Krueger v. Lewis

Case Date: 07/24/2003
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-02-1212 Rel

FOURTH DIVISION
July 24, 2003



No. 1-02-1212

 

PATRICIA KRUEGER, ) Appeal from
) the Circuit Court
                                   Plaintiff-Appellant, ) of Cook County.
)
           v. ) No. 01 L 671
)
MARY ANN LEWIS, ) Honorable
) Kathy M. Flanagan,
                                   Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge Presiding.




PRESIDING JUSTICE THEIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Patricia Krueger, appeals from an order of the circuit court granting defendant's,Mary Ann Lewis's, motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint under section 2-615 of the IllinoisCode of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)). Plaintiff argues the trial court erred indismissing the complaint in that it adequately stated a cause of action for slander per se and thedefendant's communications were not absolutely privileged. For the following reasons, wereverse.

The complaint alleges the following facts. Plaintiff held the position of Village trustee ofthe Village of Lyons since April 20, 1999. On Tuesday, June 19, 2001, plaintiff served at atelevised meeting of the Village of Lyons board of trustees which contained an "audiencecrowded with Lyons citizens and voters." Plaintiff alleges that defendant, "maliciously intendingto injure plaintiff in her good name and reputation," charged that plaintiff "in her capacity as aVillage Trustee, had accepted a bribe to establish a [tax increment financing] district in theVillage of Lyons, and that [p]laintiff was pocketing money from developers in exchange for[p]laintiff's cooperation." Plaintiff requested that defendant repeat her statement and defendantdid so. Defendant made the statement "upon information and belief, in full knowledge that [itwas] untrue or in reckless disregard of [its] truth or falsity, and for the purpose of injuringplaintiff in her good name and business." Plaintiff further alleges that "[a]t the time of thepublication of her statement, the defendant made no reasonable effort to inquire as to thetruthfulness of her claim that [p]laintiff accepted bribes." Plaintiff claims these statements havecaused injury to her reputation and seeks $50,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000 inpunitive damages.

Defendant filed a section 2-615 motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2000)), arguing, inter alia, that her statements were absolutely privileged. The trial court granted themotion to dismiss, finding the statements were absolutely privileged because they were made at alegislative proceeding. Plaintiff appeals.

We first address defendant's argument that the trial court properly granted the motion todismiss under section 2-615 because plaintiff has not pleaded the actual words used by defendantas indicated by the lack of quotation marks around the slanderous statements.

When conducting our de novo review of a motion to dismiss under section 2-615, weaccept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences fromthose facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Casualty Insurance Co. v. Hill Mechanical Group,323 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1032, 753 N.E.2d 370, 374 (2001). A complaint is susceptible todismissal under section 2-615 for failure to state a cause of action only when it clearly appearsthat no set of facts could be proved under the pleadings that would entitle plaintiff to relief. Casualty Insurance Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1033, 753 N.E.2d at 374. A pleader is not required toset out his evidence. Casualty Insurance Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1034, 753 N.E.2d at 374. Onlythe ultimate facts to be proved need be alleged, not the evidentiary facts tending to prove suchultimate facts. Casualty Insurance Co., 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1034, 753 N.E.2d at 374.

A complaint for defamation must set forth the words alleged to be defamatory "clearlyand with particularity." Lykowski v. Bergman, 299 Ill. App. 3d 157, 163, 700 N.E.2d 1064, 1069(1998). This rule allows the defendants to properly formulate their answer and affirmativedefenses (Lykowski, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 163, 700 N.E.2d at 1069), and to provide the court withthe ability to meaningfully review the statements (Mittleman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220, 230, 552N.E.2d 973, 978 (1989) (abrogated on other grounds by Kuwik v. Starmark Star Marketing &Administration, Inc., 156 Ill. 2d 16, 619 N.E.2d 129 (1993)). Although the alleged defamatorywords are invariably quoted verbatim in the reported cases (3 R. Michael, Illinois Practice