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JUSTICE GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:

NATURE OF THE CASE

Lease Partners Corporation (plaintiff or Lease Partners) appeals from a decision of thecircuit court of Cook County dismissing its breach of contract complaint for failure to pay Illinoisstate corporate franchise tax, pursuant to section 15.85 of the Illinois Business Corporations Act(section 15.85) (805 ILCS 5/15.85 (West 2000)), and for failure to file security for costs,pursuant to section 5-103 of the Illinois Civil Practice Code (section 5-103) (735 ILCS 5/5-103(West 2000)). Lease Partners contends that the court misconstrued section 15.85 as requiringdismissal of the action, rather than staying the proceedings with directions that it pay thearrearage. Lease Partners also contends that the court exceeded its authority by sua sponte raising the issue of security for costs under section 5-103, and summarily dismissing itscomplaint. Lease Partners further contends that, on its face, section 5-103 violates the equalprotection clause of the United States and Illinois constitutions and that the trial court's orderdenied it due process of law. For the reasons discussed below, we reverse the circuit court'sdismissal of this action under both sections 15.85 and 5-103. Because our analysis of the properapplication of each of these sections disposes of the instant appeal and grants the relief sought byLease Partners, we do not reach Lease Partners' alternative constitutional challenges.

BACKGROUND

The facts, as outlined in plaintiff's brief to this court, were adopted unchallenged bydefendants. Lease Partners is a California corporation with an Illinois office responsible foradministering the contracts at issue. Defendants are R & J Pharmacies, Inc. (R & J Pharmacies),Steve Randall and Randall Pharmacies (Randall Pharmacies), and Wells Yeager Best Co., Inc.and Steven Klink (Wells Yeager). During 1993 and 1994, Recomm International DisplayLimited Corporation (Recomm), a non-party to this suit, sold equipment ("AdvisoryBoards"-which were designed to display advertising) to Lease Partners. At the time of the sales,Lease Partners executed leases for the boards with defendants, and Recomm delivered thisequipment directly to defendants. Recomm simultaneously entered into separate agreementswith defendants to rent advertising space on the boards.

In 1995, Recomm ceased to meet its obligations to defendants, who in turn ceased tomake lease payments to Lease Partners. Ultimately, Recomm filed for bankruptcy and in 1998the bankruptcy court entered an order modifying the leases between defendants and LeasePartners to reflect a total amount due. Each defendant failed to make payments under this orderand Lease Partners brought suit against the defendants individually in the circuit court of CookCounty.

On June 27, 2000, the circuit court dismissed Lease Partners' suit against one defendant,R & J Pharmacies, without prejudice, making the following conclusions of law:

"2) As a result of its failure to pay its current Illinois state corporate franchisetaxes [Lease Partners] may not maintain any civil action in the state of Illinois,pursuant to 805 ILCS 5/15.85: and,

3) Pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/5-103, this action having been commenced withoutpreviously filing or causing to be filed a security for costs, the action should bedismissed."⁽¹⁾

The court indicated that the ruling was based only on the above mentioned grounds and not uponR & J Pharmacies' previously filed "motion to dismiss" which contested personal jurisdiction. On July 10, 2000, the court dismissed plaintiff's complaint against Randall Pharmacy withprejudice, reaching the same conclusions of law quoted above. On July 12, 2000, the courtdismissed plaintiff's complaint against the third defendant, Wells Yeager, in the same manner. No defendant made a motion to dismiss for failure to file security for costs.

Plaintiff appealed each of the dismissals to this court and moved to consolidate the casesbased on similarity in issues presented. We granted plaintiff's motion.

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in dismissing its action against all defendants because the court misinterpreted section 15.85. Plaintiff argues that our courts have interpretedthis statute as affording parties who are delinquent in paying their corporate franchise taxes anopportunity to pay those taxes and avoid dismissal. Defendants counter that the language of thestatute contemplates a direct dismissal based on a tax delinquency and that the trial court did noterr in ordering such a dismissal. We agree with plaintiff that the statute contemplates that courtsshould stay proceedings involving delinquent plaintiffs until such time as the franchise taxes arepaid and does not contemplate a dismissal on this ground.

Section 15.85 states that "[n]o corporation required to pay a franchise tax, license fee orpenalty under this Act shall maintain any civil action until all such franchise taxes, license feesand penalties have been paid in full. " 805 ILCS 5/15.85 (West 2000). As this court has held, theword "maintain" means only "continue," and is not meant to bar a delinquent corporation fromproceeding with an action. Amman Food & Liquor, Inc. v. Hertitage Insurance, Co., 65 Ill. App.3d 140,147, 382 N.E.2d 562, 567 (1978) (appellate court reversed trial court's dismissal of corporation's action to recover under insurance policy because corporation was delinquent inpaying franchise tax). Building on the foundation established in Amman, this court morerecently noted that:

"[Section 15.85] should not be seen as an absolute bar to the prosecution of claimsbrought by corporations which are delinquent in the payment of their franchisetax. Nor should the section be deemed to extinguish those claims * * *. Rather, itserves merely as a temporary impediment to the completion of the action."(Emphasis added.) Merchants Environmental Industries, Inc. v. MontgomeryWard and Co., Inc., 252 Ill. App. 3d 906, 911-12, 625 N.E.2d 689, 693 (1993).

