Kahn v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co.

Case Date: 12/30/2004
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-03-3694 Rel

SECOND DIVISION
December 30, 2004



 

No. 1-03-3694

 

AHMAD KAHN, Special Administrator of
the Estate of Muhammad Ahmad, a
Minor, Deceased; MAHEEN AHMAD, a
Minor, by her Father and Next Friend,
Ahmad Kahn; and AHMAD KAHN,

                        Plaintiffs-Respondents-
                       Appellees,

                                           v.

ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR COMPANY, an
Illinois corporation, and DIANE
LOPEZ,

                        Defendants-Petitioners-
                        Appellants.

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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.











Honorable
Joseph N. Casciato,
Judge Presiding.

PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendants Enterprise Leasing Company of Chicago (Enterprise)(1)and Diane Lopez (Lopez) appeal from an order of the circuit courtdenying their motion to reconsider the court's denial of theirmotion to transfer venue in plaintiffs Ahmad Kahn(2) and MaheenAhmad's negligence action from Cook County to DuPage County on thebasis of forum non conveniens. In accordance with a supervisoryorder from the Illinois Supreme Court, on April 23, 2004, wegranted defendants' petition for leave to appeal pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 306(a)(2). 166 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(2). Onappeal, defendants contend that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in denying their motion to transfer venue because theprivate and public interest factors heavily weigh in favor oftransferring this case to DuPage County. For the reasons set forthbelow, we reverse.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On February 25, 2003, Ahmad Kahn (Kahn), on his own behalf andas special administrator of the estate of his seven-year-old sonMuhammed Ahmad (Muhammed), and Maheen Ahmad (Maheen), a minorrepresented by Kahn, her father, filed a complaint againstEnterprise, an Illinois corporation, and Lopez, an alleged agent ofEnterprise. In the complaint, plaintiffs alleged that on October19, 2001, Lopez negligently operated a vehicle, owned byEnterprise, at or near 103 West Roosevelt Road in Villa Park,Illinois, which struck and injured both Muhammed and Maheen as theywere walking across the street. Muhammed died as a result of theinjuries he sustained. In counts I through IV, plaintiffs allegedclaims based on wrongful death and survival in relation to theinjuries sustained by Muhammed. In counts V and VI, plaintiffsalleged a claim based on "personal injuries" sustained by Maheen. In counts VII and VIII, plaintiffs sought damages for the expensesincurred in treating Muhammed and Maheen's injuries pursuant tothe Family Expense Act (750 ILCS 65/15 (West 2002)).

On May 7, 2003, defendants filed a motion to transfer theaction based on forum non conveniens, arguing that the private andpublic interest factors strongly favored transfer of the case toDuPage County. On June 23, plaintiffs filed their answers to forumnon conveniens interrogatories, in which they admitted, inter alia:the accident took place in Villa Park, which is located in DuPageCounty; all of the nine potential witnesses to the accident wereresidents of DuPage County; plaintiffs and Muhammed were residentsof DuPage County; the Villa Park police department personnel wereat the scene of the accident following the collision; although notidentified individually or by county residency, there werepotential medical witnesses from Good Samaritan Hospital (GoodSamaritan) in DuPage County, where both Muhammed and Maheenreceived medical treatment for their injuries, and from LutheranGeneral Hospital (Lutheran) in Cook County where Muhammed wastransferred by air and treated just before his death; and theDeputy Medical Examiner of Cook County conducted Muhammed'spostmortem examination, was a potential medical witness, andresided in Cook County.

On August 20, 2003, plaintiffs filed their response todefendants' motion to transfer, arguing that Cook County had asignificant connection to their lawsuit because Muhammed wastransferred to Cook County for "emergency treatment," includingsurgery, on October 19, 2001, died in Cook County on October 20,2001, and was given postmortem and toxicological analyses by theCook County medical examiner's office. Plaintiffs also argued thatEnterprise does substantial business in Cook County, thatEnterprise maintains numerous business outlets and files lawsuitson a regular basis in Cook County, and that defendants had failedto show that the facts in the case strongly favored transfer toDuPage County. Plaintiffs also filed an affidavit of theirattorney, in which the attorney averred that, upon review ofvarious medical records from Good Samaritan in DuPage County andLutheran in Cook County, he found that a craniotomy, a postmortemexamination, and a toxicologic analysis were performed on Muhammedat Lutheran. The attorney further averred that the "partiesstipulate[d] that Enterprise *** does substantial business in CookCounty," and that he received "a computer print-out from the Officeof the Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County ***, consisting of59 pages, which demonstrates that Enterprise Rent-A-Car and/orEnterprise Leasing Company of Chicago has filed in excess of 900cases in the First Municipal District."

During the hearing on defendants' motion to transfer,defendants' attorney, in arguing that the only relationship betweenthis case and Cook County was the fact that Muhammed wastransported to Lutheran and died at Lutheran, stated that "this isnot a case where there's a causation issue. There is no doubt that[Muhammed] died from the injuries sustained in this accident. Wecertainly stipulate to that." On September 16, the trial courtdenied defendants' motion to transfer. On October 14, defendantsfiled a motion to reconsider, arguing that in light of our supremecourt's recent decision in Dawdy v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 207Ill. 2d 167, 797 N.E.2d 687 (2003), the trial court abused itsdiscretion in failing to transfer the case to DuPage County. Thetrial court denied defendants' motion to reconsider on November 19,2003.

On December 19, defendants filed a petition for leave toappeal to this court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2) (166Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(2)), requesting a review of the trial court'sorder denying their motion to reconsider. On January 15, 2004, wedenied defendants' petition. In accordance with a supervisoryorder from the Illinois Supreme Court to consider defendants'petition, on April 23, 2004, we vacated our previous order denyingthe petition and granted defendants' petition for leave to appealpursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(2).

This appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Defendants contend that the trial court abused its discretionin refusing to follow our supreme court's decision in Dawdy. Defendants argue that private and public interest factors stronglyfavor that the trial of this case be held in DuPage County because:the incident that is the basis for the plaintiffs' cause of actionoccurred in DuPage County; defendant Lopez and plaintiffs areresidents of DuPage County; all of the witnesses to the collisionreside in DuPage County; the fact that subsequent medical treatmenttook place in a chosen forum is not listed by our supreme court inDawdy as a factor to consider when conducting a forum nonconveniens analysis, and, even if it were a proper factor toconsider in conducting the analysis, both Muhammed and Maheenreceived medical treatment at Good Samaritan Hospital in DuPageCounty as well; the subsequent medical treatment given to Muhammedin Cook County is not relevant to the forum non conveniens analysisin this case because "there is no dispute as to the necessity orpropriety of the medical treatment [Muhammed and Maheen] receivedafter the occurrence at issue," but, rather, the dispute in thecase at bar centers upon whether Lopez's conduct, which occurred inDuPage County and was witnessed only by DuPage County residents,was negligent; the courts of Cook County are more congested thanthose of DuPage County; the possibility that the jury may view thescene of the injury weighs in favor of having the trial in DuPageCounty; DuPage County has a strong local interest in this case,whereas Cook County has virtually none; it would be unfair toburden the citizens of Cook County with jury duty; the fact thatCook County and DuPage County are contiguous is of littleconsequence; the fact that Enterprise does business in Cook Countyis not dispositive under Dawdy and should not have been given suchsubstantial weight by the trial court; and plaintiffs' choice offorum in the instant case deserves minimal consideration sinceplaintiffs do not reside in Cook County and the accident did notoccur in Cook County.

Plaintiffs contend that defendants have failed to show thatprivate and public interest factors strongly favor trial of theinstant case in DuPage County because: Cook County has an interestin deciding this case locally since Muhammed's action for wrongfuldeath arose in Cook County, where he died; Muhammed was treatedwith "emergent medical care," including surgery, in Cook County; apostmortem examination was conducted on Muhammed in Cook County; Enterprise does substantial business in Cook County; and Enterpriseregularly appears as a plaintiff in the Cook County courts. Plaintiffs also argue that "[t]here is significant authorityestablishing that non-elective medical care and/or a wrongful deathin the county are significant ties to the county in a forum nonconveniens analysis."

We review the trial court's decision here for an abuse ofdiscretion. See Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 176 (the trial court'sdecision on a forum non conveniens motion lies within its sounddiscretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of thatdiscretion); Stringer v. Packaging Corp. of America, 351 Ill. App.3d 1135, 1140, 815 N.E.2d 476 (2004) (the trial court's decision togrant or deny a motion to reconsider lies within its sounddiscretion). "An abuse of discretion will be found where noreasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177. In other words, we must determine ifthe trial court abused its discretion in balancing the private andpublic interest factors discussed in more detail below. Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 177.

Pursuant to section 2-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure,venue lies "in the county of residence of any defendant who isjoined in good faith" or "in the county in which the transaction orsome part thereof occurred out of which the cause of action arose." 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2000). When more than one potential forumexists, the equitable doctrine of forum non conveniens may beinvoked to determine the most appropriate forum. Dawdy, 207 Ill.2d at 171. Under this doctrine, "the court in which the action wasfiled [may] decline jurisdiction and direct the lawsuit to analternative forum that the court determines can better serve theconvenience of the parties and the ends of justice." Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 172.

In ruling upon a forum non conveniens motion, the court mustapply a balancing test of private and public interest factors todetermine the appropriate forum. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 172. Private interest factors include

"the convenience of the parties; the relativeease of access to sources of testimonial,documentary, and real evidence; theavailability of compulsory process to secureattendance of unwilling witnesses; the cost toobtain attendance of willing witnesses; thepossibility of viewing the premises, ifappropriate; and all other practicalconsiderations that make a trial easy,expeditious, and inexpensive." Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 172.

The relevant public interest factors include

"the administrative difficulties caused whenlitigation is handled in congested venuesinstead of being handled at its origin; theunfairness of imposing jury duty uponresidents of a county with no connection tothe litigation; and the interest in havinglocal controversies decided locally." Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 173.

"A defendant seeking transfer is not required to show that theplaintiff's choice of forum is inconvenient; rather, transfer isallowed where defendant's choice is the substantially moreappropriate forum." Czarnecki v. Uno-Ven Co., 339 Ill. App. 3d504, 508, 791 N.E.2d 164 (2003). The trial court must "look at thetotality of the circumstances in an effort to determine whether thedefendant has proven the factors strongly favor transfer." Botellov. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 348 Ill. App. 3d 445, 456, 809 N.E.2d 197 (2004). See also Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 176 (stating thatultimately the test is "whether the relevant factors, viewed intheir totality, strongly favor transfer to the forum suggested bydefendant").

In addition to the above factors, the trial court must"consider the plaintiff's substantial right to choose the forum inwhich to bring an action." Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 456. Inthis regard,

"[a] plaintiff's right to select the forum issubstantial. Unless the factors weigh stronglyin favor of transfer, the plaintiff's choiceof forum should rarely be disturbed." Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 173.

However, a plaintiff's choice of forum is not entitled to the sameweight or consideration in every case. Rather, " '[w]hen the homeforum has been chosen, it is reasonable to assume that this choiceis convenient.' [Citation.]" Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173. Likewise,when the plaintiff chooses the forum in which the accident orinjury occurred, " 'the choice is convenient because the litigationhas the aspect of being "decided at home." ' [Citation.]" Dawdy,207 Ill. 2d at 173. Conversely, " '[w]hen the plaintiff isforeign, *** th[e] assumption is much less reasonable. Because thecentral purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensurethat the trial is convenient, a foreign plaintiff's choice deservesless deference.' [Citation.]" Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 173-74. Inthis instance, "it is reasonable to conclude that the plaintiffengaged in forum shopping to suit his individual interests, astrategy contrary to the purposes behind the venue rules." Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 456. See also Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at174; Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Illinois CentralR.R. Co., 329 Ill. App. 3d 189, 196, 768 N.E.2d 779 (2002). Thepresumption favoring a plaintiff's choice is also diminished wherethe injury did not occur in the chosen forum. Czarnecki, 339 Ill.App. 3d at 509.

Two recent cases are instructive on the forum non conveniensanalysis to be undertaken by the courts when considering adefendant's motion to transfer. In Dawdy, the defendant filed amotion to transfer the plaintiff's lawsuit from Madison County toMacoupin County. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 169. The trial courtdenied the motion to transfer, and the appellate court affirmed thetrial court's decision. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 169. On appeal, thesupreme court reversed, concluding that trial in Macoupin County"would better serve the convenience of the parties and the ends ofjustice." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 177. In so holding, the Dawdycourt evaluated the following private interest factors.

