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FOURTH DIVISION

November 25, 1998

No. 1-97-0917

JUSTICE McNAMARA delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Maria Jaime filed this action for administrative review in the circuit court againstdefendants Director of the Illinois Department of Employment Security (IDES), Board of Reviewof the Illinois Department of Employment Security (Board of Review), and Ed Miniat, Inc.(Miniat), seeking reversal of the Board of Review's decision to affirm the IDES referee's decisionto deny Jaime's claim for unemployment insurance benefits based on a finding of ineligibility. (The IDES referee's decision had affirmed an IDES claims adjudicator's earlier determination thatplaintiff was ineligible for unemployment benefits.) The Board of Review found that Jaime hadvoluntarily terminated her employment without good cause attributable to her employer. Thecircuit court reversed the Board of Review's decision as being against the manifest weight of theevidence and entered judgment in favor of Jaime. It is from this judgment that the Director ofIDES and the Board of Review of IDES (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants)appeal. Miniat is not a party to this appeal.

On appeal, defendants contend that the circuit court erred in finding that the Board of Review'sdecision to deny Jaime unemployment insurance benefits because she voluntarily left workwithout good cause attributable to her employer was against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. The undisputed facts relevant to this case are as follows.

Jaime worked for Miniat for approximately 10 years, and for the duration of her employmentthere, she resided at 2307 South Marshall Boulevard in Chicago. In December 1995, Miniatmoved its place of business from 38th Street and Halsted Street in Chicago to 16250 South Dakinin South Holland, a distance of 16 miles. Following Miniat's move, Jaime continued to work forthe company for about six weeks. (Defendants state in their brief that this period was twomonths.) On February 11, 1996, Jaime applied for unemployment compensation benefits, and onFebruary 13, 1996, she resigned from Miniat.

Miniat filed a protest of Jaime's claim on February 28, 1996, stating that Jaime was not entitled tobenefits because she had left work voluntarily. On March 14, 1996, Jaime informed the claimsadjudicator that she had left Miniat due to a lack of transportation. On March 16, 1996, theclaims adjudicator denied her claim for benefits, finding that Jaime had "voluntarily left workwithout good cause attributable to [her] employer." Jaime requested reconsideration of theclaims adjudicator's determination, stating that she had left her job due to a lack of transportationafter her employer moved close to Indiana.

On April 25, 1996, a hearing was held before a referee regarding Jaime's eligibility for benefits. At that hearing, Jaime appeared pro se and was accompanied by a Spanish translator. Miniat wasrepresented by Danielle Satelius of the company's human resources department. At the hearing,the referee asked a total of seven nonroutine questions. Jaime testified that she had worked forMiniat for 10 years and that, during the preceding December, the company had moved from 38thStreet and Halsted Street in Chicago to 16250 South Dakin in South Holland. Jaime stated thatfollowing Miniat's move, she continued to work for the company, obtaining a ride with acoworker. She asserts that she resigned from Miniat on February 13, however, because thecoworker with whom she had been getting a ride had stopped working for the company andJaime therefore had no means of getting to work. The entire transcript of the hearing is 2 1/2pages long.

The referee issued a decision on April 26, 1996, affirming the decision of the claims adjudicatorand denying Jaime unemployment insurance benefits. The referee found that Jaime "voluntarilyleft her job because she lost her means of transportation to get to work."

Thereafter, Jaime retained counsel. On May 8, 1996, she requested review of the referee'sdecision by the Board of Review. On August 14, 1996, the Board of Review issued its decision,affirming the referee's decision and concluding that Jaime had properly been deniedunemployment insurance benefits, because she had left work due to transportation problems,which were not attributable to her employer. The Board did not provide an analysis supportingits conclusion.

