil criminal or thatotherwise might result by reason of suchactions. For the purpose of any proceedings,civil or criminal, the good faith of anypersons required to report or refer, orpermitted to report, cases of suspected childabuse *** shall be presumed." 325 ILCS 5/9(West 2000).

Under section 9, defendants are statutorily presumed to haveacted in good faith and, therefore, are immune from suit when theyreport a case of suspected child abuse or neglect. Lehman, 148Ill. App. 3d at 551. However, in Lehman, the court pointed out:

"Any such presumption, however, is rebuttable. In Illinois, a rebuttable presumption createsa prima facie case of the particular issueinvolved. Here, that issue is the good faithof the defendants. It is then incumbent uponthe party against whom the presumptionoperates to come forward with evidencesufficient to meet the presumption. [Citation.] As such, Illinois recognizes theso-called 'bursting bubble' theory regardingpresumptions: once evidence is introducedcontrary to the presumption, the bubble burstsand the presumption vanishes. [Citations.]The party intending to rebut the presumptionmust come forward with evidence ' "sufficientto support a finding of the nonexistence ofthe presumed fact." ' [Citation.] Shouldthis be the case, the presumption would ceaseto operate, and the issue in dispute would bedetermined as if no presumption ever existed. [Citation.] Only then, with the presumptionmet, would the burden here shift from theplaintiffs to the defendants. On the otherhand, if no evidence is introduced to thecontrary, then the prima facie case createdunder the presumption will prevail, and thedefendants would be entitled to judgment as amatter of law." Lehman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at551.

We must therefore determine whether defendant's conductamounted to a "reporting" under section 9 of the Reporting Act. Ifso, good faith is presumed, thus triggering the statutory immunityafforded under section 9. If the acts are not "reporting," thereis no presumption of good faith. However, immunity is stillafforded a defendant if it "participat[ed] in good faith *** in theinvestigation of such a report or referral" under the ReportingAct. 325 ILCS 5/9 (West 2000).

Plaintiff concedes that defendant's conduct at the ChicagoHeights campus amounted to a reporting, but asserts thatdefendant's conduct at the Olympia Fields campus was not reporting.Instead, plaintiff argues defendant's conduct at Olympia Fields wasan investigation, an activity that is not afforded a presumption ofgood faith under section 9 of the Reporting Act. Additionally,plaintiff contends that the actions of defendant at Olympia Fieldswere not taken in good faith and that, at this stage of theproceedings, it was improper for the trial court to grant defendantimmunity as a matter of law. In response, defendant argues thatthe trial court properly granted its motion to dismiss because allof its conduct was proper "reporting" under section 9 of theReporting Act and that all its actions were "cloaked" with thepresumption of good faith. Defendant also claims that theallegations in plaintiff's complaint fail to rebut the presumptionof good faith established in section 9.

As pointed out earlier, in Lehman, the appellate court, afterreviewing section 9 of the Reporting Act, concluded that "goodfaith is only presumed as to 'reporters' under [section 9 of] theAct." Lehman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 551.

Further, in Falk v. Martel, 210 Ill. App. 3d 557, 560, 569N.E.2d 248 (1991), the appellate court found that a DCFS worker whowas investigating a report of child abuse was not entitled to apresumption of good faith. In Falk, the plaintiff and her minordaughter filed a five-count complaint against the defendant, a DCFSinvestigator. The allegations arose out an investigation by thedefendant concerning a report of suspected child abuse involvingthe plaintiffs. Count V of the complaint was removed to federalcourt and dismissed, but the remaining counts were remanded to thestate trial court. Counts I alleged the defendant committed abattery upon the minor daughter by pinching her buttocks, shoulder,and back. Count II alleged that the defendant committed a batteryon the plaintiff mother by grabbing her by the shoulder andthrowing her onto a bed. Counts III an IV alleged that thedefendant caused severe emotional distress by verbally abusing andhumiliating the plaintiffs.

The defendant filed a section 2-619 motion to dismiss thecomplaint on the ground that he was entitled to statutory immunityunder section 9 of the Reporting Act. In an affidavit filed withthe defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant denied forciblyentering the plaintiff's residence and assaulting them. He furtherstated that every act he performed while at the plaintiffs'residence was necessary to conduct his investigation. The trialcourt granted the defendant's motion finding that he was entitledto immunity under section 9.

