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THIRD DIVISION
May 28, 2003

On June 1, 1997, the legislature's attempt to level theplaying field for interim attorney fee awards in marriagedissolution cases went into effect. One new provision of theIllinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act),750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3) (West 2000), empowers trial judges toallocate fees previously paid by a party to his or her lawyer forpayment to the other party's lawyer. In effect, a disgorgementof attorney's fees to "achieve substantial parity between theparties." 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3) (West 2000).

Here, attorney E. William Bedrava was ordered by a trialjudge to disgorge $20,000, part of the fee he received from hisclient during proceedings brought under the Illinois ParentageAct of 1984, 750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 1998) (Parentage Act). He refused. He was held in indirect civil contempt. He appealsthat contempt finding. Among the issues he raises: (1) Doessubsection 501(c-1)(3) apply to proceedings brought under theParentage Act; and (2) Does subsection 501(c-1)(3) violate theFederal and/or Illinois Constitutions?

Because we answer the first question in the negative, wereverse the trial court's order requiring Bedrava to disgorge$20,000. We also reverse the order of contempt.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner Patrick Stella filed a petition under theParentage Act on January 29, 1998, to establish a parent-childrelationship with his daughter, Alexis. Stella originally wasrepresented by Kim Grannen, who later was replaced by Bedrava. Respondent Pearl Garcia was not represented by counsel untilNovember 2, 1998, when attorney Sue Roberts-Kurpis filed a motionon her behalf.

On May 22, 2000, Roberts-Kurpis filed a petition for interimattorney's fees and costs under section 17 of the Parentage Actand subsection 501(c-1) and section 508 of the Marriage Act,along with an affidavit in support.⁽¹⁾ In addition to listing theamount of time spent on this case, Roberts-Kurpis asserted in heraffidavit, among other things, she had incurred $10,000 inattorney's fees defending herself against false allegations ofcriminal misconduct and unethical conduct brought by Stella, hisparents, and Bedrava. Bedrava filed a response to the petition.

On July 31, 2000, Bedrava filed his affidavit in support ofthe response to the petition. In the affidavit, Bedrava said hehad been paid $43,870 in connection with the case as of July 31,2000.⁽²⁾

On August 2, 2000, Bedrava filed a motion to strike anddismiss the petition and filed a supporting memorandum of law inwhich he contended subsection 501(c-1) of the Marriage Act didnot apply to the Parentage Act. In her memorandum of law insupport of the claim for third party liability for attorney'sfees, Roberts-Kurpis argued the court should order Bedrava todisgorge a portion of the fees he received and pay the sum toher.

The court denied the motion to strike and scheduled "briefargument" on the petition. No mention of an evidentiaryproceeding was made.

Bedrava issued and served a subpoena on Roberts-Kurpisadvising her to appear in court on October 11, 2000, and to bringher expense records, among other things. Roberts-Kurpis filed amotion to quash this subpoena.

On October 11, 2000, the trial court found no good cause hadbeen shown for an evidentiary hearing and it quashed thesubpoenas Bedrava had served on the Internal Affairs Division ofthe Chicago Police Department and on Roberts-Kurpis.

On March 6, 2001, the court ordered Bedrava to "disgorge inthe sum of $20,000" and pay it to Roberts-Kurpis. Bedrava fileda motion to reconsider, contending the court's order was an abuseof discretion, a violation of Bedrava's due process rights, anorder constituting involuntary servitude, and an impairment ofcontract.

On April 24, 2001, the court denied the motion. In itssupporting opinion, the court found "interim attorney's fees andcosts are available in a parentage case through subsection 501(c-1) of the [Marriage Act] or alternatively through section 17 ofthe Parentage Act using the framework set forth in subsection501(c-1)." The court also explained it had quashed bothsubpoenas and, because "good cause for an evidentiary hearing hadnot been shown, the hearing would be summary in nature."

Bedrava then requested a technical finding of contempt and astay, which would allow him to appeal the award of interim fees. On December 4, 2001, the court granted the motion and orderedBedrava to pay a dollar per day for so long as he does not complywith the disgorgement order. It is from this order and thedisgorgement order that Bedrava appeals.

DECISION

Bedrava contends subsection 501(c-1)(3) of the Marriage Actdoes not apply to the Parentage Act. This means, Bedrava says,the trial court was without authority to order him to pay interimfees to Roberts-Kurpis. Roberts-Kurpis responds that section 17of the Parentage Act incorporates section 508 of the MarriageAct, which in turn incorporates subsection 501(c-1)(3) of theMarriage Act. Roberts-Kurpis says the court had jurisdiction toenter an order under subsection 501(c-1)(3) of the Marriage Actin a case brought under the Parentage Act. No Illinois decisiondirectly addresses this question.

