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SECOND DIVISION
SEPTEMBER 21, 2004
(Nunc pro tunc August 03, 2004)

On January 9, 2002, the State filed a supplemental petitionfor appointment of a guardian with right to consent to adoptionalleging that respondent mother, Laura V., was unfit for (1)failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility as to her child's welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)(West 2000)), and (2) failure to make reasonable efforts andprogress toward the return home of her son, R.L. (750 ILCS50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2000)).

A termination proceeding, which is the subject of theinstant appeal, began in February 2003. In April 2003, the trialcourt found respondent mother unfit under section 1(D)(m) of theAdoption Act (750 ILCS 50/0.01 et seq. (West 2000)). The trialcourt then terminated respondent mother's parental rights.

Respondent mother appeals contending: (1) the trial courterred in not specifying the nine-month period in which she failedto make reasonable progress; (2) the trial court's finding offailure to make reasonable progress conflicts with the evidencein the record; (3) her fundamental rights were violated when thetrial court disallowed R.L. to return home before the fitnesshearing; and (4) the trial court erred in finding it was inR.L.'s best interest to terminate her parental rights. Weaffirm.

BACKGROUND

Respondent mother is the biological mother of R.L., born May16, 1998. The trial court terminated respondent mother'sparental rights to R.L. on April 16, 2003. Benjamin Ambriz isR.L.'s biological father and signed a general surrender of hisparental rights on March 16, 2000. Ambriz is not a party to thisappeal.

Although R.L. is the only child who is the subject of thispresent case, respondent mother is also the biological mother ofSharicoll, born in December 1994; Cynthia, born in November 1995;and Joey, born in December 2001. The evidence also revealed thatrespondent mother gave birth to another child shortly before thehearing terminating her parental rights to R.L.

Sharicoll⁽²⁾, Cynthia, and R.L. came into the protectivecustody of the Illinois Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS) in October 1998, when Cynthia was found to have ablack eye and several bruises on her body. On October 9, 1998,the trial took protective custody of the three children. Subsequently, the State filed a petition for adjudication ofwardship for R.L. alleging he was abused and neglected due to hissibling's marks and bruises, his parents' history of domesticviolence, and his mother's history of mental illness.

On January 14, 1999, respondent mother stipulated to thefollowing facts: (1) she had a history of mental illness and ahistory of domestic violence in her relation with Ricardo L., herparamour and the natural father to some of her other children;(2) Cynthia was observed with a black eye on October 3, 1998,while in the care and custody of Ricardo L.; (3) an October 7,1998, physical examination of Cynthia revealed she had bruises onher thighs and buttocks for which the respondent mother wasunable to give an adequate explanation; (4) Cynthia had severalbruises on her body consistent with physical abuse inflicted byrespondent mother; (5) Sharicoll had several linear bruises onher thighs and buttocks consistent with physical abuse inflictedby respondent mother; and (6) on October 6, 1998, an anonymousfemale called the Chicago police department from respondentmother's home stating that she would kill herself and herchildren if DCFS removed them. Subsequently, the trial courtadjudicated R.L. abused due to a substantial risk of physicalinjury and neglect due to an injurious environment. 705 ILCS405/2-3(1)(b), (2)(ii) (West 1998). However, the trial courtstayed the adjudication order pending service on R.L.'s father.

On March 16, 2000, the trial court made R.L. a ward of thecourt and found respondent mother unable to care for him. Thetrial court also entered an order giving full force and effect toits January 1999 adjudication order which found that Ambriz wasR.L.'s biological father, and noted that Ambriz had surrenderedhis parental rights to R.L.

On March 18, 2000, a permanency hearing was held for R.L.pursuant to Section 2-28 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705ILCS 405/2-28 (West 2000)) and a goal of "return home withintwelve months" was entered as respondent mother⁽³⁾ was makingsubstantial progress.

On January 30, 2001, another permanency hearing was held forR.L. The permanency goal entered was "substitute care pendingcourt determination on termination of parental rights." A noteattached to the permanency order stated, "Natural father signedgeneral surrender on [March 16, 2000]. Minor is in an adoptivehome since five months old. Mother's progress is equivocal."

