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JUSTICE COUSINS delivered the opinion of the court:

In November 1994, Krusinski Construction Company (Krusinski) was namedthe general contractor for the construction of approximately 300,000 squarefeet of office and warehouse space in Buffalo Grove, Illinois, for CourtesyCorporation (Courtesy). Krusinski hired eight subcontractors to perform theconstruction services. In 1997, a dispute arose between Krusinski andCourtesy. Krusinski filed a demand for arbitration. Courtesy filed acounterclaim against Krusinski alleging that the eight subcontractorsperformed defective construction services. Krusinski tendered its defense andindemnification to its commercial general liability insurer, NorthbrookProperty & Casualty Insurance Company (Northbrook), and the subcontractors'insurers. Each of the insurers denied coverage.

Krusinski sought a declaratory judgment finding that the subcontractors'respective insurers had a duty to defend and indemnify it as to any liabilityit may incur in the underlying Courtesy arbitration.

In a March 13, 2000, order, the trial court held that Northbrook wasresponsible for seven of the eight claims against Krusinski and that AmericanCountry Insurance Company (American Country) was responsible for one of theeight claims against Krusinski. Northbrook filed a motion to reconsider onApril 12, 2000. On July 12, 2000, the trial court allowed Northbrook to filea second amended complaint instanter. The trial court denied Northbrook'smotion to reconsider and entered judgment in favor of American Country oncounts II and III of the second amended complaint. Northbrook now presentsthe following issue upon appeal: whether Northbrook has a duty to defendKrusinski relative to seven of the eight claims brought by Courtesy in theunderlying arbitration.

BACKGROUND

In November 1994, Krusinski was named the general contractor for theCourtesy office and warehouse project, to be completed November 15, 1995. Inorder to complete the project, Krusinski secured contracts with eightsubcontractors: Binzel Industries, Inc. (Binzel); Kole Construction Company,Inc. (Kole); Sellergren Brothers (Sellergren); Chicago Heights Glass, Inc.(Chicago Heights Glass); Haley Floor & Wall Design, Inc. (Haley); O'HareEngineering, Inc. (O'Hare); Century Concrete Construction Company (Century);and Lenzini Excavating, Inc. (Lenzini). Article 13.6 of all of thesubcontracts provided:

"THE SUBCONTRACTOR WILL NAME THE CONTRACTOR, OWNER, ARCHITECT ANDENGINEER AS ADDITIONAL INSUREDS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITYAND UMBRELLA POLICIES. The coverage afforded the Additional Insuredunder these policies shall be primary insurance. If the AdditionalInsured has other insurance which is applicable to the loss, such otherinsurance shall be on an excess or contingent basis."

General contractor Krusinski acquired commercial general liabilityinsurance from Northbrook. The pertinent sections of Northbrook's policyprovide:

"a. We [Northbrook] will pay those sums that the Insured [Krusinski]becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injury orproperty damage to which this insurance applies. We will have the rightand duty to defend any suit seeking those damages. We may at ourdiscretion investigate any occurrence and settle any claim or suit thatmay result.

* * *

b. This insurance applies to any bodily injury and property damageonly if:

(1) The bodily injury or property damage is caused by an occurrencethat takes place in the coverage territory; and

(2) The bodily injury or property damage occurs during the policyperiod.* * *

4. Other Insurance

If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the Insuredfor a loss we cover under Coverages A and B of this insurance, ourobligations are limited as follows:

a. PRIMARY INSURANCE

This insurance is primary except when paragraph b. below applies. Ifthis insurance is primary, our obligations are not affected unless anyof the other insurance is also primary. Then, we will share with allthat other insurance by method described in c. below.

b. EXCESS INSURANCE

This insurance is excess over any other insurance, whether primary,excess, contingent or on any other basis;

(1) That is property insurance, such as, but not limited to Fire,Extended Coverage, Builder's Risk or Installation Risk Coverageapplicable to your work;

***

When this insurance is in excess, we will have no duty underCoverages A or B to defend any claim or suit that any other insurer hasa duty to defend. When no other insurer defends, we will undertake todo so, but we will be entitled to the Insured's rights against all thoseother insurers."

