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FOURTH DIVISION
November 24, 2004

This is an appeal from a two-year plenary order of protection entered by the trial courtagainst respondent-appellant mother, L.S., and in favor of the child T.H. No questions are raisedon the pleadings and, for the reasons that follow, we affirm.

T.H., the child at issue in the underlying juvenile court proceedings, was born on August7, 1991. She was first taken into custody in December of 1997, when respondent was arrestedfor battery, possession of drug paraphernalia, disorderly conduct, and resisting arrest. OnOctober 10, 1998, T.H. was found to be abused and neglected pursuant to sections 2-3(1)(a), 2-3(1)(b), and 2-3(2)(ii) of the of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a), (1)(b),and (2)(ii) (West 1998)) for lack of care, injurious environment, and substantial risk of seriousinjury, respectively. Thereafter, on July 25, 1999, the trial court granted respondent unsupervisedday visits with T.H.. On that same date, T.H. was adjudged a ward of the court and was placed inthe custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

On September 3, 1999, the trial court granted respondent unsupervised overnight visitswith T.H. and, on March 21, 2000, ordered that T.H. should be returned to respondent's custody. In connection with T.H.'s return to her mother's custody, the trial court also entered an order ofprotection on that date which imposed a number of conditions, such as drug testing and sex abusecounseling for T.H.. However, on July 19, 2000, a child protection warrant was issued for T.H.after she was taken from the State of Illinois without the permission of the court and in violationof the order of protection. Again, T.H. was placed in the custody of DCFS after the courtdetermined that it was in her best interest to do so. On September 29, 2000, the trial courtentered a permanency order, where the court noted that respondent needed a drug assessment anda psychological evaluation. Subsequently, respondent failed to appear for the psychologicalevaluation and did not complete the drug assessment. In addition, she was inconsistent in keepingscheduled visits with her children and tested positive for cocaine.

In February of 2001, T.H. was classified as a "SACY" (Sexual Aggressive Children andYouth) ward, following an incident in which she fondled her younger foster brother, performedoral sex on him, and encouraged her sister and foster brother - ages three and four, respectively -to engage in sexual activity. According to DCFS reports, respondent previously had involvedT.H. in various acts of prostitution to the point where she was "exposed to a great deal ofsexually explicit activities while living in various hotel rooms with [ respondent]." Additionally,T.H. was sexually victimized by a male cousin while in the respondent's care.

In May of 2001, T.H. was referred to the Human Effective Living Program (HELP) forsexual aggression assessment and treatment. In October of 2001, the State filed a supplementalpetition for appointment of a guardian with right to consent to adoption seeking to terminaterespondent's parental rights. On January 15, 2002, T.H.'s attorney filed a motion to suspendvisitation. The motion alleged that T.H. told her sex abuse therapist that her mother had T.H.perform oral sex on men for money. T.H.'s sister, K.M., also told the therapist she saw T.H.perform oral sex on men.

A January 7, 2002, evaluation from Sandra Christman, of HELP, provided furtherevidence of such behavior:

"T.H. gave additional information that not only was she taught to steal food andbeg for money but that she was sexually exploited by her mother. T.H. stated thather mother would take her to 'be with a man.' T.H. says of the men, 'they knewmy mama. I'd have to take my clothes off and let them touch me ***.' T.H. statedthat she had to touch these men and 'my mama got the money.' When asked abouthow she felt about these events, T.H. stated, 'They didn't hear my crying. I havemad feelings toward my mom. I was scared, I didn't want to do this.'"

The report also recommended that supervised visitation between T.H. and her mother be stopped. On January 17, 2002, the trial court suspended supervised visitation between T.H. and hermother until further order of court. Also on that date, a DCFS report was admitted that indicatedthat while T.H. was in her mother's custody, her mother involved her in prostitution. The reportthen went on to state that T.H. was traumatized by contact with her mother. Shortly thereafter,on January 31, 2002, the trial court terminated all visitation between respondent and T.H. andK.M., finding that "suspension of visits between the minors and the natural mother is in the bestinterests of the minors."

On July 19, 2002, the trial court heard evidence on T.H.'s motion for an emergencydomestic violence order of protection and a motion to vacate the visitation order. In that regard,Christman testified that on July 1, 2002, the respondent came to the HELP facility with a personwho was described as respondent's "advocate" and requested T.H.'s therapy reports, and she wastold that she could not get them. Thereafter, at the same time respondent left the HELP facilitythrough the front door, T.H. was being dropped off for her therapy session. Respondent thenapproached T.H. and told her that she loved her, she kissed her, and told her that she was skinny. Respondent's "advocate" then told T.H. that she was going to be returned to her mother'scustody. Christman testified that immediately after the incident, T.H. looked shocked, beganshaking her head, and stated that she did not want to go back. Christman opined that the incidentwas very traumatic for T.H. and continues to be so, as T.H. has brought up the incident insubsequent therapy sessions.