On January 9, 2002, the State filed a supplemental petitionfor appointment of a guardian with right to consent to adoption. The petition alleged respondent mother was unfit for failure tomaintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility as to R.L.'s welfare. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West2000). The petition also alleged respondent mother had failed tomake reasonable effort and progress within nine months afteradjudication or within any nine-month period after adjudication. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2000).

On March 14, 2002, a permanency order regarding R.L.'swelfare was entered. A permanency goal of "substitute carepending [a court] [determination] on TPR [termination of parentalrights]" was entered. The trial court also noted that the goalof "return home" had been previously ruled out. It was alsonoted that R.L.'s father had surrendered his parental rights.

Termination Proceeding
Fitness Hearing

On February 24, 2003, the trial court began respondentmother's termination proceeding and took judicial notice thatR.L.'s father had executed, on March 16, 2000, a generalsurrender of his parental rights. The trial court also tookjudicial notice of: (1) the January 14, 1999, order adjudicatingR.L. abused and neglected; (2) the March 16, 2000, dispositionalorder making R.L. a ward of the court and finding the respondentmother unable to care for R.L.; and (3) the March 16, 2000, orderstating that the January 15, 1999, adjudication order had fullforce and effect.

Additionally, the trial court entered into evidence, withoutobjection from the parties, several exhibits presented by theState relevant to the issue of fitness. Exhibit 1, a clientservice plan dated April 22, 1999, contained respondent mother'srated service tasks for January to April 1999. Respondent motherwas rated satisfactory for her completion of parenting classesand a drug and alcohol evaluation; however, she was deemedunsatisfactory in addressing domestic violence issues and takingpersonal responsibility for DCFS involvement in her life. Respondent mother attended therapy but denied any abusivebehavior toward her children. Respondent mother's overallprogress toward her goal of "return home within 12 months" was"satisfactory."

The State's exhibit 2 was a client service plan datedOctober 14, 1999, and containing respondent mother's rated tasksheets from April to October 1999. Respondent mother's tasks forcounseling and domestic violence were rated "satisfactory," andher overall progress was rated "satisfactory."

The State's exhibit 3 was a client service plan dated April1, 2000. The document contained rated task sheets for October1999 to April 2000. Respondent mother received a "satisfactory"rating for her individual therapy tasks; however, it was notedthat "her progress is much slower." Also, the plan noted thatrespondent mother was "still having trouble with her parentingtechniques" and, specifically, "having trouble with discipliningthe children."

The State's exhibit 4 was a client service plan datedOctober 1, 2000, and covering April to October 2000. Respondentmother's task sheet for individual counseling is ratedunsatisfactory due to her "unhealthy and unstable" relationshipwith her paramour. Her task sheet for attending domesticviolence counseling was also rated "unsatisfactory" due to thefact that she "continues to surround herself with violent men." The plan's selected goal was "substitute care pending a courtdetermination on TPR [termination of parental rights]."

The State's exhibit 5 was the client service plan datedApril 2001 and covering October 2000 to April 2001. The planstated that although respondent mother was attending therapy, herprogress was minimal; the plan rated her progress in counselingas "unsatisfactory." Although respondent mother's visits withR.L. were satisfactory, the selected goal for R.L. was substitutecare pending termination of parental rights.

The State's exhibit 6 was a client service plan datedOctober 2001 and covering April to October 2001. Respondentmother's task sheet rated her attending counseling and addressingissues related to DCFS as unsatisfactory. The plan detailed thatrespondent mother's previous therapy had been discontinued as hertherapist was of the opinion that a "return home" goal for R.L.was not possible. The plan also stated that although respondentmother claimed she was attending counseling at a church and hadcompleted 22 sessions, she was unable to provide verification.

The State's exhibit 7 was a client service plan dated April2002, which stated that the goal for R.L. was substitute carepending court determination of termination of parental rights. The plan noted that respondent mother "had failed to makeprogress toward the return home of [R.L.]" However, overall theplan rated respondent mother's progress in counseling fromOctober 2001 to April 2002 as "satisfactory."