On August 23, 1996, Jaime filed her complaint for administrative review of the Board ofReview's decision pursuant to section 3-101 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)(735ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 1994)). She also filed a memorandum of law in support of saidcomplaint, wherein she asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the approximate 16- miledistance between Miniat's former and current locations. On February 6, 1997, the circuit courtissued an order, reversing the Board of Review's decision, finding it contrary to law. The court,stating that it was making its determination on a case-by- case basis, declared that it would havebeen too great a burden on Jaime to have required her to take public transportation to Miniat'snew location. The court concluded that it found the Board of Review's decision "contrary to lawin this particular case only" and that it reached this decision because it was aware that Jaime didnot drive.

The main purpose of the Unemployment Insurance Act (Act) is to alleviate the economicinsecurity and burden caused by involuntary unemployment. 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1994);Jones v. Department of Employment Security, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 657 N.E.2d 1141 (1995). "The Act is intended to benefit only those persons who become unemployed through no fault oftheir own." Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 284, 657 N.E.2d at 1144. Section 601(A) of the Acttherefore provides that "[a]n individual shall be ineligible for benefits [because] he has left workvoluntarily without good cause attributable to the employing unit." 820 ILCS 405/601(A) (West1994); Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 284, 657 N.E.2d at 1144.

"The findings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact [are] held to beprima facie true and correct." 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 1994). It is well settled that suchfindings will not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless they are found to be against themanifest weight of the evidence. Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 657 N.E.2d 1141. "Anadministrative decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when, after viewingthe evidence in a light most favorable to the agency, the court determines that no rational trier offact could have agreed with the agency's decision." Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 284, 657 N.E.2d at1144, citing County of Will v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 220 Ill. App. 3d 62, 65, 580N.E.2d 887 (1991). Where the evidence supports fairly the action of the administrative agency,the decision is considered not to be against the manifest weight of the evidence and must besustained on review. Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d 281, 657 N.E.2d 1141. "However, as deferentialas this standard of review is, it `does not permit Illinois courts to automatically place a stamp ofapproval on the findings merely because [the] agency heard the witnesses and made the requisitefindings.'" Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 285, 657 N.E.2d at 1144, quoting Viera v. Illinois RacingBoard, 65 Ill. App. 3d 94, 99, 382 N.E.2d 462 (1978). Thus, "`when an administrative order iscontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, it is the duty of the appellate court to affirm theaction of the circuit court in setting the order aside.'" Jones, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 285, 657 N.E.2dat 1144, quoting Gee v. Board of Review, 136 Ill. App. 3d 889, 895, 483 N.E.2d 1025 (1985).

"While unemployment insurance benefits are a conditional right and the burden of establishingeligibility rests with the claimant, the Act must be liberally construed to favor the awarding ofbenefits." Kiefer v. Department of Employment Security, 266 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1061, 640N.E.2d 1252, 1255 (1994).

Turning to the present case, we must first set forth the standard of review. Jaime asserts that a denovo standard of review is to be applied, since the facts of this case are undisputed and thequestion involved, she alleges, is one of law, as it concerns statutory interpretation. We disagree. Although the facts are undisputed, we find that the question with which we are presented,whether Jaime's inability to maintain her employment after her employer relocated constitutes"good cause attributable to [her] employer" pursuant to section 601(A) of the Act (820 ILCS405/601(A)(West 1994)), is a question of fact. Thus, the appropriate standard of review to beapplied, as defendants assert, is the manifest weight of the evidence standard. Jones, 276 Ill.App. 3d 281, 657 N.E.2d 1141.

Defendants assert that the Board of Review's decision to deny Jaime unemployment insurancebenefits, because she voluntarily left work without good cause attributable to her employer, wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence. They argue that Jaime failed to bear her burdenof demonstrating that her decision to terminate her employment with Miniat was for good cause. Defendants point out that Jaime did not present evidence regarding her salary or the increaseddistance she would be required to travel, which would have allowed the Board of Review toweigh the increased transportation expenses she would incur in traveling to Miniat's newlocation, against the compensation that she was receiving.