Stacy Boyland, the secretary at HELP, also testified. She stated that prior to July 1, 2002,respondent had appeared at HELP and had been told that only DCFS and the guardian hadauthority to release T.H.'s records and, therefore, that HELP could not release the records to therespondent. However, Boyland testified that even though respondent had been told that shewould not be given T.H.'s records, respondent appeared again on July 1, 2002. That day, whenBoyland received a call from the transportation agency to go downstairs and pick up T.H. fromthe transportation agency, she did so and encountered respondent, who again claimed she was onher way upstairs to request records. However, as Boyland exited the building to get T.H.,respondent and her "advocate" followed her out the door and approached T.H.. According toBoyland, respondent exclaimed, "There is my baby, there's my T.H.." Respondent's "advocate"then told T.H., "I am working with your mommy now, she loves you, she is going to get you allback home." Boyland then told respondent that she and T.H. had to go inside the building, andshe took T.H. upstairs.

Caseworker Alfreda Hartzol then testified that she had been T.H.'s caseworker since Julyof 2000. She noted that DCFS had determined that respondent was not entitled to T.H.'s mentalhealth records because turning over those records would be detrimental to the "therapeuticrelationship of trust." To that end, Hartzol sent a letter to respondent informing her not to returnto HELP, which respondent received at the latest by July 8, 2002. Nevertheless, respondentreturned to HELP on July 9 and 10, 2002. Hartzol also testified that she contacted thetransportation agency that takes T.H. to and from her therapy appointments. Personnel whoworked for the company told her that they would not take her to therapy because they did notwant to be liable if a similar incident happened again. However, Hartzol noted, the transportationcompany agreed that it would transport T.H. if it had a court order that would allow it to call thepolice if respondent was again present. Hartzol stated that a domestic violence order ofprotection would be in T.H.'s best interest.

Respondent then testified that she had been to the HELP office on June 27, 2002, June28, 2002, and July 1, 2002, all in the effort to obtain T.H.'s mental health records. However,respondent claimed that she did not know that T.H. would be present on July 1, 2002, and thatwhat occurred was simply a "chance encounter." Respondent's "advocate," Toni Stith, alsotestified that she had no idea that T.H. was coming there. Nevertheless, respondent's counseladmitted that by speaking to T.H., respondent may have violated the court order.

The trial court concluded that respondent violated the January 31, 2002, court order byhaving direct contact with T.H.. Accordingly, the court entered an interim domestic violenceorder of protection and stated:

"And I certainly don't buy this idea that you were just going back to just check forrecords. After being told specifically that you were not going to get them, youwent back on two separate occasions."

The interim order of protection was entered on July 19, 2002, and remained in effect until August15, 2002.

Thereafter, on August 15, 2002, the trial court heard testimony on T.H.'s petition for aplenary domestic violence order of protection. Again, Christman, Boyland, and Hartzol alltestified to the same sequence of events of July 1, 2002, as they had testified in the previoushearing for the interim order of protection. Respondent's counsel argued that the protectiveorder was not necessary because "[respondent] now understands how the process works and howshe is to get records if she needs records." In response, the public guardian argued that theplenary order was essential because any future violation of the orders previously entered couldonly be resolved by returning to court, whereas the domestic violence order of protection allowsfor police intervention when necessary.

The trial court then noted the July 19, 2002, interim domestic violence order of protectionand the transcript from the July hearing. After the court considered that testimony, as well as thetestimony of the three witnesses, it entered the plenary domestic violence order of protection andordered that respondent was prohibited from committing physical abuse or harassment. Furthermore, the court ordered respondent to stay away from T.H. and prohibited her fromentering or remaining at HELP while T.H. was present. In addition, the court denied respondentaccess to T.H.'s records as well as any contact with T.H.'s transportation company. In the end,the court concluded that, based on all the evidence before it, the order of protection was in T.H.'sbest interest.

On September 5, 2002, respondent filed a notice of appeal regarding the August 15, 2002,plenary order of protection only, contending that the trial court abused its discretion in enteringthe order because the record contained no evidence of abuse or harassment and because the courtentered the order without making specific findings. The State initially responds that this court iswithout jurisdiction to hear this appeal. In respondent's appellate brief, she states that we havejurisdiction to consider her appeal on five separate grounds: (1) article VI, section 6 of the IllinoisConstitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI,