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First Division
September 13, 2004

JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent-appellant, L.C., is the biological mother ofminors V.M. (male child born in April 1995) and M.M. (femalechild born May 1996). The juvenile court entered an ordertransferring guardianship to the paternal grandparents of theminors and closing the case. L.C. seeks review of whether thetrial court's permanency goals and final order were against themanifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons set forthbelow, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

On October 4, 1996, the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS) filed petitions for adjudication of wardship onbehalf of the minors alleging that on or about September 3, 1996,V.M. suffered brain damage or a skull fracture and bruises on hislegs as a result of a direct action of the parent or otherpersons responsible for the child's welfare.

During a hearing on October 7, 1996, the stipulated factsprovided that V.M. sustained a skull fracture and bruises to hislegs. Further, when asked how the child received the injuries,L.C. provided the DCFS worker and hospital staff three differentaccounts. L.C. told hospital staff that she attempted suicide onor about August 22, 1996. If called to testify, L.C. would statethat she gave a consistent account of how the injury to V.M. wassustained. The father of V.M. and M.M. was not the custodialparent at the time of the incident.

On February 25, 1997, an adjudication hearing was held forV.M. and M.M. and the court found that pursuant to section 2-3 ofthe Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(West 1996)), the minors were abused or neglected due to physicalabuse and an injurious environment while in the L.C.'s care.

On July 29, 1997, a dispositional hearing was held and both parents were found unable for some reason other than financialcircumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline theminors. The court also found that reasonable efforts had beenmade to prevent or eliminate the need for the removal of theminors from the home and appropriate services aimed at familypreservation and family reunification were unsuccessful. Therefore, the court held that it was in the best interest of theminors to take them from the custody of the parents. The minorswere placed in the guardianship of DCFS, with the right to placethe minor.

On April 14, 1998, L.C. was granted unsupervised overnightvisits up to two nights per week. In May 1999 and November 1999,the visitation was suspended due to DCFS hotline allegations ofabuse. In December 1999, L.C. filed a motion for unsupervisedovernight visitation.

At the hearing on L.C.'s motion, on January 7, 2000, DCFScaseworker and child welfare specialist Robert Brown testifiedthat he was assigned to this case for approximately two years,until another caseworker took over the case. He stated that DCFSrecommended that unsupervised visits be reinstated because therecent investigation was unfounded, the family therapistrecommended that visits be unsupervised, a DCFS caseworker foundthe visits between the mother and children appropriate based onher observation, and the mother had cooperated with services andwas likely to continue to do so. He also recommended individualcounseling for L.C. with a therapist other than the familytherapist, resources for anger-management and behaviormodification therapy, family therapy sessions with anotheragency, and conflict resolution with the paternal grandfather. Brown believed it was in the best interests of the children toreinstate unsupervised visits.

On January 31, 2000, family therapist Grecia Bautista,Robert Brown and L.C.'s psychiatrist, Carlos Espaillat, testifiedat the hearing on L.C.'s motion for unsupervised overnightvisitation. DCFS worker Brown testified that he would recommendtwo-hour, unsupervised day visits initially and then eight-hourvisits. Psychiatrist Espaillat testified that he observed apositive relationship between the children and L.C. TherapistBautista testified that she observed L.C. change "[a] little bit"in her ability to manage her anger. She also noted that L.C. was"still interested in continuing working for her children andwishe[d] to make some changes in her life." Bautista said thatdespite the fact that L.C. had poor coping skills and impulsecontrol, she believed that L.C. had the capacity to know what hersituation was and knew how to collect herself, cope with thesituation and take control of it. From her meetings with L.C.,she had not observed anything that would give her the impressionthat L.C. was going to abuse the children. She noted that L.C.had demonstrated the ability to discipline the children withoutusing verbal or physical force. Bautista recommended two hoursof unsupervised visitation.

At the close of evidence at the January 31, 2000, hearing,the court stated that it had reservations about grantingunsupervised visits and noted that L.C. had "anger controlissues," albeit not directed toward her children. The courtobserved that from time to time, L.C. had made some progresswhile at other times, she had not. The court denied the motionto reinstate the unsupervised overnight visits.

A permanency hearing was held on June 6, 2000. Testimonyfrom the January hearings was incorporated with testimony fromL.C. and Tim McCray. McCray works for Life Link and becameinvolved in the case in April 2000. He stated that L.C. did notmiss any of her weekly visits with her children and all of therandom "urine drops" came out "clean." All of the visits wereappropriate. It was his recommendation that the foster parenthave guardianship of the minors due to the amount of time theminors have been in the system and the need for permanency.