Defendants further claim that while Jaime asserted that she quit work due to transportationproblems, she failed to demonstrate that she made reasonable efforts to resolve those problemswhich arose as the result of Miniat's move, such as finding alternative means of transportation. Defendants assert that the record is devoid of any evidence that she made any effort to employpublic transportation, that she spoke to her employer in an effort to resolve any transportationproblems, that she spoke to other employees regarding the possibility of riding with them afterthe coworker with whom she was getting a ride to work resigned or that she could not purchase acar. Defendants state that while the trial judge stated as grounds for her ruling that "[she was]making this particular decision because she knew this claimant does not drive," the recordcontains no evidence that Jaime is unable to drive.

Alternatively, defendants argue that Jaime's decision to continue working for two monthsfollowing her employer's move precludes her from claiming that her subsequent decision toresign was due to good cause attributable to her employer. They assert that Jaime presented noevidence that during this time period, she spoke to her employer in an effort to resolve theproblems confronting her. Rather, defendants argue that because Jaime remained where theworking conditions had changed, she is therefore not entitled to claim that change as good causefor leaving.

This is a case of first impression in Illinois. As such, it is instructive to look at decisions offoreign jurisdictions that have considered this issue.

Because the critical issue with which we are presented concerns whether Jaime's leaving heremployment was for "good cause attributable to the employing unit," it is imperative that wedefine the phrases "good cause" and "attributable to the employing unit." "`Good cause'connotes a reason for rejecting work that would be deemed by reasonable men and women asvalid and not indicative of an unwillingness to work." Watson v. Employment Security Comm'n,111 N.C. App. 410, 413, 432 S.E.2d 399, 401 (1993). "Good cause" for voluntarily leavingemployment has also been defined as that which results from circumstances producing real andsubstantial pressure to terminate employment and which under the circumstances would compel areasonable person to act in the same manner. Burke v. Board of Review, 132 Ill. App. 3d 1094,1101, 477 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (1985), citing Deiss v. Unemployment Compensation Board ofReview, 475 Pa. 547, 381 A.2d 132 (1977). "A cause `attributable to the employer' is one whichis produced, caused, created or [is the] result of actions by the employer and also includesinaction by the employer." Watson, 111 N.C. App. at 413, 432 S.E.2d at 401. The salientquestion is whether the conduct of the employer caused the termination of employment to occur. Pearson v. Board of Review, 194 Ill. App. 3d 1064, 1068, 551 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (1990). A"substantial, unilateral change in employment which renders the job unsuitable" may preventdisqualification based on voluntarily leaving one's employment. Finik v. Department ofEmployment Security, 171 Ill. App. 3d 125, 133, 524 N.E.2d 1148, 1156 (1988).

In the present case, the Board of Review stated the following in its decision:

"The company moved to the suburbs and the claimant

then got a ride from another employee for about one

and a half months. After that employee left, the claimant had no means to get to work,and was forced

to quit. Nevertheless her leaving [her job] was because of transportation, which was notattributable to the employer."

In Watson, the claimant, over a period of approximately 10 months, made a series of differenttransportation arrangements to get to work after her employer moved its plant from Charlotte toMooresville, North Carolina. Immediately prior to quitting her job, she had been riding to workwith a coworker in his truck. When the coworker's truck broke down, the claimant, believing thetruck to be beyond immediate repair, quit her job, as she had no other foreseeable means oftransportation to work. Watson, 111 N.C. App. 410, 432 S.E.2d 399. In interpreting anunemployment compensation statute similar to our act in Illinois, the North Carolina appellatecourt held that, with regard to the claimant's leaving her job, the employer's moving of its plantwas "good cause attributable to the employer." Watson, 111 N.C. App. at 414, 432 S.E.2d at402. More specifically, the court stated:

"The relocation of the plant was an act of the employer, done for its own benefit, and wasan event over which petitioner had no control. Her leaving work was solely the resultthereof. Thus her separation from employment was unquestionably `attributable to theemployer.'" Watson, 111 N.C. App. at 415, 432 S.E.2d at 402.

