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SIXTH DIVISION

JUSTICE BUCKLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Jeffrey Kanne, filed this action against three physicians, including defendant, Dr. Edward Winslow, alleging negligence in failing to diagnose prostate cancer. Defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005(c) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996)), stating that plaintiff filed his lawsuit after both the applicable statute of limitations and statute of repose expired (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1996)). The circuit court of Cook County granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on December 9, 1997, and this timely appeal followed. On appeal, plaintiff maintains that: (1) he brought this action before the statute of repose expired; and (2) if the limitations period started running before plaintiff was aware of his claim, the statute violated his state and federal constitutional rights. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

FACTS

The pleadings, affidavits and depositions reveal the following facts relevant to this appeal: Plaintiff began seeing defendant in January of 1989 and continued to receive medical treatment from defendant until June of 1992. Plaintiff stated that when he became dissatisfied with defendant in 1992, he went to see another physician for treatment. In July of 1992, plaintiff's new physician determined that he had prostate cancer, and, as a result, plaintiff underwent a radical prostatectomy on August 27, 1992. Plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the care he received from defendant led him to retain legal counsel, who requested plaintiff's medical records from defendant in October of 1993.

After his prostatectomy, plaintiff remained cancer free until 1996, when his prostate specific antigen (PSA) tests indicated that the cancer might recur. On August 26, 1996, plaintiff filed a three-count complaint against defendant and two other physicians, claiming negligent treatment. Specifically, in count III, plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in one or more of the following respects:

"(a) Failed to adequately treat and care for Kanne;

(b) Failed to diagnose the existence of prostate cancer in Kanne;

(c) Failed to undertake adequate exami-nation of Kanne's prostate gland;

(e) Failed to order a PSA test for Kanne;

(f) Failed to order ultrasound or other diagnostic techniques regarding the condition of Kanne's prostate; and

(g) Failed to advised Kanne of a need to have regular prostate examinations."

On December 3, 1996, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his claims against the two other physicians. Defendant then answered the complaint and moved for summary judgment pursuant to section 2-1005(c) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996)). Defendant's motion argued that plaintiff's claim was time barred by both the two-year statute of limitations and the four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions (735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1996)), because defendant last treated plaintiff in June 1992 and plaintiff did not file his complaint until August 1996. The circuit court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and subsequently denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is only appropriate where the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and exhibits in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1996); Busch v. Graphic Color Corp., 169 Ill. 2d 325, 333 (1996). We review the circuit court's decision granting defendant's motion for summary judgment de novo. Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 389 (1997).

II. SECTION 13-212(a)

Plaintiff first contends that the circuit court erred in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, because the "four-year" statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions does not start running until an injury is manifested in the plaintiff. We disagree with this contention.

Section 13-212(a) of the Code provides as follows:

"[N]o action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1996).

When interpreting a statute, the court's only role is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature. Cunningham v. Huffman, 154 Ill. 2d 398, 405 (1993), citing People ex rel. Hanrahan v. White, 52 Ill. 2d 70, 73 (1972). To determine the legislative intent, we first consider the statutory language. Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d at 405. Section 13-212(a) is bifurcated, providing both a statute of limitations and a statute of repose. Turner v. Nama, 294 Ill. App. 3d 19, 24 (1997). The limitations period incorporates the "discovery rule" and clearly provides that a plaintiff has two years to bring an action from the date he/she knows or should know of the injury at issue. 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1996); Turner, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 24.

The second part of the statute, the period of repose, places a legislatively mandated limit on when a lawsuit may be filed after the occurrence alleged to have caused the injury. 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1996); Turner, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 25. The repose period starts to run on the last date of negligent treatment (Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d at 405) and "is intended to terminate the possibility of liability after a defined period of time, regardless of a potential plaintiff's lack of knowledge of his cause of action." (Emphasis added.) Mega v. Holy Cross Hospital, 111 Ill. 2d 416, 422 (1986). Although the repose period may bring harsh consequences in some cases, the legislature wanted to prevent infinite exposure to medical malpractice claims under the discovery rule. See Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 312 (1979). Thus, the distinction between the repose period and the limitations period is that the repose period is triggered by defendant's wrongful act or omission that causes the injury, while the limitations period is triggered by the patient's discovery of the injury. Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d at 406.⁽¹⁾

In failure-to-diagnose cases, such as the instant case, where a plaintiff blames a defendant's omission for his injury, the omission at issue is deemed to have occurred on the date defendant rendered his final treatment. Turner, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 25. The language of section 13-212(a) supports this conclusion. As noted above, the statute provides that "in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) (West 1996). This language clearly states that the four-year cap on medical malpractice actions commences from the alleged act or omission that caused plaintiff's injury. There is no requirement in the language of the statute that an injury must exist before the statute of repose commences.

In the case at bar, plaintiff's complaint alleges that defendant was negligent in his failure to diagnose plaintiff's prostate cancer. Considering plaintiff testified at his own deposi-tion that he never saw or received any treatment from defendant after June 1992, we must find that the language of section 13-212(a) caused the statute of repose to start running in June of 1992 and extinguished plaintiff's cause of action against defendant in June of 1996. The onset of chemical evidence of a recurrence of prostate cancer in 1996 is of no import to this analysis.