On review, the appellate court, citing Lehman, 148 Ill. App.3d at 551, noted that while the first part of section 9 grantsimmunity to those acting in good faith under the Reporting Act, thesecond sentence grants a presumption of good faith only to requiredand permitted reporters, and not to other categories of personsmentioned in the first sentence. Falk, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 560. The court therefore concluded that the defendant, who wasinvestigating a report of child abuse, was not entitled to thepresumption of good faith. Falk, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 560. Withoutthe presumption, the court concluded that counts I and II ofplaintiffs' complaint were sufficient to withstand the motion todismiss. Falk, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 560-61.

Based on our review of the entire record, we conclude thatmaterial questions of fact exist as to whether defendant's actionsat Olympia Fields went beyond reporting and fell into the categoryof investigation, where good faith is not presumed under section 9of the Reporting Act. Assuming arguendo that the acts complainedof were "reporting," the allegations in the complaint, if taken astrue along with plaintiff's affidavit, raise questions of fact soas to rebut any presumption of good faith at this stage of theproceedings. Whether plaintiff will eventually prevail is not theissue here, but whether the allegations can withstand the motion todismiss. Falk, 210 Ill. App. 3d at 560-61. We find that they do.

Here, Nicole was brought to the emergency room at defendant'sChicago Heights campus for treatment of a fever. As part of thetests conducted relative to the treatment of Nicole's fever, aurinalysis was taken. After defendant conducted this urinalysis,defendant suspected child abuse due to trace amounts of spermatozoain Nicole's urine. The defendant then contacted DCFS and thepolice department. The complaint alleges that the police arrivedand began to question plaintiff even before she was aware of theurinalysis results.

Upon learning the results, plaintiff insisted that there hadbeen a mistake, that the test results were someone else's, and thatdefendant should conduct an additional urinalysis. The secondurinalysis revealed no spermatozoa present. Defendant thenconducted the first vaginal exam on Nicole, which indicated that noabuse occurred. According to the complaint, defendant concludedthat there was no evidence of abuse and that the first urinalysiswas obviously misidentified as being Nicole's. The allegationsfurther claimed that defendant apologized to plaintiff for theembarrassment, anxiety, and distress caused by defendant's errors.

Plaintiff was then advised that Nicole could not be treated atthe Chicago Heights campus, so she was transferred to defendant'scampus in Olympia Fields. There, plaintiff and Nicole werequestioned by defendant's agents concerning child abuse andmultiple vaginal examinations were again conducted upon Nicole. The complaint also alleged that defendant recontacted DCFS aboutpossible child abuse. The record also suggests that on December23, 2000, defendant contacted DCFS but that DCFS made no officialreport until defendant called DCFS again on December 25, 2000. Nicole was not allowed to leave the defendant's Olympia Fieldscampus until December 26, 2000, when she was cleared and releasedby DCFS.

At Olympia Fields, plaintiff and Nicole, outside the presenceof DCFS, were subjected to additional questioning and Nicole wassubjected to multiple vaginal examinations even though at thatpoint there was no evidence of sexual abuse. While we are awarethat reporters are presumed to be acting in good faith and aregranted immunity under section 9 of the Reporting Act, we find thatquestions of fact have been raised as to whether the conductalleged by plaintiff at Olympia Fields exceeded reporting andbecame investigating, which does not enjoy the presumption of goodfaith. We also find questions of fact exist as to whether theseactions were taken in good faith when the second urinalysis andvaginal exam at Chicago Heights had already revealed no evidence ofsexual abuse. Further, according to the complaint, defendantadmitted its erroneous urinalysis in the first instance andapologized for the embarrassment, anxiety, and distress it causedplaintiff. Thereafter, defendant initiated new questioning and abattery of physical exams, which, it can at least be inferred, wereconducted without any good-faith basis because the hospital at thattime had clear evidence of no sexual abuse. Under the ReportingAct, reporting is required when hospital personnel have "reasonablecause to believe a child known to them in their professional orofficial capacity may be an abused child." 325 ILCS 5/4 (West2000). We find the allegations suggest defendant did not have"reasonable cause to believe" Nicole may have been an abused childand raised questions of fact regarding defendant's good faith.