Applying the rationale espoused in Watson to our case, we find that Miniat's moving of its plantfrom the south side of Chicago to South Holland, a distance of about 16 miles, constituted "goodcause attributable to the employer" with regard to Jaime's leaving her job.

Jaime's testimony at the hearing demonstrates that she made reasonable efforts to maintain heremployment. Miniat, her employer of 10 years, moved its plant from a site near her home inChicago to a suburban location approximately 16 miles away. Jaime continued to work forMiniat for six weeks following the move, obtaining a ride with a coworker. Jaime resigned onlyafter said coworker quit her job, as Jaime no longer had a means of getting to work.

The findings of the Board of Review clearly demonstrate that Jaime desired and attempted tocontinue to work for Miniat after its move and that the relocation of the company was an act ofMiniat, done for its benefit, over which Jaime had no control. See Watson, 111 N.C. App. 410,432 S.E.2d 399. A reasonable person would view Jaime's reason for leaving her employment asa valid one and not indicative of an unwillingness to work on her part. Notably, the Board ofReview did not find her unwilling to work either. See Watson, 111 N.C. App. 410, 432 S.E.2d399. While an employee's transportation to and from work is generally not the responsibility ofthe employer, Jaime's inability to maintain her employment is the direct result of Miniat's movingits location, thereby significantly changing the circumstances of her employment. See Watson,111 N.C. App. 410, 432 S.E.2d 399. Therefore, we find that the credible evidence Jaimepresented was sufficient to meet her burden of proving her entitlement to benefits, as it showedthat her leaving was for "good cause attributable to her employer." We find this to be particularlytrue under the circumstances, where Jaime, accompanied by a Spanish translator because shedoes not speak English fluently, appeared pro se at the hearing, during which her work record of10 years was never criticized. Jaime showed a causal connection between Miniat's change oflocation and her inability to get to work, despite her reasonable attempts to do so. Indeed, thecircuit court noted that "the public transportation to get to that particular location in SouthHolland would really create an undue burden on [Jaime]." Our findings are in sync with ourlegislature's policy that a person who becomes unemployed through no fault of his own should beentitled to unemployment compensation benefits. 820 ILCS 405/100 (West 1994); see Watson,111 N.C. App. 410, 432 S.E.2d 399.

Furthermore, we find no merit in defendants' alternative, if not disingenuous, contention thatJaime's decision to continue working for a period of time following Miniat's move to SouthHolland precludes her from claiming that her subsequent decision to resign was due to "goodcause attributable to her employer." Jaime should not be penalized for her attempt to continueworking after Miniat chose to move its location to another city. Rather, Jaime's efforts should becommended; they comport with state policy that unemployment benefits should go only to thosewho are not at fault in their unemployment. Watson, 111 N.C. App. at 415, 432 S.E.2d at 402. Itis important to note that courts of other jurisdictions have also upheld the award ofunemployment benefits where a person has left his employment due to workplace relocation,even in the instance where the person had attempted to work at the new location, as Jaime didhere. See Guillory v. Office of Employment Security, 525 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 1988); Ross v.Rutledge, 175 W. Va. 701, 338 S.E.2d 178 (1985); J.C. Penney Co. v. UnemploymentCompensation Board of Review, 72 Pa. Commw. 445, 457 A.2d 161 (1983).

We note that Latzy v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 87 Pa. Commw. 432, 487A.2d 121 (1985), and Lee v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 42 Pa. Commw.461, 401 A.2d 12 (1979), two cases relied on by defendants, in which the claimants were deniedunemployment benefits, are distinguishable from our case. Unlike Jaime, who rode with acoworker for six weeks until that option was no longer available to her, the claimant in Latzymade no attempt to get to her new job location, while the claimant in Lee had severaltransportation options available to her to the new jobsite. Latzy, 87 Pa. Commw. 432, 487 A.2d121; Lee, 42 Pa. Commw. 461, 401 A.2d 12.

Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err, when it reversed the Board of Review'sdecision finding Jaime ineligible for unemployment benefits.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

HOFFMAN and WOLFSON, JJ., concur.