Northbrook's "other insurance" clause, as amended by endorsement, provides:

"Commercial Liability Conditions is hereby amended to include thefollowing:

b. EXCESS INSURANCE

4. In those instances where the named insured (you) under thispolicy is an additional insured on a policy issued by any other insurer,but only if this policy would have provided such coverage for the namedinsured (you)."

Subcontractor Lenzini secured an insurance policy with American Country. American Country's "Additional Insured" endorsement provides:

"WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insuredany person or organization (called additional insured) whom you arerequired to add as an additional insured on this policy by:

1. An agreement, to which you are bound, executed prior to an'occurrence' giving rise to 'bodily injury' or 'property damage' and;

2. A certificate of insurance designating that person or organizationas an additional insured has been issued by our authorized producerprior to an 'occurrence' giving rise to 'bodily injury' or 'propertydamage.' ***

The insurance provided to the additional insured is limited asfollows:

1. That person or organization is an additional insured but only withrespect to your acts or omissions in connection with 'Your work' forthat additional insured by you or on your behalf at the locationdesignated in the agreement and designated in a certificate of insuranceissued by our authorized producer.

***

2. Additional Exclusions. This insurance does not apply to:

a. 'Bodily injury' or 'property damage' for which the additionalinsured(s) are obligated to pay damages by reason of the assumption ofliability in a contract or agreement. ***

* * * Any coverage provided hereunder shall be excess over any otherinsurance, issued in favor of the additional insured whether primary,excess, contingent or any other basis, whether the additional insuredcan collect on it or not, unless a written agreement, to which you arebound, specifically requires that this insurance be primary or thecertificate of insurance on file with the company showing the person ororganization as an additional insured states the insurance applies on aprimary basis.

When this insurance is primary, it shall be contributory inaccordance with the method of sharing as set forth in paragraph C ofCondition 4, Other Insurance (Section IV). When this insurance isexcess, we will pay only our share of the amount of the loss, if anythat exceeds the sum of:

(1) The total amount that all such other insurance would pay for theloss in the absence of this insurance; and

(2) The total of all deductible and self-insured amounts under allthat other insurance."

A dispute arose between Krusinski and Courtesy regarding allegedconstruction deficiencies. In July 1997, Courtesy filed a demand forarbitration. Krusinski filed for declaratory judgment to stay Courtesy'sdemand for arbitration. Krusinski's motion to stay was granted.

In May 1998, Krusinski filed an amended demand for arbitration againstCourtesy and all eight subcontractors. Courtesy filed a counterclaim againstKrusinski in July 1998. Courtesy's counterclaim against Krusinski assertedthat Courtesy was not able to occupy the project site until after thecompletion date and "many aspects of the Work performed by Krusinski weredefective and/or not in conformance with the Contract." The alleged defectiveor nonconforming work included the following:

"1. *** The risers within [the 'monumental staircase'] at variouslocations vary beyond the Contract specifications as well as industrystandards.

2. The stone floor in the entrance lobby at the Project site hassignificant out of level conditions ***.

* * *

8. Courtesy suffered significant damages *** when *** LenziniExcavating, severed a power line ***."

Courtesy requested compensation for the defective and nonconforming work, thecosts to correct the same, and loss of business and profits.

In August 1998, Krusinski tendered the Courtesy counterclaim to seven ofthe eight subcontractors' insurers, excluding Lenzini's insurer, for defenseand indemnity. Each of the insurers denied coverage.

In January 1999, Krusinski filed a complaint for declaratory judgmentagainst St. Paul Insurance Company (St. Paul) and all eight subcontractors andtheir insurers to defend and indemnify it against the Courtesy claims. Krusinski amended its complaint and substituted Northbrook for St. Paul as theinsurer obliged to defend and indemnify Krusinski in Courtesy's underlyingcounterclaim for arbitration.

