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FOURTH DIVISION

November 27, 2002

JUSTICE KARNEZIS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Robert and Patricia Kane, brought this cause of action againstdefendants, Motorola and several of its employees, claiming that Robert Kanedeveloped a brain tumor as a result of testing a prototype antenna for a cellulartelephone when he was employed by Motorola as an engineer. After a lengthydiscovery process, the circuit court struck plaintiffs' two expert witnesses, Dr. Milhamand Dr. Leestma, finding that their testimony was not based on scientific evidence. Thecourt subsequently granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis thatplaintiffs did not have any competent evidence on the issue of causation. Plaintiffs nowappeal. On appeal, plaintiffs contend: (1) the court misapplied the Frye standard whenit struck the testimony of plaintiffs' two expert witnesses; (2) the court erred in enteringsummary judgment; and (3) the court improperly limited the scope of discovery. Weaffirm.

On three separate dates in 1984, plaintiff Robert Kane (Kane) conducted fieldtests for a prototype cellular telephone antenna. The purpose of the tests was toassess the effectiveness of the antenna. The first day of testing occurred onSeptember 19, and the second and third days of testing occurred on November 4, andNovember 9. Kane estimated the duration of the tests over the three-day period totaledabout 60 to 90 minutes. During many of the tests, Kane was directed to place theantenna approximately one centimeter above his right ear. Kane noticed during thetests the telephone became hot against his head. Several days after the last day oftesting, Kane developed a skin condition on his right scalp that he characterized as"dermatitis." He described his scalp as becoming very itchy and having a "wet feeling"that lasted several months. Although plaintiffs' experts stated in their depositions thatthe "wetness" on Kane's scalp was also accompanied by excessive ear wax or a waterydischarge from Kane's ear, Kane never mentioned such a symptom during hisdeposition.

Kane estimated the prototype antenna operated at a power output of about 0.6to 1 watt. He acknowledged, however, Motorola documents indicated the antennaoperated at 0.1 watt. Kane also estimated the antenna operated at a frequency ofabout 845 megahertz.

In 1992, Kane suffered a brain seizure and was diagnosed with a brain tumor. The tumor was classified as a grade two oligodendroglioma malignancy. It was locatedin Kane's right temporal lobe, the same area in which he held the prototype antennaand developed the wetness on his scalp. Because the tumor mass was diffused asopposed to well-defined, it could not be completely removed. Plaintiffs alleged in theircomplaint that during Kane's testing of the prototype antenna, he was exposed to anunsafe level of radio frequency (RF), which was the proximate cause of his brain tumor. Plaintiff's complaint was filed in December 1993, approximately nine years after Kanehad conducted the testing. During discovery, plaintiffs requested the prototype antennafrom defendants and defendants produced as much of the prototype as still existed,which included the inner circuitry. Plaintiffs acknowledged receiving the prototype andfurther acknowledged returning the prototype to defendants after a period of time.

Plaintiffs offered the expert witness testimony of two doctors, Dr. Samuel Milhamand Dr. Jan Leestma, to establish that RF emitted from the prototype antenna causedKane's tumor. In his deposition, Dr. Milham, an epidemiologist, concluded theexcessive discharge from Kane's ear and the wetness on Kane's scalp were evidenceof an RF burn from the cellular antenna, which in turn led to the development of Kane'stumor. Dr. Milham admitted, though, there was no scientific evidence that Kane's braintissue suffered a burn injury. He inferred that the wetness on Kane's scalp and thedischarge from Kane's ear indicated a burn injury because a burn injury generallycauses clear liquid to ooze. Yet, he did not know whether a watery dischargeassociated with a regular burn would occur from an RF burn. Dr. Milham admitted hedid not know of any literature establishing a connection between a watery dischargeand RF exposure. He was also unaware of any scientific evidence demonstrating anassociation between wetness of the scalp and a brain tumor. Dr. Milham also agreedthat the wetness on Kane's scalp could have been described as dermatitis, which hasnumerous causes including allergies or diet. He admitted it was possible to getdermatitis anywhere on the body, including on one 's scalp.

Although Dr. Milham stated he believed there was evidence that tissue injury,including burn injury, was associated with the development of cancer, he was not awareof any evidence linking an RF burn with cancer. He admitted the relevant scientificliterature did not support the conclusion that RF exposure caused cancer. Instead, hecompared cancer developing on the skin after a sunburn with an RF burn causing acancerous brain tumor.

