Jackson v. Urban Investment Property Services

Case Date: 10/28/2005
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-03-3001 Rel

                                                                                                                                                                                                                SIXTH DIVISION
                                                                                                                                                                                                                November 18, 2005

No. 1-03-3001

DAWN JACKSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

URBAN INVESTMENT PROPERTY SERVICES a/k/a
Urban Investment Trust, Inc.; DESIGNED EQUIPMENT
CORPORATION; and OTHER UNKNOWN OWNERS
OF THE PROPERTY COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE
UPTOWN THEATER LOCATED AT 4816 N. BROADWAY,
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,

Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County

 

 

Honorable
Kathy M. Flanagan,
Judge Presiding

 



PRESIDING JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Plaintiff Dawn Jackson sued Urban Investment PropertyServices (Urban) and Designed Equipment Corporation (Designed) innegligence to recover for injuries she sustained when part of ascaffolding Urban leased from Designed fell on plaintiff outsideof Urban's property. Defendants moved for summary judgment,arguing that the fire fighter's rule (sometimes called theinherent risk principle) barred plaintiff from recovering for herinjuries because she was injured while performing her duties as apublic officer. The trial court granted defendants' motion andplaintiff appealed. We hold that when an officer responds to acall about a scaffold falling, the landowner is not liable innegligence to the officer for injuries caused by the scaffoldfalling on the officer. However, since Designed presented noevidence that it performed any activity on Urban's premises, therecord does not support application of the fire fighter's rule torelieve Designed from liability. Therefore, we affirm the circuitcourt's ruling as to defendant Urban and reverse as to defendantDesigned.

BACKGROUND

On April 7, 2001, plaintiff, a Chicago police sergeant,responded to a call that scaffolding was falling around atheater, damaging cars parked nearby. Defendant Urban owns thetheater and defendant Designed leased the scaffolding equipmentto Urban for renovations.

When she arrived at the scene, plaintiff observed debris,including plywood boards, scattered across the four-lane street.She also noticed a board flapping in the wind. After she spoketo another officer to determine what damage had occurred,plaintiff called for a building inspector. Plaintiff also radioedfor additional police units to help her keep traffic off thestreet.

When the building inspector arrived at the scene, hediscussed the situation with plaintiff and asked for someadditional information. Plaintiff walked toward her squad car toretrieve the information. When she was about 15 feet from hercar, a board flew off the scaffolding and struck her, injuringher severely. Plaintiff sued Urban and Designed, alleging thatdefendants negligently constructed and maintained thescaffolding.

In the motion for summary judgment, defendants asserted thatthe fire fighter's rule barred plaintiff's claim becauseplaintiff was performing her official duties when she sufferedthe injury. Plaintiff replied that the fire fighter's rule didnot apply because she was never on defendants' premises. Plaintiff also argued that, because courts have not extended thefire fighter's rule beyond the context of owner and occupierliability, Designed could not use the rule to protect itself fromliability.

The trial court found that the fire fighter's rule relieveddefendants of liability because the plaintiff "was not merely atraffic officer injured by a hazard unassociated with herduties." She was a police officer on duty, responding to a callof debris falling from scaffolding, and "she was injured by thatsame debris from that property owned and or occupied by theDefendants, including Designed which was engaged in constructionactivity vis-a-vis the scaffold on Urban's property on behalf ofUrban." (Emphasis in original). The trial court therefore granteddefendants summary judgment.

 

ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiff asserts that defendants cannot availthemselves of the fire fighter's rule because she was not ondefendants' premises when she was injured. Additionally, plaintiff contends that contested issues of fact, especiallyissues concerning the relation between her work and her injury,preclude summary judgment.

A trial court should grant summary judgment only if thepleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file entitlethe moving party to judgment as a matter of law. Boswell MemorialHospital v. Bongiorno, 314 Ill. App. 3d 620, 621 (2000). Wereview de novo the decision to grant summary judgment. Bongiorno,314 Ill. App. 3d at 621.

Under the fire fighter's rule, "public officers may notrecover from those whose negligence caused the emergency thatrequired their presence when their injuries were caused by thatemergency." Knight v. Schneider National Carriers, Inc., 350 F.Supp. 2d 775, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2004). For example, "while alandowner owes a duty of reasonable care to maintain his propertyso as to prevent injury occurring to a fireman from a causeindependent of the fire[,] he is not liable for negligence incausing the fire itself." Washington v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,66 Ill. 2d 103, 108 (1976).

Plaintiff argues that we should apply the fire fighter'srule narrowly because the legislature recently amended the FireInvestigation Act to state that "[t]he owner or occupier of thepremises and his or her agents owe fire fighters who are on thepremises in the performance of their official duties *** a dutyof reasonable care in the maintenance of the premises." 425 ILCS25/9f (West 2004). Plaintiff claims that the legislature, withthis amendment, has rejected the fire fighter's rule. Asplaintiff concedes, the amendment on its face does not apply tothis case as it addresses only the owner's or occupier's duty tofire fighters and not to police officers. The amendment does notaffect the binding precedent concerning application of the firefighter's rule to police officers.

Our supreme court followed precedent involving the firefighter's rule in Fancil v. Q.S.E. Foods, Inc., 60 Ill. 2d 552(1975). In Fancil, burglars concealed on the defendant'spremises, outside its store, killed a police officer during theofficer's security check. The officer's estate sued the storeowner, alleging that the owner failed to provide adequatelighting for the store's exterior. Our supreme court appliedsection 343 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides:

"A possessor of land is subject to liability forphysical harm caused to his invitees by a condition ofthe land *** only if *** the condition *** involves anunreasonable risk of harm to such invitees ***." Restatement (Second) of Torts