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FIRST DIVISION
November 24, 2003

Nos. 1-02-0138, 1-02-0897, 1-02-1271 (Consolidated)

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

These three consolidated cases compel us to interpretsection 11(a) of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (ParentageAct) (750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West 2000)). That section gives thetrial court authority to enter a finding of paternity as asanction if the alleged father refuses to submit to a blood testto determine paternity, but only "if the rights of others and theinterests of justice so require." 750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West 2000). The trial court in all three of the consolidated casesentered findings of paternity as sanctions for refusal to complywith court orders for testing. Both parties in two of the casesask us to reverse the trial court's judgment. In the third casethose parties seek reversal, but the alleged father, who refusedto take the paternity test, asks us to affirm the finding ofpaternity. Because we find no evidence in the record that therights of others or the interests of justice require thepaternity findings, we reverse the judgments in all three cases.

In re Donnell M.

R.M. gave birth to Donnell M. on October 16, 1996. OnSeptember 26, 2000, the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS) took Donnell into custody. Two days later theDepartment petitioned for adjudication of wardship pursuant tosection 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(West 2000)). DCFS alleged that R.M. left Donnell and hisyounger sister alone, without an adequate care plan. Thepetition listed Donnell's father as "UNKNOWN," but the courtordered K.G., father of some of R.M.'s children, to take apaternity test. After the State's Attorney published notice ofproceedings to all unknown persons who might be Donnell's father,the court entered a judgment of default against "unknownfathers."

On November 30, 2000, a caseworker went to R.M.'s home todiscuss services and court proceedings. R.M. named R.E. as thefather of one of her children, G.H. as the father of another,K.G. as the father of a third, and she could not remember thename of the father of a fourth child. She named J.F. asDonnell's father. DCFS amended its petition for wardship to nameJ.F. as Donnell's father.

Through diligent searching the caseworker eventually foundJ.F., and on May 9, 2001, J.F. appeared in court in response to asummons. J.F. said he had never seen Donnell, and he did notknow whether Donnell was his child. He admitted that he knewR.M. and he could possibly be Donnell's father. The courtordered him to take a paternity test. The court explained thatif the test showed he was Donnell's father, DCFS wouldinvestigate him to determine whether he should have custody ofDonnell.

When J.F. failed to appear for testing, the State's Attorneypetitioned for a finding of contempt. The sheriff could notcontact J.F. at the address and telephone number he gave thecourt.

At a hearing on October 23, 2001, R.M. testified that shebelieved J.F. was Donnell's father, but she did not know whereJ.F. lived. A paternity test proved that K.G. was not Donnell'sfather. The State's Attorney asked for a default finding thatJ.F. was Donnell's father. The office of the Cook County publicguardian (Guardian), appointed to protect Donnell's interests,objected. The court entered a finding of paternity against J.F.,using the remedy available under the Parentage Act. 750 ILCS45/11(a) (West 2000).

The Guardian moved for reconsideration of the paternityfinding. The Guardian argued that no party had filed a properpetition under the Parentage Act and, therefore the court lackedauthority to enter the paternity determination. The Guardianadded that the finding would not serve Donnell's interests, as itwould foreclose Donnell from seeking a different adjudication ofpaternity if evidence should come to light showing that a manother than J.F. was his father. The State's Attorney agreed withthe Guardian about Donnell's interests and joined in the requestto vacate the finding of paternity.

The court found that the petition for adjudication ofwardship met the statutory requirement of a petition allegingpaternity. The court then asked whether the Guardian sought abody attachment of J.F. so that the court could obtain the tissuesamples necessary for a paternity test. The attorney said thatthe court should either issue such an attachment or find theevidence insufficient for a determination of paternity.

The court noted that the State's Attorney had not succeededin serving J.F. with summons for the contempt proceedings. Thejudge said:

"It seems to this Court that it would be more punitiveif this Court were to issue a body attachment whichwould require that law enforcement officials *** take[J.F.] in custody ***.

*** The Court feels that the Parentage Actallowing the finding of paternity to be entered is amore reasonable exercise of its discretion.