Dr. Milham concluded the prototype antenna more probably than not causedKane's brain tumor, but admitted he did not conduct a study or test to determinewhether an antenna similar to the prototype antenna operating at 1 watt and at 845megahertz would be able to cause a burn injury to brain tissue. He further admitted hedid not have the expertise to determine whether the prototype antenna had enoughpower to injure or burn Kane's brain tissue. Dr. Milham admitted he could not state to areasonable degree of medical certainty that RF exposure initiated Kane's brain tumor. Dr. Milham further admitted he was not aware of any scientific evidence showing anoligodendroglioma developing in as little as eight years and had no knowledge oflatency periods for that type of tumor.

Dr. Leestma, a neuropathologist, stated in his deposition that he believed RFexposure "might or could" cause cancer in humans, but could not state to a reasonabledegree of medical certainty that exposure to RF caused human brain cancer. Althoughhe believed Kane's dermatitis-like condition was caused by RF exposure, he did notconsult a dermatologist or conduct research to determine whether dermatitis coulddevelop on one's scalp without exposure to RF. He was also not aware of any scientificevidence that RF exposure caused dermatitis or of any evidence demonstrating anassociation between dermatitis and brain tumors.

Dr. Leestma stated that Kane's excessive ear wax supported his opinion that theRF radiation Kane was exposed to might or could have caused Kane's brain tumorbecause it was a symptom reported in the same location as Kane's exposure to RF. Hestated, though, he could not cite to any scientific evidence to establish that an increasein temperature associated with RF exposure was sufficient to stimulate the glands thatproduce ear wax. He also was not aware of any scientific evidence that found thatincreased production of ear wax was a symptom of a brain tumor.

Dr. Leestma admitted there was no objective evidence that Kane sustained aburn injury based on his examination of the tissue samples of Kane's tumor. He statedhe believed exposure to RF might or could have induced changes in Kane's DNA thatcould have resulted in Kane's tumor. However, he did not know of any scientificevidence indicating that exposure to 845 megahertz of RF has sufficient energy tobreak a chemical bond in the human body. Dr. Leestma also admitted he did not knowof any scientific data indicating RF was capable of breaking DNA bonds in humantissue. He further admitted that breaks in DNA bonds do not necessarily mean cancerwill occur.

Dr. Leestma also admitted that although he did not know whether there was alatency period for oligodendroglioma tumors, he believed that eight years came withinthe domain of credibility. He also stated that the most common site foroligodendroglioma tumors is in the temporal lobe, the same location where Kane'stumor was located.

Dr. Leestma further stated that although there were reports in the media aboutindividuals developing brain tumors from cellular telephones, there were no scientificcase studies in peer-reviewed literature establishing a connection between brain tumorsand RF radiation. He admitted he did not perform laboratory research to confirmwhether RF caused any type of cancer and was not aware of any laboratory studies inwhich RF induced brain cancer in a laboratory animal.

Defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiffs' experts as well as a motion forsummary judgment. The circuit court struck the motions without prejudice on the basisthat the motion for summary judgment was too broad. The court directed defendants tofile amended motions narrowing the scope of the motion for summary judgment. Thecourt then informed plaintiffs that if they had insufficient knowledge to respond to theamended motions they could file an affidavit pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 191(b)(145 Ill. 2d R. 191(b)), in which they could request additional discovery to respond tothe allegations.

Defendants' amended motion to strike plaintiffs' experts alleged their testimonyfailed to meet the standard of reliability as set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F.1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Defendants' amended motion for summary judgment was limitedto the issue of causation and alleged plaintiffs were unable to bring forth competenttestimony as to causation. Defendants attached the affidavits of Dr. Christopher Davisand Dr. Theodore L. Phillips.

Dr. Davis, who received his Ph.D. in physics, averred that Kane's exposure to RFcould only have elevated Kane's brain temperature a maximum of about .23 degreesCelsius. He further averred that an elevation in temperature in the brain even by a fewdegrees can happen naturally without harmful effects, such as when a personexercises.