In April 1999, Northbrook filed its answer, affirmative defenses andoriginal counterclaim. In its August 1999 amended counterclaim, Northbrookasserted that there was no coverage for Krusinski relative to the Courtesyclaims under the Northbrook policies, Northbrook was not obligated to defendor indemnify Krusinski, and the Northbrook policies were excess policies toother insurance provided to Krusinski.

In June 1999, Krusinski filed a motion for summary judgment againstNorthbrook and all eight subcontractors and a separate motion against each ofthe subcontractors' insurers. Northbrook filed a cross-motion for summaryjudgment. Each of the insurers filed for summary judgment. In several ordersentered in November and December 1999, the trial court granted summaryjudgment in favor of the insurers for Binzel, Century, O'Hare, Haley, Kole,Sellergren, and Chicago Heights. Relative to Courtesy's claim againstKrusinski, whose insurer is Northbrook, the court found in its orders that theclaims made by Courtesy against Krusinski in the Courtesy arbitration were for"breach of contract" and that the subcontractors' insurers had no obligationto defend or indemnify Krusinski in the underlying Courtesy arbitration. Inthese orders, the court found: there was no coverage for Krusinski providedunder policies issued by these seven subcontractors as the claims made byCourtesy in the underlying arbitration proceedings "do not allege and'occurrence' or 'property damage.'"

On December 6, 1999, Krusinski filed a notice of appeal from the summaryjudgment orders in favor of the seven insurers. That appeal was not pursuedand, on April 26, 2000, Krusinski's appeal was dismissed.

On December 1, 1999, the trial court granted Krusinski's motion forpartial summary judgment, in part, and denied American Country's cross-motionfinding that Courtesy's underlying amended counterclaim alleged an occurrenceof property damage under the insurance policies of Northbrook and AmericanCountry. The court reserved its ruling on the issues of the duty to defendand the primary/excess insurer issue.

Following the December 1999 order, American Country filed a motion toapportion defense fees and asserted that it was entitled to an allocation ofdefense fees and costs pursuant to the underlying arbitration. Krusinskifiled its response arguing that American Country's duty to defend all claimsin the underlying counterdemand for arbitration was triggered by the claimarising out of Lenzini's work. At a hearing held on American Country's motionto apportion, the trial judge stated the following:

"The facts in this case appear to be unique. *** While, of course,there is no issue here that American Country's policy is primary inregard to Linzini's [sic] claim, the hard part of this case, of course,comes about the remaining seven claims.

* * *

Among the allegations in the underlying counterclaim in thearbitration are that Krusinski didn't adequately supervise and preventthe misdeeds of the various subs. That was really what the purpose ofthe insurance was.

In taking a look at it that way as opposed to just the generalprinciples of law in a vacuum, I have decided to grant AmericanCountry's motion to apportionment. I am going to find that AmericanCountry is primary and Northbrook is excess for the defense of theLinzini [sic] claim only, and that American Country is entitled to anallocation of defense fees and costs upon proof of fees and costsallocated to covered and noncovered claims." (Emphasis added.)

On March 13, 2000, the trial court entered the following order:

"1. American Country's Motion to Apportion is granted. The Courtdeclares that the American Country policy is primary and the Northbrookpolicy is excess for the defense of Krusinski for the claim arising outof Lenzini's work. This Court finds and declares that American Countryowes a defense to Krusinski only for the claim arising out of Lenzini'swork. The Court further finds that American Country is entitled toallocation of defense fees and costs in the underlying arbitration basedon actual proof of fees and costs allocated to covered and non-coveredclaims.

2. Northbrook's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. TheCourt finds that Northbrook must defend the entirety of the remainingclaims against Krusinski.

3. The Court further finds that American Country has waived, in opencourt and on the record, its reservation of rights pursuant to which ithad offered a defense to Krusinski for the claim arising out ofLenzini's work. Therefore, there is no conflict of interest for defensecounsel appointed by American Country to represent Krusinski for theclaim arising out of Lenzini's work.

