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SIXTH DIVISION
February 27, 2004

JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Antoinette L. Jenkins, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook Countyaffirming the decision of the Illinois Department of Employment Security Board of Review(Board) denying her claim for unemployment insurance benefits under the UnemploymentInsurance Act. 820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 2002). For the reasons stated below, wereverse.

The facts of this case are undisputed. Plaintiff was employed full time with PilotCorporation (Pilot) in Bloomington, Illinois, from December 16, 1996, to July 27, 2001, as acashier. Plaintiff left Pilot in order to relocate to Chicago to take care of her ailing father, JerryJenkins (Jenkins), who suffered from numerous health problems. Plaintiff told Pilot she wasrelocating to take care of Jenkins and gave two weeks' notice. Plaintiff left Pilot on good terms.

When plaintiff returned to Chicago she filed for benefits under the UnemploymentInsurance Act. On September 8, 2001, plaintiff was found ineligible for unemployment insurancebenefits. Plaintiff, pro se, timely appealed that decision. On October 19, 2001, a hearing washeld via telephone before referee Frank Kaitis. During that hearing, the following testimony tookplace:

"REFEREE KAITIS: Okay, now ma'am, you said your father wassick. What was wrong with him?

PLAINTIFF: My father has heart trouble. He's had several strokes.

REFEREE KAITIS: Okay. Was he under the care of the doctor?

PLAINTIFF: Yes, he goes back to the doctor (inaudible).

***

REFEREE KAITIS: Okay, now ma'am, did any doctor advise youto leave the job to take care of your dad?

PLAINTIFF: Did any doctor? No."

During the hearing, Rick Kallsen, general manager of Pilot, stated plaintiff "left on goodterms, gave two weeks' notice, and just left on good terms." In his decision, referee Kaitis foundthat plaintiff "testified that she was not advised by any Doctor to leave her position in order tocare for her father." Referee Kaitis concluded plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment benefits.

Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appealed to the Board. Plaintiff provided the Board withan affidavit and a letter from Dr. Meisner, her father's physician.⁽¹⁾ Plaintiff's affidavit indicated, inpart, that (1) Jenkins had several small strokes in early 2001, which impaired his memory andspeech, (2) Jenkins had heart trouble and poor vision, (3) Jenkins was attacked and sustained ahead injury in June 2001, which worsened his speech and memory problems, and (4) becauseplaintiff was the only member of her family who could take care of Jenkins, plaintiff leftBloomington to return to Chicago. Plaintiff's affidavit indicated Dr. Meisner wrote the letter onDecember 18, 2001, though the letter itself is undated. Dr. Meisner's letter stated, in part,"[Plaintiff] is the daughter of my patient Mr. Jerry Jenkins. She has moved home to help assisther father who does have multiple medical problems. Because of his dementia and inability tocarry out all household tasks, she does need to assist him in these activities."

The Board adopted referee Kaitis's factual conclusions and affirmed the denial ofunemployment insurance benefits. The Board found plaintiff "left work for personal reasonsunrelated to the employer and did not advise the employer that she left work on the advice of alicensed and practicing physician to provide care for her elderly, ailing parent."

Plaintiff timely appealed the Board's decision in the circuit court of Cook County inaccordance with the Administrative Review Law. 735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2002). Thecircuit court affirmed the Board's decision.

Plaintiff appeals, contending that the Board erroneously found her ineligible forunemployment benefits by requiring her to show (1) that a licensed and practicing physicianadvised her that she needed to leave her job to take care of Jenkins, and (2) that she told Pilot herreason for leaving was because a licensed and practicing physician advised her to leave her job totake care of Jenkins.

The Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) (820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 2002)) wasenacted to benefit persons who become unemployed through no fault of their own. Jones v.Department of Employment Security, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 284 (1995). The individual claimingunemployment insurance benefits has the burden of establishing his or her eligibility. Zbiegien v.Department of Labor, 156 Ill. App. 3d 395, 399 (1987). Illinois courts must construe the Actliberally in favor of awarding benefits. Wrobel v. Illinois Department of Employment Security,344 Ill. App. 3d 533, 536 (2003); Flex v. Department of Labor, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1021, 1024(1984). Generally, an individual is ineligible for benefits under the Act if he "has left workvoluntarily without good cause attributable" to his employer. 820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West 2002). However, certain exceptions to this rule exist, and an individual may still be eligible for benefits ifhe left his employment voluntarily. 820 ILCS 405/601(B) (West 2002). Section 601(B)(1) of theAct provides that an individual who voluntarily left work is eligible for benefits if that individualleft work:

"Because he is deemed physically unable to perform hiswork by a licensed and practicing physician, or has left workvoluntarily upon the advice of a licensed and practicing physicianthat assistance is necessary for the purpose of caring for his spouse,child, or parent who is in poor physical health and such assistancewill not allow him to perform the usual and customary duties of hisemployment, and he has notified the employing unit of the reasonsfor his absence[.]" 820 ILCS 405/601(B)(1) (West 2002).

