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JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Mark Twain wrote about the Mississippi River: "It is goodfor steamboating, and good to drink; but it is worthless for allother purposes, except baptizing."⁽¹⁾ Not quite.

In February 1990, the Illinois General Assembly decidedriverboat gambling would be an economic benefit to the people ofthis State. The legislation authorized the Illinois Gaming Board(the Board) to issue ten licenses for riverboats, the first fourof them for gambling on the Mississippi River.

This case is about one of the first four licenses (the"tenth license"), and it is about the efforts of Lake CountyRiverboat, L.P. (Lake County) to obtain that license for agambling boat on the Fox River. Standing in Lake County's way isa June 1999 statute that allows the Emerald Casino, Inc.(Emerald) to use its Mississippi River license anywhere itwishes, subject to local approval -- 230 ILCS 10/11.2(a) (West2000).

Lake County filed suit against the Board, asking for adeclaration that section 11.2 violates the State Constitution'sspecial legislation provision, Ill. Const., 1970, art IV, sec.13. Joining the Board in contending section 11.2 is valid wereEmerald, Des Plaines Development, L.P. (Des Plaines), the Villageof Rosemont (Rosemont), and the West Central Municipal Conference(West Central). The trial court never reached the issue of thestatute's constitutionality. It found Lake County lackedstanding to challenge the statute and dismissed the lawsuit. Lake County appeals the order of dismissal. We affirm.

FACTS

Section 10/7(e) of the 1990 Riverboat Gambling Act (the Act)authorized the Board to issue five licenses to become effectivenot earlier than January 1, 1991, four of them for gambling onthe Mississippi River, the fifth on the Illinois River south ofMarshall County. Another license was to be issued for gamblingon the Des Plaines River in Will County "not earlier than March1, 1992." That left "four additional licenses." The Board wasgiven authority to issue them "effective not earlier than March1, 1992," but no specific location was mandated. 230 ILCS 10/11-2(a) (West 2000).

In 1992, the Board issued one of the first four licensesauthorized for the Mississippi River to H.P., Inc., which laterbecame Emerald. (For purpose of clarity, we will refer to thelicensee as Emerald.)

Emerald operated a riverboat on the Mississippi out of EastDubuque, Illinois. Like the other three, Emerald's license wasfor a duration of three years and could be renewed annually on ashowing of adherence to statutory and regulatory requirements. 230 ILCS 10/7(f),(g) (West 1998).

Emerald's license was renewed for one year in July 1996, butthe Board expressed concern about Emerald's financial outlook. In fact, competition from Iowa proved too great, and Emeraldstopped operating its riverboat at its dock site on theMississippi in July 1997.

In June 1997, Emerald applied for a license renewal. Butnot for use on the Mississippi. Emerald wanted to relocate toRosemont. The Board refused to renew the license. Emerald beganto pursue its administrative appeals, first asking for a hearingbefore the administrative law judge. The Board asked the ALJ toaffirm its denial of Emerald's license renewal application.

On May 5, 1999, the ALJ concluded Emerald's renewalapplication "failed to meet the requirements of the RiverboatGambling Act and the Board's decision to deny its renewalapplication was correct." In support of his decision, the ALJobserved Emerald did not have a riverboat to operate from, andeven if it did the Act did not provide for relocation from theMississippi. He said:

"A new application and an opportunity for other parties toparticipate in the application process for a riverboatcasino other than where originally located is required."

Emerald filed two motions for reconsideration of the ALJ'sorder. Both were denied. The matter went back to the Board. But before the Board had a chance to act on the ALJ's order, thelegislature intervened. Effective June 25, 1999, section 10/11.2was amended to read:

"(a) A licensee that was not conducting riverboat gamblingon January 1, 1998 may apply to the Board for renewal andapproval of relocation to a new home dock locationauthorized under section 3(c) and the Board shall grant theapplication and approval upon receipt by the licensee ofapproval from the new municipality or county, as the casemay be, in which the licensee wishes to relocate pursuant tosection 7(j)." 230 ILCS 10/11.2(a) (West 2000).

