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FIRST DIVISION
June 14, 2004

This dispute arises from an action brought by petitioner-appellee/cross-appellant, International Federation of Professionaland Technical Engineers, Local 153 (Union), to confirm anarbitration award entered in its favor against respondent-appellant/cross-appellee, Chicago Park District (Park District). The arbitration award was the result of a grievance filed pursuantto a collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the ParkDistrict. The grievant was a Union member who was employed by thePark District and was demoted from his position. The Union broughtthe petition to confirm the arbitration award on the ground thatthe Park District had refused to comply with it. In response, thePark District filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that thepetition was moot because, at the time of the filing of the motionto dismiss, the Park District had fully complied with thearbitration award. The trial court denied the Park District'smotion to dismiss.

The Union then filed a motion for summary judgment on thebasis that no question of fact existed that the Park Districtfailed to fully comply with the arbitration award. In the samemotion, the Union also moved for attorney fees and costs undersection 14 of the Uniform Arbitration Act (Arbitration Act) (710ILCS 5/14 (West 2000)). The Park District filed a cross-motion forsummary judgment on the ground that there was no genuine issue offact that it fully complied with the arbitration award.

The trial court granted the Union's motion for summaryjudgment, denied the Park District's cross-motion for summaryjudgment, and allowed the Union to file a petition for attorneyfees and costs. The Union then filed a petition for attorney feesand costs which was denied by the trial court on the basis that nospecific statutory authorization for attorney fees was provided insection 14 of the Arbitration Act. The Park District appeals theorder denying its cross-motion for summary judgment and grantingthe Union's motion for summary judgment. The Union cross-appealsthe trial court's order denying its petition for attorney fees.

The parties agree that the Park District's appeal is now mootbecause the grievant voluntarily retired from the Park Districtwhile the appeal was pending. When an intervening event occursrendering it impossible for a reviewing court to grant the reliefto any party, the case becomes moot because a ruling on the issuecannot have any practical effect on the controversy. In re Tekela,202 Ill. 2d 282, 292-93, 780 N.E.2d 304 (2002); LaSalle NationalBank v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill. 2d 375, 378-79, 121 N.E.2d 486(1954). Thus, the only issue we need address is the questionraised in the Union's cross-appeal; whether the trial courtproperly denied the Union's petition for attorney fees undersection 14 of the Arbitration Act. The following background factsare relevant.

Emil Mitchell, a member of the Union, was employed by the ParkDistrict and was demoted from his position as a "Park OperationsSupervisor." The Union filed a grievance on Mitchell's behalfpursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between the Unionand the Park District, and after several hearings, an award wasentered by the arbitrator in favor of the Union. Specifically, theaward stated: "Mitchell is to be offered reinstatement to hisposition as Park Operations Supervisor of Landscape Management inthe Southeast Region and is to [be] made whole for any loss ofbenefits and compensation."

When the Park District did not comply with the award, theUnion filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award on May 21,2002. As of the date the petition was filed, the Park District hadnot offered Mitchell reinstatement to his position as ParkOperations Supervisor and had not made him whole for loss wagessince the date of his demotion. The Park District responded byfiling a motion to dismiss under section 2-619 of the Illinois Codeof Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(West 2000)) on the ground thatthe Union's petition was moot because the Park District hadcomplied with the arbitration order. Specifically, the ParkDistrict's motion to dismiss indicated that Mitchell had beenreinstated, was being paid at the wage rate commensurate with thejob title "Park Operations Supervisor," and had received back wagesequal to the difference of what he would have received as a ParkOperations Supervisor and what he actually earned during the periodhe was demoted to a "Maintenance Foreman." The Park Districtclaimed that the location of Mitchell's assignment "was of nomoment" under the arbitrator's award or the parties' collectivebargaining agreement, and it noted that the Union admitted that thePark District was given latitude to transfer Park OperationsSupervisors between regions of the district. On December 5, 2002,the trial court denied the Park District's motion to dismiss "forreasons stated in open court."

On May 7, 2003, the Union filed a motion for summary judgmenton the ground that no question of fact existed that the ParkDistrict failed to comply with the arbitration award becauseMitchell was not reinstated to the southeast region. Instead, hewas placed in the north region, a different region with lesserresponsibility. As we noted above, the Union, as part of itssummary judgment motion, also sought attorney fees and costspursuant to section 14 of the Arbitration Act.

On June 16, 2003, the Park District filed a cross-motion forsummary judgment arguing that no question of fact existed that ithad complied with the arbitration award by reinstating Mitchell andby giving him back wages. The Park District argued that thearbitration award only required "that Mitchell be offeredreinstatement to the position of Park Operations Supervisor." Inits motion, the Park District further noted that Mitchell had beenreinstated, made whole for all lost wages and benefits, and hadeven been transferred back to the southeast region. The recordreveals that for a short time period after his reinstatement,Mitchell was transferred to the southeast region and thentransferred back to the north region.