Dr. Theodore L. Phillips, a medical doctor, averred that it would be scientificallyimpossible for the RF radiation to which Kane was exposed to have burned Kane'sbrain tissue. He stated there was no scientific evidence that a short-term elevation intemperature was associated with the development of cancer or with the mutation ofhuman cells. He concluded the peer-reviewed scientific research did not support acausal relationship between RF and the development of cancer in the brain or in anyother human tissue.

Several months later and prior to the court's ruling on defendants' motions,plaintiffs were permitted to disclose a third expert witness, Dr. Jerry Phillips. Dr. JerryPhillips and defendants' expert, Dr. Theodore Phillips, are not related. Dr. JerryPhillips, who received his Ph.D. in biochemistry, stated in his affidavit he believed "morelikely than not" that Kane's tumor was the result of exposure to RF during the testing ofthe prototype antenna. He stated he relied on scientific studies that indicated RF canalter biological processes and lead to adverse biological effects. He stated his opinionwas also based on animal laboratory studies in which animals developed cancers at anaccelerated rate when exposed to RF.

Plaintiffs then responded to defendants' motions, attaching an affidavit from BillCurry, who they introduced as a rebuttal witness for the purpose of refuting defenseexpert Dr. Christoper Davis. Curry, a physicist, averred that Dr. Davis's conclusionswere "flawed" and "unreliable." Plaintiffs did not file a Rule 191(b) affidavit allegingadditional discovery was necessary.

The circuit court granted defendants' motion to strike Drs. Milham and Leestma,noting that both experts' testimony was based upon speculation rather than scientificevidence. The court found that Dr. Milham admitted none of the epidemiologicalstudies upon which he relied indicated the RF exposure experienced by Kane causedbrain tumors. The court further found that, similarly, Dr. Leestma was unable to cite toany scientific evidence linking RF to brain tumors. The court did not comment onplaintiffs' third expert, Dr. Jerry Phillips, or affiant Bill Curry.

The circuit court subsequently granted defendants' motion for summaryjudgment finding that plaintiffs were unable to present competent testimony showingcausation. The court noted the insufficiency of both Dr. Milham's and Dr. Leestma'stestimony, but again did not mention Dr. Jerry Phillips or Bill Curry.

On appeal, plaintiffs first contend the circuit court erred in striking the testimonyof its two experts, Drs. Milham and Leestma. They contend their experts' testimonywas sufficient to satisfy the Frye standard of reliability because their conclusions wereextrapolated from generally accepted scientific data. Plaintiffs maintain that an expert'stestimony is admissible even when the conclusion is not generally accepted in thescientific community as long as the expert's conclusions were extrapolated from soundscientific data.

In Illinois, "the exclusive test for the admission of expert testimony is governed bythe standard first expressed in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)." Donaldson v. Central Illinois Public Service Co., 199 Ill. 2d 63, 76-77, 767 N.E.2d 314(2002). This standard, also referred to as the "general acceptance" test, indicates thatscientific evidence is admissible "if the methodology or scientific principle upon whichthe opinion is based is 'sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance inthe particular field in which it belongs.'" Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 77, quoting Frye, 293F. at 1014. General acceptance applies to the underlying methodology used togenerate the conclusion; it does not concern the actual conclusion reached. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 77. Despite the novelty of the conclusion reached by theexpert, the fact finder may consider the opinion if the underlying methodology used togenerate the opinion is reasonably relied on by experts in the field. Donaldson, 199 Ill.2d at 77. A cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established before an expertcan testify that such a relationship exists, as long as the basic methodology employedto reach the conclusion is sound. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 78, quoting Ferebee v.Chevron Chemical Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984). A technique ormethodology, however, "is not 'generally accepted' if it is experimental or of dubiousvalidity." Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 78.

Extrapolation is commonly used by scientists when the medical inquiry is new orthe opportunities to examine a specific cause and effect relationship are limited. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 84-85; see also Linstrom v. Han, No. 1-00-4028, slip op. at 9(August 29, 2002)(extrapolation is a generally accepted technique in cases that involvea question to which medical science lacks a clear answer). In these limited instances,an expert may rely upon scientific literature discussing similar, yet not identical, causeand effect relationships. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 85. "'As long as the basicmethodology employed to reach such a conclusion is sound, such as use of tissuesamples, standard tests, and patient examinations, products liability law does notpreclude recovery until a "statistically significant" number of people have been injuredor until science has had the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratorystudies * * *.'" Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 86, quoting Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1535-36.

