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Plaintiff Ruben King appeals from the circuit court'sdismissal of his two-count complaint against the City of Chicago(City), Richard C. Stevens, the Chicago Housing Authority policedepartment (CHAPD), and Donnie Hixon⁽¹⁾.

BACKGROUND

The following is contained in the complaint. King was hiredby CHAPD on May 16, 1996. An incident involving King and severalother CHAPD officers occurred on January 1, 1998, wherein it wasalleged that King was present when several CHAPD officers firedtheir weapons into the air and he failed to report the conduct tohis superiors. A complaint was filed and an investigationconducted regarding the incident. Hixon, a member of theinternal affairs division of the CHAPD, was in charge of theinvestigation.

On September 12, 1998, King was laid off from the CHAPD forfinancial and organizational reasons. As of September 12, 1998,King had not received any formal discipline for his involvementin the January 1, 1998, incident.

King was contacted by the Chicago police department (CPD) inOctober 1998, regarding his application for employment with theCPD. CPD investigator Stephen Scott's subsequent backgroundinterview with King included discussion of the CHAPDinvestigation. King told Scott he had not been disciplined norhad he received any formal notice of suspension or terminationfrom the CHAPD as a result of the incident.

On November 13, 1998, King was notified by the CPD to reportfor training as a police recruit. The notification letter statedKing had "completed the pre-hiring screening process." Kingbecame a CPD probationary officer on November 30, 1998.

Sometime after November 13, 1998, Hixon contacted Scott andScott's supervisor at the CPD. King alleges Hixon made thefollowing statements at that time: (1) King had been suspendedfrom the CHAPD due to the January 1, 1998, shooting incident; (2)that "whoever had done the background check at Chicago had reallyfucked up"; and (3) King should not be a police officer. The CPDterminated King on December 11, 1998.

In his two-count complaint, King alleged the CHAPD and Hixonhad defamed him and that the City and Stevens improperlyterminated him. King sought monetary damages from the CHAPD andHixon and either reinstatement to the police training academy oran investigation from the City and Stevens. The trial courtdismissed count I (against the CHAPD and Hixon) on September 17,1999, and count II (against the City and Stevens) on October 12,1999, pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure(Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)). King timely filed hisnotice of appeal from both orders.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, King contends the trial court erred in rulingthat the CHAPD and Hixon were immune from liability under theLocal Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act(Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2000)) andthe Employment Record Disclosure Act (Disclosure Act) (745 ILCS46/10 (West 2000)). King also contends the trial court erredwhen it found Hixon's statements were qualifiedly privileged. Asto the City and Stevens, King contends their dismissal waserroneous because King was entitled, under a CPD general order,to an investigation prior to termination.

King alleged in count I that the CHAPD, through its agentHixon, defamed him when Hixon told CPD investigator Stephen Scottthat (1) King had been suspended by the CHAPD because of ashooting incident; (2) "whoever had done the background check atChicago had really fucked up"; and (3) King should not be apolice officer. The trial court's order dismissed count Ipursuant to section 2-619 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West1998).

A motion for involuntary dismissal pursuant to section 2-619should be granted only when there are no material facts indispute and the moving party is entitled to dismissal as a matterof law. Rochon v. Rodriguez, 293 Ill. App. 3d 952, 958 (1997). A section 2-619 motion admits as true the well-pleaded facts andthe legal sufficiency of the complaint. MBL (USA) Corp. v.Diekman, 137 Ill. App. 3d 238, 241 (1985). Section 2-619 allowsa defendant to seek involuntary dismissal of an action because itis barred by affirmative matter that defeats the claim. MBL, 137Ill. App. 3d at 241-42. A section 2-619 movant may provide anaffidavit in support of the motion if the grounds for thedismissal do not appear on the motion's face. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(West 1998). A section 2-619 affidavit may not present factsthat challenge the allegations of the complaint. MBL, 137 Ill.App. 3d at 242-43. A reviewing court is not bound to accept thereasons given by the trial court for its judgment and thejudgment may be sustained upon any ground warranted, regardlessof whether it was relied on by the trial court and regardless ofwhether the reason given by the trial court was correct. Material Service Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 98 Ill. 2d 382,387 (1983). A trial court's ruling on a motion based on section2-619 is reviewed de novo. Epstein v. Chicago Board ofEducation, 178 Ill. 2d 370, 383 (1997).

The trial court found the CHAPD and Hixon were immune fromliability for Hixon's statements under the Tort Immunity Act. 745ILCS 10/1-101 et seq. (West 2000).

The Tort Immunity Act provides in part:

"A local public entity is not liable for injury caused byany action of its employees that is libelous or slanderousor for the provision of information either orally, inwriting, by computer or other electronic transmission, or ina book or other form of library material." 745 ILCS 10/2-107 (West 2000).

and:

"A public employee acting in the scope of his employmentis not liable for an injury caused by his negligentmisrepresentation or the provision of information eitherorally, in writing, by computer or any other electronictransmission, or in a book or other form of librarymaterial." 745 ILCS 10/2-210 (West 2000).

By failing to raise the argument in his brief on appeal,King concedes that the trial court properly granted dismissalagainst the CHAPD pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act. See Saldanav. Wirtz Cartage Co., 74 Ill. 2d 379, 386 (1978) (When anappellant seeks reversal, any theories that are not pursued oradvanced with citation of authorities are deemed waived). Therefore, we focus our discussion on the court's dismissal as toHixon on the basis of the Tort Immunity Act.

