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SECOND DIVISION
OCTOBER 22, 2002

JUSTICE CERDA delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondents, J.Y. and D.Y., appeal from the circuit court'stermination of their parental rights. The trial court found thatboth parents had failed to make reasonable progress or effortstoward the return home of their children during any nine-monthperiod after the end of the initial nine-month period followingthe adjudication of neglect or abuse; that the mother was unableto discharge her parental responsibilities due to her mentalillness and would be unable to do so for a period extendingbeyond a reasonable time; that the father was a habitualdrunkard; and that the father had failed to maintain a reasonabledegree of responsibility for the children. Respondents argue onappeal that (1) the trial court erred in retroactively applyingthe amended statute, which allows the court to consider any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect or abuse indetermining whether the parents made reasonable efforts towardthe return of their children; (2) the State did not prove thatthe father was unfit due to habitual drunkenness; and (3) theState did not prove that the mother was unfit due to mentalillness.

The mother, J.Y., and father, D.Y., are married and two oftheir three children are the subject of the neglect and abuseproceedings involved in this appeal. The daughter, T.Y., wasborn on January 27, 1990, and the son, T.Y., was born on November25, 1987 (hereinafter T.Y. and T.Y. will be referred to as "thechildren").

On April 17, 1990, petitions for adjudication of wardshipalleging neglect and dependency were filed for both of thechildren. The allegations of neglect were based on a lack ofnecessary care for the children's well being and their exposureto an injurious environment; the allegation of dependency wasbased on the mental and/or physical disability of the mother. There was evidence that the case arose when J.Y. contacted theauthorities, reporting that she was overwhelmed and was afraidshe would hurt the children. Although the record is not clear,it indicates the petitions may have been amended on August 15,1990, to add allegations of physical abuse.

According to a subsequent supplemental petition filed by theState, on September 13, 1990, the court made a finding of"neglect/lack of care" as to the girl and a finding of physicalabuse as to the boy. The orders regarding these findings do notappear in the record.

On January 29, 1991, dispositional orders were enteredfinding that the parents were unable, for reasons other thanfinancial circumstances, to care for, protect, train, ordiscipline the children. Both children were placed under theguardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS).

Four months later, however, the parents were grantedunsupervised visitation. Then, on October 9, 1991, the courtfound the parents were able to care for the children and thechildren were returned home under an order of protectivesupervision.

On December 16, 1991, the State filed petitions allegingthat the parents had not cooperated with the reasonable requestsof DCFS, that the father continued to physically and mentallyabuse the mother, and that the father continued to use corporalpunishment on the children. On April 24, 1992, the State filedadditional petitions alleging that the mother had not providedall the care necessary for the children's well being. The Statealso alleged that the mother had not cooperated with allreasonable requests of DCFS and she was using corporal punishmenton the children.

On May 7, 1992, the court entered another dispositionalorder, finding that the girl had been neglected, and the courtagain placed her under DCFS guardianship. A dispositional orderregarding the boy does not appear in the record, but there is nodispute that both children were again removed from the home in1992. At the time of the children's removal, D.Y. wasincarcerated for driving under the influence of alcohol, and themother had been hospitalized for psychiatric reasons. The exactdates of the incarceration and hospitalization do not appear inthe record.

Beginning September 7, 1995, unsupervised day visits betweenrespondents and the children were allowed, but they weresuspended three months later. On June 13, 1996, a permanencygoal of long-term foster care was entered by the court for allthree children. The order found that the parents were visitingregularly and were involved in family counseling. The ordernoted, however, that a therapist smelled alcohol on D.Y.'s breathat February, March, and April visitations and that he needed toattend counseling and undergo urine screening. On January 13,1997, the court ordered D.Y. to submit to random urine drops atleast twice a month.

On January 12, 1999, the court entered a permanency goal ofsubstitute care pending court determination of parental rights. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999, the State filed supplementalpetitions requesting that respondents be found unfit, that theirparental rights be terminated, and that the children be appointeda guardian with the right to consent to their adoption.

The petitions alleged that the parents had failed tomaintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility for the children; that the parents had failed toprotect the children from injurious conditions in the children'senvironment; that the parents had failed to make reasonableefforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for theremoval of the children within nine months after the adjudicationof abuse, neglect, or dependency, and/or failed to makereasonable progress toward the return home of the children withinnine months after the adjudication of abuse, neglect, ordependency; that D.Y. was a habitual drunkard and/or addicted todrugs other than those prescribed by a physician for at least oneyear immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitnessproceeding; and that the mother was unable to discharge parentalresponsibilities because of mental impairment, and there wassufficient justification to believe that the mother's inabilityto discharge parental responsibilities would extend beyond areasonable time.