4. There is no just delay enforcement or appeal of this order."

On April 12, 2000, Northbrook filed a motion to reconsider the judgmentorder of March 13, 2000. Northbrook was granted leave to file its secondamended counterclaim on July 12, 2000, arguing that under the Northbrookpolicy, there was no coverage for Krusinski with respect to the Courtesyclaims; Northbrook was not obligated to defend or indemnify Krusinski againstthe Courtesy claims; the Northbrook policies are excess to other insuranceprovided to Krusinski; American Country should be liable to Krusinski for itsdefense costs in the Krusinski arbitration; any coverage provided byNorthbrook's policy is excess to the coverage provided by American Country;and to the extent Northbrook is forced to pay Krusinski's defense costs,Northbrook has a right to equitable indemnification and equitable contributionfrom American Country.

On July 12, 2000, the trial court entered an order which provided:

"1. Northbrook is allowed leave to file its second amended counter-complaint instanter adding Counts II & III against American CountryInsurance Co.

2. The Court enters judgment on the pleadings in favor of AmericanCountry and against Northbrook on Counts II & III of the Second AmendedComplaint.

3. Northbrook's motion to reconsider is denied in all other aspectsand for all other relief sought."

Northbrook now appeals. We affirm.

ANALYSIS

Northbrook contends that it has no duty to defend Krusinski relative toseven of the eight claims brought by Courtesy. In contrast, Krusinski assertsthat Northbrook is obligated to defend it against the underlying Courtesyclaims as its primary insurer. American Country asserts that the March 13,2000, apportionment ruling should be affirmed and that the July 12, 2000,judgment in favor of it relative to the second amended countercomplaint shouldalso be affirmed.

The review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Zekman v.Direct American Marketers, Inc., 182 Ill. 2d 359, 374, 695 N.E.2d 853 (1998). The construction of the provisions of an insurance policy is also subject tode novo review. American States Insurance Co. v. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d 473,479-80, 687 N.E.2d 72 (1997). Apportionment is an equity matter and,therefore, the standard of review is abuse of discretion. See FremontCompensation Insurance Co. v. Ace-Chicago Great Dane Corp., 304 Ill. App. 3d734, 742, 710 N.E.2d 132 (1999). In this case, we are reviewing theconstruction of insurance policies and the apportionment of insurer liability.

American Country argues that while Northbrook has standing to appeal theJuly 12, 2000, judgment against it and in favor of American Country on thesecond amended countercomplaint, it lacks standing to appeal the trial court'sMarch 13, 2000, apportionment decision. American Country states that "[t]herewas no counter-complaint pending between Northbrook and American Country onMarch 13, 2000, when the trial court entered the judgment on apportionment." Although the general rule in Illinois is that the only party who may appealfrom a judgment in favor of a codefendant is the plaintiff, that rule issubject to the limitation that it applies only in cases where the rights ofthe appellant are not affected by the error. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital v.Kuczaj, 174 Ill. App. 3d 268, 271, 528 N.E.2d 290 (1988). Northbrook'sresponsibilities as an insurer were directly adverse to those of AmericanCountry in the March 13, 2000, order on apportionment and the July 12, 2000,denial of Northbrook's motion to reconsider. Therefore, Northbrook hasstanding to appeal.

In construing the language of an insurance policy, the court's primaryobjective is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties to thecontract. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. A court must construe the policy as awhole and take into account the type of insurance purchased, the nature of therisks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract. Crum & ForsterManagers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391, 620 N.E.2d1073 (1993). If the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, they mustbe given their plain and ordinary meaning. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. Provisions that limit or exclude coverage will be interpreted liberally infavor of the insured. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479.

The extent of an insurer's duty to defend is determined by a comparisonof the allegations in the underlying complaint to the relevant provisions ofthe insurance policy. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. If the facts alleged inthe complaint fall within, or potentially fall within, the language of thepolicy, the insurer's duty to defend arises. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479.