The parties disagree about the standard of review applicable to this case. Plaintiff framesthe issue as a question of law, namely, whether the Board correctly interpreted the statutorylanguage of section 601(B)(1), and therefore asserts that we must review the Board's decision denovo. See Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d351, 369 (2002). The Board, on the other hand, argues that the issue is a mixed question of factand law, namely, whether the Board correctly applied the law to a certain set of facts, andtherefore asserts we must apply the "clearly erroneous" standard. See AMF Messenger Service,Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001). Although the Board isthe trier of fact and we must defer to its factual findings unless they are against the manifestweight of the evidence, "we owe no deference to the Board's conclusions of law." Wrobel, 344Ill. App. 3d at 536. In the case at bar, we are concerned only with the Board's construction of theAct, and thus face only a question of law. We will therefore review de novo the Board's decision.

Plaintiff argues that the Board erroneously interpreted section 601(B)(1) to require her toestablish that a licensed and practicing physician advised her to leave her job to take care of herailing father. Plaintiff, relying on Flex, 125 Ill. App. 3d 1021, argues that section 601(B)(1) doesnot so require.

In Flex, the plaintiff left her job after giving birth to a disabled son. The plaintiff's claimfor benefits under the Act was denied. The plaintiff appealed and presented the Board with aletter from her son's pediatrician detailing his medical problems and advising " '[i]t is importantthat [the plaintiff] spend as much time with [her son] as possible.' " Flex, 125 Ill. App. 3d at1023. The Board affirmed the denial of benefits. The circuit court, relying on section 601(B)(1),reversed and the Board appealed. On appeal, the Board argued that section 601(B)(1) did notapply because the letter from the pediatrician "did not specifically state that caring for her disabledchild made it impossible for her to continue her employment." Flex, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 1024. The Board argued that section 601(B)(1) required (1) that an ill family member be in need ofassistance, and (2) that such assistance prevent the employee from performing the customaryduties of his job. The Board argued that the pediatrician's letter established the first requirement,but did not establish the second. This court rejected the Board's interpretation and agreed withthat of the plaintiff. Noting that courts were bound to construe the Act in favor of awardingbenefits, the Flex court agreed that "the physician must state only that assistance is necessary tocare for the ill child and that, independent of the physician's statement, the assistance must be suchas to preclude the claimant from performing the duties of his job." Flex, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 1024. The court found that a physician is an expert on the type of assistance necessary to care for hispatients, but "[an] opinion on how such assistance will effect the parent's job duties is whollyoutside his area of expertise and should not be required as a predicate for the award of benefits." Flex, 125 Ill. App. 3d at 1024.

In the case at bar, the Board's interpretation of section 601(B)(1), similar to thatadvocated by the Board in Flex, requires that a doctor specifically advise the employee that hemust leave his job to care for the ailing family member. The Board further argues the letter fromDr. Meisner is insufficient, relying on Dubinin v. Ward, 137 Ill. App. 3d 281 (1985), andZbiegien, 156 Ill. App. 3d 395, to support its argument.

Both Dubinin and Zbiegien apply to the first portion of section 601(B)(1), or when anemployee leaves work "[b]ecause he is deemed physically unable to perform his work by alicensed and practicing physician." 820 ILCS 405/601(B)(1) (West 2002). Both cases involvewhether a statement from the employee's doctor sufficiently indicated that the employee's ownillness made him unable to perform his job. In both cases, the doctor's statement made clear thatthe employee could still continue working. We thus find these cases inapplicable to the case atbar.

Applying Flex, we agree with plaintiff that the Board improperly construed section601(B)(1) to require that a doctor must have specifically advised plaintiff to leave her job to assistJenkins. As indicated in Flex, section 601(B)(1) requires a doctor to advise that the parent, child,or spouse is in need of assistance. Flex makes clear that the issue of whether an employee mustleave his job to tend to an ailing family member is independent of whether that family member is inneed of assistance. Following the logic of Flex, we conclude that the Board erroneously foundthat plaintiff was required to show that a doctor specifically advised her to leave her job in orderto assist her father. It follows that the Board erroneously construed section 601(B)(1) to requirethat plaintiff specifically tell Pilot that her reason for leaving was because a licensed and practicingphysician told her she needed to leave her job to assist her father. Plaintiff adequately informedPilot that she was leaving to relocate to Chicago to take care of Jenkins.

Plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of section 601(B)(1). She provided the Board witha letter from her father's physician indicating Jenkins (1) suffered from "multiple medicalproblems" including dementia, (2) was unable "to carry out all household tasks," and (3) neededassistance in these household tasks. Plaintiff further explained that it was because of Jenkins'medical problems that she needed to relocate to Chicago from Bloomington.

Accordingly, for these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed.

Reversed.

O'MARA FROSSARD, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.

1. Plaintiff submitted the affidavit and letter by filing a "Request to Submit AdditionalEvidence" with the Board.