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Following oral argument, this court entered an order remanding this caseto the circuit court in order for the circuit court to make certain findingswith respect to the denial of the plaintiff's motion for a preliminaryinjunction. Upon remand, the circuit court issued a written order and againdenied the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction.

The plaintiff brings this timely interlocutory appeal from the circuitcourt's November 20, 2001, order denying it preliminary injunctive relief.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in denying theplaintiff a preliminary injunction.

[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23 omitted here]

On November 20, 2001, the circuit court issued its written opinion. Thecourt's findings and conclusions are summarized below.

The circuit court found that the plaintiff had failed to present anyevidence on these two elements. The court rejected the plaintiff's argumentthat both elements were satisfied by the fact that the "plaintiff could notreceive the contract if DiPaolo received the contract."

The circuit court found that the plaintiff had presented some evidence tomake a prima facie case on this element since the defendants did not disputethat the plaintiff was an unsuccessful bidder on the contract.

1. The court found that as a matter of law, the plaintiff didpresent a prima facie case questioning whether DiPaolo had the requiredtunneling experience. However, the prima facie case did not survive based uponthe testimony of the witnesses and the bid documents.

2. The court found that the plaintiff had presented some evidence tomake a prima facie case that DiPaolo failed to demonstrate that it had theproper machinery to do the work. However, the prima facie case did not survivebased upon the testimony in the case.

3. The court found that the plaintiff had presented a prima faciecase as to whether the DiPaolo followed the requirements for obtaining a waiverof the minority and/or women-owned businesses (MBE/WBE) 15% utilization goaland that after weighing the evidence, the prima facie case survived. The courtspecifically found that DiPaolo provided copies of solicitation letters to only14 rather than the 15 MBE/WBEs as required and that DiPaolo's ability to self-perform the contract was insufficient to support a waiver.

The circuit court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.

On November 20, 2001, the plaintiff filed this interlocutory appeal.

The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests within thesound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not disturb thedecision absent a clear abuse of discretion. Desnick v. Department ofProfessional Regulation, 171 Ill. 2d 510, 516, 665 N.E.2d 1346, 1351-52 (1996);Joseph J. Henderson & Son, Inc. v. City of Crystal Lake, 318 Ill. App. 3d 880,883, 743 N.E.2d 713, 716 (2001).

In this case, the circuit court granted a directed finding for thedefendants pursuant to section 2-1110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS5/2-1110 (West 2000)). When ruling on a section 2-1110 motion, the trial courtmust apply a two-part analysis. In re Estate of Goldstein, 293 Ill. App. 3d700, 709, 688 N.E.2d 684, 690 (1997). First, the court must determine as amatter of law whether the plaintiff has presented a prima facie case on each ofthe elements of the case. That is, did the plaintiff present some evidence oneach of the elements of the case? Second, if the plaintiff has presented aprima facie case, the court must consider and weigh all of the evidence offeredby the plaintiff, including evidence favorable to defendant, to determinewhether the prima facie case survives. Goldstein, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 709, 688N.E.2d at 690.

If the trial court finds that the plaintiff has failed to present a primafacie case as a matter of law, the appellate standard of review is de novo. Ifthe trial court moves on to consider the weight and quality of the evidence,finding no prima facie case remains, the appellate standard is the deferential"'manifest weight of the evidence'" standard. Goldstein, 293 Ill. App. 3d at709, 688 N.E.2d at 690.

However, in the present appeal, DiPaolo maintains that the proper standardof review of a section 2-1110 motion is whether the circuit court's decision isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence under either part of the Goldsteinanalysis, citing Kokinis v. Kotrich, 81 Ill. 2d 151, 154, 407 N.E.2d 43 (1980).

DiPaolo misreads Kokinis. In that case, the court stated as follows:

"In any case in which the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima faciecase, i.e., he has not presented at least some evidence on every elementessential to his cause of action, the defendant is entitled to judgmentin his favor as a matter of law. When a defendant, as here, moves forjudgment under section 64(3) [now section 2-1110], the trial judge mustfirst determine, as a legal matter, whether the plaintiff has made out aprima facie case. If he has not, the court should, without more, grantthe motion and enter judgment in the defendant's favor.