Based on the appellate court decision in Pryweller v. Cohen,282 Ill. App. 3d 899, 668 N.E.2d 1144 (1996), and section 7 of theReporting Act (325 ILCS 5/7 (West 2000)), defendant claims that thereporting process may be an "on-going one" where "the child is ina hospital for several days being treated for an unrelatedcondition." Thus, defendant claims that the reporting processbegan at the Chicago Heights campus and continued after Nicole wastransferred to Olympia Fields. Defendant also argues that theperformance of the vaginal examinations on Nicole or thequestioning of plaintiff in regard to the suspected abuse "were notunreasonable in light of the original urinalysis findings." But aswe noted above, the second urinalysis and first vaginal exam atChicago Heights indicated that no sexual abuse occurred. It alsoappears that DCFS never even conducted an investigation of abuse inthis case. Thus, plaintiff's allegations in regard to defendant'ssubsequent conduct at Olympia Fields raise questions of fact as towhether the presumption has been rebutted, the bubble burst, andthe presumption vanished. Lehman, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 551.

In Pryweller, the plaintiff alleged that his ex-wife falselyaccused him of sexually abusing their daughter. Because of thisallegation, the plaintiff's ex-wife and children came into contactwith defendant Cohen of Human Effective Living Programs (HELP), aDCFS subcontractor. Cohen determined that the plaintiff hadsexually abused his daughter and reported the finding to DCFS,which made a preliminary determination that sexual abuse wasindicated. The circuit court then terminated the plaintiff'scontact with his children based on Cohen's determination of abuse.

Later, however, doctors at Mount Sinai Hospital examined thechildren and found that there was no evidence of sexual abuse. Asa result, the circuit court granted the plaintiff visitationrights. Thereafter, the defendants, all employees of HELP, treatedthe plaintiff and his children at HELP. The plaintiff conditionedhis participation in the treatment upon the defendants' agreementthat he did not sexually abuse his daughter. Despite thedefendants' representations that no sexual abuse had occurred, theycontinued to provide DCFS reports indicating that the plaintiff hadsexually abused his daughter and continued to treat the plaintiff'schildren as though the abuse had occurred. The treatments resultedin the children's substantial and potentially irreversible hatredof the plaintiff. Ultimately, DCFS reversed its finding thatsexual abuse was indicated and expunged the accusation from itsfiles. The circuit court then entered an agreed order whichconcluded that there was no sexual abuse in the first instance. The plaintiff then filed an action against Cohen and the otherdefendants alleging that they improperly diagnosed sexual abuse andimproperly treated the plaintiff and his children.

The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-619 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure on the basis that they were immune under the Reporting Act from liability for theparticipation, reporting, or investigation of the charge againstthe plaintiff. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claimswith prejudice.

Among other things, the plaintiff argued that the trial courterred in granting the defendants' motions under section 2-619because a question of fact existed as to whether the defendantsacted in good faith and were therefore immune under section 9 ofthe Reporting Act. The appellate court noted that "presumption ofgood faith under this section applies only to those reporting childabuse under the Reporting Act and not to those performing the otherfunctions listed in section 9 of the Reporting Act." Pryweller,282 Ill. App. 3d at 908.

On appeal, the plaintiff also argued that the presumption ofgood faith only applied to the initial report under the ReportingAct, that Cohen made the initial report, and that the otherdefendants who participated in subsequent reports were not entitledto the presumption of good faith and the immunity flowingtherefrom. The appellate court found that defendant Cohen wasentitled to the presumption of good faith because the plaintifffailed to show any facts to the contrary. Pryweller, 282 Ill. App.3d at 910. With regard to the reporting activities of the otherdefendants, the court concluded that the presumption should beapplied to them on the ground that they were "downstreamevaluators." Specifically, the court found, "[o]ur reading of theReporting Act as a whole indicates that the word 'report' insection 9 is not limited to the initial report of abuse." Pryweller, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 911.