Following the presentation of the foregoing exhibits, thetrial court heard testimony. Dr. Sylvia Mojica-Castillo, atherapist with Mary and Tom Leo and Associates, testified shebegan working with respondent mother in 1999. At first, Dr.Castillo saw respondent mother weekly, sometimes individually andsometimes with her paramour or children. Dr. Castillodiscontinued therapy with respondent mother in May 2001, becauseshe wanted to work toward reunification and Dr. Castillo couldnot recommend that.

During her first sessions with respondent mother, Dr.Castillo explained to respondent mother that the reason fortherapy was to correct the physical abuse suffered by Cynthia. Dr. Castillo stressed respondent mother's actions had to becorrected so that Cynthia, as well as respondent mother's otherchildren, would not be at risk once they were returned home.

During the first year of therapy, Dr. Castillo did notrecommend unsupervised visits between respondent mother and R.L.because she had concerns regarding R.L.'s safety based onrespondent mother's interactions with male figures in her life. Dr. Castillo focused on teaching respondent mother how herpersonal life influenced her ability to keep her children safe. Respondent mother took responsibility for physically abusingCynthia. However, Dr. Castillo testified that respondentmother's main problem throughout therapy was a "growingmisunderstanding from [respondent mother's] point of view of[R.L.'s] need to separate and become his own individual and tryto set his own agenda and that it was [not] anything personalagainst her that he did [not] love her, it was that children growup and they try to learn about the world and be their ownperson."

On cross-examination by the public guardian, Dr. Castillotestified that some of the milestones she was looking for inrespondent mother's therapy related to (1) setting limits for herchildren without resort to physical punishment, and (2)developing age-appropriate expectations for her children. Dr.Castillo observed that despite attending parenting classes, inseveral specific instances respondent mother failed to set age-appropriate limits for her children. Moreover, Dr. Castillotestified that respondent mother's relationships with men posed arisk to her children because if she was with a partner who wasmeeting her emotional needs, she would be unable to put aside herown needs and protect her children from her mate.

Dr. Castillo testified she terminated therapy withrespondent mother because of her "lack of progress." Whentherapy was terminated in May 2001, respondent mother still hadnot made progress in protecting R.L. from a harmful environment.For example, respondent mother would engage in relationships withmen without considering whether the relationships would put R.L.at risk. Dr. Castillo stated:

"[A]s much as [respondent mother] tried andas much as she loved her children, she wassuch a needy human being that her needs hadto come first. It doesn't mean that shecouldn't provide. *** But the emotionalneeds, her needs, had to come first. She hadjust not developed as a person enough to seethat the children's needs had to come first."

The public guardian also presented several exhibits. Thepublic guardian's exhibit 1 was a therapy progress report writtenby Dr. Castillo and dated April 18, 2000. Dr. Castillo's reportstates that respondent mother needed to continue addressing herindividual issues as she has no insight regarding how herbehavior and lifestyle impacted her ability to protect herchildren. However, Dr. Castillo's report also noted thatrespondent mother related well with R.L. and loved him.

The public guardian's exhibit 2 was a therapy progressreport written by Dr. Castillo and dated July 18, 2000. Thereport focused on respondent mother's couples' therapy with herparamour, Ricardo L. The report states that although the twowere in therapy, respondent mother was passive in herinteractions with her children and had difficultly assertingherself. As a result, her needs were unmet and she wouldsometimes become angry. The report warned that respondent motherand Ricardo L. might have difficulty changing their negativepattern of interactions but if their interactions did not change,then R.L. should not be returned to respondent mother.

The public guardian's exhibit 4⁽⁴⁾ was a therapy progressreport written by Dr. Castillo and dated January 23, 2001. Thereport concerned respondent mother and Ricardo L.'s couples'counseling and stated, "despite attending all the servicesrequired of them, as a couple they have not made the changesnecessary to ensure that the children would not be at risk ifunder [respondent] mother's care." Respondent mother had madeadvances in employment and in fulfilling her medical needs.

The public guardian's exhibit 5 was a therapy progressreport written by Dr. Castillo and dated April 2001. Theprogress report stated that although respondent mother had madesome positive changes in her life, R.L.'s return home was notwarranted.