Everyone agrees section 11.2 applies only to Emerald. Thisis the statute Lake County challenges as special legislation.

Lake County had not simply been sitting back and observingevents. While the ALJ was reviewing the Board's order denyingEmerald's application for renewal, Lake County filed its ownapplication for an owner's license on December 30, 1997.

Lake County proceeded on the assumption that Emerald had nochance of keeping its license. Lake County was asking that theformer Emerald license be reissued as a new license. But LakeCounty, like Emerald, was not interested in the Mississippi Riveras a location. It wanted to put its boat in the Fox River, in Lake County.

On February 17, 1998, the Board denied Lake County'sapplication "without prejudicing the applicant," noting that nojudgment was being made on the substantive merits of theapplication. The Board apparently was recognizing there was no"tenth license" available, since Emerald still held it. At thesame time, the Board unanimously directed its staff to "revisethe current owner's application form and develop a competitiveprocess to be implemented in the future for the solicitation ofapplicants for an owner's license and the uniform submission andreview of information by each applicant."

Lake County did not appeal the Board's denial, giving rise to defendants' claim in this lawsuit that Lake County failed toexhaust its administrative remedies.

Passage of section 11.2 changed everything. Board action onthe ALJ recommendation that Emerald's license not be renewed cameto a halt. The proceeding was pronounced "moot" on September 7,1999. The Board had no choice. Emerald and only Emerald couldfile an application for renewal and relocation of the tenthlicense.

On October 8, 1999, Lake County filed its complaint in theLake County Circuit Court, challenging the constitutionality ofsection 11.2. After legal wrangling not relevant to our decisionthe case was transferred to Cook County, where the trial judgegranted the defendants' section 2-619 motions to dismiss (735ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2000)), holding Lake County lacked standing tochallenge the statute and that it failed to exhaust itsadministrative remedies. Lake County appeals.

DECISION

In this appeal the standing issue is paramount. That iswhere we focus our attention. We review the trial court'sdismissal de novo. Prodromos v. Howard Savings Bank, 295 Ill.App. 3d 470, 474, 692 N.E.2d 707 (1998). We take Lake County'swell-pleaded allegations as true when deciding whether thereexists any set of facts that would entitle the plaintiff torecover. B&B Land Acquisition, Inc. v. Mandell, 305 Ill. App. 3d1068, 1071, 714 N.E.2d 58 (1999).

STANDING

First, we review the standing doctrine, especially as itapplies to parties who challenge the constitutionality of astatute.

In order to challenge section 10/11.2 Lake County must havesustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injuryas a result of enforcement of the statute. Flynn v. Ryan, No.90--263, slip op. at 6 (Ill. May 23, 2002). The alleged injurymust be (1) distinct and palpable, (2) fairly traceable todefendant's actions, and (3) substantially likely to be preventedor redressed by the grant of the requested relief. ChicagoTeachers Union v. Board of Education, 189 Ill. 2d 200, 207, 724N.E.2d 914 (2000).

Because lack of standing is an affirmative defense, thedefendants must plead and prove it. Chicago Teachers Union, 189Ill. 2d at 206.

The defendants' contentions come down to two propositions,either of which, they say, defeats Lake County's standing tochallenge the statute: first, Lake County has no right to thetenth license because Emerald holds it; second, the pre-amendmentAct did not permit Emerald's license to operate anywhere but onthe Mississippi.

If the defendants are correct about either of thepropositions they raise, Lake County's challenge to theconstitutionality of section 10/11.2 becomes an abstractquestion, interesting perhaps, but not the kind of issue ourcourts are designed to litigate since there would be no realcontroversy which Lake County has a direct interest in resolving. See Inland Real Estate Corp v. Tower Construction, 174 Ill. App.3d 421, 425, 528 N.E.2d 421 (1988).

Lake County contends the only barrier to its standing tochallenge section 10/11.2 is the statute itself. Without it,Emerald's license would have been available for competitivebidding by serious bidders. That is, once Emerald was deniedrenewal of its license, a new license would be issued to a newowner, who then could ask the Board to get away from theMississippi River and dock in the Fox River.