With respect to ease of access to the evidence, the courtnoted that the accident occurred in Macoupin County, 2 of thepotential witnesses lived in Macoupin County, none of the potentialwitness lived in Madison County, most of the 18 potential witnesseslived in counties nearer to Macoupin County than Madison, 4 of the10 medical witnesses lived in Macoupin County, and the rest of themedical witnesses lived in other counties that were nearer toMacoupin County than Madison. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178. TheCourt concluded that

"[b]ecause the location of the accident is inMacoupin County, and the location of theidentified witnesses are on a whole closer toMacoupin County than Madison County, thesefactors slightly weigh in favor of theconvenience of Macoupin County over MadisonCounty." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 178.

The court then noted that another factor, the possibility ofviewing the premises, was an important consideration and concludedthat "it would be irrational for a jury composed of Madison Countyresidents to travel to Macoupin County to view the accident scene." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 179. Also, regarding the plaintiff'sargument that Madison Count was convenient because it adjoinedMacoupin County, the court stated that "we cannot accept thecontention that trial in an adjacent county is conclusively notinconvenient for a defendant," and that " '[m]ileage is but onefactor of convenience.' " Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 180. Ultimately,the Dawdy court concluded that the private factors favored transferto Macoupin County. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 180.

In evaluating the public interest factors, the court concludedthat they "strongly weigh[ed] against Madison County as theappropriate forum in which [the] case should be tried." Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 181. As to congestion, the court stated that "byitself, [this factor] is relatively insignificant" and "is notsufficient to justify transfer of venue when none of the otherrelevant factors weigh strongly in favor of transfer." Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 181. However, the court further stated that "it isappropriate to consider the congested conditions of the docket inthe plaintiff's chosen forum." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181. Afterreviewing the annual report of the Administrative Office of theIllinois Courts, the court found that the statistics demonstratedthat Madison County's congestion was a great concern. Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 181. With respect to "local interest in localcontroversies," the court first noted:

"Merely conducting business, or maintaining apost office box, in Madison County does notaffect the forum non conveniens issue. It isassumed on a forum non conveniens motion thatthe plaintiff's chosen forum is a proper venuefor the action. If [the corporate defendant]did no business in Madison County, that countywould have been an improper venue for thecase." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 182.

The court then found that

"the accident occurred in Macoupin County andnot Madison County. Neither plaintiff nor[the defendant] reside in Madison County.Although some of the witnesses may work inMadison County, there is little elseconnecting them to Madison County. Clearly,Madison County has little or no interest intrying the action of a nonresident whose claimarose in Macoupin County." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2dat 183.

The Dawdy court then found that, conversely,

"Macoupin County has a strong connection withand interest in this action. In addition to[the defendant], some of the witnesses residein Macoupin County. Most significantly, thefact that the accident occurred in MacoupinCounty gives the action a local interest." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181.

Lastly, with respect to jury duty, the court stated that becausethe accident occurred in Macoupin County, this gave that county "asignificant interest in the dispute and, therefore, it would not beunfair to burden the residents thereof with jury duty in thiscase," but that it would be unfair to burden the residents ofMadison County with jury duty given the fact that the action didnot arise in, and has no relation to, their county." Dawdy, 207Ill. 2d at 183. Ultimately, the Dawdy court concluded that "theweight of the private interests favor Macoupin County" and "[t]heweight of the public interest factors greatly favors MacoupinCounty." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 184. The court further noted that"the deference to plaintiff's choice of Madison County is reducedbecause he does not reside there and the action did not arisethere." Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 184. Accordingly, the Dawdy courtconcluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in denyingthe defendant's motion to transfer. Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 185.

Similarly, in Botello, the appellate court reversed the trialcourt's order denying the defendant's motion to transfer theplaintiff's lawsuit from Cook County to DuPage County. Inevaluating the private factors, the Botello court noted that themajority of occurrence witnesses were from DuPage County, all ofwhom were busy professionals. Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 456. According to the Botello court, a trial in DuPage County wouldincrease the convenience to the witnesses by significantlyshortening their travel times. Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 456. Also, because of the increased convenience to the witnesses, theconvenience to the parties would increase by making the witnessesmore readily available to testify in court. It was significant tothe Botello court that the plaintiff had not identified anywitnesses from Cook County. Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 456-57. The court then noted that the other three potential witnesses wereIowa residents, which was also closer to DuPage County. Botello,348 Ill. App. 3d at 457. With respect to sources of proof, thecourt noted that although the record was devoid of any informationin this regard, because the witnesses were in DuPage County, "itstands to reason that the location of the sources of proof and thelocation of witnesses is one and the same." Botello, 348 Ill. App.3d at 457. The Botello court next noted that the accident andinjury occurred in DuPage County and, if it was necessary to viewthe site, it would be more expeditious to do so from the DuPagecourthouse. Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 457.