Illinois law is clear that primary and excess insurers insure differentrisks. Schal Bovis, Inc. v. Casualty Insurance Co., 315 Ill. App. 3d 353, 732N.E.2d 1179 (2000). Primary insurance is coverage whereby liability attachesimmediately upon the happening of the occurrence that gives rise to liability. Northbrook Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. United States Fidelity &Guaranty Co., 150 Ill. App. 3d 479, 483, 501 N.E.2d 817 (1986). Primarypolicies generally impose on the insurer a duty of defense separate from theduty to indemnify the insured against the claim. Zurich Insurance Co. v.Raymark Industries, Inc., 145 Ill. App. 3d 175, 201, 494 N.E.2d 634 (1986). Excess or secondary coverage liability attaches only after a predeterminedamount of primary coverage has been exhaustive. Northbrook Property, 150 Ill.App. 3d at 483. Rather than providing a duty to defend, most excess policiesrequire the excess insurer to indemnify the insured for the costs of thedefense as part of the "ultimate net loss" against which the policy insures. Zurich, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 201.

Northbrook cites Schal Bovis to support its contention that thesubcontracts at issue in the instant case "are the very types of writtenagreements contemplated by American Country's 'Additional Insured' endorsementand, in fact, specifically require that the insurance provided by AmericanCountry be primary." In Schal Bovis, the underlying litigation involved aworker's fall from a steel beam while working on a construction project. MKDG/Buck 123 Partnership (Buck) owned the site, and Schal Bovis, Inc. (SchalBovis), was the general contractor. Both were insured by Northbrook Property& Casualty Company (Northbrook). Schal Bovis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 358. SchalBovis contracted with four subcontractors, Ozark Steel Fabricators, Inc., andOzark Steel Sales, Inc. (collectively, Ozark), Ranken Steel, Inc., and R.S.Erectors, Inc. (collectively, Ranken), Alcan United Concrete, Inc. (Alcan),and Chicago Forming, Inc. (Chicago Forming), to complete the project. Buckand Schal Bovis were additional insureds on each of the subcontractors'insurance policies issued by Great American Insurance Company (GreatAmerican), Wausau Insurance Company (Wausau), Casualty Insurance Company(Casualty), and American States Insurance Company (American States).

The Northbrook policy in Schal Bovis contained an "other insurance"clause that stated that the coverage provided would be considered excessinsurance, but only in the case where: (1) the other insurance was propertyinsurance; (2) the other insurance was for fire, explosion aircraft or vehicleinsurance for premises rented to Schal; or (3) loss arose out of themaintenance or use of aircraft, autos or watercraft. Schal Bovis, 315 Ill.App. 3d at 361. However, Northbrook issued an endorsement to the policy thatprovided that the "other insurance" clause was amended to make the policy anexcess policy "[i]n those instances where an Insured under [the] policy is an Additional Insured on a policy issued by any other insurer." Schal Bovis, 315Ill. App. 3d at 361. Northbrook also executed a "Blanket Person Insured byContract" endorsement providing that the "Persons Insured" provision would beamended to include any person or organization that the "Named Insured hasagreed by contract, either oral or written, prior to loss, to include as aninsured with respect to operations performed by, for, or on behalf of theNamed Insured." Schal Bovis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 361.

Schal Bovis and Buck tendered their defenses to Wausau, Great American,Casualty and American States. Schal Bovis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 360. Wausauand Great American accepted the tender. Casualty participated in Schal Bovis'and Buck's defense, but withdrew when its named insured, Alcan, was dismissedfrom the suit. American States never participated in Schal Bovis' or Buck'sdefense. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the injured employee andassess his recoverable damages in the amount of $2,892,500 against SchalBovis, Buck and Ozark. Schal Bovis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 360. The jury wasnot asked to apportion fault. Schal Bovis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 360.

Northbrook brought alternative claims: (1) in its count seekingreimbursement from Casualty and American States, Northbrook asserted that itwas an excess insurer of Schal Bovis and Buck; and (2) in its count seekingequitable contribution, it asserted that it insured the "same risk" as theother insurers who were alleged to be primary carriers. Schal Bovis, 315 Ill.App. 3d at 360.