The defendants say a conclusion that Emerald would have lostits license would be nothing more than impermissible speculation. They compare Lake County's position to the claims made by thephysical education teachers in Chicago Teachers Union v. Board ofEducation. There, the teachers challenged a statute that allowedschool districts to petition the State Board of Education forwaiver of School Code mandates, used in that case to waivephysical education requirements for eleventh and twelfth gradestudents. The teachers claimed the waiver reduced job securityand career opportunities. The Court, noting that physicaleducation classes still would be offered, held there was no realharm to the teachers, that any adverse consequences to jobsecurity were purely speculative. Thus, no standing.

Both sides in this case find some support for theirpositions in Nolan v. Hilliard, 309 Ill. App. 3d 129, 722 N.E.2d736 (1999).

The case concerned the City of Chicago Police Department'splan for promoting patrolmen to sergeants. It began with awritten qualifying test scheduled for January 10, 1998. Officerswho passed the written test would be placed on a merit eligiblelist and would be considered for promotion pursuant to a meritselection process. Further, an applicant would have to have aminimum of 60 semester hours of college credit to be eligible forpromotion. Nolan, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 129-34.

Officer Jaconetti applied for the 1998 sergeantsexamination. But he did not have the required level of collegeeducation. He did not take the written test. He joined othersin suing the City, asking that the City be permanently enjoinedfrom implementing the education requirement as a prerequisite topromotion, and from making any promotion based on merit or anyfactor other than the results of competitive testing. Nolan, 309Ill. App. 3d at 134.

The trial court dismissed the case, deciding that Jaconettiand the others did not have standing to challenge the departmentprocedures for promotion. The results were mixed on appeal.

The court held Jaconetti had standing to challenge thecollege education requirement. True, as the City contended, hedid not take the written test, but that does not defeat standingsince Jaconetti was "clearly injured" by the educationrequirement whether or not he took the test. Nolan, 309 Ill.App. 3d at 140. That is, "Jaconetti's injury would not have beenalleviated by sitting for the January qualifying test." Nolan,309 Ill. App. 3d at 140. If he had taken it and had scored high,he still would have been excluded from the promotional process. That is an actual controversy between the parties, and Jaconettihad standing to attack the education prerequisite.

It was a different matter for Jaconetti's standing to attackmerit-based promotions. Jaconetti did not have a sufficientinterest in that claim because he was not on the merit promotioneligibility list. That is, even if the court were to determinethe merit component of the exam process was invalid, Jaconettiwould not benefit from that ruling because he withdrew from thepromotional process without taking the qualifying test. He couldnot have been considered for promotion, merit-based or otherwise,without first having taken the written test. He did not sustaina direct injury, and he was not "in immediate danger ofsustaining a direct injury as a result of the complained-ofconduct." Nolan, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 138.

The reported cases stake out the territory in this case, but they provide only general guidance to the specific questions thatare raised. Whether Lake County has standing to challengesection 10/11.2 depends on whether Emerald's license would havebeen available for competitive application and whether thelicense was geographically restricted to the Mississippi River inthe absence of legislation that would authorize relocation.

We will address the two issues separately. We believe thebest way to look at them is to play out the scenario as ifsection 10/11.2 had not been enacted, although we recognize thatfactual extrapolation can be a risky business.

THE EMERALD LICENSE

By June 1999, when section 10/11.2 was enacted, Emerald waswell on it way to losing its license. The Board had deniedrenewal. The ALJ had affirmed that denial. The Board was headedtoward termination of the license.

Emerald contends in this appeal that the license could havebeen used only on the Mississippi, although before June 1999 itwas asking permission to relocate to Rosemont. If Emerald's license was restricted to the Mississippi, it was useless becauseEmerald had no boat on the Mississippi and no inclination to dobusiness on the Mississippi. Emerald was marking time.

The Board's February 17, 1998, denial of Lake County'sapplication was "without prejudicing the applicant," and theBoard, anticipating a license would become available, directedits staff to gear up for competitive bidding.

