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1-01-0608 and 1-02-0081 (cons.)

This is a consolidated matter consisting of an action in debt filed in the first municipaldistrict of the circuit court of Cook County and citation proceedings based on a claim forattorneys fees flowing from a 1991 dissolution of marriage decree. Approximately eight yearsfollowing the entry of the judgment of dissolution of marriage, the law firm commenced thesetwo proceedings to collect the balance of a debt allegedly owed for its professional services. The trial court in the action-in-debt case sua sponte struck plaintiff-appellant's complaint withoutruling on defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss. The trial court in the citation-to-discover-assets case granted defendant-appellee's motion to quash the two citations to discover assets. Forthe reasons that follow, both matters are reversed and remanded.

James T. Haddon, Ltd. (Haddon), a corporation consisting of James T. Haddon as itsprincipal who is licensed to practice law in the State of Illinois, filed supplementary proceedingsfor garnishment and a citation to discover assets against Edie Weiss, a former client. A divorcewas granted in 1991. It appears as though no action was taken between 1992 and 2000 whensupplementary proceedings were commenced. The supplementary proceedings, consisting ofcitations to discover assets, were based upon a recital in the divorce decree wherein Weisspromised to pay Haddon $15, 201.66 for legal services. In the intervening years following thedivorce, Weiss paid $1,560. The last payment was made on or about January 10, 1992. Once thesupplementary proceedings were commenced, Weiss filed a motion to quash the citations,claiming that the judgment of dissolution of marriage was not a judgment in favor of Haddon andagainst Weiss. Weiss based this position on the fact that Haddon was not a party to thedissolution proceedings and no judgment was entered in its favor. Weiss also reasoned that,owing to the passage of more than seven years since the entry of the dissolution, it could not beenforced. The trial court granted the motion to quash and denied a motion to vacate whenHaddon filed its notice of appeal. As for the action in debt proceedings, the trial court sua spontestruck the case from the court's call without ruling on the substance of Weiss' pending motion todismiss.

In appeal number 1-01-0608, Haddon argues that the trial court erred in striking the debtcase from the call. Haddon's argument hinges on the premise that the complaint stated a cause ofaction for a debt due from Weiss to it. As authority, Haddon cites section 508(a) of the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1994)⁽¹⁾. Section 508(a)authorizes the trial court to order attorney fees as follows:

"The court from time to time, after due notice and hearing,and after considering the financial resources of the parties, mayorder any party to pay a reasonable amount for his own costs andattorney's fees and for the costs and attorney's fees necessarilyincurred ***." 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1994).

In appeal number 1-02-0081, Haddon argues that the trial court erred in quashing itscitation proceedings. Haddon claims that the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce itsdomestic relations orders. Haddon also argues that, because the citation sufficiently describes theoriginal judgment, it acts to revive the original judgment.

Weiss responds that nowhere in the judgment order or the marital settlement agreement isthere a finding in favor of Haddon and against Weiss for a sum of money. She argues that arecital of a promise to pay one's attorney, contained in a marital settlement agreement, does nottranslate into an enforceable judgment absent an adjudication and finding by the trial court. Sheargues that only the decretal portion of a trial court's order will suffice. Weiss also argues thatHaddon's actions of initiating supplementary proceedings did not act so as to revive thedissolution judgment. She argues that the language in the divorce decree retaining the trialcourt's jurisdiction was limited to issues of child support, maintenance and property distribution. Weiss contends that the judge in the first municipal district lacked the scope of jurisdiction thatthe judge who dissolved the marriage had. Weiss also argues for affirmance because there neverwas a section 508 hearing at the end of which the trial court declared Haddon's rights againstWeiss. Finally, Weiss argues that any judgment Haddon might have possessed became stale withthe passage of time. Weiss argues that the only thing that could conceivably survive the seven-year stale-judgment rule involves child support and maintenance.

In reply, Haddon argues that the express language of the dissolution of marriage decreegives the trial court continuing jurisdiction to enforce its terms and the terms of the maritalsettlement agreement. Additionally, Haddon argues that the judgment for dissolution of marriageproperly adjudicated its rights to collect its attorney fees.

Section 508(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act authorizes a trialcourt, upon appropriate circumstances and after notice and a hearing, to order a party to payreasonable attorney fees. 750 ILCS 5/508(a)(West 1994). No section 508 hearing wasconducted by the trial court. The Illinois Supreme Court has indicated that a client may waivethe right to a section 508 hearing provided that client acts deliberately and understanding therights being waived. In re Marriage of Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d 174, 184 (1992).

Section 508, like all legislative enactments, "should be read as a whole with all relevantparts considered, and they should be construed, if possible, so that no term is renderedsuperfluous or meaningless." In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001). "The primarypurpose of section 508 is to give the court the authority in a dissolution proceeding to equalizethe relative positions of the parties before it, 'diminishing any advantage one spouse may haveover the other in the presentation of a case due to a disparity in their respective financialresources.' [Citation.] " Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d at 183. While the Illinois Supreme Court, in Pagano,identified that as the primary purpose, it is not the only purpose, hence the need for readingstatutes in their entirety. "The language of [section 508] does more, however, as it also gives thecourt hearing the dissolution claim the discretion of ordering attorney fees against a lawyer's ownclient." Pagano, 154 Ill. 2d at 183. Specifically, section 508(c) reads:

"The court may order that the award of attorney's fees and costshereunder shall be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforcesuch order in his name, or that they be paid to the relevant party.Judgment may be entered and enforcement thereof hadaccordingly." (Emphasis added.) (750 ILCS 5/508(c)(West 1994).