The fitness portion of the bifurcated termination proceedingbegan in December 1999. At the hearing, therapist Jodi Bessingertestified that she conducted sessions with D.Y. in October,November, and December of 1995. The purpose of the therapy wasto work toward the return home of the children and to address theissues of domestic violence, substance abuse, parenting, and themother's mental illness. At that time, D.Y. was not receivingtreatment for alcoholism, he was not attending AlcoholicAnonymous (AA) meetings, and he denied that he had a drinkingproblem. Bessinger testified that D.Y. did not understand thescope of J.Y.'s mental illness or the children's attentiondeficit disorder. D.Y. did not understand the children'semotional needs or how to develop a loving and nurturingrelationship with them. Bessinger characterized D.Y.'s bringingof gifts and money to the children every visit as verydisturbing. She believed that D.Y. did not take responsibilityfor any of the reasons that the children were removed from thehome.

Bessinger also reported that respondents' daughter told herduring therapy that sometime in 1995 or 1996 the children were inthe car with D.Y. when they got into an accident. D.Y. wasdrinking at the time. The son also told Bessinger that hisfather kept a trash can next to his chair for his beer cans.

Susan Barry, the caseworker assigned to the children's casefrom September 1996 through February 1997, identified the mainissues that D.Y. needed to address at that time: angermanagement, domestic violence, drinking problem based on severalincidents of driving while under the influence, parenting skills,and a tendency to minimize the mother's mental illness. Therewas no evidence of the dates of the driving incidents.

Barry did not believe that D.Y. made progress in controllinghis anger while she was assigned to the case. She based heropinion on the mother's concern that D.Y. would be upset,evidenced by comments such as, "He's not going to like this." However, the mother never said she was fearful of D.Y., and Barrynever observed any explosive behavior.

Barry also concluded that, during her time on the case, D.Y.had not progressed in controlling his alcohol abuse. Althoughshe admitted he complied with the required urine drops and wasattending AA meetings, the children reported that he had openlyconsumed alcohol in front of them during an unsupervised visit. D.Y. did not deny that the incident had occurred. The children'sfoster parents further reported that they smelled alcohol onD.Y.'s breath when he returned the children to their home.

Barry observed the parents in 10 to 20 supervised visits. D.Y. participated in the visits and did things such as cookmeals. She never saw D.Y. get angry or hit the children, nor didshe ever see him drink alcohol or smell alcohol on his breath. Barry did not believe that D.Y. had more than a minimalunderstanding of the mother's mental illness.

Barry never recommended the return of the children to theirmother because of the seriousness of J.Y.'s psychotic breaks andthe reports of D.Y.'s drinking.

D.Y. and J.Y. were not receiving marriage counseling duringthe time that Barry was assigned to the case, as they stated theyno longer needed it. However, J.Y. continued attending visitswith a psychiatrist.

The court entered into evidence a service plan dated April17, 1997, which rated D.Y. unsatisfactory for counseling and forsubmitting to random blood screens. D.Y. was also ratedunsatisfactory for another task, however, the meaning of the taskis unclear: "Provide documentation from any referral sources whoassess Mr. [Y] as not appropriate for treatment." D.Y. was ratedsatisfactory for signing a release of information concerning hisparticipation and progress in counseling. The evaluation notedthat the parents had not continued marital counseling. Finally,in an unsigned visiting plan, visits were rated unsatisfactory,noting "visits has not occurred 2 month [sic]."

Beginning in the fall of 1997, Dr. Jennifer Rolando, aclinical psychologist, conducted family-therapy sessions. Thirteen sessions were held, however, the children did not attendsix of the sessions. The sessions focused on fostering anenvironment in which the parents could develop the necessaryskills to meet the children's needs. D.Y.'s anger management wasalso addressed.

Although the children had been highly active and unfocusedduring the sessions, Dr. Rolando believed that they respondedwell to their parents' efforts to refocus them. Dr. Rolandoobserved that the parents had adequate parenting skills, theywere receptive to learning and improving, they practiced newskills during sessions, they attended all of the sessions, theyconsistently followed through with service plans, and theyexhibited a realistic view of the changes that would occur if thechildren returned home.

According to Dr. Rolando, the children had a good rapportwith their parents and wanted to return home. The childrenstated that they felt safe in their parents' care. The parentsdemonstrated love for the children, and Rolando had no concernsregarding the children's safety. She believed that the ultimategoal should have been reunification, although the immediate goalshould have been longer supervised visits and not return home.

A 1997 bonding assessment was entered into evidence, whichwas performed for D.Y. at the request of a caseworker. Theexaminer observed D.Y.'s interactions with his wife and childrenand then independently with each of the three children during anextended visit in the home. The youngest boy was 10, and thegirl was 8 at the time. Both children stated a preference tolive with their parents. The oldest child, S.Y., was living in agroup home due to behavioral problems.

The assessment stated that D.Y. admitted to pushing his wifeduring an altercation, after she threatened to hit him with achair; the date of the incident was not reported. It furtherstated that D.Y. had participated in AA for the past three years;he had attended three meetings a week for two years and one amonth for the past year.

The report concluded that D.Y. was cooperative and engagedin the bonding assessment process. D.Y. reported a strong desireto have his family reunited and put forth a significant amount ofeffort in interacting with his children. He attempted to helpeach of the children in different ways and tried to be attentiveto their needs although, at times, his attempts were not wellformulated. He also attempted to understand the children's pointof view and feelings, but his interpretations were not alwaysaccurate. D.Y. exerted appropriate amounts of effort to parenthis children and provide them with support. He also attempted todisplay affection to his children at various times.

According to the report, the three children displayed a veryhigh level of activity and D.Y. demonstrated difficultystructuring their activities and keeping them engaged. It wasnoted, however, that the children had not been in the family homefor an extended period of time, so their desire to investigatethe home was understandable. The children displayedimpulsiveness, distractibility, and poor coping skills, whichmade parenting difficult.

On a test requiring solutions to different parentingsituations, D.Y.'s answers indicated that he was able tocognitively provide adequate solutions to many problematicsituations. His responses indicated an ability to identify whenthe children needed reassurance.

The report noted that the family cared for each other andwanted to be together, but concluded that returning the childrenwould be very difficult for the parents.

A July 1998 report from Dr. Rolando to the caseworker statedthat the parents had demonstrated a passionate dedication to gaincustody through unwavering pursuit over the last seven years. Rolando stated that five out of seven nights each week had beendevoted to parenting activities, such as parenting classes,counseling, and visitation with the children. The parents hadtaken the initiative to arrange and pay for a number of requiredservices without waiting for the system to make arrangements.

On October 5, 1998, D.Y. was evaluated by DCFS on an April10, 1998, service plan. D.Y. was rated satisfactory for thefollowing tasks: (1) maintaining stable housing with J.Y., whichwas free of observable hazards and safe for the children; (2) submitting to monthly random drug/alcohol screening; and(3) continuing to attend AA meetings regularly and submittingadequate documentation. D.Y. was rated unsatisfactory forvisiting with the children on a regular basis and providing awork schedule. It was noted that telephone contact would beterminated if inappropriate conversation regarding the courtprocess continued, and that D.Y. was late or missed entire visitsa majority of the time. Despite a July 1998 report from thefamily therapist asserting the parents' understanding ofnecessary parenting skills, D.Y. was rated unsatisfactory for hisprogress in family therapy. The report also noted that D.Y. hadnot shown adequate progress in his anger management.

Diane Schmitz was the caseworker assigned to the case fromJuly 1997 through September 1999, a time when the parents' visitswere supervised. She observed 30 to 40 supervised visitationsand the parents attended all the visits. She stated that theparents doted on the children, who reciprocated the affection. Schmitz further reported that J.Y. acted inappropriately duringvisits and was not able to demonstrate appropriate parenting. Inaddition, family therapy for J.Y. and the children was notbeneficial because J.Y. would discuss inappropriate topics. J.Y.'s therapist recommended that individual counseling beterminated, and Schmitz concluded that J.Y. would not be able toparent the children due to her mental illness.

According to Schmitz, D.Y. arrived late to some of thevisits and sometimes arrived in work clothes. During visits,D.Y. would become angry and raise his voice. At one visit in thefall of 1998, D.Y. yelled at Schmitz and raised his hand at herwhen she asked him not to send food home with one of thechildren. D.Y. did not show effective parenting or participateduring the supervised visits.

In addition, during an administrative review meeting inOctober 1998, D.Y. became disruptive by interrupting and speakingloudly. His breath smelled of alcohol, and he refused to do aurine drop.

