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FOURTH DIVISION
February 11, 2004

PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN delivered the opinion of the court:

After a hearing, the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB)affirmed the Lake Point Tower level "A" parking garage (level "A")assessment of $633,184 for each of the tax years of 1997 and 1998. The Lake Point Tower Association (Tower Association) and Lake PointGarage Association (Garage Association) bring this consolidatedappeal alleging (1) level "A" was a common area and thus subject topay $1 in property tax for each of the tax years of 1997 and 1998;and (2) the PTAB violated the Tower and Garage Associations'constitutional right of equal protection by failing to assess theproperty tax of level "A" as other similar properties. Althoughthe original action before the PTAB involved numerous taxpayers andtheir properties, the only property on this appeal is the level "A"parking garage. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Lake Point Tower (Tower) is primarily a residential high-risecondominium building with an adjoining parking garage. The Toweris 70 stories tall and consists of 718 residential units. There isa restaurant, a market, a coin-operated laundry, a dry cleaner, atravel agency, a ticket broker, a nail salon and a company calledAmerican Invesco located inside the Tower. The building is managedby the Tower Association.

The garage, which is underneath the residential tower,consists of four parking levels - "A," "B," "C," and "D." Levels"B," "C" and "D" consist of 436 parking spaces. These are privateparking spaces owned by the residents of the Tower. Level "A" islocated on the basement level of the Tower. It has over 300parking spaces. Since there are 718 residential units in theTower, with 436 parking spaces available on parking levels "B" to"D," many of the residential units that do not have a parking spaceon those floors rent parking spaces on level "A." Level "A" wasinitially owned by the building developer, Lake Point Tower LimitedPartnership.

In 1996, the developer converted level "A" into a condominiumby the filing of a separate condominium declaration. Level "A"became governed and managed by a new and separate association - theGarage Association.

On March 7, 1997, the Tower Association purchased level "A" from the developer because the developer was considering allowingthe public to park on level "A." The Tower Association paid $3.2million for level "A." When the Tower Association bought level"A," it was identified as "Unit A-1" or "Unit No. A-1" in thegarage condominium declaration. The Tower Association became amember of the Garage Association.

After purchasing level "A," the Garage Association retainedStandard Parking to oversee its daily operation. Standard Parkingprovided valet parking services on level "A" and monthly parking tosome of the residents of the tower. It also provided daily orhourly parking for the visitors of the residents and to businesspatrons of the Tower. Some employees of the commercial businesseslocated in the Tower also rented parking spaces on a monthly basison level "A."

The president of the Tower Association, John Houston,testified that the Tower's residents' monthly rentals make upapproximately 75% of level "A"'s total revenue, and the rest of therevenue come from transient visitors. Houston further testifiedthat should the demand for residential monthly parking exceed thenumber of the parking spaces available, all transient parking wouldbe terminated to accommodate the residents of the Tower.

In 1997 and 1998, level "A"'s assessment was $633,184 for eachof the tax years. The Tower and Garage Associations appealed tothe Cook County Board of Review arguing that level "A" should besubject to a $1 tax assessment because it was a common area forrecreational or similar residential purposes. The Board of Reviewfound that level "A" was designated as a condominium unit accordingto the Garage Association declaration. As such, level "A" was nota common area under the Illinois Condominium Property Act. 765ILCS 605/1 et seq. (West 1996). Consequently, level "A" was noteligible for the special $1 assessment under either the CondominiumProperty Act or the Illinois Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-35(a) (West 1996)). The Tower and Garage Associations appealed tothe PTAB. After a hearing, the PTAB affirmed the Board of Review'sruling. On appeal, the Tower and Garage Associations assert that(1) level "A" was a common area and thus subject to $1 in propertytax for each of the tax years of 1997 and 1998; and (2) the PTABviolated the Tower and Garage Associations' constitutional right ofequal protection by failing to assess the property tax of level "A"as other similar properties.

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

An administrative agency's determination regarding questionsof law is reviewed de novo. City of Belvidere v. Illinois StateLabor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). An agency'sinterpretation of a statute is a question of law. Albazzaz v.Department of Professional Regulation, 314 Ill. App. 3d 97, 105(2000). An agency's rulings regarding mixed questions of fact andlaw are not to be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. Under the clearly erroneousstandard, a reviewing court should reverse an administrativeagency's decision only if the court has a definite and firmconviction that the agency was mistaken. AFM Messenger Service,Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395(2001). As the PTAB's decision in the instant case involved amixed question of fact and law, we will apply the clearly erroneousstandard in reviewing this case.

Section 10-35(a)

On appeal, the Tower and Garage Associations assert that level"A"'s assessment should be $1 for each of the tax years of 1997 and1998. The Tower and Garage Associations cite to the IllinoisProperty Tax Code and Illinois Condominium Property Tax Act tosupport their arguments.