If, however, the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, thetrial judge, in his role as the finder of fact, must then weigh theplaintiff's evidence as aforesaid. This weighing process may result inthe negation of some of the evidence necessary to the plaintiff's primafacie case, in which event the court should grant the defendant's motionand enter judgment in his favor. On the other hand, if sufficientevidence necessary to establish the plaintiff's prima facie case remainsfollowing the weighing process, the court should deny the defendant'smotion and proceed as if the motion had not been made." Kokinis, 81 Ill.2d at 154-55, 407 N.E.2d at 45.

Nothing in the above language suggests that the trial court weighs theevidence in determining the first prong of the Goldstein analysis. In fact,Kokinis specifically holds that the trial court determines as a matter of lawwhether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case.

Therefore, under Kokinis and Goldstein, this court applies a de novostandard to the circuit court's determination of whether the plaintiff made outa prima facie case, i.e., presented some evidence on each element required forthe issuance of a preliminary injunction. Where the circuit court hasdetermined that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case as to an elementand then weighed the evidence to determine if the prima facie case survives,this court applies the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Goldstein,293 Ill. App. 3d at 709, 688 N.E.2d at 690.

The plaintiff has brought this interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule307(a)(1). In such an appeal, the only question before the reviewing court iswhether there was a sufficient showing made to the trial court to sustain itsorder granting or denying the interlocutory relief sought. Postma v. JackBrown Buick, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 391, 399, 626 N.E.2d 199, 203 (1993). The rulemay not be used as a vehicle to determine the merits of a plaintiff's case. Postma, 157 Ill. 2d at 399, 626 N.E.2d at 203.

We begin our analysis by reciting the elements necessary for the grantingof a preliminary injunction.

To succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party mustplead and prove each of the following elements: a clear right or interest inneed of protection, irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted, the lackof an adequate remedy at law, and the likelihood of success on the merits. Joseph J. Henderson & Son, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 743 N.E.2d at 716. In addition, the trial court must determine if the balance of hardships to theparties supports the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. Joseph J.Henderson & Son, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d at 883, 743 N.E.2d at 716. Because thepurpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo pending adecision on the merits, the plaintiff does not carry the same burden of proofthat is required to prevail on the ultimate issue. Williams BrothersConstruction Co. v. Public Building Comm'n, 243 Ill. App. 3d 949, 955-56, 612N.E.2d 890, 894 (1993)

Of the above elements, the circuit court found that the plaintiff hadestablished that it had a likelihood of success on the merits and a clear rightin need of protection. The court made no ruling as to the element of thebalance of the hardships.

In an indirect way, DiPaolo challenges the circuit court's finding thatthe plaintiff established a clear right in need of protection. DiPaolosuggests that the circuit court's finding that plaintiff had no clear right tothe contract was a finding that the plaintiff had not proven the existence of aclearly ascertainable right in need of protection. See Brando Construction,Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 139 Ill. App. 3d 798, 803, 487 N.E.2d1132, 1133 (1985) (citing cases holding that a disappointed bidder does nothave a recognizable property interest and lacks standing to challenge the awardof the contract, the reviewing court remanded the case to the circuit court forfindings of fact to be made as to the plaintiff's standing as an unsuccessfulbidder); see also Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius, 77 Ill. 2d 287, 295, 395 N.E.2d1376, 1379 (1979) (the court held that the State's failure to award a contractto the plaintiff was not a denial of due process since the State reserved theright to reject any and all bids, and thus there was no intention to confer a"'claim of entitlement'" on bidders for government contracts).

We note that Brando Construction, Inc. involved the issue of standing tosue, while Polyvend, Inc. involved a declaratory judgment rather than apreliminary injunction. However, neither Evanston nor DiPaolo in this case haschallenged the plaintiff's standing to bring this suit.

Even if we were to agree with DiPaolo that the plaintiff has no clearright in need of protection because it was an unsuccessful bidder, nonetheless,the plaintiff's right to participate in a fair bidding process, as more fullydescribed later in this opinion, supports the circuit court's finding in thiscase that the plaintiff had a clear right in need of protection.

However, the circuit court found that the plaintiff had not establishedthe elements of irreparable harm or an inadequate remedy at law. The courtfound that the plaintiff had not presented a prima facie case as to either ofthose elements. Therefore, pursuant to Goldstein, our review of the circuitcourt's findings as to those elements is de novo.

In its second amended complaint, the plaintiff pleaded only that it wouldbe irreparably harmed by the fact that if DiPaolo were to begin work on theproject, the plaintiff could not be awarded the contract. Before the circuitcourt, the plaintiff added the argument that, under section 365.640(d) of theIllinois Administrative Code (the Code) (35 Ill. Adm. Code