King alleged in his complaint, and it stands as admitted ina section 2-619 motion, that Hixon was acting on behalf of theCHAPD and as its agent when he "negligently" made the allegedstatements. The plain language of section 2-210 of the TortImmunity Act cloaks Hixon with immunity from liability. See 745ILCS 10/2-210 (West 2000). The trial court properly dismissedcount I against Hixon.

Having determined that count I was properly dismissedpursuant to the Tort Immunity Act, we find no need to analyze theother grounds relied upon by the trial court for the dismissal. See Material Service, 98 Ill. 2d at 387.

King next argues that the trial court erred when itdismissed count II against the City and Stevens. King contendscount II alleged a justiciable issue, as defined in Rochon, 293Ill. App. 3d at 956-57, because the City had improperlyterminated him by failing to investigate the statements made byHixon. King sought either reinstatement as a probationaryofficer or an order requiring the City and Stevens to conduct aninvestigation.

The parties agree that CPD probationary officers such asKing are at-will employees. King however, argues that the CPD'spower to discharge him is limited by CPD general order No. 93-3⁽²⁾(Chicago Police Department General Order No. 93-3 (eff. January15, 1993)), which requires an investigation of the charges andsubstantial evidence of violations before the imposition ofdiscipline. However, general order No. 93-3 clearly isinapplicable to this case. By its terms, it is concerned solelywith the discipline of CPD members for violations of CPD rules,regulations, directives and orders. General order No. 93-3 isentitled "Complaint and Disciplinary Procedures" and sets forththe "rights, responsibilities and procedures for conductinginvestigations relative to disciplinary matters." Chicago PoliceDepartment General Order 93-3 (eff. January 15, 1993) (Emphasisadded.) King does not contend that he was discharged because ofany misconduct as a CPD probationary officer or for an allegedviolation of any CPD rule or regulation. His discharge was not adisciplinary measure as defined by CPD general order No. 93-3. Hence, his reliance on general order No. 93-3 is misplaced.

King has not directed us to any other ordinance, law,contract or understanding limiting the superintendent's abilityto discharge an at-will employee. He has failed, therefore, toestablish that he had a legitimate expectation of continuedemployment with the CPD. See Faustrum v. Board of Fire & PoliceCommissioners, 240 Ill. App. 3d 947, 949 (1993). Without alegitimate expectation of continued employment, King has noproperty interest in his position with the CPD. See Faustrum,240 Ill. App. 3d at 949. We note further that the very orderupon which King relies specifically provides that "[n]othing inthis order diminishes the authority of the Superintendent ofPolice to *** separate *** probationary employees." ChicagoPolice Department General Order No. 93-3, Addendum 2 (eff.January 15, 1993).

King attempts to analogize his case to those in which thiscourt has found the probationary officers were improperlydischarged. See Rochon, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 957-58; Brzana v.Martin, 211 Ill. App. 3d 415, 429 (1991); Messina v. City ofChicago, 145 Ill. App. 3d 549, 555 (1986). The cases are readilydistinguishable, however, as they involved complaints of so-called "double discipline", i.e., two punishments for a singleinfraction, a circumstance not present here. Our concern is thesuperintendent's discretionary authority to dischargeprobationary police officers.

We find the facts presented by this case similar to those inFlynn v. Hillard, 303 Ill. App. 3d 119, 123 (1999), where wefound that unlike the plaintiffs in Rochon, Flynn had notidentified any legal right that was violated by the CPD's failureto follow its own rules and general orders. The Flynn courtdistinguished Rochon, as we do here, as standing for "theproposition that rules for meting out punishment must beconsistent even for probationary employees." Flynn, 303 Ill.App. 3d at 123.

Finally, we note that requiring the superintendent toconduct an investigation prior to the dismissal of a CPDprobationary officer would eviscerate the superintendent'sdiscretionary authority to discharge probationary officers atwill. The superintendent has nearly absolute discretion in hisselection of sworn police personnel and may fire probationaryofficers for any legal reason without a hearing. See, e.g.Rochon, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 957; Brzana, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 427;Messina, 145 Ill. App. 3d at 556.

For the reasons set forth, we affirm the orders of the trialcourt which dismissed both counts of King's complaint.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN and SOUTH, JJ., concur.

1. Donnie Hixon was incorrectly sued as "Donnie Hickson" inthe circuit court and will be referred to as "Donnie Hixon" inthis opinion.

2. The portion of general order 93-3 relied upon by Kingprovides:

"The member assigned to investigate a complaint against aDepartment member will before sustaining a complaint, ensurethat 'just cause' exists to support the allegation. Theinvestigator will consider the following criteria in makingthis determination:

a. The member must have received forewarning or haveforeknowledge of possible of probable consequencesof his conduct. (This is satisfied by a publishedrule, regulation, or other order made known toDepartment members.)

b. A full and fair investigation established that themember did in fact violate or disobey a rule ororder of the Department.

c. The accused was afforded an opportunity to respondto the allegations.

d. The investigation uncovered substantial evidenceor proof of the allegations against the accused.

e. The rules, regulations, orders and penalties havebeen applied without discrimination." (Emphasis inoriginal.) Chicago Police Department GeneralOrder No. 93-3, Addendum 3 (eff. January 15,1993).