On cross-examination by respondent mother, Dr. Castillotestified that in the early stages of respondent mother'stherapy, the focus was on respondent mother's relationship withher paramour, Ricardo L. As therapy progressed, respondentmother was able to separate from Ricardo L. and gain someindependence. Dr. Castillo also testified that in a therapyreport dated July 1999, she stated that respondent mother wouldpossibly be able to parent R.L. in the future as she had learnedabout the importance of her children's needs. Moreover, thereport stated that if respondent mother were in a stable romanticrelationship, it might add to her parenting abilities. Dr.Castillo also testified that in April 2000, after observingvisits between respondent mother and R.L., she wrote thatrespondent mother's interactions with R.L. were not negativelyimpacted by any problems in her life. In July 2000, Dr. Castilloalso wrote that respondent mother had reached a point where shewas ready to listen and possibly learn how to set limits for herchildren. Regarding domestic violence, respondent mother hadindicated to Dr. Castillo that when a man was physicallyaggressive toward her, it was a sign of his virility. Dr.Castillo testified that she terminated therapy with respondentmother in May 2001, and was unaware if respondent mother had madechanges in her life since then.

On redirect examination, Dr. Castillo testified that duringthe course of therapy, respondent mother had engaged inrelationships involving domestic violence. Respondent mother'srelationships posed a risk to her children because if she couldnot protect herself, she could not protect her children. TheState then rested and the fitness hearing recommenced on April16, 2003.

Luz Trejo testified for respondent mother. Trejo had actedas the caseworker for respondent mother and R.L. since January2002. During that time, Trejo had not seen the respondent motheracting in an inappropriate manner towards R.L.

Respondent mother then introduced exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6,which were visitation records from: June 17, 1999; July 23, 1999;May 5, 2000; June 2, 2000; and August 9, 2001, respectively. These records contained narratives of visits between respondentmother and R.L. and showed no unusual incidents or negativeinteractions occurring during these visits. The trial court alsoadmitted into evidence respondent mother's exhibit 7, a clientservice plan dated October 21, 2002, documenting that respondentmother's progress toward return home of another child, Joey, wassatisfactory as she had completed services and was attendingtherapy.

Respondent mother then testified on her own behalf that shehad been in a romantic relationship with Alejandro Perez for twoyears and four months. Respondent mother testified herrelationship with Perez had no domestic violence. Respondentmother testified she had taken two or three different parentingprograms and did not feel she was dependant on Perez and could goon by herself if her relationship with him ended. Respondentmother testified she wanted R.L. returned to her. All partiesthen rested.

The trial court found: "It's not slavish adherence toservice plans, but totality of the evidence in this case thatmake it clear and convincing to this Court that mother did notmake satisfactory progress." The trial court also stated: "It isnot a question of whether or not ultimately mother madereasonable progress toward return home because that is not whatthe statute reads. The question is whether if [there was] anynine month period after adjudication where mother did not makeprogress." The trial court specifically stated that the motherwas rated "unsatisfactory" from April to October 2000, fromOctober 2000 to April 2001, and from April to October 2001. Thetrial court noted that respondent mother's progress in therapywas minimal and stated, "[t]here is a difference between effortand progress. And that is what the statute intended." The trialcourt then found respondent mother unfit under section 1(D)(m)for "failing to make reasonable progress." 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2000).

Best Interest Hearing

The trial court then proceeded to the best interest hearing. Trejo testified R.L. was currently five years old and had beenplaced in a traditional foster home since October 1998, when hewas five months old. There were no signs of abuse, neglect, orunusual incidents in the foster home and R.L.'s foster parentsensured that he received prescribed language services. R.L. wasalso attending kindergarten and his foster parents helped himwith school work. Trejo also testified that R.L. lived with his14-month-old biological brother in the foster home. Trejobelieved that terminating respondent mother's parental rightswould be in R.L.'s best interest because of the extended timeR.L. had been in the foster home and the bond he had with hisfoster parents. Trejo went on to describe specific interactionsbetween R.L. and his foster parents which indicated a familialbond.

On cross-examination by the public guardian, Trejo testifiedthat when R.L. visited with respondent mother, he acted as if hewere seeing a friend or family member and the visits wereappropriate. However, Trejo also testified that during visitsbetween R.L. and respondent mother, R.L. would often not listento respondent mother and could not be directed by her. Moreover,R.L. told Trejo that he did not want to live with respondentmother. Trejo testified that R.L.'s foster parents were willingto allow respondent mother to maintain contact with R.L. throughphone calls and visits, but R.L.'s foster parents wanted to adopthim.