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. In reMarriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309, 753 N.E.2d 1032(2001). In construing a statute, our goal is to effectuate thelegislature's intent. In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3dat 309. If the language of the statute is clear, we must giveeffect to its plain and ordinary meaning without resorting toother aids of construction. In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill.App. 3d at 310. We may not "supply omissions, remedy defects,annex new provisions, substitute different provisions, addexceptions, limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change thelaw so as to depart from the plain meaning of language employedin the statute." In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d at309-10.

Actions brought under the Parentage Act are " 'entirelystatutory in origin and *** the court's authority is limitedthereby.' " In re Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 476,478-79, 732 N.E.2d 11 (2000), quoting In re Marriage of Cohn, 93Ill. 2d 190, 206, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982). The court has noinherent power in parentage cases. In re Parentage of Melton,314 Ill. App. 3d at 479.

In re Parentage of Melton is instructive here. In thatcase, we considered whether the Parentage Act conferred on thecourt all powers conferred by the Marriage Act. In particular,the issue was whether the trial court had authority in aparentage action to issue an injunction preventing the custodialparent from removing the child from the state under the MarriageAct.

We noted that sections 14 and 16 of the Parentage Act adoptportions of the Marriage Act. In re Parentage of Melton, 314Ill. App. 3d at 478. Section 14 expressly adopts the relevantfactors set forth in the Marriage Act for judgments, especially"the guidelines and standards" for determining child support. Inre Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 478. Section 14 alsoexpressly authorizes trial judges hearing parentage cases toapply the "relevant standards" of the Marriage Act whendetermining: the best interests of the child, custody, jointcustody, or visitation. In re Parentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App.3d at 478. Section 16 of the Parentage Act expressly adopts "therelevant factors" of the Marriage Act for modifying any order forsupport, custody, or visitation. In re Parentage of Melton, 314Ill. App. 3d at 478.

We said, however:

"While the Parentage Act adopts some of the factors,guidelines and standards stated in the Marriage Act, theParentage Act does not incorporate the procedures of theMarriage Act and it does not broadly confer on the court thesame powers conferred on the court in actions under theMarriage Act. *** In particular, the Parentage Act nowhereconfers on the court the power to enjoin parents fromremoving the child from the state, or any of the otherpowers conferred by subsection 501 or 501.1 of the MarriageAct." (Emphasis added.) In re Parentage of Melton, 314Ill. App. 3d at 478.

In re Parentage of Melton was followed in In re Adams, 324Ill. App. 3d 177, 754 N.E.2d 425 (2001). The question waswhether the Parentage Act, through the Marriage Act, gives courtsthe power to enjoin a parent with joint custody from removing thechild from the state. The court held the answer is no:

"Although the Parentage Act has adopted some of theprovisions of the Marriage Act, it does not incorporate theentire Marriage Act and does not confer the same broadpowers on the court. See Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 478. The court has no inherent powers in parentage cases, and thecourt's authority to hear parentage cases is limited to theexercise of those powers that are expressly given to it bythe statute." In re Adams, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 180.

We take In re Parentage of Melton and In re Adams to meanonly those Marriage Act relevant factors and standards expresslyembraced by the Parentage Act may be applied by trial judges inparentage cases. These would include a section 508 provisionthat permits awards of attorney's fees to be paid directly toattorneys, Heiden v. Ottinger, 245 Ill. App. 3d 612, 616 N.E.2d1005 (1993); and a section 508 provision that allows a trialcourt to award reasonable attorney's fees incurred by custodialparents during child support enforcement proceedings where thenon-custodial parent's failure to pay is without cause orjustification. Davis v. Sprague, 186 Ill. App. 3d 249, 541N.E.2d 831 (1989). We find nothing in the pertinent statutesthat expresses a legislative intent to grant trial judges thepower to order disgorgement of interim fees in a Parentage Actproceeding.

The statute at issue here is section 17 of the ParentageAct:

"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the court mayorder reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and other costsof the action, pre-trial proceedings, post-judgmentproceedings to enforce or modify the judgment, and theappeal or the defense of an appeal of the judgment, to bepaid by the parties in accordance with the relevant factorsspecified in Section 508 of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act, as amended." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/17 (West 2000).