Lake County was a serious potential bidder, having spentsubstantial time and expense on its hopes for a Fox Riverlicense.

Of course, had the Board entered a final termination order,Emerald would have a right to administrative review in thecourts. Once in court, Emerald could have asked for a stay ofthe Board's final order. See 5 ILCS 100/10-65(b) (West 2000). Whether a stay would have been granted is a question we are in noposition to answer.

Given the circumstances, we do not see how Emerald couldhave saved its license. Sooner or later, most likely sooner, thelicense would have been gone. It could be Emerald would havebeen able to delay the inevitable during the review process, butit was a matter of time.

We believe Lake County had a realistic pre-amendment hope ofbecoming a competitive bidder for the tenth license, maybe notimmediately, but soon.

We do not believe the defendants' comparisons of ChicagoTeachers Union and Nolan v. Ryan to the facts of this case are persuasive on this point. The evidence that Emerald was about tolose its license is compelling, not speculative.

We also do not agree with defendants that Lake County has toprove it would have been the successful bidder in order toestablish standing. We know of no such requirement. In othersettings, not directly on point here, we have protected thestanding of unsuccessful bidders to challenge unlawfulgovernmental actions. See Cardinal Glass Co. v. Board ofEducation, 113 Ill. App. 3d 442, 447, 447 N.E.2d 546 (1983);Stanley Magic-Door, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 74 Ill. App. 3d 595,597, 393 N.E.2d 535 (1979) ("palpable economic injuries have longbeen recognized as sufficient to lay the basis for standing withor without a specific statutory provision for judicial review").

To buttress their claim that Lake County suffered no directinjury from passage of section 10/11.2, the defendants observethe amendment was enacted about a year after Lake County'sapplication for a license was denied without prejudice. Duringthat time, Lake County did not appeal the denial. Given thecircumstances of the license denial, we do not see muchsignificance in the period of Lake County's inactivity. Thelicense was not available to anyone other than Emerald duringthat time, but the Board was moving inexorably toward terminationand a new set of competitive rules for applicants. Lake County'sattorney had been told by the Board "no prejudice" attached tothe denial of the application, and: "your client may apply for anowner's license when such a license becomes available." LakeCounty, after expending substantial amounts of time and money,could do little else but stand and wait.

Lake County's position was not much different than OfficerJaconetti's situation in Nolan v. Ryan. He was "clearly injured"by the education requirement established by the City, whether ornot he took the test. Nolan, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 140.

Whether this means Lake County has demonstrated it is in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result ofenforcement of section 10/11.2 depends on whether thepre-amendment Act geographically restricts the tenth license tothe Mississippi River.

THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER

If Emerald's license were to become available during lifewithout section 10/11.2, could the Board have granted Lake Countythe right to use it on the Fox River? If not, Lake County'sclaim to direct injury crumbles. It would have no "real interestin the outcome of the controversy." Chicago Teachers Union, 189Ill. 2d at 206.

Lake County suggests we allow the Board to determine whetherthe tenth license can be used on the Fox River, but the issuebefore us is Lake County's standing to challenge a statute, andthat is the issue we must decide. Doing so, we are not entitledto make any comment on the constitutionality of section 10/11.2.

We also observe that in this appeal, for reasons that areunclear to us, the Board takes the position it had not been giventhe legislative authority in the 1990 Act to relocate Emerald'slicense from the Mississippi should it be revoked or terminatedand reissued to a new licensee.

All defendants contend section 10/7(e) of the 1990 statuteis clear: the Board has no discretion to relocate any of thefirst six licenses since the statute places them on specificwaterways. They say only the legislature can move them. TheBoard's discretion is reserved for the last four "additionallicenses." The geographical restriction is "insurmountable."

Not so, responds Lake County. The pre-amendment statutegives the Board discretion to reissue a revoked or terminatedlicense as a "new" license to a "new" owner for a "new" location.

Our examination of the Riverboat Gambling Act (230 ILCS 10/1et seq. (West 2000)) reveals no specific reference to the fate oflicenses that are revoked or terminated. Nothing is saidanywhere in the statutory scheme about locations for "new"licenses or reissued licenses.