On July 17, 2003, the trial court entered an order grantingthe Union's motion for summary judgment and denying the ParkDistrict's cross-motion for summary judgment. It also confirmedthe arbitration award and allowed the Union to file a petition forattorney fees and costs. On August 18, 2003, the Union filed its petition for attorney fees and costs. In an order dated October29, 2003, the trial court denied the Union's request for attorneyfees of $14,492 and legal research fees of $820 on the ground thatsection 14 of the Arbitration Act did not specifically authorizethe award of attorney fees. Despite its ruling, the trial courtawarded the Union's request for certain costs identified as"related nontaxable expenses" in the amount of $259.40.

The Park District appeals the denial of its cross-motion forsummary judgment and the grant of the summary judgment motion infavor of the Union. As we noted above, the issues of whether thePark District's cross-motion for summary judgment was properlydenied and whether the Union's motion for summary judgment wasproperly granted are now moot because Mitchell voluntarily retiredfrom the Park District. We address the remaining issue raised onthe Union's cross-appeal whether the trial court properly deniedthe Union's petition for attorney fees and costs on the ground thatno statutory authorization for attorney fees existed under section14 of the Arbitration Act. The interpretation of a statute is aquestion of law that we review de novo. Krohe v. City ofBloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392, 395, 789 N.E.2d 1211 (2003).

Section 14 of the Arbitration Act states the following:

"Upon the granting of an orderconfirming, modifying or correcting an award,judgment shall be entered in conformitytherewith and be enforced as any otherjudgment. Costs of the application and of theproceedings subsequent thereto, anddisbursements may be awarded by the court asto the court seems just." 710 ILCS 5/14 (West2000).

Because there was no underlying contract between the partiesauthorizing the recovery of attorney fees, the Union reliesentirely upon section 14 of the Arbitration Act in support of itsargument that its petition for attorney fees should have beengranted.

The Union concedes that the word "costs" does not encompassattorney fees. See State Farm and Casualty Co. v. Miller ElectricCo., 231 Ill. App. 3d 355, 359, 596 N.E.2d 169 (1992), quotingMeyer v. Marshall, 62 Ill. 2d 435, 441-42, 343 N.E.2d 479 (1976). Nevertheless, the Union contends that the word "disbursements" insection 14 should be interpreted to include attorney fees and that,therefore, the trial court had the authority to award attorney feesunder the Arbitration Act and should have granted its petition. Wenote that a "disbursement" is defined as the "act of paying outmoney, commonly from a fund or in settlement of a debt or accountpayable." Black's Law Dictionary 475 (7th ed. 1999). Neither thelanguage in section 14 nor the definition of a disbursementexpressly refers to attorney fees. Thus, we are charged withdetermining whether a disbursement, within the meaning of section14 of the Arbitration Act, would include an award of attorney fees.

The Park District claims that we must follow a well-recognized principle in Illinois, the "American Rule," which"disallows attorney fees for the successful litigant in the absenceof a statute or agreement." Saskill v. 4-B Acceptance, 139 Ill.App. 3d 143, 144, 487 N.E.2d 97 (1985); House of Vision v. Hiyane,42 Ill. 2d 45, 51-52, 245 N.E.2d 468 (1969). The American Rule hasfurther been interpreted to mean that "attorney fees and othercosts of litigation are ordinarily not recoverable by theprevailing party unless specifically authorized by statute orcontract." (Emphasis added.) Qazi v. Ismail, 50 Ill. App. 3d271, 272, 364 N.E.2d 595 (1977); City of Chicago v. Fair EmploymentPractices Comm'n, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 114, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976);Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 553, 46 N.E.2d 41 (1943); City ofChicago v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 34 Ill. App.3d 114, 117, 339 N.E.2d 260 (1975), aff'd, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 357N.E.2d 1154 (1976); and Waller v. Board of Education, 28 Ill. App.3d 328, 333, 328 N.E.2d 604 (1975). Relying upon the AmericanRule, the Park District claims that, because section 14 of theArbitration Act does not specifically authorize attorney fees, theUnion is prohibited from recovering them.

Our research reveals no Illinois decision that has interpretedwhether a "disbursement" under section 14 of the Arbitration Actincludes attorney fees. Only two Illinois decisions have evenmentioned attorney fees under section 14 of the Arbitration Act andneither decision interpreted whether the term "disbursements"included attorney fees. Cerajewski v. Kunkel, 285 Ill. App. 3d222, 227-28, 674 N.E.2d 57 (1996); Stein v. Feldmann, 85 Ill App.3d 973, 974, 407 N.E.2d 768 (1980). Instead the courts inCerajewski and Stein both found that the question of attorney feesis within the province of the trial court and that a trial court'sdecision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Cerajewski, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 227-28; Stein, 85 Ill. App. 3d at974. In both cases, the appellate court affirmed the trial court'sdenial of attorney fees. Cerajewski, 285 Ill. App. 3d at 228;Stein, 85 Ill. App. 3d at 975.

The Union contends that we must look to other jurisdictions'interpretation of "disbursements" under section 14 of theArbitration Act. It also claims that as an interpretive matter,Illinois has a policy of showing "greater than usual" deference tothe opinions of courts from other jurisdictions involving theArbitration Act because the Act is to be construed to createuniformity in the law of the states that have enacted it. Garverv. Ferguson, 76 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 389 N.E.2d 1181 (1979); Bass v. SMG,Inc., 328 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497, 765 N.E.2d 1079 (2002); J&K CementConstruction, Inc. v. Montalbano Builders, Inc., 119 Ill. App. 3d663, 668, 456 N.E.2d 889 (1983).