Section 508 of the Marriage Act provides, in relevant part:

"(a) The court from time to time, after due notice andhearing, and after considering the financial resources ofthe parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable amountfor his own or the other party's costs and attorney's fees. Interim attorney's fees and costs may be awarded from theopposing party, in accordance with subsection (c-1) ofSection 501. At the conclusion of the case, contribution toattorney's fees and costs may be awarded from the opposingparty in accordance with subsection (j) of Section 503. Fees and costs may be awarded to counsel from a formerclient in accordance with subsection (c) of this Section."(Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2000).

The remainder of section 508 is devoted to the enforcement ofjudgments or orders relating to attorney's fees, final hearingsfor fees and costs against an attorney's own client, consentjudgments, independent proceedings for fees and costs, thewritten agreement between attorney and client, and theapplicability of the section. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 2000).

Referring to interim attorney's fees, subsection 501(c-1)(3)states, in relevant part:

"If the court finds that both parties lack financial abilityor access to assets or income for reasonable attorney's feesand costs, the court (or hearing officer) shall enter anorder that allocates available funds for each party'scounsel, including retainers or interim payments, or both,previously paid, in a manner that achieves substantialparity between the parties." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS5/501(c-1)(3) (West 2000).

Nowhere in section 17 of the Parentage Act did thelegislature refer to disgorgement of fees. Nor does it cross-reference subsection 501(c-1) of the Marriage Act. The onlycross-reference to the Marriage Act in section 17 of theParentage Act is to section 508. More importantly, section 17does not adopt section 508 of the Marriage Act in its entirety. Rather it expressly adopts only "the relevant factors specifiedin Section 508" of the Marriage Act for determining "reasonablefees of counsel, experts, and other costs." 750 ILCS 45/17 (West2000).

Although section 508 of the Marriage Act allows the court toaward interim fees from the opposing party according tosubsection 501(c-1)(3), section 508 lists no "relevant factors"to consider in awarding interim fees. Nor does section 508authorize disgorgement of fees already paid to an attorney. Themechanism under which a court may award interim fees and thepower to disgorge attorney's fees simply are not "relevantfactors specified in Section 508" of the Marriage Act todetermine "reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and other costs." Absent a clear legislative directive to the contrary, we holdsection 17 of the Parentage Act does not give the courts expressauthority to order disgorgement under subsection 501(c-1)(3) ofthe Marriage Act.

The apparent purpose of subsection 501(c-1)(3) is to stoplawyers with greater resources from protracting the marriagedissolution litigation. That is, from using those greaterresources as a litigation tool, outlasting an opponent until anunfair settlement is reached. See A General Explanation of the"Leveling of the Playing Field" in Divorce Litigation Amendments,11-SEP CBA Rec. 32, 32 (1997). It is difficult to see how thatgoal would apply to Parentage Act cases.

The trial court in this case did not have the power to orderBedrava to disgorge money he had received from his client andthen pay it to Roberts-Kurpis. The March 6, 2001, and April 24,2001, orders directing Bedrava to disgorge $20,000 and pay it toRoberts-Kurpis are reversed. Because Bedrava sought a contemptorder solely to allow review of this issue, we reverse thefinding of contempt against him. In re Marriage of Beyer, 324Ill. App. 3d at 322.

Because we reverse the trial court's judgments on ourreading of the statutes, we need not address Bedrava's remainingcontentions, particularly his constitutional challenges. Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391,396, 634 N.E.2d 712 (1994) ("A court will not consider theconstitutionality of a statute if the case can be disposed ofwithout determining that question").

Reversed.

HOFFMAN, and HALL, JJ., concur.

1. The petition and various related motions were filed in thename of either Garcia or Stella as the named parties in thiscase. Because the real parties-in-interest on this matter areBedrava and Roberts-Kurpis, we will use their names here.

2. $42,870 of the money came from Stella's parents and was aloan to Stella. Stella's parents had intervened briefly in theparentage case requesting visitation as Alexis' grandparents. OnJuly 6, 2000, they filed a motion for voluntary dismissal for"economic reasons." Roberts-Kurpis challenged the motion on thebasis that this was Stella's and Bedrava's way of "hiding behind[Stella]'s personally limited financial resources while payingthousands of dollars to *** BEDRAVA." Roberts-Kurpis said thistactic was intended to avoid payment of any interim fees to her. The court granted the grandparents' motion for voluntarydismissal, but still considered their payment to Bedrava onbehalf of Stella when calculating interim fees.