Section 10/7(e) contains three paragraphs, two of them relevant to our inquiry. The first paragraph sets the licenselimit at ten. Five of the licenses would become effective notearlier than January 1, 1991, four of them on the Mississippi,the fifth on the Illinois River. Another was to be issued forthe Des Plaines River in Will County "not earlier than March 1,1992." Of the "four additional licenses," to be issued"effective not earlier than March 1, 1992," no specific locationwas mandated, leaving it to the Board to determine location. Themeaning of the sentence that then concludes the first paragraphis at the heart of the dispute:

"In determining the navigable streams upon which riverboatswill operate with licenses effective on or after March 1,1992, the Board shall consider the economic benefit whichriverboat gambling confers on the State, and shall seek toassure that all regions of the State share in the economicbenefits of riverboat gambling." (Emphasis added.) 230ILCS 10/7(e) (West 1998).

Further complicating matters is the second paragraph of section 10/7(e):

"In granting all licenses, the Board may give favorableconsideration to economically depressed areas of the State,to applicants presenting plans which provide for significant economic development over a large geographic area, and toapplicants who currently operate non-gambling riverboats inIllinois. The Board shall review all applicants for owners licenses, and shall inform each applicant of the Board'sdecision." (Emphasis added.) 230 ILCS 10/7(e) (West 1998).

The defendants contend the "In determining" sentence thatconcludes paragraph one applies only to the last "four additionallicenses," not to any of the first four placed on theMississippi. That, say the defendants, defines the limits of theBoard's discretion.

Lake County claims the sentence applies to any "new" orreissued license -- the "tenth license," which Emerald's formerlicense would be. That is, once one of the original fourMississippi River licenses is terminated or revoked, it isreissued as a new license, "effective on or after March 1, 1992,"triggering the Board's discretion to consider the economicbenefits gambling brings to all regions of the State. LakeCounty emphasizes it does not seek a transfer or relocation ofEmerald's license, it seeks to compete for a newly availablelicense after Emerald's application for renewal is denied.

Neither side offers any insight into the meaning or purpose of the second paragraph of section 10/7(e), which begins: "Ingranting all licenses ***." (Emphasis added.) We cannot ignorethe paragraph, because "statutes should be construed so thatlanguage is not rendered meaningless or superfluous." People v.Singleton, 103 Ill. 2d 339, 345, 469 N.E.2d 200 (1984).

We know the legislature considered the possibility that alicense would be revoked or terminated. See, for example,sections 10/5(b)(1), (11), (15); section 10/7(g). We also knoweach license was issued for a 3-year period, renewable on meetingcertain conditions. Section 10/7(g). Yet, we cannot findanywhere in 230 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 2000) a clear statementabout the Board's authority to relocate any of the first sixlicenses should it be revoked or terminated. On the other hand,nothing in the statute specifically requires that the first sixlicenses remain on the designated waterways until the legislaturemoves them. We must deal with legislative reticence.

The defendants rely heavily on two opinion letters issued bythe Illinois Attorney General, 1995 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. __, No.95-011, and 2001 Ill Att'y Gen. Op. 004, especially the 1995opinion. The last paragraph of the Attorney General's 1995opinion:

"I would note, however, that as section 7 is currentlywritten, it appears to require that four riverboats belicensed to operate on the Mississippi River, one on theIllinois River south of Marshall County and one on the DesPlaines River in Will County. There is nothing in the Actthat indicates that licenses issued subsequent to theinitial licenses are exempt from that requirement. Consequently, in issuing new licenses, the Gaming Board willhave to ensure that the statutorily-imposed balance ismaintained, unless it is repealed or modifiedlegislatively." 1995 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. __, No. 95-011.

We are reluctant to give that last paragraph too muchweight. First, the Attorney General was being asked only whethera current licensee could relocate its riverboat gamblingoperations. Second, there are other references in the opinionletter that could be seen as inconsistent, depending on how they

are interpreted. For example:

"Following the expiration or termination of the licensesinitially authorized, however, the Illinois Gaming Board mayissue owners licenses for different locations in accordancewith the criteria established by the Riverboat Gambling Act(230 ILCS 10/1 et seq. (West 1994))." (Emphasis inoriginal.) 1995 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. __, No. 95-011.