*** [The] Guardian does not have any specificinformation which would allege that someone other than[J.F.] is the father of the child. Whether or not thatwould exist would be speculation."

The court denied the motion for reconsideration. The Guardianappeals, and appellee, the State, joins in the request forreversal of the trial court's judgment.

In re C.P.

Y.D. gave birth to C.P. on February 7, 1996. On July 23,2001, DCFS petitioned for adjudication of wardship pursuant tosection 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (West2000)). DCFS alleged that six of Y.D.'s children tested positivefor illegal substances at birth, and Y.D. admitted to usingillegal substances again while pregnant in 2001. The petitionidentified C.P.'s father as Leslie P. of unknown address.

In July 2001 Y.D. testified that Leslie P. was C.P.'sfather. She named the street where Leslie lived. The courtgranted temporary custody of C.P. to the guardianshipadministrator for DCFS.

At a hearing in November 2001, Letaoine P. testified that hedid not know whether he was C.P.'s biological father. The courtordered Letaoine to take a paternity test. Nothing in the recordon appeal explains the court's treatment of Letaoine P. as thoughhe were the same as Leslie P., but the court so treated himthroughout the proceedings. The caseworker named the putativefathers of Y.D.'s other children and explained efforts made tocontact those persons. No one appeared for testing to determinethe paternity of C.P. Based on the refusal to submit toparentage testing the court named Leslie P. the father of C.P. The Guardian objected that the findings did not serve C.P.'sinterests. The court asked whether the Parentage Act requiredsuch a finding. The Guardian responded that the evidence did notclearly and convincingly demonstrate paternity. The court heldthat the refusal to submit to paternity testing proved, clearlyand convincingly, that Leslie P. was C.P.'s father. The Guardianappeals and appellee, the State, joins in the request forreversal of the judgment.

In re Devon M.

E.G. gave birth to Devon M. on July 9, 2001. E.G. died aweek later. On July 25, 2001, DCFS took Devon into custody, andtwo days later DCFS petitioned for adjudication of wardshippursuant to section 2-4(1)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS405/2-4(1)(a) (West 2000)), because Devon had no parent, guardianor legal custodian. The petition, which listed Ras M. as Devon'sfather, alleged that Devon needed a blood transfusion.

Ras sought the aid of the public defender's office. Heswore in an affidavit that he was unemployed, with neither incomenor assets. He owned no car. The court appointed the publicdefender to represent Ras. Ras testified that he was sure he wasDevon's father. But M.G., E.G.'s uncle, testified that he spokewith Ras at E.G.'s funeral, and Ras then told M.G. he thought thebaby was not his. The court ordered Ras to submit to a paternitytest.

Although Ras did not object to the order for paternitytesting, he never appeared for the test. The Guardian moved tostrike Ras's name from the petition for adjudication of wardship. The court found that Ras's testimony in court, and his refusal tosubmit to the test, proved clearly and convincingly that he wasDevon's father. The Guardian appeals and the State joins in therequest for reversal of the judgment. Ras submitted a brief onappeal asking this court to affirm the trial court's judgmentnaming him as Devon's father.

Jurisdiction

The Guardian contends that Supreme Court Rules 301 and 303give this court jurisdiction to consider these appeals. 155 Ill.2d Rs 301, 303. Those rules allow appeals only from judgmentsthat terminate the litigation between all parties on the merits,or dispose of the rights of all parties in the entirecontroversy. Peter Fischer Import Motors, Inc. v. Buckley, 121Ill. App. 3d 906, 909 (1984). In all three of these cases theDepartment sued for an adjudication of wardship. The records inthe three cases show no final dispositions of those petitions. Without such final dispositions Rules 301 and 303 cannot conferjurisdiction on this court.