In Donaldson, the plaintiffs' experts utilized extrapolation to conclude that acause and effect relationship existed between the exposure to coal tar and thedevelopment of neuroblastoma, a rare form of cancer. The plaintiffs' experts hadtestified that extrapolation was necessary because the relationship between coal tarand neuroblastomas had not been the subject of extensive study and research.

The court found the plaintiffs' experts' testimony had been properly admitted becausethe experts' conclusions were based on similar, although not identical, scientific studiesand theories. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 88. The court noted the plaintiffs' experts hadtestified that they utilized the method of extrapolation and that the technique wasgenerally accepted in their fields. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 87-88. The court alsoreiterated that the relevant inquiry was whether the methodologies used to extrapolatethe conclusion were generally accepted among the scientific community, not whetherthe actual conclusion reached was generally accepted. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 88.

Nevertheless, courts may reject an expert's conclusions when their extrapolationmethodologies are unsound or when the scientific data upon which they rely is notrelated to the conclusion reached. In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139L. Ed. 2d 508, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997), the Supreme Court found the plaintiffs' experts'testimony inadmissible because the animal studies upon which they based theirconclusions were so dissimilar to the facts presented in the litigation. The court notedthat the experts failed to explain why and how they extrapolated their opinions from theseemingly far-removed animal studies. The court further noted "there [was] simply toogreat an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered." Joiner, 522 U.S.at 146, 139 L.Ed.2d at 519, 118 S.Ct. at 519.

Additionally, in Schmaltz v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D.Ill. 1995), the plaintiff claimed his exposure to certain herbicides containing atrazinecaused his chronic respiratory disease. The court found the experts' testimonyinadmissible because the experts could not cite to any documented cases whereexposure to the alleged chemical caused the alleged illness. Rather, the experts reliedon studies where high doses of atrazine caused eye irritation in rabbits. The courtnoted the "analytical gap between the evidence presented and the inferences to bedrawn * * * is too wide." Schmaltz, 878 F. Supp. at 1122.

Although plaintiffs suggest a de novo standard of review, our supreme court hasmade it clear that Frye issues are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 76.

Here, it was not an abuse of discretion for the circuit court to conclude thatplaintiffs' experts' testimony was inadmissible because their conclusions were based onspeculation rather than sound science. Although plaintiffs argue their experts'conclusions were based on numerous scientific data, both experts acknowledged intheir depositions the scientific data did not support their conclusions that Kane sufferedan RF burn, which led to his development of a brain tumor. The experts stated theyknew of no studies indicating an RF burn was capable of causing a brain tumor. Theyalso could not rule out any other cause of Kane's tumor, including genetics. Plaintiffs'experts were unable to state how they extrapolated their conclusions from the scientificdata upon which they relied or how the numerous dissimilar studies they cited tosupported their conclusions. They also acknowledged they had not conducted anyindependent tests or investigation to determine whether the prototype or an antennasimilar to the prototype was capable of causing an RF burn. Plaintiffs' experts wereunable to explain what steps they took or methodologies they used to extrapolate theiropinions. A court is not required to accept any conclusion an expert may reach merelybecause the expert claimed the conclusion was extrapolated from generally acceptedscientific data. An expert must be able to show the methodologies he employed toextrapolate his conclusion were sound. Plaintiffs' experts failed to do so.

Although plaintiffs repeatedly argue the eight-year latency period in which Kane'stumor developed supports their claim, they fail to acknowledge that both experts statedthey were not aware of a known latency period for oligodendroglioma tumors.

Plaintiffs also argue the circuit court mistakenly rejected Dr. Leestma's testimonybecause he concluded Kane's exposure to RF "might or could have" caused the braintumor. They argue that a "might or could have" opinion by an expert is sufficient foradmissibility on causation.

We reject plaintiffs' claim because it is not supported by the record. The courtstated it excluded Dr. Leestma's opinion because he admitted there was no scientificdata to support his opinion.

Plaintiffs next contend the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue the court ignored plaintiffs' expert Dr. Jerry Phillips and affiant Bill Curry,whose testimony was sufficient to preclude summary judgment.

Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, admissions,and other matters on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact andthat the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Armor Plus Co., 248Ill. App. 3d 831, 839, 617 N.E.2d 1346 (1993). A triable issue of fact exists where thereis a dispute as to material facts or where the material facts are undisputed butreasonable persons might draw different inferences from those facts. In re Estate ofHoover, 155 Ill. 2d 402, 411, 615 N.E.2d 736 (1993). The court should construe theevidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the opponent. Richter v.Burton Investment Properties, Inc., 240 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1001, 608 N.E.2d 1254 (1993). Appellate review of an order granting summary judgment is de novo. Outboard MarineCorp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102, 607 N.E.2d 1204 (1992).

Although a party opposing a motion for summary judgment need not prove hiscase, he must provide some factual basis that would arguably entitle him to judgmentunder the law. Davis v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 297 Ill. App. 3d 488, 495, 697N.E.2d 380 (1998). In Davis, this court found that the plaintiff's claims of retaliatorydischarge were insufficient to raise a question of fact to preclude summary judgment forthe defendant. The plaintiff's purported evidence of retaliatory discharge was based onunsupported assertions, opinions, and conclusory, self-serving statements that hemade in his deposition testimony, and which were not supported by the record. Thecourt found that because the plaintiff's attempts to create genuine issues of materialfact were based on assertions unsupported by the record, summary judgment for thedefendant was proper. Davis, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 497-498.

Here, we find the circuit court's order entering summary judgment in favor ofdefendants proper. Plaintiffs' complaint alleged that Kane's exposure to the prototypeantenna was the proximate cause of his brain tumor; however, plaintiffs failed to bringforth any competent evidence in support of proximate cause. Although plaintiffs arguethe circuit court failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Jerry Phillips and Bill Curry,plaintiffs fail to specifically argue how their testimony created a question of fact withregard to causation. Plaintiffs refer only to the conclusory, unsupported allegations ineach of their affidavits. Plaintiffs neither cite to nor argue that their deposition testimonycreated a question of fact. It is not a reviewing court's duty to search the record for"unargued" and "unbriefed" reasons to reverse a lower court's decision. Boeger v.Boeger, 147 Ill. App. 3d 629, 631, 498 N.E.2d 814 (1986). Although plaintiffs need notprove their case at the summary judgment stage, they must come forward with scientificevidence regarding causation to preclude the entry of summary judgment. Summaryjudgment is proper when the party opposing the motion cannot establish an essentialelement of his or her cause of action. Volpe v. IKO Industries, Ltd., 327 Ill. App. 3d567, 577-78, 763 N.E.2d 870 (2002). Because plaintiffs were unable to establishcausation, summary judgment was proper.

Lastly, plaintiffs argue the circuit court abused its discretion when it limited thescope of discovery. Plaintiffs maintain that although they did not file a Rule 191(b)affidavit in response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, their discoveryrequests already before the court were sufficient to comply with the rule.

When a party cannot sufficiently respond to a motion for summary judgmentbecause it believes additional discovery is necessary, it may file a Rule 191(b) affidavit. Giannoble v. P&M Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 233 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1064, 599N.E.2d 1183 (1992); see also 145 Ill. 2d R. 191(b). Rule 191(b) provides:

"If the affidavit of either party contains a statementthat any of the material facts which ought to appear in theaffidavit are known only to persons whose affidavits affiant isunable to procure by reason of hostility or otherwise, namingthe persons and showing why their affidavits cannot beprocured and what affiant believes they would testify to ifsworn, with his reasons for his belief, the court may makeany order that may be just, either granting or refusing themotion, or granting a continuance to permit affidavits to beobtained, or for submitting interrogatories to or taking thedepositions of any of the persons so named, or forproducing papers or documents in the possession of thosepersons or furnishing sworn copies thereof." 145 Ill. 2d R.191(b).

The "[f]ailure to comply with Rule 191(b) defeats an objection on appeal that insufficienttime for discovery was allowed." Giannoble, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 1064.

Here, despite the circuit court's advisement that plaintiffs would be permitted tofile a Rule 191(b) affidavit if they needed additional discovery, plaintiffs failed to do so. They cannot now complain the discovery process was insufficient or limited. Althoughthey argue their discovery requests were sufficient in form to satisfy the technicalrequirements of Rule 191(b), the cases they rely on do not support their argument. These cases concern situations where a party filed an affidavit requesting additionaldiscovery, but the affidavit was in some way technically deficient. We reject plaintiffs'contention.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

THEIS, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.