And,

"This does not necessarily mean that an owner will beprecluded, in all circumstances, from applying for andreceiving a license for a different location." 1995 Ill.Att'y Gen. Op. __, No. 95-011.

The 2001 opinion letter does not shed any additional light. It is addressed to the question of whether a current MississippiRiver license could be authorized for mooring at an inlandlocation within the same community. The answer was no, but oflittle interest to us.

Our primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the trueintent of the legislature. Palos Community Hospital v. Illinois Health Facilities Planning Board, 328 Ill. App. 3d 336, 339, 765 N.E.2d 1187 (2002). Because we are unable to determine thelegislature's intent from the words of the statute, we are allowed to resolve the statute's ambiguity by considering itslegislative history and debates, and by examining the statute'spurposes and underlying policies. Advincula v. United BloodServices, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 19, 678 N.E.2d 1009 (1997).

Nowhere in the legislative debates of 1989 and 1990 do wefind any indication the legislature intended to give the Boardauthority to relocate any of the first four licenses from theMississippi to some other waterway in the event one of thoselicenses was reissued to a new licensee. We see a consistent andpersistent commitment to gambling boats on the Mississippi River,without any apparent concern for the financial viability of thoseenterprises. The wisdom of legislative choice is not for us todetermine.

Excerpts from the 1989 and 1990 debates confirm legislativecommitment to the Mississippi River:

The sponsor of Senate bill 572, Senator Denny Jacobs,explained the purpose of the bill:

"This bill sets out a rigorous plan for regulating riverboatgambling. *** A number of Illinois communities, in regardto tourism, could use some of that ***. In fact, rivertowns all along southern Illinois, two shore lines could ***use a shot in the tourism arm. Excursion boats cruising upand down the Mississippi River might be just the ticket." 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 26, 1989, at243-44 (statements of Senator Jacobs).

Later, Representative Brunsvold declared the broader goal ofthe bill:

"This Bill in Illinois was introduced by Senator Jacobs, mysenator, and started in the Senate and had approval in theSenate, had some changes in the task force in the House. We're at a point now where we have 10 licenses at thediscretion of the board. The overall concept of riverboatgambling was for tourism and economic development along theMississippi River. That and along with the Illinois Riverin Peoria, seems to me to be the ideal location forriverboat gambling." 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, June 22, 1989, at 93-94 (statements ofRepresentative Brunsvold).

When the bill returned to the Senate, Senator Jacobsexplained how the legislation was changed:

"This bill has been changed slightly, in order to allow fourlicenses on the Mississippi River and one license on theIllinois River for -- effective January of 1990. And thenthe other five licenses that were referred to earlier, to --phase in in 1991." 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., SenateProceedings, June 30, 1989, at 243-44 (statements of SenatorJacobs).

In response to Senator Jacobs' explanation, Senator Karpielsaid, "I do not want gambling boats on the Fox River." Karpielasked, "How [do] we prevent this from happening on other riversin the State of Illinois?" 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., SenateProceedings, June 30, 1989, at 387 (statements of SenatorKarpiel).

Senator Jacobs replied:

"Well, Senator. Under this particular legislation, as thedraft is now, you have two protections. Number one, underthe first -- the first licenses that -- that are to begiven, four will be on the Mississippi; one, will be on theIllinois. So that excludes any other river, other thanthose. The second portion, which is the trigger-in, comes alittle bit later, which is in January 1991. So at thattime, we would have an opportunity, as a Body, that if wefelt that a particular river does not want to be in, we cancome back and legislatively say that." (Emphasis added.) 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, June 30, 1989, at387 (statements of Senator Jacobs).

