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SECOND DIVISION
October 19, 2004

This case illustrates the doctrine of unintendedconsequences. It arises out of In re Stella (Stella I), 339 Ill.App. 3d 610, 791 N.E.2d 187 (2003), where we were asked to decidewhether section 17 of the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984(Parentage Act), 750 ILCS 45/17 (West 2002), allows a trial judgeto order an attorney to pay to an opposing attorney retainers orinterim payments received from a client--a procedure commonlyreferred to as "disgorgement," a device for leveling the playingfield. We held it does not.

The trial court in this case, relying entirely on Stella I,held the Parentage Act does not provide for interim attorney'sfees. We intended no such result and today we clear the air byaddressing two questions certified for interlocutory appealpursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 308(a):

"Question 1: Can interim attorney's fees be awardedunder section 17 of the [Parentage Act]?

Question 2: If the answer to Question 1 is "Yes," canthose interim attorney's fees be awarded using themethods, factors, and procedures, set forth in section501(c-1)(1), (2), and (3) of the [Marriage Act] withoutconsidering disgorgement?"

We answer the certified questions "yes" and "yes."

BACKGROUND

Stella I began when Patrick Stella filed a petition underthe Parentage Act to establish a parent-child relationship withhis daughter, Alexis. During the proceedings, respondent PearlGarcia filed a petition seeking attorney's fees and costs underSection 17 of the Parentage Act and subsections 508 and 501(c-1)of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act(Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/508, 501(c-1) (West 2002)). The trialcourt ordered Stella's attorney to pay Garcia's attorney $20,000,that sum representing a portion of the fees Stella had paid hisattorney. That is, disgorgement was ordered.

Stella's lawyer refused to pay, contending the disgorgementprovision in section 501(c-1)(3) did not apply to parentageproceedings. The trial court entered a finding of contempt andordered the attorney to pay a dollar a day for as long as he didnot comply with the order. The attorney appealed. We held thetrial court did not have the authority to order the attorney todisgorge money he had received from his client and then pay it toGarcia's attorney. Thus, Stella I.

This case comes to us because the trial court read Stella Ias requiring denial of Garcia's petition for interim attorney'sfees. The certified questions were framed and we granted anapplication for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois SupremeCourt Rule 308(a). 155 Ill. 2d R. 308(a). Appellant raisesseveral constitutional issues, but we believe this is a matterthat can be resolved by applying rules of statutory construction. See City of Chicago v. Powell, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 1140, 735N.E.2d 119 (2000) (a reviewing court should not reachconstitutional issues if the case can be determined on othergrounds).

DECISION

We review issues of statutory construction de novo. In reMarriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309, 753 N.E.2d 1032(2001). In construing a statute, our goal is to effectuate thelegislature's intent. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42, 733N.E.2d 1235 (2000). We look first to the language of thestatute, the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493,504, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). We cannot read words into a statutethat are not there. Chicago Tribune Co. v. Board of Education ofthe City of Chicago, 332 Ill. App. 3d 60, 67, 773 N.E.2d 674(2002). "Nor, under the guise of statutory interpretation, canwe 'correct' an apparent legislative oversight by rewriting astatute in a manner inconsistent with its clear and unambiguouslanguage." Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d at 42.

Actions brought under the Parentage Act are entirelystatutory in origin, and the court has no inherent power inparentage cases. Stella I, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 614. See In reParentage of Melton, 314 Ill. App. 3d 476, 478-79, 732 N.E.2d 11(2000) (trial court had no authority in a parentage action toissue an injunction preventing the custodial parent from removingthe child from the state under the Marriage Act).

To answer the certified questions in this case we travel atortuous path, from the Parentage Act to one, and then another,provision of the Marriage Act.

First, section 17 of the Parentage Act:

"Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the court mayorder reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and other costsof the action, pre-trial proceedings, post-judgmentproceedings to enforce or modify the judgment, and theappeal or the defense of an appeal of the judgment, to bepaid by the parties in accordance with the relevant factorsspecified in Section 508 of the [Marriage Act], as amended." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/17 (West 2002).