With respect to public interest factors, the Botello courtbelieved it was of great importance what effect a trial would haveon the Cook County courts and community that would be burdenedfinancially in furnishing a forum. Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at458-59. With respect to local interest, the Botello courtconcluded that if the train tracks on which the accident occurredwere found to be unsafe, the residents of DuPage County would havea strong connection and interest in this finding. Botello, 348Ill. App. 3d at 459. Specifically, DuPage County had a stronginterest in ensuring the safety of the tracks and its residents.Lastly, the Botello court noted that the Cook County courts aremore congested than the courts in DuPage County. Botello, 348 Ill.App. 3d at 459. The Botello court ultimately remanded the causefor additional proofs on the defendant's motion to transfer basedon issues not relevant here. Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 460.

Before addressing the application of the above relevantfactors to the instant case, we find plaintiffs' contention, thatEnterprise's status as a plaintiff in previous lawsuits filed inCook County is a factor to be considered when determining whetherthe case should be transferred based on the doctrine of forum nonconveniens, lacks merit. First, the Dawdy Court, in reviewing theforum non conveniens analysis and the several factors relevant tosuch, never stated that such a factor could be considered in theanalysis. Second, plaintiffs have cited no case law in support oftheir argument that previous lawsuits filed by a defendant in aplaintiff's chosen forum is a factor to consider when determiningwhether to transfer a case based on the doctrine of forum nonconveniens. "Bare contentions in the absence of argument orcitation of authority do not merit consideration on appeal and aredeemed waived." Obert v. Saville, 253 Ill. App. 3d 677, 682, 624N.E.2d 928 (1993). Accordingly, we do not consider plaintiff'sproof of the lawsuits filed by Enterprise in Cook County.

In applying the above relevant factors to the instant case, wefind that the trial court abused its discretion in denyingdefendants' motion to reconsider its order denying defendants'motion to transfer plaintiffs' lawsuit to DuPage County. First,although we acknowledge that plaintiffs have a substantial right tochoose the forum in which they wish to bring their action, theirright in the instant case is not entitled to the same weight orconsideration because their choice of forum, Cook County, is notwhere the accident complained of occurred or where plaintiffsreside. Thus, the presumption favoring plaintiffs' choice of forumis diminished in the instant case.

With respect to the relevant private interest factors, we notethat the accident occurred at or near 103 West Roosevelt Road inDuPage County. Plaintiffs admitted in their answers to the forumnon conveniens interrogatories that they, the decedent, Lopez andall named witnesses to the accident reside in DuPage County. Thus,both the accident and the identified witnesses were located inDuPage County, and, based on Dawdy, are factors that weigh in favorof the convenience of DuPage County over Cook County. Plaintiffsalso admitted in their answers to the forum non conveniensinterrogatories that personnel of the Villa Park police department,in DuPage County, were called to the scene of the accident, whichfurther weighs in favor of the convenience of DuPage County. Inaddition, conducting a trial in DuPage County would increase theconvenience to the parties by shortening the travel times of theiridentified witnesses, all of whom are DuPage residents, making thewitnesses more readily available to testify in court. Thus, therelative ease of access to real and testimonial evidence concerningthe accident favors the convenience of DuPage County. Further, thepossibility of the jury viewing the intersection where the accidentoccurred, at or near 103 West Roosevelt Road in DuPage County, indetermining whether Lopez negligently operated the vehicle thatstruck Muhammed and Maheen, is an important consideration in thisaction, and obviously weighs in favor of the convenience of DuPageCounty. Moreover, and as stated in Dawdy, we cannot accept thecontention that trial in the adjacent Cook County is, by itself,conclusively not inconvenient. Accordingly, we find that theprivate interest factors strongly favor transfer of plaintiffs'lawsuit to DuPage County.

In finding that the private interest factors strongly favortransfer to DuPage County, we note that, with respect to theprivate interest factor concerning the location of the accident,plaintiffs argue that, although the collision occurred in DuPageCounty, portions of the wrongful death action arose in Cook Countybecause Muhammed was transferred to Lutheran in Cook County andtreated there before he died hours later, and should weigh in favorof the convenience of Cook County. According to plaintiffs,"[t]here is significant authority establishing that non-electivemedical care and/or a wrongful death in the county are significantties to the county in a forum non conveniens analysis."