Defendant concludes that Pryweller makes clear that, not onlythe initial report, but subsequent actions, can be considered partof the reporting process under section 9 of the Reporting Act. Wefind Pryweller distinguishable from the instant case. InPryweller, the court made clear that the reporting activities ofdownstream evaluators were afforded immunity because "the word'report' in section 9 [was] not limited to the initial report ofabuse." Pryweller, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Further, it was atleast arguable, based upon Cohen's report in Pryweller, that apossibility of abuse existed in that case.

Here, other than defendant's admitted mistake concerning thefirst misidentified urinalysis, there was no evidence that sexualabuse occurred. As we made clear above, questions of fact exist asto whether defendant's conduct in this case crossed over fromreporting, which occurred at the Chicago Heights campus, to aninvestigation of sexual abuse that resulted in multiple vaginalexaminations on Nicole at the Olympia Fields campus. Nicole wasbrought to defendant to treat a fever and in connection with thattreatment she was given a urinalysis that indicated a trace amountof spermatozoa. After a second urinalysis and vaginal examinationshowing no evidence of sexual abuse, defendant conceded that thefirst urinalysis was not Nicole's and that a mistake had been made. Nevertheless, after apologizing to plaintiff and Nicole andconceding that a mistake had been made, defendant continued toinvestigate the existence of potential sexual abuse at the OlympiaFields campus by performing multiple vaginal examinations onNicole. Significantly, there is no evidence that any of theseexams indicated any sexual abuse. It also appears that Nicole wasreleased from Olympia Fields on December 26, 2000, without anyinvestigation ever being conducted by DCFS, the agency actuallycharged with investigating allegations of abuse under the ReportingAct. See 325 ILCS 5/7.3 (West 2000). The conduct here is notsimilar to the reporting activities conducted by the defendants inPryweller.

In any event, even if defendant's actions were considered "reporting" under section 9, we find that the allegations inplaintiff's complaint would, at this stage of the proceedings,rebut any presumption that defendant acted in good faith. Defendant has not supported its claim of acting in good faith withan affidavit or any other supporting materials. In fact, defendantdid not provide the trial court with any documents or otherevidence to suggest that "multiple vaginal examinations" would bereasonable after admitting an erroneous test result, having otherclear evidence of no abuse, and apologizing for the error that hadoccurred. The only affidavit filed in this case was sworn to bythe plaintiff.

Defendant relies on Doe v. Winny, 327 Ill. App. 3d 668, 683,764 N.E.2d 143 (2002), for the proposition that "the evidence ofnegligence, standing alone, is insufficient to create a question offact as to whether an individual acted with good faith as requiredby [section 9] of the Act." The decision further states that,"[t]o raise a question of fact, the plaintiff must show that thereporter has acted maliciously, dishonestly, or for some improperpurpose." Doe, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 683. Doe also recognized,however, that "an individual does not act with good faith under[section 9 of] the Act when he acts with actual malice, violatesthe provisions of the Act, or makes a report of abuse when there isno reasonable basis for such a report and the evidence suggeststhat the report was made for malicious purposes. [Citations.]" Doe, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 682.

Here, in count I of the complaint, plaintiff alleged thatdefendant knowingly and intentionally falsely imprisoned Nicoleagainst plaintiff's consent and will. It further alleged thatdefendant willfully and wantonly disregarded plaintiff's rights. Count II alleged that defendant knowingly and intentionally invadedNicole's privacy by conducting multiple vaginal examinations. Count IV alleged that defendant intentionally inflicted emotionaldistress upon plaintiff and that plaintiff's emotional problemswere caused by the knowing and intentional conduct of thedefendant. Finally, count V alleged that defendant made knowingand intentional statements which defamed plaintiff in thecommunity. While these allegations are conclusory, they aresupported by specific facts pointed out earlier which rise aboveasserting mere negligence. They suggest that there was noreasonable basis for a report and investigation in the firstinstance. If taken as true, they also suggest that thereport/investigation was made for a malicious purpose. At thisstage, they are sufficient to rebut the presumption that defendantacted in good faith under section 9 of the Reporting Act.