On cross-examination by respondent mother, Trejo testifiedthat visiting records documented that R.L. had developed a bondwith respondent mother and would run to her and embrace herduring visits. Trejo also testified that R.L.'s foster parentswere going to move to Florida and R.L.'s biological brother wouldnot be going with them. Trejo testified that R.L.'s fosterparents planned to return to Chicago twice a year. Trejotestified respondent mother had always been loving andappropriate to R.L. and there were times when R.L. had adifficult time ending visits with her.

Respondent mother testified that she and R.L. have a bondand when he sees her he runs to her and hugs her. Respondentmother testified that R.L. would be better off with her.

The trial court then stated it was considering the statutorybest interest factors. The trial court also noted that it wasthe State's burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidencethat it was in the best interest of the minor, pursuant to thestatutory factors, to terminate parental rights. The trial courtwent on to distinguish the case sub judice from In re D.T., 338Ill. App. 3d 133, 788 N.E.2d 133 (2003), based on the facts thatin D.T., (1) there was testimony that it would be harmful toterminate the minor child's relationship with his mother, (2) theminor child wished to return home, and (3) there was a strongbond between the minor child and his mother. The court notedthat in this case:

"There is no such strong bond. And notherapist has come forward [n]or has anycaseworker come forward to testify that itwould be harmful to the minor for therelationship of parental rights to beterminated. Nor was there any testimony thatthe minor wanted to return home."

The trial court then found it was in R.L.'s best interest thatrespondent mother's parental rights be terminated. The trialcourt specifically found that R.L. felt loved by and was attached to his foster parents, who wanted to adopt him. The trial courtalso noted that R.L.'s bond with respondent mother was notstrong.

"The Court must look at what is in thebest interest of the minor and not what is inthe best interest of the mother. The onlytestimony provided besides the mother's wasthat when this child looks for anything helooks for the foster parent. It's his homewhere he receives comfort and nurturing. Andin fact he does not have a strong bond withthe mother. It's a preadoptive home. It's ahome that he has known since October 1998. His special needs are being addressed.

When it comes to the physical safety andwelfare of this child, it's the foster parentwho has been there and provided that. Whenit comes to his sense of attachment where hefeels loved, actually feels love, which arethe terms in the statute, where he has asense of being valued, secure and familiar. When we look at his wishes, as best he canexpress, there are many factors. And indeed,relationships with siblings and otherparental figures or relatives is a factor. And the Court considers that factor.

In weighing all the factors based on theevidence presented [in this] best interesthearing, this Court must find that it's inthe best interest of the minor that parentalrights be terminated."

The trial court then ordered that a guardian be appointed to R.L.to consent to his adoption.

ANALYSIS

I. Reasonable Progress

Respondent mother first contends that the trial court erredin not specifying the nine-month period in which she failed tomake reasonable progress toward the return home of R.L. TheState and public guardian argue that respondent mother waivedthis argument as she failed to object at trial. Additionally,the State and public guardian argue that the trial court didspecify the time periods on which it based its decision as itreferred specifically to the time periods respondent mother wasfound to be "unsatisfactory" in her service plans.

As a preliminary matter, we consider the argument raised bythe State and public guardian regarding waiver. The recordindicates that following the close of evidence during the fitnessportion of the termination proceeding, the trial court noted:

"It's not slavish adherence to serviceplans, but the totality of the evidence inthis case that make[s] it clear andconvincing to this court that mother did notmake satisfactory progress. When we look atthe service plans - and reasonable progresstoward the return home of the minor. It istrue that mother was rated unsatisfactory bythe caseworker in the date of evaluation forthe period from April of 2000 to October 31st2000, and the period of October 2000 to April2001, and from the period of April 2001 toOctober 2001.