While it is true, in a wrongful death action, the fact thatthe death occurred in a particular forum is considered by thecourts when determining whether venue is proper in that particularcounty (see Bradbury v. St. Mary's Hospital of Kankakee, 273 Ill.App. 3d 555, 558, 652 N.E.2d 1228 (1995) (since venue is properwhere some part of the transaction occurred out of which the causeof action arose, in a wrongful death action where death is anelement of such action, venue is proper where the wrongful deathoccurred)), we note, as the Dawdy Court stated, a "forum nonconveniens motion causes a court to look beyond the criteria ofvenue when it considers the relative convenience of a forum." (Emphasis added). Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 182. Therefore, althoughMuhammed's death in Cook County makes Cook County a proper forum,that fact, by itself, should not be considered when determining therelative convenience of the forum.

Thus, the only apparent impact that Muhammed's transfer toLutheran in Cook County would have on the forum non conveniensanalysis is the impact on the relative ease of access to theevidence of Muhammed's death and the expense incurred at thehospital. In this respect, two things should be noted. First,while evidence of Muhammed's death and the expenses incurred willbe relevant to his action, the major issue to be determined in thiscase is whether Lopez was negligent in striking Muhammed and Maheenwhile they were crossing the intersection in DuPage County. Theonly relationship between this case and Cook County is the factthat Muhammed, and only Muhammed, was transferred to Lutheran anddied at Lutheran shortly thereafter. During the hearing on themotion to transfer venue, defendants stipulated that there was "nodoubt that [Muhammed] died from the injuries sustained in thisaccident." As a result, even though venue in both counties isproper because portions of the cause of action took place in both,plaintiffs here have misplaced the focus in this case by focusingon Cook County. Rather, the focus of this case is upon the eventsthat occurred at the Roosevelt intersection in DuPage County. SeeAllee v. Myers, 349 Ill. App. 3d 596, 606, 812 N.E.2d 522 (2004)(in reversing the trial court's decision to deny the defendants'motion to transfer venue based on the doctrine of forum nonconveniens, the Allee court noted that, although the location ofthe incident arguably occurred in both Stephenson County and CookCounty because the victim was sexually assaulted in both counties,the plaintiffs misplaced the focus by concentrating on the sexualassaults, when the focus should have been upon the defendants'conduct in connection with the premises owned by them since thatwas the basis of the plaintiffs' negligence claim against thedefendants).

Second, and unlike the specific names and addresses set forthby plaintiffs of the potential witnesses to the accident on Roosevelt Road, plaintiffs, with the exception of setting forth thename and address of the Cook County Deputy Medical Examiner, failedto set forth any names or addresses of any of the alleged potentialmedical witnesses concerning Muhammed's death or the expenseincurred at the hospital. See Botello, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 456-57(in reviewing the trial court's decision to deny the defendant'smotion to transfer based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens,the court found the fact that the plaintiff had not identified anywitnesses from his chosen forum significant in the forum nonconveniens analysis, and thus favored transfer to the other forum). Plaintiffs further failed to include what facts these witnesseswould testify to either in general or in detail. However, it islogical to assume that those witnesses' testimony would relate toMuhammed's subsequent treatment and death, which, as stated above,is not at the heart of the issue in this negligence action, and,accordingly, we find that plaintiffs' offer of nonspecifiedpotential Cook County witnesses is not a factor that favors CookCounty in the forum non conveniens analysis. See Allee, 349 Ill.App. 3d at 606-07 (where the plaintiffs identified four Cook Countywitnesses, but failed to include what facts those witnesses wouldtestify to either in general or in any detail, and it was logicalto assume that those witnesses would testify as to conduct relatingto the codefendant's conduct, rather than to the defendant'sconduct, that factor did not favor Cook County in the forum nonconveniens analysis).