Defendant also relies upon Poulos v. Lane, 276 Ill. App. 3d524, 659 N.E.2d 34 (1995), where, according to defendant, "[f]actssufficient to demonstrate bad faith were found lacking." InPoulos, a DCFS social worker informed the plaintiffs, Steve andKatherine Poulos, who were husband and wife, that a former fosterchild had made allegations that, when he lived with the plaintiffs,Steve Poulos had sexually abused him. DCFS then advised theplaintiffs that their own two-year old child, Daniel, would have tobe evaluated for sexual abuse. The plaintiffs retained an attorneywho recommended that Daniel be taken to Dr. Lynda Lane, whom theattorney claimed was an expert in the field of child abuse.

Dr. Lane conducted a physical examination of Daniel by takingcultures from Daniel's rectum, throat, and penis. The cultureswere then delivered to the laboratory for evaluation. In theinterim, Dr. Lane drafted a report which stated that Daniel showedno signs of sexual abuse. Subsequently, the lab reports came backindicating that Daniel's throat tested positive for gonorrhea. When Dr. Lane learned of the report, she informed the plaintiff'sattorney. She also informed Steve Poulos and wrote a letter to theplaintiffs indicating that she intended to confirm the test resultand that she would treat Daniel if the retest was positive. Atthat time, she reported the test result to the DCFS child abusehotline. Based on Lane's confirmed diagnosis that Daniel hadgonorrhea and Lane's testimony at a temporary custody hearing, thetrial court ordered Daniel removed from his parents.

After 11 months in foster care, the court returned Daniel tothe custody of the plaintiffs. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filedsuit against Dr. Lane and other defendants for negligence,conspiracy to commit fraud, fraud, and breach of contract. Dr.Lane filed a motion for summary judgment contending that she wasimmune from liability under section 9 of the Reporting Act. Thetrial court granted Lane's motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, the primary issue was whether Dr. Lane acted ingood faith. The plaintiffs asserted that Dr. Lane demonstrated badfaith by: (1) allowing an attorney to recommend her as an expert inthe field of sexual abuse of children; (2) undertaking anevaluation of Daniel for a substantial fee; and (3) delaying thereporting of the false positive gonorrhea test result to DCFS.

The appellate court, after examining the record, found that nogenuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Dr. Lane actedin good faith because she followed the proper procedures inconducting her examination of Daniel; submitting the test resultsto the lab; and reporting the results to the DCFS after notifyingthe plaintiffs. As a result, the court found that the plaintiffhad failed to overcome the statutory presumption that Dr. Laneacted in good faith by reporting Daniel's test results to DCFS. Poulos, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 532.

Poulos is distinguishable from the instant case. First, inPoulos, there was an actual report of child abuse from DCFS asopposed to the instant case where Nicole was brought in fortreatment of a fever. Second, the test conducted by Dr. Laneactually revealed the presence of gonorrhea in Daniel's throat.

Here, defendant conducted a urinalysis on Nicole whichrevealed only a trace amount of spermatozoa. Defendant then conducted a second urinalysis and a vaginal exam on Nicole whichresulted in defendant's determination that no sexual abuse hadoccurred. Defendant apologized to plaintiff and concluded that thefirst urinalysis had been misidentified as Nicole's. Despite theapology and apparent confusion in test results, defendant, atOlympia Fields, subjected Nicole to further questioning regardingsexual abuse, repeated vaginal examinations, and confinement untilDCFS finally released her three days later. Aside from the firsturinalysis which was misidentified as Nicole's, none of defendant'squestioning or examinations demonstrated any evidence that Nicolehad been sexually abused. As a result, we do not find Poulosanalogous to the instant case.

For all of the reasons above, we find that, as pled, theactions taken by defendant at Olympia Fields were not reporting,but amounted to an investigation, and therefore not entitled to apresumption of good faith. Additionally, even if defendant'sactions at Olympia Fields were considered reporting, materialquestions of fact exist as to whether the presumption vanished anddefendant acted in good faith. Accordingly, we conclude the trialcourt's order granting defendant's motion to dismiss was improper. Because of our finding that the complaint was improperly dismissed,we need not address plaintiff's additional arguments as to whyimmunity should not be extended to defendant's conduct at thisstage of the proceedings.

The order of the trial court is reversed.

Reversed.

CAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.