* * *

Notwithstanding that, counselors havestated that natural mother has completeddomestic violence counseling at Uptown HullHouse and continues to surround herself withviolent men. Mother has attended therapy,however, progress has been minimal. There isa difference between effort and progress. And that is what the statute intended. ***[W]hen the Court considers the reports of thetherapist as well as her testimony, Ms.Monica Castillo states that in relevant partthat [respondent mother] continues strugglingto establish and maintain a stable lifestyle. It's highly improbable that she will make thenecessary changes to provide a home andpromote an environment for her child in thenext year."

As pointed out by the State and public guardian, respondentmother failed to object or to indicate that the trial court'sreference to unsatisfactory evaluation dates lacked specificity. We therefore agree with the State and public guardian thatrespondent mother waived review of this issue. "Questions notraised in the trial court cannot be argued for the first time onappeal." Parks v. Kownacki, 193 Ill. 2d 164, 180, 737 N.E.2d 287(2000); In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d 223, 238, 802 N.E.2d 800 (2003). However, the rule of waiver is a limitation on the partiesand not on this court. In re D.F., 208 Ill. 2d at 238, citingDillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05, 771 N.E.2d357 (2002). We therefore choose to address this issue on themerits.

Respondent mother argues the order terminating her parentalrights should be vacated and the matter remanded because thetrial court failed to precisely state which nine-month period itconsidered when ruling on whether or not she had made reasonableprogress toward the return home of R.L. To support herproposition, respondent mother cites In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d461, 740 N.E.2d 60 (2000), In re J.D., 314 Ill. App. 3d 1109, 734N.E.2d 93 (2000), and In re E.B., 313 Ill. App. 3d 672, 730N.E.2d 617 (2000).

In In re D.F., the Appellate Court, Fourth District, vacateda trial court's order finding that the trial court consideredconduct outside the statutorily prescribed time periods for eachground of parental unfitness. In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at466. In that case, the trial court was found to have erred inconsidering conduct that occurred before the adjudicatory hearingand before the trial court's order making DCFS the custodian ofthe child at issue. In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 465. Similarly, In re J.D. dealt with a record which included evidenceof events outside the statutory time frame for determining aparent's reasonable progress. In re J.D., 314 Ill. App. 3d at1110. The In re J.D. court found that, "[t]he record is unclearwhether the trial court examined events outside of the statutorytime frame in determining whether respondent parents madereasonable progress" and remanded with directions to review theevidence. In re J.D., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 1110. In In re E.B.,the appellate court found that the trial court had failed tospecify the time period during which it was assessing evidence ofa parent's reasonable efforts or progress. In re E.B., 313 Ill.App. 3d at 674. "A court can sever a natural parent's rights tohis or her child only through proceedings that strictly complywith the [Adoption] Act." In re D.F., 317 Ill. App. 3d at 463;In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 163, 711 N.E.2d 809 (1999). Section 1(D)(m) specifies:

"The grounds of unfitness are any one or more of the following:

Failure by a parent (i) to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditionsthat were the basis for the removal of thechild from the parent, or (ii) to makereasonable progress towards the return of thechild to the parent within [nine] monthsafter an adjudication of neglected or abusedminor ***, or (iii) to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child tothe parent during any [nine]-month periodafter the end of the initial [nine]-monthperiod following the adjudication ofneglected or abused minor ***." 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 2000).

In this case, we reject respondent mother's contention thatthe trial court failed to specify the nine-month period itconsidered when determining that she had failed to makereasonable progress toward R.L.'s return home. The trial courtclearly stated that it had considered all the evidence presented,including the fact that respondent mother's actions were rated"unsatisfactory" three times, from April to October 2000, October2000 to April 2001, and April to October 2001. Because the trialcourt did specify, inter alia, the dates it considered whendetermining respondent mother's unfitness, we find no error inits determination that respondent mother had not made reasonableprogress toward the return home of R.L.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Respondent mother also maintains that the evidence adducedat trial demonstrated that she had made reasonable progresstoward the return home of R.L. The State and public guardiancontend the trial court's finding was not against the manifestweight of the evidence as respondent mother failed to makeprogress in therapy and was unable to adequately protect R.L.from her relationships involving domestic violence.