After the bill was approved in the Senate, RepresentativeBrunsvold repeated the general understanding of the purpose ofthe bill:

"The last decade, the eighties, has been a very interestingdecade for our area. We were, since 1930, pretty recession-proof. We had Cat, John Deere, Farmall. We had theag[ricultural] industry there that pretty much was stablefor all those years. In 1980 everything collapsed. We'vebeen struggling through the eighties, trying to diversify,get more jobs in the Quad Cities. Riverboat gambling? Isthat the answer? No, that's not the answer, but it's apiece of the puzzle that can help us in a different area. Tourism. We have one of the greatest attractions in theworld. People say, 'Where are you from?' and I say, "I'mfrom the Quad Cities.' 'Well, where's that?' 'Well, it'son the Mississippi River.' 'I know where that is.' TheMississippi River is important to our area. It's a touristattraction. Riverboat gambling is part of the history ofthat Mississippi River. Having two licenses of four boatson the Mississippi River would be a magnet for tourists toour area[, the Quad Cities.]" 86th Ill. Gen. Assem., HouseProceedings, January 11, 1990, at 51-52 (statements ofRepresentative Brunsvold).

If the legislature wanted to authorize the Board to issuenew licenses for new locations when an existing Mississippi Riverlicense was revoked or terminated, it easily could have done so. It chose not to. We are not inclined to amend the legislation byjudicial fiat.

Our conclusion is supported by the 1999 amendments to the Act, constitutional or not. Section 10/11.2, the section underattack by Lake County, permits relocation of Emerald's licensebut does not allow change of location of the other MississippiRiver licenses. Section 10/7(e) was amended to conform tosection 10/11.2; it now reads: "Three of such licenses shallauthorize riverboat gambling on the Mississippi River ***." There is no indication those licenses could be relocated by theBoard should they be revoked or terminated. No additional powersto relocate were granted to the Board.

During the 1999 debate on the amendments, the House sponsor,Representative Brunsvold, was asked whether the amendment would allow other boats to be relocated to new sites:

"Davis, S.: One other question. The boats who are currentlyon the Mississippi River.

Brunsvold: Correct.

Davis, S.: Okay. Under current law, what is the current lawregarding the moving of these boats to another site?

And ...

Brunsvold: There is no language.

Davis, S.: There is no language. Is there language in thisBill that would require three boats to remain on theMississippi River?

Brunsvold: Yes, there is. The language was changed to ...from four to three, now. And this three is in this ... isin this Bill that would require to be ... remain on theMississippi River.

Davis, S.: I want to make sure, for the record, that ...

Brunsvold: There are three boats.

Davis, S.: ... that is very clear, that three boats willremain on the Mississippi River. That they will not end upin Cook County or in the City of Chicago.

Brunsvold: This is the number that's been in the languageall along the process." (Emphasis added.) 91st Ill. Gen.Assem., House Proceedings, May 20, 1999, at 185-86(statements of Representatives Davis and Brunsvold).

The Board has no general or common law powers. Daniels v.The Industrial Commission, No. 90--318, slip op. at 4, (Ill.March 21, 2002). The only powers it possesses are those grantedto it by the legislature. Any action it takes must bespecifically authorized by statute. Business & ProfessionalPeople for the Public Interest v. Illinois Commerce Commission,136 Ill. 2d 192, 243-44, 555 N.E.2d 693 (1989).

Based on all we have said, we conclude the RiverboatGambling Act of 1990 does not give the Board discretion to issueany of the first six licenses for a location away from theirstatutorily designated navigable streams, even where a license is revoked or terminated and reissued to a new licensee. Forthat reason, Lake County would have had no chance of winningEmerald's revoked or terminated license for use on the Fox River. It follows, then, Lake County has no standing to challenge theconstitutionality of section 10/11.2 because it has not sustainedand is not in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as aresult of the enforcement of the statute. Chicago TeachersUnion, 189 Ill. 2d at 206.

CONCLUSION

Lake County has no standing to challenge theconstitutionality of section 10/11.2. Because we reach thisconclusion, there is no reason to inquire into the exhaustion ofremedies argument made by the defendants. We affirm the judgmentof the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

HALL, P.J., and SOUTH, J., concur.

1. M. Twain, Life on the Mississippi, Chapter 22 at 113,Reissue edition (May 1997).