We concluded, "it has long been recognized that a 'suit could not be dismissed for failure to payfranchise taxes[,] [i]t could only be continued until those taxes were paid." MerchantsEnvironmental, 252 Ill. App. 3d at 910, 625 N.E.2d at 692, quoting Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v.Jos Joseph & Brothers Co., 238 Ill. App. 45, 49 (1925). Accord, Kaybill Corp. Inc v. Cherne, 24Ill. App. 3d 309, 314, 320 N.E.2d 598, 603 (1974); Jorgensen v. Baker, 21 Ill. App. 2d 196, 203,157 N.E.2d 773, 777 (1959). Thus, we held that the trial court erred in dismissing with prejudicecounterclaims filed by a delinquent defendant. Based upon this precedent, we conclude that thetrial court erred in summarily dismissing the instant suit when the proper remedy is an orderstaying proceedings until the delinquency is rectified.

Defendants intimate that because the complaints were not dismissed simultaneouslyplaintiff was, in fact, afforded an opportunity to pay the taxes and avoid dismissal. Weacknowledge that the record reflects that in its initial order dismissing plaintiff's complaintagainst R & J Pharmacies, the trial court noted that the dismissal was without prejudice and wasbased solely on plaintiff's failure to pay its taxes and to forward security for costs. The courtfurther noted that the suit could be reinstated upon payment. The court issued this order on June27, 2000, and did not issue its next order, dismissing the second suit with prejudice, until July 10,2000. Defendants' suggestion that plaintiff had the equivalent of an opportunity to continue itssuit is, however, of no moment. First, such an opportunity was not afforded plaintiff in its caseagainst R & J Pharmacies, which the record demonstrates was dismissed without prior notice ofthe trial court's intentions. Furthermore, as illustrated above, our courts have held that section15.85 is not grounds for dismissal in any event and thus, regardless of any de facto opportunity topay that plaintiff may have been afforded, the trial court pursued an improper remedy.

Plaintiff also argues that this case is controlled by our supreme court's decision in TextileFabrics Corporation v. Roundtree, 39 Ill. 2d 122, 233 N.E.2d 376 (1968). Because that casedecided the constitutionality of a statute not at issue here, we fail to see its relevance. In TextileFabrics, the court held that section 13.70 of the Business Corporations Act, which states that "noforeign corporation transacting business in this State without a certificate of authority ispermitted to maintain a civil action in any court of this State," (805 ILCS 5/5-13.70 (West2000)), violates the commerce clause of the United States constitution when applied to foreigncorporations suing on transactions involving interstate commerce. Textile Fabrics , 39 Ill. 2d at124-25, 233 N.E.2d at 377-78. However, the trial court in the instant case explicitly noted thatplaintiff's failure to pay franchise taxes warranted dismissal under section 15.80 of the BusinessCorporations Act, which imposes franchise taxes on both domestic and foreign corporations, andit is therefore neither implicated in, nor controlled by, the decision in Textile Fabrics, whichapplies to certificates of authority required only of foreign corporations.

Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in raising, sua sponte, the issue of itsfailure to file security for costs and then summarily dismissing the complaint without allowingplaintiff an opportunity to so file. We agree. The Illinois Civil Practice Act contemplates thatforeign plaintiffs who choose to avail themselves of the Illinois courts must file security for costswith the court. 735 ILCS 5/5-101 (West 2000). The statute indicates that:

"in all civil actions, where the plaintiff * * * is not a resident of this State, theplaintiff * * * shall, before he or she institutes such an action, file, or cause to befield, with the clerk of the court in which the action is to be commenced, securityfor costs." 735 ILCS 5/5-101 (West 2000).

Our courts have held that this security may take the form of a surety bond or a personalundertaking, at the court's discretion, but a court may not require litigants to deposit personalfunds, as to do so would unduly restrict nonresident's access to our courts. Bullard v. Bullard, 66Ill. App. 3d 132, 137, 383 N.E.2d 684, 668 (1978). Should a nonresident plaintiff fail to filesuch security, the statute provides that

"the court, on motion, shall dismiss the same, and the attorney of the plaintiff shallpay all costs accruing thereon, unless the security for costs is filed within suchtime as is allowed by the court, and when so filed shall relate back to thecommencement of the action." 735 ILCS 5/5-103 (West 2000).

We note that little has been published on section 5-103 in recent years and we must turnto longstanding cases interpreting the statute for guidance in our analysis. Upon conducting sucha review, we see that courts generally disfavor dismissal of actions based on failure to filesecurity for costs, being dilatory in nature, and have consistently held that only slight evidence issufficient to overcome the prima facie case of the party making the motion. Turning v. Martin,65 Ill. 157 (1872); Adams v. Miller, 12 Ill. 27, (1850). Recognizing that actions under the statuteare disfavored, our courts have further circumscribed the statute's applicability and effect. First,courts have held that dismissal is improper where the plaintiff files a bond without leave of court,(Baker v. Palmer, 83 Ill. 568 (1876)), although the statute appears to require leave. Our courtshave also concluded that the statute is not jurisdictional and does not affect the validity of, orhave any force after, judgment. Plaff v. Pacific Exp. Co., 251 Ill 243, 965 N.E. 1089 (1911). Moreover, a century of caselaw has held that the right to dismissal for plaintiff's failure to filesecurity for costs attaches to the defendant, is in the nature of a plea in abatement, and will bewaived if not raised "at the earliest time possible" (Gregory v. Richey, 307 Ill. 219, 138 N.E. 669(1923)), certainly, before an answer has been filed. Trustees v. Walters, 12 Ill. 154 (1850). Notwithstanding that the statute indicates that "the right to require security for costs shall not bewaived by any proceeding in the action" (735 ILCS 5/5-103 (West 2000)), our courts andcommentators have consistently concluded that dismissal for failure to provide security for costswill be waived if untimely raised. Adams v. Miller, 12 Ill. 27, (1850); Papineau v. Belgrade, 81Ill. 61 (1876); Grutza v. Original Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co., 178 Ill. App. 274 (1913);Nichols, Illinois Civil Practice