The appellate court wrote:

"It is undisputed that Schal and Buck are insureds under the Northbrookpolicy, and it is also undisputed that Schal and Buck are additionalinsureds on each of the policies issued by Great American, Casualty,Wausau and American States. Therefore, by operation of the 'otherinsurance' endorsement, we find Northbrook to be an excess insurerrelative to the other insurers in this case." Schal Bovis, 315 Ill.App. 3d at 362.

The appellate court reasoned that the endorsement which amended the "otherinsurance" clause was "clear and unambiguous and indicate[d] that Northbrookwas intended to be an excess insurer whenever its insureds (Schal and Buck)were named as additional insureds on any policy issued by another carrier." Schal Bovis, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 361-62. However, Schal Bovis is inappositebecause the underlying litigation in that case involved a single personalinjury claim.

Northbrook also relies on Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. InternationalInsurance Co., 288 Ill. App. 3d 69, 679 N.E.2d 801 (1997). In MissouriPacific, there was an insurance coverage dispute between Missouri PacificRailroad Company and four of its excess general liability insurance carriers:Commercial Union Insurance Company, Federal Insurance Company, InternationalInsurance Company, and Century Indemnity Company. Missouri Pacific, 288 Ill.App. 3d at 71. Thousands of current and former Missouri Pacific employeesbrought claims against Missouri Pacific seeking damages for hearing lossallegedly caused by continuous and repeated on-the-job exposure to unsafenoise levels. Also, hundreds of current and former employees sought damagesfor asbestos-related injuries allegedly caused by continuous and repeatedexposure to unsafe levels of asbestos over the course of their employment. The trial court found as a matter of law that all of the hearing loss claimsarose from a single occurrence. Missouri Pacific, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 74. Also, the trial court held that all of the asbestos claims arose from a singleoccurrence. Missouri Pacific, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 74. Importantly, unlikethe instant case, Missouri Pacific involved "a single continuous occurrence."Missouri Pacific, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 78.

Another case that Northbrook cites is Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers,64 Ill. 2d 187, 355 N.E.2d 24 (1976). In Maryland Casualty, James Mims fileda personal injury action because he had been shot by Robert Peppers while hewas fleeing the pizza parlor owned by Peppers. There was no policy ofinsurance on the pizza parlor covering liability for personal injuries. Adjacent to the pizza parlor was a building which was insured by MarylandCasualty Company (Maryland Casualty) under a general liability policy. Nextto that building was the Peppers' home, which was insured by St. Paul Fire &Marine Insurance Company (St. Paul) under a homeowner's policy of insurance. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 191. The policies issued by Maryland and bySt. Paul both specifically excluded coverage for injuries intentionallyinflicted. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 190. The policy issued byMaryland Casualty was limited by its terms to pay on behalf of Peppers and hiswife all sums which they became legally obligated to pay for bodily injury orproperty damage caused by an occurrence and arising out of the ownership,maintenance, or the use of the insured premises. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill.2d at 192-93.

The trial court held that the Maryland Casualty policy issued to Peppersdid not cover the occurrence in question. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at193. However, the trial court held that St. Paul was obligated under itspolicy to defend Peppers. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 193. Theappellate court modified and affirmed. The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 199. The supreme court reasoned that thecontrolling question as to Maryland's coverage and duty to defend involved thelocation of the occurrence. Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 192.

The supreme court wrote:

"In determining whether the insurer owes a duty to the insured todefend an action brought against him, it is the general rule that theallegations of the complaint determine the duty. If the complaintalleges facts within the coverage of the policy or potentially withinthe coverage of the policy the duty to defend has been established.[Citations.]

This duty to defend extends to cases where the complaint allegesseveral causes of action or theories of recovery against an insured, oneof which is within the coverage of a policy while the others may notbe." Maryland Casualty, 64 Ill. 2d at 193-94.

However, Maryland Casualty is also inapposite because, unlike the instantcase, that case involved a single occurrence by a single actor. Here, we haveacts of alleged nonconformance by seven different subcontractors that areunrelated to each other and unrelated to the previously resolved Lenziniaction.