In Illinois, the statute of repose is controlled by the date on which treatment was discontinued, not the onset of the injury. See Hayes v. Wilson, 283 Ill. App. 3d 1015, 1016 (1996). In fact, "once treatment by the negligent physician is discontinued, the statute of repose begins to run, regardless of whether or not the patient is aware of the negligence at termination of treatment." Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d at 406 (reading the word "occurrence" in section 13-212(a) to only refer to the time when the defendant was negligent). Such decisions are unambiguous in their reading of section 13-212(a) and support a finding that the statute of repose in the instant case commenced in June of 1992 and extinguished plaintiff's cause of action in June of 1996--two months before he filed his complaint. Therefore, we find that the trial court pro-perly interpreted section 13-212(a) and did not err in finding that the four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions barred plaintiff's claim.

Plaintiff argues that since the Cunningham decision concluded "the statute of repose is triggered by the 'act or omission or occurrence' causing an injury," the logical extension of this language is that the statute requires an injury before the statute of limitations is triggered. Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d at 406. This argument merely confuses the issue and fails to recognize the distinction between the limitations period and the repose period in section 13-212(a). It makes little sense to rely on language dis-cussing commencement of a statute of repose to infer the starting point for a statute of limitations. As discussed previously, the two time periods are very different in their objectives and application. More importantly, however, the express language in the sentence from Cunningham directly preceding the sentence quoted by plaintiff states, "once treatment by the negligent physician is discontinued, the statute of repose begins to run, regardless of whether or not the patient is aware of the negligence at termination of treatment." (Emphasis added.) Cunningham, 154 Ill. 2d at 406. This language is clear. Plaintiff did not have to know of his injury before the statute of repose started running. Despite plaintiff's efforts, we rely on prior constructions of the statute of repose and decline the invitation to redefine "occurrence" as it is used in section 13-212(a).

Plaintiff also devotes several pages of his brief to a discussion of how federal courts have interpreted "occurrence" or "event" in insurance policies and the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. We find these arguments unpersuasive. Plaintiff is attempting to avoid the plain language of the statute by turning to non-Illinois cases that have absolutely nothing to do with section 13-212(a) of the Code.

Finally, we also find plaintiff's references to Wolf v. Bueser, 279 Ill. App. 3d 217 (1996), unhelpful. Wolf specifically discussed the discovery rule's mitigating effect on the two-year statute of limitations. However, the analysis of the two-year statute of limitations was essential in Wolf because the four-year statute of repose had not yet expired. In this case, because the four-year statute of repose expired and extinguished plaintiff's cause of action, we need not address the two-year statute of limitations and when plaintiff discovered his injury.

Accordingly, for these reasons we find that the circuit court correctly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.

III. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 13-212(a)

Plaintiff next argues that section 13-212(a) is forbidden "special legislation" and violates numerous state and federal constitutional rights, including access to the courts, equal protec-tion and due process. We disagree.

A. Special Legislation

According to the Illinois Supreme Court, "repose periods reflect the legislature's balancing of an individual's interest in recovery against the problems and costs perceived in medical malpractice actions and the public's interest in having available to it affordable health care." Mega, 111 Ill. 2d at 428. The Illinois General Assembly has the ability to reduce a litigant's ability to recover, so long as there is a sound and reasonable basis for the measure. See Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 391 (1997). Furthermore, an otherwise valid action may be eliminated if this course serves a greater good--for example, governmental immunity. See Barnett v. Zion Park District, 171 Ill. 2d 378, 391 (1996).

In the past, our supreme court has found that section 13-212(a) does not violate the Illinois Constitution of 1970. For example, in Mega, the supreme court found a prior but similar version of section 13-212(a) constitutional and stated that although the statute "restricts the time within which an action must be brought, *** it does not eliminate an entire category or type of action. That the repose provision may, in a particular instance, bar an action before it is discovered is an accidental rather than necessary consequence." Mega, 111 Ill. 2d at 424.

Plaintiff relies on the Best decision to support the proposition that it is unconstitutional for a statute to deprive him of a remedy. We find that this reliance is wholly misplaced. Best held that certain aspects of the civil justice reform amendments (Pub. Act 89-7, eff. March 9, 1995) represented "special legislation" but explicitly distinguished the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions. Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 401. The supreme court was quick to point out that in enacting the statute of repose for medical malpractice actions the General Assembly was "responding to judicial expansion of the discovery rule, which had undermined the medical malpractice statute of limitation by creating a tolling provision of potentially unlimited duration." Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 401, citing Anderson, 79 Ill. 2d at 316-21. This holding and analysis does not support finding the medical malpractice statute unconstitutional "special legislation." Plaintiff is correct in stating that the statute's four-year repose period is arbitrary but, as noted in Best, the repose period serves a legislatively determined policy objective by setting a temporal limit on liability. Illinois courts have consistently found this objective to be reasonable. Accordingly, we reject plaintiff's assertion that section 13-212(a) is unconstitutional "special legislation."

B. Access to Courts

Plaintiff next contends that section 13-212(a) violates article I, section 12, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,