It is clear that by application of the plain language of section 508(c), if there exists a validorder in a dissolution of marriage case charging a party with the obligation to pay her attorney,the attorney may enforce it in his own name. We must necessarily now turn to an examination ofwhether Haddon has a valid, enforceable order and whether the right to a hearing has beenwaived. We believe that it does have an enforceable order that does not, under the facts andcircumstances of this case, require a hearing. "It is an elementary principle of law that a court isvested with the inherent power to enforce its orders." Smithberg v. Illinois Municipal RetirementFund, 192 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (2000), citing In re Baker, 71 Ill. 2d 480, 484 (1978). "Where adomestic relations order has been entered, the trial court retains jurisdiction to enforce its order(In re Marriage of Hartman, 305 Ill. App. 3d 338, 343 (1999)), as further performance by theparties is often contemplated (In re Marriage of Adamson, 308 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764 (1999))." Smithberg, 192 Ill. 2d at 297-98. Though this case is factually distinct from Smithberg, owing tothe specific mention of Haddon in the martial settlement agreement, we believe the principle stillapplies. The Weiss judgment of dissolution of marriage incorporates by reference the maritalsettlement agreement. The trial court, in the judgment of dissolution, indicated that the maritalsettlement agreement "was entered into freely and voluntarily between the parties." The trialcourt found, as a matter of law, that "the marital settlement agreement is not unconscionable andought to receive the approval of [the trial] court and that the marital settlement agreement is ***made a part of [the] judgment for dissolution of marriage." The marital settlement agreementcontains specific language identifying the party sought to be charged, in this instance Weiss, andthe sum certain. The document was initialed by both Edie and Marc Weiss. As such, the aspectof the judgment order referring to the marital settlement agreement became final and enforceablealong with the rest of it. Additionally, Weiss made partial payment of the sum identified in themarital settlement agreement. For reasons not chronicled in the record, Weiss paid a portion ofthe attorney fees then stopped making payments.

We next address Haddon's delay in enforcing its rights. At the time Haddon initiated itssupplemental proceedings, approximately eight years had passed since the entry of the judgmentof dissolution. This is beyond the applicable time period found in the limitation-on-enforcementsection of the Code of Civil Procedure. That section reads as follows:

"Except as herein provided, no judgment shall be enforcedafter the expiration of 7 years from the time the same is rendered,except upon the revival of the same by a proceeding provided bySection 2-1601 of this Act[.]" 735 ILCS 5/12-108 (West 2000)

Section 2-1601 of the Code of Civil Procedure formally abolished the common lawdoctrine of scire facias and the legislature codified it. An action to revive a judgment, formerlybrought under a writ of scire facias, is now brought pursuant to section 13-218 of the Code ofCivil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/13-218 (West 2000). That section provides for the revival of ajudgment so long as such proceedings are commenced within 20 years from the date of the entryof the underlying judgment, in this case the judgment for dissolution of marriage. See FirstNational Bank in Toledo v. Adkins, 272 Ill. App. 3d 111 (1995). In its reply brief, Haddon citesDepartment of Public Aid ex rel. McGinnis v. McGinnis, 268 Ill. App. 3d 123, 130 (1994), citingPeople ex rel. Wray v. Brassard, 226 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1011 (1992), for the proposition that anexpress request for revival is not necessary to effect revival of a judgment. We agree. "[E]venunder the requirements for the now-abolished writ of scire facias, all that was required to effectrevival was 'a creditor must describe the original judgment by date and amount and state whetheror not it has been partially satisfied.' " McGinnis, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 130, quoting A.A. StoreFixture Co. v. Kouzoukas, 87 Ill. App. 3d 631, 636 (1980).

Based upon the existence of the marital settlement agreement containing expresslanguage indicating that Haddon was owed its fees and that partial payment thereof had in factbeen made, Haddon's subsequent actions to collect the debt operate as a revival under these factsand circumstances. Haddon filed a certificate of mailing certifying that Weiss was served with acopy of the citation to discover assets directed to the North Community Bank. She was alsoserved with a copy of the certificate of mailing that certified that Weiss received a copy of thecitation to discover assets directed to the sheriff of Cook County. Because Haddon's initialpetition gave Weiss adequate notice of an attempted revival of a debt, she cannot reasonablydeny knowledge of its existence. This, coupled with Weiss' history of partial payment, Haddonhad every right to pursue its debt by any means available.

In light of the foregoing, the judgments of the trial court in both the appeal numbered 1-01-0608 and 1-02-0081 are reversed. Both causes are hereby remanded for further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion.

Judgments reversed and remanded.

1. At the time of the dissolution of marriage, this statute was codified as "Ill. Rev. Stat.1991, ch. 40, par. 508(a)."