The Union argues that Illinois is one of 35 states that haveadopted the Arbitration Act. Chicago Southshore & South Bend R.R.v. Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District, 184 Ill. 2d151, 155, 703 N.E.2d 7 (1998). It further contends that a majorityof states that have construed section 14 of the Arbitration Acthave found "disbursements," in the context of proceedings toconfirm an arbitration award, to include attorney fees. Blitz v.Beth Isaac Adas Israel Congregation, 352 Md. 31, 44, 720 A.2d 912,918-19 (1998); Driver v. SI Corp., 139 Idaho 423, 80 P.3d 1024,1031 (2003); Buzas Baseball, Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925P.2d 941, 953 (Utah 1996); Canon School District No. 50 v. W.E.S.Construction Co., Inc., 180 Ariz. 148, 154, 882 P.2d 1274, 1280(1994); County of Clark v. Blanchard Construction Co., 98 Nev. 488,492, 653 P.2d 1217, 1220 (1982); Wachtel v. Shoney's, Inc., 830S.W.2d 905, 909-10 (Tenn. 1992); and Anchorage Medical & SurgicalClinic v. James, 555 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1976), overruled onother grounds by Ahtna, Inc. v. EBASCO Constructors, Inc., 894 P.2d657, 662 (Alaska 1995). In Canon, the Supreme Court of Arizonaindicated that this interpretation of section 14 promotes thepublic policy of encouraging early payment of valid arbitrationawards and the discouragement of nonmeritorious protractedconfirmation challenges. Canon, 180 Ariz. at 153, 882 P.2d at1279.

Despite the public policy described in Canon and the authorityfrom other jurisdictions that have interpreted section 14 of theArbitration Act to include attorney fees, the well-establishedprecedent in Illinois noted above does not permit the recovery ofattorney fees by the prevailing party unless specificallyauthorized by statute. Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 272. Further, asa general rule, "[s]tatutes which provide for the award ofattorney's fees to a successful litigant do so only in specificlanguage." Qazi, 50 Ill. App. 3d at 273. In Waller, cited above,the court stated:

"The legislature has in the pastspecifically provided for attorneys' feeswhere it wished to, and the courts haverefused to interpret imprecise language aspermitting attorneys' fees.

* * *

The legislature has determined whenattorney's fees should be awarded. It hasbeen done by specific language such as listing'attorney's fees' to overcome the common lawrule. Where they have not used such specificlanguage, the courts have consistently refusedto give an expanded reading to the legislativelanguage used." Waller, 28 Ill. App. 3d at331.

While the above-referenced public policy and the goal ofuniformity in states' enactments of the Arbitration Act areimportant factors to be considered, we do not find that theyoverride the long-standing precedent in Illinois which requiresthat attorney fees be specifically authorized by statute orcontract. It is clear that section 14 of the Arbitration Act doesnot specifically authorize the recovery of attorney fees by theprevailing party. As no specific authorization allowing attorneyfees exists in section 14, we are without authority to interpretthe word "disbursements" to include them.

We further note that the State of Montana, which also requiresspecific statutory or contractual authorization for the recovery ofattorney fees, rejected the interpretation of the "costs anddisbursements" language in its codification of section 14 toinclude attorney fees. Terra West Townhomes, L.L.C. v. Stu HenkelRealty, 298 Mont. 344, 355, 996 P.2d 866, 873 (2000). The SupremeCourt of Montana reasoned that the language of the statute simplydid not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and it wouldnot read the words "costs" or "disbursements" to include them. Terra West Townhomes, 298 Mont. at 355, 996 P.2d at 873.

In addition, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,mindful of provisions in the Arbitration Act, held that attorneyfees associated with obtaining and confirming an arbitration awardare not recoverable. Floors, Inc. v. B.G. Danis of New England,Inc., 380 Mass. 91, 100, 401 N.E.2d 839, 845 (1980). Specifically,the court stated that, in the absence of a special agreement,"legal fees arising out of arbitration have never been awarded inthe past, and we shall not depart from this practice in the absenceof a legislative determination to do so." Floors, 380 Mass. at101, 401 N.E.2d at 845. Thus, at least two other jurisdictionshave determined that attorney fees are not permitted under theArbitration Act absent express statutory or contractual language tothe contrary.

We further find that the trial court in the instant case wascorrect in rejecting the $820 in legal research fees sought by the Union. It has been held that "computer-assisted legal researchexpenses are a form of attorney fees and are not separatelyrecoverable as a cost or expense pursuant to the parties'contingent fee arrangement." Guerrant v. Roth, 334 Ill. App. 3d259, 269, 777 N.E.2d 499 (2002). Thus, the trial court was correctin denying these fees.

Given our holding above, we need not address the remainingarguments raised by the parties. The trial court's order ofOctober 29, 2003, is affirmed.

Affirmed.

O'MALLEY, P.J., and GORDON, J., concur.