Instead we find that Rule 304(b)(1) gives this courtjurisdiction over the appeals. That rule provides that an "orderentered in *** [a] guardianship[] or similar proceeding whichfinally determines a right or status of a party" is immediatelyappealable without any special finding from the trial courtregarding appealability. 155 Ill. 2d R. 304(b)(1). The orderappealed in Donnell's case finally determined J.F.'s status asDonnell's father, and J.F. was therefore a party to the case. The order appealed in C.P.'s case finally determined Leslie P.'sstatus as C.P.'s father, and the order appealed in Devon's casefinally determined Ras's status as Devon's father. All of theorders arose in guardianship proceedings. Accordingly, we havejurisdiction to consider these appeals.

Sufficiency of the Petitions

The Guardian claims that the trial court lacked authority toenter the paternity findings because no one filed a paternitypetition as required by the Parentage Act. That act provides:

"An action to determine the existence of thefather and child relationship *** may be brought by thechild; the mother; a pregnant woman; any person orpublic agency who has custody of, or is providing orhas provided financial support to, the child; theIllinois Department of Public Aid if it is providing orhas provided financial support to the child or if it isassisting with child support collection services; or aman presumed or alleging himself to be the father ofthe child or expected child. The complaint shall beverified and shall name the person or persons allegedto be the father of the child." 750 ILCS 45/7(a) (West2000).

The Department had custody of Donnell and Devon when itfiled the petitions in their cases, and the Department tookcustody of C.P., and began providing for his support, shortlyafter filing the petition. Therefore, the Parentage Actauthorized the Department to bring actions to determineparentage.

The Guardian claims that the Department filed a petition,not a complaint as required by the Parentage Act, and thepetition did not initiate an action to determine paternitybecause the Department did not specifically request that relief.Each of the three cases on appeal began with a verified petitionfor adjudication of wardship. The petitions (after amendment inDonnell's case) named the alleged fathers. The petition in eachcase, the first pleading, stated the facts for the cause ofaction, framed the issues and requested the relief thepetitioners sought. Thus, the petition in each case qualified asa complaint. See 735 ILCS 5/2-602 (West 2000); Kasper v. Frank,9 Ill. App. 3d 481, 483 (1972).

DCFS prayed for adjudication of the minors as wards of thecourt and added a general prayer for "such orders as are in thebest interests of the minor, and other relief under the JuvenileCourt Act." In the context of the guardianship proceedings wefind the general prayer sufficient to invoke the court's power todeclare paternity of the minor. See Heritage Standard Bank &Trust Co. v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 149 Ill. App. 3d563, 568 (1986). The petitions met the statutory criteria forinitiating paternity determinations. We find that the trialcourt had authority to enter the orders regarding paternity ofthe three minors here.

Paternity Findings

The trial court found that section 11(a) of the ParentageAct (750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West 2000)) authorized a finding ofpaternity as a sanction against the alleged fathers who refusedto submit to paternity tests. Section 11(a) provides:

"[T]he court *** may, and upon request of a partyshall, order or direct the mother, child and allegedfather to submit to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) teststo determine inherited characteristics. If any partyrefuses to submit to the tests, the court may resolvethe question of paternity against that party or enforceits order if the rights of others and the interests ofjustice so require." 750 ILCS 45/11(a) (West 2000).

The statute authorizes a finding of paternity as a sanctionagainst an alleged father, but it limits that authority to casesin which "the rights of others and the interests of justice ***require" such a finding. The trial court relied on this sectionas authority for the paternity judgments here, but in no case didthe court explain what rights of others or interests of justicerequired the judgment.

The parties cite several cases reminding the courts that thelegislature intended the Parentage Act to protect the interestsof the child at issue. E.g. Klawitter v. Crawford, 185 Ill. App.3d 778, 784 (1989); In re Violetta B., 210 Ill. App. 3d 521, 533(1991). But the parties cite no case explaining the finalsentence of section 11(a), and we found no Illinois casesconstruing that sentence.

The Parentage Act derives from the Uniform Parentage Act(1973), 9B U.L.A. 377-505 (2001), and a number of states thathave adopted forms of the Uniform Parentage Act have also allowedfindings of paternity as a sanction in similarly limitedcircumstances. See Kan. Stat. Ann.