"The Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides a bifurcatedprocedure to determine whether a parent's rights should beterminated." In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 390, 757 N.E.2d613 (2001), citing 705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998). The trialcourt must first hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whethera parent is unfit. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d at 390. Upon afinding of unfitness, it must then determine whether thetermination of a parent's rights is in the best interest of theminor. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d at 390. "The trial court'sfinding of unfitness is accorded great deference and will not beoverturned unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence and the record clearly demonstrates the opposite resultis the only proper one." In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d at 390,citing In re Latifah P., 315 Ill. App. 3d 1122, 1128, 735 N.E.2d1004 (2000).

Under the Adoption Act, a parent is considered unfit if shefails to make either (1) a reasonable effort to correct theconditions that led to the child's removal, or (2) reasonableprogress toward the child's return home within nine months of theadjudication of neglect. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000). "Although the two bases coexist within the same subparagraph ofthe Adoption Act, they are distinct, each requiring separateanalysis." In re J.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d 553, 564, 736 N.E.2d 678(2000). Only one ground of unfitness needs to be proved by clearand convincing evidence in order to find a parent unfit. In reJ.A., 316 Ill. App. 3d at 564. "Reasonable effort" is asubjective standard and is associated with the goal of correctingthe conditions which caused the child's removal. In re J.A., 316Ill. App. 3d at 565. The focus is on the amount of effortreasonable for the particular parent involved. In re M.A., 325Ill. App. 3d at 391. Conversely, "'reasonable progress' is anobjective standard that relates to making progress toward thegoal of returning the child to the parent." In re M.A., 325 Ill.App. 3d at 391. Failure to make either reasonable efforts orreasonable progress can be grounds for an adjudication ofunfitness. In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d at 391, citing In reC.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 210-211, 752 N.E.2d 1030 (2001).

In this case, the trial court found respondent mother hadnot made "reasonable progress" toward the goal of returning R.L. In determining unfitness, the trial court may only considerevidence of the parent's conduct in any nine-month periodfollowing the adjudication of neglect, abuse, or dependency. 750ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000). The trial court's adjudicationorder went into effect in March 2000, based upon a finding R.Lwas abused and at a substantial risk for physical injury andneglect due to an injurious environment. Therefore, respondentmother's progress had to be assessed and measured in nine-monthperiods following that adjudication.

In finding respondent mother unfit, the trial court statedthat it specifically considered the fact respondent mother'sactions were rated unsatisfactory from April to October 2000,October 2000 to April 2001, and April to October 2001. Duringthose time periods, the State's exhibits 4, 5, and 6 demonstrate, although respondent mother was attending parenting classes,domestic violence counseling, and personal counseling, she wasunable to implement the skills taught. For example, respondentmother continued to surround herself with violent men, continuedan unhealthy and unstable relationship with her paramour RicardoL., and was unable to address issues regarding how she initiallybecame involved with DCFS. Also, despite attending parentingclasses respondent mother had difficulty setting boundaries thatdid not involve physical punishment. Moreover, Dr. Castillotestified respondent mother engaged in relationships withoutconsidering the effect they could have on R.L. Althoughrespondent mother's brief emphasizes language on specificprogress reports that characterizes her interactions with R.L. asfavorable, the evidence, when taken as a whole, supports thetrial court's finding.

We agree with the trial court that "there is a differencebetween effort and progress." Although respondent mother made aneffort to learn good parenting techniques, her ability toimplement the information she garnered proved unsuccessful. Forall the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the trialcourt's decision finding respondent mother unfit was not againstthe manifest weight of the evidence.

III. Permanency Goal

Respondent mother contends her fundamental right to a parentand child relationship was denied where the trial courtdisallowed R.L. to return home before a hearing was heldterminating her parental rights. Specifically, respondent motheralleges the termination proceeding was improperly predeterminedwhen, on March 14, 2002, the trial court entered a permanencygoal of termination of parental rights. The State and publicguardian argue that the trial court's entry of a "termination ofparental rights" permanency goal before the terminationproceeding did not violate respondent's mother's due processrights, as permanency hearings are mandated by statute to occurevery six months and have no impact on subsequent terminationpetitions.

Pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1et seq. (West 2000)), permanency goals are to be set every sixmonths in order to determine the future status of the child. 705ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2000). The trial court is directed to seta permanency goal that is in the best interest of the child,review the child's placement status, and set a placement goal forthe child. 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2000); see In re CurtisB., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 55, 784 N.E.2d 219 (2002). Permanencyhearings do not concern themselves with the issue of parentalunfitness as permanency hearings (1) contain no burden orstandard of proof, (2) are designed to hear probative evidence,and (3) result in non final orders. In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2dat 58. Conversely, fitness hearings require clear and convincingevidence and any orders are final in nature. See In re J.N., 91Ill. 2d 122, 127, 435 N.E.2d 473 (1982) (final orders set or fixthe rights of the parties).

In setting a permanency goal on March 14, 2002, the trialcourt noted that the permanency goal of "return home" had beenpreviously ruled out. However, in its setting of a permanencygoal in March 2000, the trial court did not enter a findingregarding respondent mother's unfitness or the actual return homeof R.L. Respondent mother's fitness hearing was a separatehearing, held in February and April 2003. At the February andApril 2003 fitness hearings, the State successfully demonstrated,by clear and convincing evidence and relevant testimony, thatrespondent mother had failed, under section 1(D)(m), to makereasonable progress toward the return home of R.L. Therefore,respondent mother suffered no due process violation.

IV. Best Interest

Finally, respondent mother contends the trial court erred infinding that it was in R.L.'s best interest to terminate herparental rights as she loves R.L. and had made reasonable effortsto facilitate his return.

Cases involving the adjudication of abuse, neglect, andwardship are sui generis and each case must be decided on its ownmerits. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 422, 1112 N.E.2d 2001(2001) ("[E]ach case is sui generis and must be decided on theparticular facts and circumstances presented"). The State mustprove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in thechild's best interest that the parental rights be terminated. Inre D.T., 338 Ill. App. 3d 133, 154, 788 N.E.2d 2d 133 (2003). "In making this determination, the court is required to considerthe following factors: the child's physical safety and welfare;the development of the child's identity; the child's familial,cultural, and religious background; the child's sense ofattachment, including love, security, familiarity, *** continuityof relationships with parent figures and other relatives; theuniqueness of every family and child; the risks related tosubstitute care; and the preferences of the person available tocare for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2000)." In reDominique W., 347 Ill. App. 3d 557, 568-69, 808 N.E.2d 21 (2004).Accordingly, the trial court's decision finding termination is inthe best interest of the child will not be disturbed on appealunless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Inre M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1115-16, 762 N.E.2d 701 (2002).

The evidence at the hearing on R.L.'s best interest revealedthat R.L. was happy in a stable and safe foster home and hadbonded with his foster family. The record also demonstrates thatR.L.'s foster family wished to adopt him. R.L. had been livingwith his foster family since he was five months old. R.L.'sfoster family ensured that he received language services andhelped him with school work. Although the trial court believedrespondent mother loved R.L., the trial court found R.L.'s bondwith his mother was not strong. Moreover, the trial court notedthat it was through R.L.'s foster parents that he receivedcomfort, nurturing, security, and love. Therefore, based on theevidence presented we cannot say that the trial court's findingthat R.L.'s best interest was served by terminating respondentmother's parental rights was against the manifest weight of theevidence. In re M.F., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 1115-16.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the trial court's orders terminating respondentmother's parental rights and authorizing the appointment of aguardian to consent to R.L.'s adoption are affirmed.

Affirmed.

CAHILL and BURKE, JJ., concur.

1. This decision was originally filed as an unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23. Upon the motions of the State'sAttorney of Cook County and the Cook County public guardian, wedecided to publish this decision with only minor changes to thebody of the text.

2. Although there are various spellings for "Sharicoll" in therecord, we will adhere to the noted spelling.

3. The trial court's March 18, 2000 permanency order impactsthe interest of R.L. as well as Sharicoll and Cynthia. Thepermanency order notes that the children's mother and father"[have] made substantial progress towards the return home of thisminor." Because R.L.'s biological father had surrendered hisparental rights two days prior to the permanency order and R.L.'sbiological father was a different man than the biological fatherof Sharicoll and Cynthia, we assume the reference to "father" and"the parents" regards Cynthia and Sharicoll's biological father.

4. The public guardian's exhibit 3 is not included as part ofthe common law record.