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FIRST DIVISION
October 29, 2001

Plaintiff, Alexis Mitchell, individually and on behalf ofher minor children, M.J. and N.J., filed a complaint againstdefendant, Raymond Banary. In her complaint, plaintiff sought toestablish paternity and to impose support obligations for thebenefit of twin boys that she conceived through artificialinsemination. Defendant was not the semen donor. The complaintsought recovery on the basis of breach of an oral contract andpromissory estoppel. The complaint further alleged thatdefendant had support obligations pursuant to the IllinoisParentage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 40/1 et seq. (West 1998)).

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that plaintifffailed to set forth a legally recognized basis for relief underthe Act. The motion to dismiss further alleged that thepurported oral agreement was unenforceable under the Frauds Act(740 ILCS 80/1 (West 1998)) and contravened Illinois publicpolicy. The trial court granted defendant's motion andplaintiff's complaint was dismissed in its entirety.

On appeal, plaintiff argues that: (1) the trial court erredin finding that plaintiff did not properly plead a cause ofaction for promissory estoppel or breach of an oral agreement;(2) the trial court erred in finding that it lacked subjectmatter jurisdiction; and (3) the Act unconstitutionallydiscriminates between children born through artificialinsemination to married persons and children born throughartificial insemination to unmarried persons.

BACKGROUND

According to plaintiff's complaint, plaintiff is a single,40-year-old African-American woman. Defendant is a Caucasianmale who was 57 years old at the time of the filing of thecomplaint. Plaintiff and defendant first met in 1986 and beganan intimate relationship that lasted until 1996. When they met,defendant introduced himself as "Jim Richardson" and indicatedthat he was divorced. However, in 1996 plaintiff discovered thatdefendant was not named Jim Richardson and that he was married.

During their relationship, the parties discussed marriage. Defendant told plaintiff that he would have to wait untilretirement for marriage because the community where he residedwould not accept a black woman. Upon retirement, defendantpromised plaintiff that they could move to another community andbe married.

The parties also discussed plaintiff's desire to havechildren with defendant. Despite sexual relations, plaintiff didnot become pregnant and it became apparent that defendant was notcapable of fathering children. In 1991, defendant allegedlysuggested to plaintiff that she become artificially inseminated. Defendant provided financial assistance for the inseminationprocedure; accompanied plaintiff to the doctor's office forexaminations; assisted plaintiff by injecting her with medicationdesigned to enhance her fertility; and decided with plaintiffthat the sperm be from a Caucasian donor so that the offspringwould appear to be a product of their relationship. Plaintifffurther alleges that defendant orally promised to support thechild when it was born; however, no writing memorializes thisrepresentation.

Plaintiff became pregnant and gave birth to twin boys in1993. After the birth, defendant allegedly acknowledged thechildren as his own. He also provided support for them in theform of monthly payments of cash and the purchase of food,clothing, furniture, toys and play equipment. In her complaint,plaintiff further describes vacations with defendant and thatdefendant also paid for the children's medical and travelexpenses.

After plaintiff discovered defendant's marital status, sheand defendant terminated their relationship. Since 1996,defendant has stopped providing financial support for thechildren.

Plaintiff filed her three-count complaint on May 11, 1999. The first two counts sought to establish an obligation of supporton the basis of breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel. The third count requested a declaration of paternity andobligation of support pursuant to the Act.

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 ofthe Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 1998)). Defendant argued that count III should be dismissed pursuant tosection 2-615 (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)), where plaintifffailed to set forth a legally recognized basis for the impositionof a father-child relationship or for child support under theAct. Defendant further argued that counts I and II should bedismissed under section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998))because plaintiff's common law claims were unenforceable underthe provisions of the Frauds Act and contravened Illinois publicpolicy.

On December 21, 1999, the trial court held a hearing on thismatter. On January 14, 2000, the trial court issued a writtenorder granting the defendant's motion and dismissed the case inits entirety.

Plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

ANALYSIS

I. CONTRACT CLAIMS

As an initial matter, we note that defendant brought hismotion to dismiss under section 2-619.1 of the Code of CivilProcedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 1998)). Section2-619.1 allows a litigant to combine a section 2-615 motion todismiss (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 1998)) and a section 2-619 motionfor involuntary dismissal (735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 1998)) into onepleading. Storm & Associates, Ltd. v. Cuculich, 298 Ill. App. 3d1040, 1047, 700 N.E.2d 202 (1998).

A section 2-615 motion poses the question of whether thecomplaint states a cause of action upon which relief can begranted. Storm, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, citing Burdinie v.Village of Glendale Heights, 139 Ill. 2d 501, 505, 565 N.E.2d 654(1990). A section 2-619 motion, on the other hand, raisescertain defects or defenses and questions whether defendant isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. Storm, 298 Ill. App. 3dat 1047, citing Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469,494, 639 N.E.2d 1282 (1994). Since the resolution of eithermotion only involves a question of law, the standard of review isde novo. Storm, 298 Ill. App. 3d at 1047. On a motion todismiss, this court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true. Steinberg v. Chicago Medical School, 69 Ill. 2d 320, 329, 371N.E.2d 634 (1977).

In the instant case, defendant sought dismissal of count IIIbased upon section 2-615. In support of his motion to dismisscounts I and II, defendant relied upon section 2-619 and alsoincorporated some of his 2-615 arguments from count III.

Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in finding thatshe did not properly plead a cause of action for breach of anoral agreement or promissory estoppel. In response, defendantcontends that plaintiff's common law theories for child supportfail in light of the Illinois Parentage Act (750 ILCS 40/1 etseq. (West 1998)).

The Act governs the treatment of a child born as a result ofheterologous artificial insemination. Specifically, section 3(a)sets forth the conditions under which the husband of a wifeartificially inseminated would be treated as the natural father. Section 3 states in pertinent part:

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