We lastly note that, with respect to considering the privateinterest factors applicable in the instant case, plaintiffs'reliance on Prouty v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp., 348 Ill.App. 3d 490, 810 N.E.2d 173 (2004), Chung v. Advocate Health Care,336 Ill. App. 3d 789, 784 N.E.2d 323 (2002), Smith v. Silver CrossHospital, 312 Ill. App. 3d 210, 726 N.E.2d 697 (2000), andBradbury, in support of their contention that "non-elective medicalcare and/or a wrongful death in the county are significant ties tothe county in a forum non conveniens analysis," is misplaced. Allof the above cases cited by plaintiffs involved actions for medicalmalpractice or medical negligence, in which the testimonies of thesubsequent doctors treating the plaintiffs were extensive andnecessary to establish that the defendant doctors were negligent intheir prior care of the plaintiffs. Such extensive testimony ofLutheran's personnel will not be necessary to establish thenegligence of Lopez in driving her vehicle. Additionally, each ofthe cases relied upon by plaintiffs contained additional factorsthat favored the plaintiff's chosen forum which are not present inthe instant case. See, e.g., Prouty, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 496 (thetrial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion totransfer venue to Lake County where, in a medical malpracticeaction, and although the alleged malpractice occurred in LakeCounty, the witnesses were dispersed fairly among Lake County andthe chosen forum and the patient stayed in the pediatric intensivecare unit in the chosen forum for two weeks after the allegedmalpractice (emphasis added)); Bradbury, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 560(the motion to transfer venue was properly denied in a wrongfuldeath action against the defendants based on medical negligencewhere the plaintiff submitted an affidavit in which she averredthat "13 named doctors and nurses [from the chosen forum] playedsignificant roles in the decedent's care and should be consideredlikely trial witnesses" (emphasis added)). Thus, the cases reliedupon by plaintiffs are distinguishable. Accordingly, we find thatthe weight of the private interest factors strongly favortransferring this case to DuPage County.

With respect to the public interest factors, the congestion ofthe Cook County courts, although not entitled to substantialweight, is a great concern. The 2001 statistics from theAdministrative Office of the Illinois Courts, of which we may takejudicial notice (Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 181), showed that there were535 jury verdicts for over $50,000 in Cook County, averaging 38.1months from filing to verdict. In comparison, DuPage County hadonly 49 such cases, averaging only 28.2 months from filing toverdict. Thus, there is an appreciable difference in congestionbetween the two counties, and DuPage County would resolveplaintiffs' case more quickly.

With respect to local interest, we reject plaintiffs' argumentthat the fact that Enterprise does business in Cook County favorsplaintiffs' choice of forum here because the Dawdy Court expresslyrejected the contention that a corporate defendant doing businessin the chosen forum affects the forum non conveniens issue. Asstated in Dawdy, "[a] forum non conveniens motion causes a court tolook beyond the criteria of venue[,] [i.e., beyond the criteria ofwhether a corporate defendant is doing business in the chosen forumfor venue purposes] when it considers the relative convenience ofa forum." (Emphasis added). Dawdy, 207 Ill. 2d at 182. Rather,we find that DuPage County has a strong connection to the issuepresented here, namely, whether Lopez was negligent when shecollided with Muhammed and Maheen at the intersection in DuPageCounty. Clearly, DuPage County, and not Cook County, has aninterest in the safety of DuPage County's streets, intersections,and drivers. Moreover, DuPage County has a local interest herebecause plaintiffs, at least one defendant, and all witnesses tothe accident reside in DuPage County. Cook County has little or nointerest in trying the action of a nonresident whose claim is basedon negligence occurring in another county. Although plaintiffsargue that Cook County has a strong connection because Muhammed wastreated for his injuries and died in Cook County, again, thisfactor is essentially irrelevant to Lopez's alleged negligence instriking Muhammed and Maheen. Additionally, with respect to juryduty, it would be unfair to burden Cook County jurors withdetermining whether defendants were negligent in connection withthe collision in DuPage County. Accordingly, we find that thepublic interest factors strongly favor transfer to DuPage County.

Because both the private and public interest factors stronglyfavor transfer to DuPage County, we find that the trial courtabused its discretion in denying defendants' motion to reconsiderits denial of their motion to transfer venue from Cook County toDuPage County based upon the doctrine of forum non conveniens.


CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the circuitcourt of Cook County.

Reversed.

WOLFSON and GARCIA, JJ., concur.

 

1. According to Enterprise's brief, the company was incorrectlysued as Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company.

2. We note that plaintiff Ahmad Kahn's last name is spelled bothas "Kahn" and "Khan" on documents in the record. As a result, wehave chosen to spell his name consistent with plaintiffs'complaint. Further, since defendants have not properly titled thecaption in this case, we have corrected it.