In the instant case, Krusinski had a responsibility for the workperformed by its subcontractors. Northbrook's policy insuring Krusinski is acomprehensive general liability policy. Northbrook's policy states that it"will pay those sums that the Insured [Krusinski] becomes legally obligated topay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which thisinsurance applies." This insurance applies to any bodily injury and propertydamage if: "(1) The bodily injury or property damage is caused by anoccurrence that takes place in the coverage territory; and (2) The bodilyinjury or property damage occurs during the policy period." The pertinentamendment to the Northbrook policy states that where the named insured,Krusinski, is an additional insured on a policy by another company, theNorthbrook policy is excess insurance, but only if Northbrook would haveprovided coverage for the claim.

In contradistinction to the other claims, the Lenzini claim involvedproperty damage for which Lenzini's insurer, America Country, became theprimary insurer and Northbrook became the excess insurer. Courtesy'sremaining claims against Krusinski were for "breach of contract" by sevendifferent companies. Where the facts alleged in the complaint fall within, orpotentially fall within, the language of the policy, the insurer's duty todefend arises. Koloms, 177 Ill. 2d at 479. In our view, Krusinski, asgeneral contractor, is potentially responsible for defective work performed byall subcontractors. However, the facts alleged in the complaint, except forone property damage occurrence, do not fall within or potentially fall withinLenzini's policy with American Country. Provisions that limit or excludecoverage will be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured (Koloms, 177Ill. 2d at 479), and, therefore, on the facts of the instant case, we holdthat the trial court did not err in finding that Northbrook had a duty todefend Krusinski in the remaining Courtesy claims.

Relative to the duty to defend claims in an underlying action that arenot potentially covered by an insured's policy, Buss v. Superior Court, 16Cal. 4th 35, 939 P.2d 766, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 366 (1997), is instructive. InBuss, H&H Sports, Incorporated (H&H Sports), brought an action against JerryH. Buss and others alleging 27 causes of action including breach of contract,defamation, specific performance, and conversion. Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 40-41,939 P.2d at 769, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369. Buss tendered the H&H Sports actionto his insurers. With the exception of Transamerica Insurance Company(Transamerica), each refused, denying coverage. Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 41, 939P.2d at 769, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 369.

Out of the 27 causes of action in the final amended form of thecomplaint, there was a single one for defamation against Buss. Buss, 16 Cal.4th at 42, 939 P.2d at 770, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370. In light of theallegations, Transamerica agreed to defend Buss in only the defamation causeof action. Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 42, 939 P.2d at 770, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370. Buss and Transamerica entered into an agreement that provided that if a courtordered defense costs to be shared pro rata by Buss and Transamerica, Bussshall reimburse Transamerica for the appropriate pro rata share of the feesand costs paid to that date. Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 42, 939 P.2d at 770, 65Cal. Rptr. 2d at 370. Subsequently, Buss settled the H&H Sports action payingH&H Sports $8.5 million. Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 42, 939 P. 2d at 770, 65 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 370. Transamerica paid Buss' independent counsel a sum equalingthe cost of defending the defamation cause of action.

In Buss, the court wrote, in pertinent part:

"It follows that, in a 'mixed' action, in which some of the claimsare at least potentially covered and the others are not, the insurer hasa duty to defend as to the claims that are at least potentially covered,having been paid premiums by the insured therefor, but does not have aduty to defend as to those that are not, having not been paid therefor." (Emphasis added.) Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 47-48, 939 P.2d at 774, 65 Cal.Rptr. 2d at 374.

In Buss, the court held that the insurer may seek reimbursement for thedefense costs that can be allocated solely to claims that are not evenpotentially covered. Buss, 16 Cal. 4th at 50, 939 P.2d at 776, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d at 376.

Finally, Northbrook asserts that if it is determined to have a duty todefend Krusinski, it is entitled to reimbursement from American Country. Wedisagree. Northbrook has not yet paid the expenses for Krusinski's defense,and based upon our holding, Northbrook will not become entitled toreimbursement from American Country.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McNULTY, J., and COHEN, P.J., concur.