We first look to the Illinois Property Tax Code to determinewhether level "A" is eligible for the favorable assessment of $1under this statute.

The Illinois Property Tax Code provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Residential property which is part of adevelopment, but which is individually owned andownership of which includes the right, by easement,covenant, deed or other interest in property, to the useof any common area for recreational or similarresidential purposes shall be assessed at a value whichincludes the proportional share of the value of thatcommon area or areas.

Property is used as a 'common area or areas' *** ifit is a lot, parcel, or area, the beneficial use andenjoyment of which is reserved in whole as anappurtenance to the separately owned lots, parcels, orareas within the planned development.

The common area or areas which are used forrecreational or similar residential purposes and whichare assessed to a separate owner and are located onseparately identified parcels, shall be listed forassessment purposes at $1 per year." (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/10-35(a) (West 1996).

The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain andgive effect to the intent of the legislature. In re C.W., 199 Ill.2d 198, 211 (2002). Where the language of a statute is certain andunambiguous, a court will apply the statute without resort tofurther aids of statutory construction. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2000).

Pursuant to the terms of section 10-35(a), only the commonareas of a planned development that are actually used forrecreational or similar residential purposes are eligible for thefavorable assessment. 35 ILCS 200/10-35(a) (West 1996).

In 1997, when the Tower Association purchased level "A," theGarage Association declaration defined level "A" as "Unit A-1" or"Unit No. A-1."

According to the Condominium Property Act, a " '[u]nit' meansa part of the property designed and intended for any type ofindependent use." 765 ILCS 605/2(d) (West 1996). "'CommonElements' means all portions of the property except the units,including limited common elements unless otherwise specified." 765ILCS 605/2(e) (West 1996). Since level "A" was classified as a"unit," it simply could not be a common area at the same time.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that Standard Parking oversawlevel "A" in 1997 and 1998. Standard Parking provided a valetparking service on level "A." Residents of the Tower rentedparking spaces on level "A" on a monthly basis. The employees ofthe businesses located in the Tower rented parking spaces on adaily basis and patrons of the businesses and transient visitorswould pay hourly rates. Standard Parking charged different ratesto different clients. The hourly parking rate was as high as $12per hour. These facts demonstrate Standard Parking was operatinga commercial parking business. A commercial parking businesscertainly does not fall within the ambit of "recreational orsimilar residential purposes." Since level "A" was neither acommon area, nor was it used for recreational or similarresidential purposes, it did not qualify for the favorableassessment of $1 under section 10-35(a) of the Property Tax Code. 35 ILCS 200/10-35(a) (West 1996).

Section 10(a)

Next, we look to the Illinois Condominium Property Act todetermine whether level "A" is eligible for the favorableassessment.

The Illinois Condominium Property Act provides, in pertinentpart:

"(a) For purposes of property taxes, real property ownedand used for residential purposes by a condominiumassociation, including a master association, but subjectto the exclusive right by easement, covenant, deed orother interest of the owners of one or more condominiumproperties and used exclusively by the unit owners forrecreational or other residential purposes shall beassessed at $1.00 per year. *** In counties containing1,000,000 or more inhabitants, any person desiring toestablish or to reestablish an assessment of $1.00 underthis Section shall make application therefor and besubject to the provisions of Section 10-35 of theProperty Tax Code." (Emphasis added.) 765 ILCS 605/10(a)(West 1996).

Pursuant to the terms of the Condominium Property Act, inorder to qualify for the assessment of $1, the subject propertymust be "used exclusively by the unit owners for recreational orother residential purposes." (Emphasis added.) 765 ILCS 605/10(a)(West 1996).

In this case, level "A"'s parking spaces were rented to Towerresidents, visitors, employees and patrons of the businesses in theTower. Employees and patrons of the businesses were not residentsof the Tower. As such, level "A" was not used exclusively by theunit owners for recreational or other residential purposes. Thus,the PTAB correctly decided that level "A" did not qualify for thefavorable assessment under the Condominium Property Act.

The common threads between the Property Tax Code and theCondominium Property Act are that in order to benefit from thefavorable assessment of $1, the subject property must be used "forrecreational or other similar purposes." 35 ILCS 200/10-35(a)(West 1996); 765 ILCS 605/10(a) (West 1996).

In Ozuk v. River Grove Board of Education, 281 Ill. App. 3d239, 243, (1996), we defined "recreation" as the " 'refreshment ofthe strength and spirits after toil.' " Ozuk, 281 Ill. App. 3d at243, quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1899(1986). "Recreational" and "residential" do not include activitiesof a commercial nature. See Ozuk, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 243.