L.C. testified at the June 2000 permanency hearing that sheattended individual counseling until November 1999, when she andthe counselor agreed that no more progress could be made. Shealso indicated that despite the difficulty in securing a newcounselor, she was willing to participate in individualcounseling. L.C. recalled that her unsupervised visitation wassuspended as a result of a new report being filed against her bythe caseworker based on the foster parent's assertion that abruise was found on V.M. after a visit with L.C. The allegationwas unfounded and visitation was resumed in November 1999. Then,in August 1999, another investigation was initiated based on herson's allegation that she kicked him. The allegation wasunfounded, but the unsupervised visitation had not be resumed bythe time of the hearing. However, she had participated in one-hour, supervised visits with her children whenever a caseworkercould pick her up. L.C. testified that she loves her children,wants them back and would like unsupervised visits reinstated.

Following that June 2000 hearing, the court found that L.C.had not made "real" progress in the three years that counselingwas available to her and held that the goal was privateguardianship. The court indicated that the most probative factorwas the series of counseling reports, which persuaded the courtthat through January 2000, L.C. was consistently provided withcounseling but she did not make substantial progress. The courtheld that the goal of private guardianship was in the bestinterest of the children.

In July 2001, DCFS filed a motion to vacate guardianship,terminate wardship, and close the case. A petition was alsofiled to appoint the minors' paternal grandparents as co-guardians.

On August 21, 2001, Shameka Williams from Life Linktestified at the permanency planning hearing that the childrenhad resided with the grandparents for approximately 4 1/2 to 5years and it was her opinion that the placement was appropriate. The court took judicial notice of the hearings held in January2000 and June 2000, and the hearing on DCFS' motion to vacateguardianship. The court indicated that nothing in the proceedingchanged its decision for the goal of private guardianship. Thecourt relied on the report of L.C.'s therapist, Amy Bauer, whohad been working with L.C. from June 2000 to May 2001. Notesfrom the closing therapy session that occurred on May 15, 2001,provided that Ms. Bauer believed that L.C. displayed behaviorsand ideas which were congruent with borderline personalitydisorder. The report also indicated that L.C. continued to havedifficulty recognizing how her behaviors impacted herrelationships and how others perceive her. Bauer recommendedthat, given L.C.'s difficulty in understanding and changing her"cognitions and behaviors" and given the length of time for thechildren's current placement, the children should remain in thecurrent foster home with a guardianship goal.

As DCFS proceeded with its motion to vacate guardianship onAugust 21, 2001, Shameka Williams testified that adoption hadbeen ruled out as a permanency goal because the mother does havea bond to the children and the agency would like for her toremain in their lives. Williams did not want to terminate L.C.'sparental rights. She testified that the grandparents are awareof their responsibility to allow monthly visitation by thenatural parents. It was Williams' recommendation that thegrandparents be named as the guardians of V.M. and M.M. Oncross-examination, Williams acknowledged that the grandparentsand L.C. have a strained relationship.

At the conclusion of the evidence, the State and the publicguardian recommended that private guardianship be ordered. Thefather, through counsel, was in agreement with the publicguardian's recommendation. L.C. was not in agreement withprivate guardianship and L.C.'s counsel noted that L.C. had a newbaby and that she had demonstrated her ability to care for thatchild. The court held that it was in the best interests of V.M.and M.M. that the paternal grandparents act as private guardiansfor them. The court stated that the existence of L.C.'s new babywas not in the evidence before it and its decision was basedsolely on the evidence it received surrounding the trial manyyears ago, the services L.C. participated in and did not makeprogress in, and her inability to parent the two children. Thecourt emphasized that L.C.'s parental rights remained intact, thegrandparents are the ultimate decision-makers for the childrenbut they should consult with the parents, and the right to visitremains intact while the grandparents may determine where, whenand how those visits take place.

L.C. filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the August21, 2001, order or judgment regarding "private guardiansappointed; wardship terminated; case closed."

ANALYSIS

I. PERMANENCY ORDERS

L.C. initially contends that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in changing the goal from return home to privateguardianship after the permanency review on June 6, 2000. TheState responds that there is no appellate jurisdiction to hearL.C.'s permanency goal challenges because the June 6, 2000, andAugust 21, 2001, permanency orders were not final orders and werenot specified in the notice of appeal. The public guardian(Guardian) also contends that L.C.'s notice of appeal failed tospecify that she was seeking review of the June 2000 and August2001 permanency orders and the subsequent hearing on the motionto transfer guardianship made any challenge to the earlierpermanency orders moot. Before addressing L.C.'s arguments, wemust determine our jurisdiction over the matter.