Section 17 has not been amended since 1990. But theMarriage Act was. On June 1, 1997, legislative action created "anew regime governing the award of attorney's fees." In reMarriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 310; Pub. Act 89-712, eff.June 1, 1997.

Section 508 of the Marriage Act now states, in part:

"(a) The court from time to time, after due notice andhearing, and after considering the financial resources ofthe parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable amountfor his own or the other party's costs and attorney's fees. Interim attorney's fees and costs may be awarded from theopposing party, in accordance with subsection (c-1) ofSection 501 [750 ILCS 5/501]." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS5/508(a) (West 2002).

Section 17 of the Parentage Act does not use the words"interim fees," but it does refer to payment of attorney's feesfor every stage of the proceedings, and then it aims directly atsection 508 of the Marriage Act for the specified "relevantfactors" that guide payment of the attorney's fees "by theparties." Here, we run into a hitch. Section 508 does notcontain any specified relevant factors. Instead, it points tosubsection 501(c-1) for the way "interim fees and costs may beawarded from the opposing party." 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 2002). Section 508 does not direct the reader to any particular part ofsubsection (c-1).

Subsection 501(c-1) first defines an "interim award" as "anaward of interim attorney's fees and costs." 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(West 2002). Then, in subsection (c-1)(1), it sets out aprocedure for filing a petition for interim fees, setting forthnine factors for courts to consider when making an award.

Subsection (c-1)(2) provides that an interim award shall bewithout prejudice as to any final allocation or claim of right ofparty or counsel and provides for the remittance of anoverpayment back to the appropriate party.

Subsection (c-1)(3) is the provision that seeks to level theplaying field. It provides an interim award shall be "in anamount necessary to enable the petitioning party to participateadequately in the litigation" after determining one party'sability to pay and the other party's inability to pay reasonableamounts. This is where we find the disgorgement provision: ifthe court finds both parties lack financial ability to payreasonable attorney's fees, the court "shall enter an order thatallocates available funds for each party's counsel, includingretainers or interim payments, or both, previously paid, in amanner that achieves substantial parity between the parties." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/501(c-1)(3) (West 2002).

This new interim fee system was an attempt to address theproblem of the "economically disadvantaged spouse," where onespouse uses his or her greater control of assets or income as alitigation tool, making it difficult for the disadvantaged spouseto participate adequately in the litigation. See A GeneralExplanation of the "Leveling of the Playing Field" in DivorceLitigation Amendments, 11-SEP CBA Rec. 32 (1997). Provisions forinterim awards were intentionally shifted from section 508 tosection 501, which provides interim fee hearings may be non-evidentiary, the court hearing arguments of counsel but otherwiseruling on the pleadings and affidavits. See "Leveling thePlaying Field" in Divorce: Questions and Answers About the NewLaw, 85 Ill. B.J. 410, 411 (1997).

Neither of the articles written by the bar associationcommittees that promoted the 1997 amendments suggests that thelevel playing field provisions in subsection (c-1)(3) wereintended to apply to parentage actions.

We turn now to the precise words of the statutes. Webelieve their language is clear, so we give effect to theirordinary and plain meaning, without resorting to other aids ofconstruction. See In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d at310. Our primary goal is to give effect to the intent of thelegislature. People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 192, 784 N.E.2d825 (2003).

Section 17 of the Parentage Act allows a court to order"reasonable fees of counsel, experts, and attorney's fees andother costs of the action, pre-trial proceedings, post-judgmentproceedings to enforce or modify the judgment, and the appeal orthe defense of an appeal of the judgment, to be paid by theparties in accordance with the relevant factors specified inSection 508 of the [Marriage Act]." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS45/17 (West 2002).

Section 508 of the Marriage Act, even before the 1997amendments, referred to fees ordered "from time to time" during acase. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1996). It is clear that the pre-amendment section 508 allowed temporary fees. See In re Marriageof Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 310; A General Explanation of the"Leveling of the Playing Field" in Divorce Litigation Amendments,11-SEP CBA Rec. 32, 32 (1997) ("one of the most serious flaws ofprior law concerned 'old