Our supreme court's recent opinion in Rexroad v. City ofSpringfield, 207 Ill. 2d 33 (2003), also sheds light on this issue. In Rexroad, the plaintiff was a high school football player. Oneday during practice, the plaintiff was asked to retrieve a helmetfor a teammate from the locker room. After retrieving the helmet,the plaintiff had to walk through a parking lot to return to thefield. While walking through the parking lot, the plaintiffstepped into a hole and broke his ankle. Plaintiff filed suit. The defendant municipality argued that section 3-106 of the LocalGovernmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (TortImmunity Act) applied: "Neither a local public entity nor a publicemployee is liable for an injury where the liability is based onthe existence of a condition of any public property intended orpermitted to be used for recreational purposes, including but notlimited to parks, playgrounds, open areas, buildings or otherenclosed recreational facilities, unless such local entity orpublic employee is guilty of willful and wanton conduct proximatelycausing such injury." (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/3-106 (West1994). Springfield argued that the school was immune from the suitbased on section 3-106.

In reversing the appellate court's affirmance of the trialcourt's summary judgment order for the defendant, our supreme courtheld that "immunity depends on the character of the property inquestion, not the activity performed at any given time," and "thecharacter of the parking lot was not recreational." Rexroad, 207Ill. 2d at 43.

While Rexroad involved the Tort Immunity Act, its holdinglends support to the PTAB's argument. In this case, the characterof level "A" was a revenue-generating commercial parking lot. Following the logic in Rexroad, we fail to see how a commercialparking lot can be classified as being used for recreational orsimilar residential purposes.

On appeal, the Tower and Garage Associations rely on 400Condominium Ass'n v. Tully, 79 Ill. App. 3d 686 (1979), andCambridge-On-The-Lake Homeowners Ass'n v. Hynes, 116 Ill. App. 3d63 (1983), to support their arguments.

400 Condominium was decided prior to the current version ofthe Condominium Property Act. The condominium declaration at issuein 400 Condominium specifically designated the building's garage asa common element, rather than as a unit, as in the instant case. Consequently, the appellate court held: "[t]he assessed tax on thegarage was not authorized by law because Section 10 of the Actprohibits separate taxation of the unit and its common elements."400 Condominium, 79 Ill. App. 3d at 691. The appellate court notedthat section 2 of the Condominium Act was amended in 1978 to define"parking spaces or facilities" as "limited common elements." 79Ill. App. 3d at 690 n. 2. This amendment did not apply to thegarage at issue because the condominium declaration was filed in1973. As the garage in 400 Condominium was properly designated asa common element under the law in effect at the time, andconsidering the fact that level "A" was designated as a "unit" inthe condominium declaration in the instant case, we hold that 400Condominium is inapplicable.

Similarly, Cambridge-On-The-Lake is inapposite to this case because that decision was governed by a statute that did notrequire that a parcel be used for "recreational or similarresidential purposes" before qualifying the parcel for a $1 taxassessment.

EQUAL PROTECTION

Next, the Tower and Garage Associations argue that the PTABviolated the equal protection clause of the United States andIllinois Constitutions by levying a different tax on level "A" thanthat levied on other similar properties.

"As a general rule, issues or defenses not raised before theadministrative agency will not be considered for the first time onadministrative review." Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. IllinoisDepartment of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 396-97 (2002). A review of the record reflects that the Tower and GarageAssociations did not raise the issue of an equal protectionviolation in the PTAB proceeding. Thus, this issue is waived onappeal.

DOUBLE TAXATION

In their reply brief, the Tower and Garage Associations arguefor the first time that the assessment of $633,184 to level "A" istantamount to double taxation of the unit owners of the TowerAssociation because the value of level "A" is "necessarily subsumedin the value of each separately taxable residential unit." Thisargument consists of one sentence. Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7)provides that points not argued in an appellant's brief areforfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief. 155 Ill. 2dR. 341(e)(7). Rule 341(e)(7) also provides that the argumentsection of an appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions ofthe appellant and the reasons therefor, with citation of theauthorities and the pages of the record relied on." 155 Ill. 2d R.341(e)(7). Strict adherence to the requirement of citing therelevant pages of the record is necessary to expedite andfacilitate the administration of justice. Maun v. Department ofProfessional Regulation, 299 Ill. App. 3d 388, 399 (1998). Arguments that do not satisfy Rule 341(e)(7)'s requirements do notmerit consideration on appeal and may be rejected for that reasonalone. Maun, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 399.

At oral argument, counsel for the Tower Association was askedhow much the assessed value of the Tower increased after level "A"was purchased. Counsel replied that he did not know andacknowledged that the only relief appellants were seeking on appealwas a reversal of the PTAB's ruling that level "A" was not subjectto the special $1 assessment under section 10-35(a). Consequently,the issue of double taxation is waived on appeal.

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the PTAB's ruling that level"A" should not be subject to the $1 favorable tax treatment undersection 10-35(a) of the Illinois Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/10-35(a) (West 1996)), or section 10(a) of the Condominium PropertyAct (765 ILCS 605/10(a) (West 1996)).

Affirmed.

HARTMAN and GREIMAN, JJ., concurring.