During Schmitz's assignment to the case, D.Y. providedsufficient documentation of his AA attendance and completion ofindividual therapy for alcohol abuse, domestic violencecounseling, and parenting classes. He and J.Y. completed maritaltherapy once, but would not return when referred a second time. He also cooperated with all of the other urine screens, whichwere required once or twice a month. Schmitz did not feel thatD.Y. had gained any insight from his alcohol abuse treatment.

Dr. Catherine E. Wilson, a clinical psychologist, testifiedthat she performed a psychological assessment of J.Y. onSeptember 8, 1999, pursuant to court order. Dr. Wilson diagnosedJ.Y.'s mental illness as chronic bipolar disorder. She reportedthat the illness caused mood disturbances, resulting in severedepression at times and, at other times, inappropriately excitedor hyperactive behavior. The illness could also cause psychoticsymptoms. J.Y. had a history of severe depression as evidencedby a previous hospitalization following a suicide attempt. Dr.Wilson noted that during her examination, J.Y.'s thoughts wentfrom one subject to another without connection, and she appearedto have trouble speaking due to the rapidity of her thoughts. Asa result, J.Y. had difficulty answering questions.

Dr. Wilson opined that J.Y. was not able to exerciseparental responsibilities and would not be capable of doing so inthe foreseeable future. She further concluded that J.Y. couldnot manage an emergency situation, she could not meet herchildren's psychological needs, and she could not care for herchildren without supervision. There was a danger that J.Y.'scondition would deteriorate as a result of the stress of dealingwith the children, and that she might lose contact with reality.

Dr. Wilson did not examine D.Y, but reported that, if D.Y.was not aware of the mother's mental illness, he may notunderstand the need to supervise the mother's interactions withthe children.

In his testimony, D.Y. admitted that he and J.Y. had analtercation in 1992 or 1993 during which he slapped J.Y. Hestated that he attended about four years of anger managementcounseling and had learned coping skills, along with how tobetter adjust around people and how to control his anger. Hebelieved in punishing the children by sending them to their roomsor, if they were very bad, he might "smack them on their butt ***with [his] hand a little bit."

D.Y. further testified that he was an alcoholic. He statedhe quit drinking alcohol in 1995, reporting he drank once everytwo or three weeks in that year. He subsequently stated,however, that he "pretty much stopped" drinking in 1996, and thenthat he "tried it all the way up to [1999]." D.Y. reported thatthe last time he had a drink was a nonalcoholic beer four or fivemonths prior to the December 1999 hearing. Other thannonalcoholic beer, he claimed he had not consumed alcohol duringvisitations. He had also attended AA since 1995.

Finally, D.Y. testified that he trusted his wife tosupervise the children by herself, including in an emergencysituation.

At the conclusion of the fitness hearing, the trial courtfound that Dr. Wilson's testimony was clear and convincing thatJ.Y. could not be trusted with the children within theforeseeable future due to her mental illness. Furthermore, D.Y.was unable to understand the seriousness of J.Y.'s mentalcondition. In part due to his alcoholism, D.Y. was unable tomanage his anger, to properly care for the children, and toassist J.Y. The caseworker reports indicated that D.Y. hadminimized both his drinking problem and J.Y.'s mental illness.

The trial court further found that in October 1996, D.Y. hadopenly consumed alcohol in front of the children. Subsequently,in October 1998, D.Y. had alcohol on his breath and refused totake a urine drop, thereby allowing the inference that he wasunder the influence of alcohol at that time. The court notedthat the October 1998 incident was within the year preceding thehearing. The history of the case showed that D.Y. had a drinkingproblem and was asked numerous times to complete alcoholtreatment. Although D.Y. was in and out of alcohol treatment anddid go to AA for periods of time, there was evidence he consumedalcohol as late as October 1998. The court stated that D.Y.still had the same problems he had in 1992. He continued tominimize his drinking problem and its effect on the children. The court found that D.Y. was a habitual drunkard for at leastone year prior to the June 2, 1999, commencement of the unfitnessproceeding.

The court also stated that D.Y. had failed to maintain areasonable degree of responsibility for the children because hedid not complete services, thereby failing to comply with theservice plans. He also failed to stay sober, control his anger,recognize J.Y.'s mental illness, and assist J.Y.

The court concluded that the parents had made efforts buthad not progressed to the point where they could be trusted withunsupervised visits. It stated that there was a lack of evidenceestablishing that the parents failed to make reasonable progresstoward the return of the children in the first nine months afterthe adjudication of neglect. However, they failed to makeprogress during any nine-month period after the end of theinitial nine months.

The trial court held that both parents were unfit,specifically finding: (1) they had failed to make reasonableprogress or efforts toward the return home of the children duringa nine-month period after the initial nine-month period followingthe adjudication (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000)), (2) J.Y. wasunable to discharge her parental responsibilities because of hermental illness and would be unable to do so for a periodextending beyond a reasonable time (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West2000)), (3) D.Y. was a habitual drunkard (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(k)(West 2000)), and (4) D.Y. had failed to maintain a reasonabledegree of responsibility for the children (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)(West 2000)).

The best-interest hearing was held on September 18, 2000. At the hearing, the case manager testified that she had beenassigned to the case since January 2000. Both children werediagnosed with "ADHD" and were taking medication. The childrenwere living with a foster family and had developed a strongattachment to their foster parents' two teenage children. Although respondents had monthly supervised visits with thechildren, the case manager saw no strong emotional attachmentbetween them. The case manager recommended that the parentalrights be terminated.

The children's therapist testified that terminatingrespondents' parental rights would not be detrimental to thechildren's emotional state.

The trial court held that it would be in the children's bestinterest to terminate respondents' parental rights. A guardianwas appointed with the right to consent to their adoption.

Respondents appeal.

Fitness of D.Y., the Father

D.Y. challenges only two of the three grounds upon which thecourt based his finding of unfitness. Due to his failure tochallenge the trial court's finding that he was unfit for failingto maintain a reasonable degree of responsibility for thechildren under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, his appeal ismoot. See In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 727 N.E. 2d 990 (2000). Evidence of a single statutory ground is sufficient to uphold afinding of parental unfitness. In re G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d 18,24, 768 N.E. 2d 367 (2002). Therefore, even if the court erredin finding D.Y. unfit under sections 1(D)(m) and 1(D)(k), thetermination of his parental rights may be upheld solely on thegrounds of section 1(D)(b). Although D.Y. does not challenge thetermination of his parental rights under this section, we willbriefly address the court's findings regarding a reasonabledegree of responsibility.

Section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act provides that a parentmay be found unfit if he fails "to maintain a reasonable degreeof interest, concern or responsibility as to the child'swelfare." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2000). In evaluatingunfitness under this section, the court must focus on theparent's efforts and not the success of those efforts. In reAdoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 279, 562 N.E. 2d 174 (1990).

In this case, evidence was presented at the fitness hearingshowing that D.Y. was late to, or did not attend, some of thevisits with the children. Although it is unclear whether thereference was to both parents, there was an April 17, 1997,rating of unsatisfactory because visits had not occurred for twomonths.

In addition, D.Y. failed to appreciate J.Y.'s incapacity toparent due to her mental illness as evidenced by the testimony oftherapists and by his testimony that he trusted his wife tosupervise the children, even in an emergency situation. Therewas at least one incident of threatening or abusive behaviorexhibited by D.Y. when he yelled and raised his hand at atherapist at a 1998 visitation. The same therapist reported thatD.Y. often became angry and raised his voice at the children anddid not participate in the visits.

Finally, the evidence showed that D.Y. was imprisoned fordriving while under the influence of alcohol in 1992, hisdaughter reported to her therapist that D.Y. had been in a caraccident in 1996 after consuming alcohol, he openly consumedalcohol in front of the children at a visitation in 1996, andtherapists smelled alcohol on his breath three times in 1996 andonce in 1998 when he also refused to do a urine drop. D.Y.,himself, testified that he quit drinking in 1995, then stated he"pretty much stopped" in 1996, then added that he "tried it ***up to 1999."

The trial judge found that D.Y.'s failure to completeservices, his failure to control his alcoholism and his anger,and his failure to recognize J.Y.'s mental health problem allsupported a finding that he did not demonstrate a reasonabledegree of responsibility for the children. The trial court is inthe best position to make factual findings and assess thewitnesses' credibility. See G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 24. Thiscourt defers to those findings and will not reweigh the evidence. See G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 24. The court's finding that D.Y.was unfit due to his failure to demonstrate a reasonable degreeof responsibility for the children was not contrary to themanifest weight of the evidence and the termination of hisparental rights may be upheld on that basis alone.

Fitness of J.Y., the Mother

J.Y. contends that the trial court erred in retroactivelyapplying amended section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act in her andD.Y.'s case. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000). She also contendsthat the State did not prove her unfit due to mental illness.

The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides that, if the courtfinds clear and convincing evidence that a parent is unfit asdefined by the Adoption Act and it is in the best interest of theminor that parental rights be terminated, the court may terminateparental rights and empower the guardian to consent to theminor's adoption. 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 2000).

Section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act was amended effectiveJanuary 1, 2000, after the commencement of the fitness hearing inthis case. Following the amendment, section 1(D)(m) stated:

"(m) Failure by a parent (i) to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditionsthat were the basis for the removal of thechild from the parent, or (ii) to makereasonable progress toward the return of thechild to the parent within 9 months after anadjudication of neglected or abused minorunder Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4of that Act, or (iii) to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child tothe parent during any 9-month period afterthe end of the initial 9-month periodfollowing the adjudication of neglected orabused minor under Section 2-3 of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minorunder Section 2-4 of that Act. If a serviceplan has been established as required underSection 8.2 of the Abused and Neglected ChildReporting Act to correct the conditions thatwere the basis for the removal of the childfrom the parent and if those services wereavailable, then, for purposes of this Act,'failure to make reasonable progress towardthe return of the child to the parent'includes (I) the parent's failure tosubstantially fulfill his or her obligationsunder the service plan and correct theconditions that brought the child into carewithin 9 months after the adjudication underSection 2-3 or 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987 and (II) the parent's failure tosubstantially fulfill his or her obligationsunder the service plan and correct theconditions that brought the child into careduring any 9-month period after the end ofthe initial 9-month period following theadjudication under Section 2-3 or 2-4 of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987." 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 2000).

Prior to the amendment, the statute did not permit a court toconsider "any 9-month period," but only the nine months followingthe adjudication of neglect or abuse. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West1998).

Respondents argue that the trial court improperly appliedthe amendment retroactively and that the retroactive applicationadversely affected their parental rights.

A reviewing court should apply the law as it exists at thetime of appeal unless doing so would interfere with a vestedright. First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d 282,290, 664 N.E.2d 36 (1996). A vested right is a right that isprotected from legislative interference by the due process clauseof the Illinois Constitution. In re S.W., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1153,1156, 735 N.E. 2d 706 (2000). It is "'an expectation that is sofar perfected that it cannot be taken away by legislation.'" S.W., 315 Ill. App. 3d at 1156, quoting First of America TrustCo., 171 Ill. 2d at 290-91.

This court has previously found that a parent's right to hisor her child is not an absolute vested right. See S.W., 315 Ill.App. 3d at 1156 (amended section 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act maybe applied retroactively where the amendment was enacted afterthe petition to terminate parental rights was filed). Inaddition, the Fourth District Appellate Court has specificallyheld that "a parent's obligation to improve once his child isadjudicated neglected does not amount to a vested right toimprove in that period." (Emphasis added.) In re K.P., 305 Ill.App. 3d 175, 179, 711 N.E.2d 478 (1999). As a result, the fourthdistrict retroactively applied an amendment to section 1(D)(m),which reduced the 12-month improvement period to 9 months, whenthe amendment was enacted while the appeal was pending. K.P.,305 Ill. App. 3d at 179.

As in K.P., respondents here had no vested right to makereasonable progress toward the return of their children in theinitial nine-month period following adjudication. Section 1(D)provides a list of statutory grounds that will support a findingof unfitness; it is not a list of parental rights. S.W., 315Ill. App. 3d at 1157; K.P., 305 Ill. App.3d at 179. Therefore,the amendment to section 1(D)(m) was properly appliedretroactively by the trial court.

J.Y.'s argument that the State failed to prove she was unfitdue to mental illness is also without merit. Respondents contendthat their expert, Dr. Rolando, was more reliable because she metwith them to evaluate services intended for family reunification,whereas Dr. Wilson was merely hired to perform a psychologicalexamination of J.Y.

Section 1(D)(p) provides that a parent is unfit where thecourt finds an "[i]nablity to discharge parental responsibilitiessupported by competent evidence *** of mental illness *** andthere is sufficient justification to believe that the inabilityto discharge parental responsibilities shall extend beyond areasonable time period." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(p) (West 2000). It isup to the trial court to make factual findings and assesses thecredibility of the witnesses; this court will not reweigh theevidence on review. See G.L., 329 Ill. App. 3d at 24.

Although Dr. Rolando opined that J.Y. was competent toparent, Dr. Wilson believed that J.Y.'s bipolar disorder, historyof severe depression, suicide attempt, disconnected thinking, andprecarious contact with reality when under stress rendered herunfit. The trial court was free to accept the testimony of Dr.Wilson over that of Dr. Rolando, and did not err in finding thatJ.Y. was unfit due to mental illness.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McBRIDE, P.J., and CAHILL, J., concur.