L.C.'s appellate brief jurisdictional statement asserts thatour jurisdiction over this appeal lies under Supreme Court Rule301, which considers appeals from final judgments of a circuitcourt in a civil case as a matter of right. 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. Rule 301 governs appeals from cases in which a final order hasdisposed of the entire controversy. In re M.M., 337 Ill. App. 3d764, 773, 786 N.E.2d 654 (2003). However, the Illinois SupremeCourt has stated that a permanency order, by statute, does notfinally determine a right or status of a party. In re Curtis B.,203 Ill. 2d 53, 56, 784 N.E.2d 219 (2002). By operation ofsection 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Act (705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West2000)), all of the rights and obligations set forth in apermanency order must remain open for reexamination and possiblerevision until the permanency goal is achieved. Curtis B., 203Ill. 2d at 60. Permanency orders must be reviewed andreevaluated at a minimum of every six months. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2002). Therefore, "[n]one of the determinationscontained in a permanency order can be considered set or fixed asa matter of law." Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d at 59. Accordingly,because permanency orders may not be appealed under Rule 301, wedo not have jurisdiction to review the issues regarding thepermanency orders in the instant case. See M.M., 337 Ill. App.3d at 772.

Furthermore, we acquire no jurisdiction to review otherjudgments or parts of judgments not specified or fairly inferredfrom the notice of appeal. In re J.P., 331 Ill. App. 3d 220,234, 770 N.E.2d 1160 (2002). Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2)requires that the notice of appeal "shall specify the judgment orpart thereof *** appealed from and the relief sought from thereviewing court." 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(2). Here, L.C.'sSeptember 18, 2001, notice of appeal states that her appeal istaken from the August 21, 2001, order or judgment regarding"private guardians appointed; wardship terminated; case closed." Despite that designation, she urges this court to review the June2000 and August 2001 permanency goals. Because L.C.'s notice ofappeal does not specify that the appeal is taken from the court'sJune 2000 or August 2001 permanency order, we may not considerher claims with respect to those orders. See In re Lakita B.,297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 991-92, 697 N.E.2d 830 (1998).

II. PRIVATE GUARDIANSHIP AND CLOSING THE CASE

L.C. contends that the trial court abused its discretion insetting a private guardianship goal and ruling in favor of DCFS'motion to transfer guardianship to the foster parents and closethe case, which was against the manifest weight of the evidenceand in violation of section 2-31(2) of the Juvenile Act (705 ILCS405/2-31(2) (West 2000)). While we cannot review the permanencygoal, we will address the final order granting privateguardianship.

The purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to serve the bestinterests of the children involved. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West2000). Whenever possible, everything must be done to return achild to the care and custody of a biological parent. 705 ILCS405/1-2(1) (West 2000). The circuit court has the discretion toselect a permanency goal and to render a final decision as to theplacement of the child that is in his or her best interests, andthe court's decision will not be disturbed unless it is againstthe manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.S., 317 Ill. App.3d 467, 472, 740 N.E.2d 54 (2000). The finding of a circuitcourt is against the manifest weight of the evidence if a reviewof the record reveals that the opposite result was the properone. D.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 472.

When deciding the best interests of the child, the followingfactors should be considered: (1) the age of the child, (2) otheroptions available for permanence, (3) the current placement ofthe child and the intent of the family regarding adoption, (4)the emotional, physical, and mental status or condition of thechild, (5) the types of services previously offered and whetheror not the services were successful and, if not successful, thereasons the services failed, (6) the availability of servicescurrently needed and whether the services exist, and (7) thestatus of siblings of the minor. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West2000).

In its ruling, the circuit court here considered factorssuch as the current placement of the children, the intent of thefoster parents, the fact that adoption had been ruled out by thefoster parents and DCFS, the emotional, physical, and mentalstatus or condition of the children, the types of servicespreviously offered to L.C. and whether or not the services weresuccessful and, if not successful, the reasons the servicesfailed. The circuit court stated that its decision was basedsolely on the evidence it received surrounding the trial manyyears ago, the services L.C. participated in but did not makeprogress in, and her inability to parent the two children. Inlight of these factors, the court held that it was in the bestinterests of the children to appoint their grandparents asprivate guardians until they reached adulthood or further orderof the court. The court emphasized that L.C.'s parental rightsremained intact and noted that while the grandparents were theultimate decision-makers for the children, they should consultwith the parents. The court also stated that the right to visitremains intact even though the grandparents may determine where,when and how those visits take place.

The children's best interests are superior to all otherfactors, including the interests of the biological parents. Inre Alicia Z., 336 Ill. App. 3d 476, 498, 784 N.E.2d 240 (2002). While L.C. participated in the services required of her, theprogress made in these sessions was not satisfactory. Additionally, the stability of the children's home environmentwas a primary factor for the court's ruling. We cannot say thatthe court, which had monitored the case for years, ruled againstthe manifest weight of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the order of the court grantingprivate guardianship to the minors' foster parents/grandparentsand closing the case is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GORDON and McBRIDE, JJ., concur.