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SECOND DIVISION
July 11, 2000

JUSTICE McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

The Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS45/1 et seq. (West 1996)) expressly refers to the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS5/101 et seq. (West 1996)). We must decide whether by suchreference the Parentage Act conferred on the court all the powersconferred by the Marriage Act. We hold that it did not. Inparticular, in proceedings under the Parentage Act the courtlacks the power to enjoin a party from removing the child fromthe state.

Lynn Hall gave birth to a son, Bremen Melton, on May 13,1997. On April 22, 1998, she filed a petition to establishparentage, naming Brace Melton as Bremen's father. She soughtpermanent custody and child support. The trial court entered anagreed order on April 12, 1999, temporarily awarding Hall childsupport and custody, and granting Brace supervised visitations atthe home of Hall's father, in Oak Park, Illinois, every Tuesdayand Thursday. Although the court titled it a temporary order, itdoes not provide for the termination of any of its provisions.

Hall then petitioned for leave to remove Bremen fromIllinois to reside with her in Vermont. On April 27, 1999, thecourt entered an order enjoining her from removing the child fromIllinois, and changing the visitation to Mondays and Wednesdays. Hall moved to vacate the injunction, arguing that the courtlacked authority to enter it. After a hearing at which theparties presented some evidence, the court denied the motion tovacate and continued the matter for mediation. The courtexpressly held that section 501.1 of the Marriage Act (750 ILCS5/501.1 (West 1996)) applied to the parentage proceedings andauthorized the injunction. Hall appeals.

Because the trial court refused to dissolve an injunction,we have jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 307(a)(1). 166 Ill. 2d R. 307(a)(1).

Section 14 of the Parentage Act provides that in parentageproceedings:

"The judgment shall contain or explicitly reserveprovisions concerning any duty and amount of childsupport and may contain provisions concerning thecustody and guardianship of the child, visitationprivileges with the child, the furnishing of bond orother security for the payment of the judgment, whichthe court shall determine in accordance with therelevant factors set forth in the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act and any other applicablelaw of Illinois, to guide the court in a finding in thebest interests of the child. In determining custody,joint custody, or visitation, the court shall apply therelevant standards of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act. Specifically, indetermining the amount of any child support award, thecourt shall use the guidelines and standards set forthin *** the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act ***." 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(1) (West 1996).

The court may use its contempt powers to punish any failure tocomply with its orders just as the court could in proceedingsunder the Marriage Act. 750 ILCS 45/15(b) (West 1996). Andaccording to section 16:

"The court has continuing jurisdiction to modifyan order for support, custody or visitation included ina judgment entered under this Act. Any custody orvisitation judgment modification shall be in accordancewith the relevant factors specified in the *** MarriageAct." 750 ILCS 45/16 (West 1996).

The Parentage Act does not incorporate the entire MarriageAct. In re Parentage of R.M.F., 275 Ill. App. 3d 43, 50, 655N.E.2d 1137 (1995). Section 14 expressly adopts "the relevantfactors set forth in the *** Marriage Act" (750 ILCS 45/14(a)(1)West 1996)) for judgments, especially "the guidelines andstandards" set forth in the Marriage Act for determining childsupport. The Parentage Act also expressly directs the courthearing a petition regarding parentage to "apply the relevantstandards" of the Marriage Act for determining custody, jointcustody, and visitation. Section 16 of the Parentage Actexpressly adopts "the relevant factors" of the Marriage Act formodifying any order for support, custody or visitation.

While the Parentage Act adopts some of the factors,guidelines and standards stated in the Marriage Act, theParentage Act does not incorporate the procedures of the MarriageAct and it does not broadly confer on the court the same powersconferred on the court in actions under the Marriage Act. Section 15(b) of the Parentage Act incorporates the contemptpowers provided by the Marriage Act, but otherwise the ParentageAct confers all applicable powers directly on the court, withoutreference to the Marriage Act. In particular, the Parentage Actnowhere confers on the court the power to enjoin parents fromremoving the child from the state, or any of the other powersconferred by section 501 or 501.1 of the Marriage Act.

Like divorce under the Marriage Act, proceedings under theParentage Act are "entirely statutory in origin and *** thecourt's authority is limited thereby." In re Marriage of Cohn,93 Ill. 2d 190, 206, 443 N.E.2d 541 (1982); Ehorn v. Podraza, 51Ill. App. 3d 816, 817, 367 N.E.2d 300 (1977). The court has noinherent powers in parentage cases or divorce actions. In reMarriage of Milliken, 199 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817, 557 N.E.2d 591(1990). Because the Parentage Act does not give the court thepower to enjoin a party from removing the child from thejurisdiction, the trial court lacked authority to enter theinjunction. That part of the court's order is vacated.

To avoid possible confusion, we will clarify the import ofour holding. Vacation of the injunction will have littlepractical effect in this case. The trial court entered an agreedorder awarding Brace visitation with Bremen. Section 14 of theParentage Act expressly confers on the court power to grant thenoncustodial parent visitation. The orders for visitation remainin effect until the trial court issues an order denyingvisitation for Brace or altering the place for that visitation. See In re Marriage of Ingram, 259 Ill. App. 3d 685, 690, 631N.E.2d 386 (1994).

The court also has the power to impose contempt sanctions,under section 15(b), for any failure to comply with its orders. Hall does not contend she could fully comply with orderedvisitations in Illinois every Monday and Wednesday if she movesto Vermont with Bremen. Therefore, the court must modifyvisitation before Hall moves to Vermont or she will disobey theorder and thereby commit contempt of court. See In re Marriageof Macino, 236 Ill. App. 3d 886, 888-89, 603 N.E.2d 105 (1992).

Section 16 of the Parentage Act permits the court to modifyany order for visitation in accord with the relevant factorslisted in the Marriage Act. The Marriage Act specifies thefactors relevant to awarding visitation to a noncustodial parentin section 607(a), and it specifies the factors for modificationof visitation in section 607(c). 750 ILCS 5/607(a), (c) (West1996). In Department of Public Aid ex rel. Gagnon-Dix v. Gagnon,288 Ill. App. 3d 424, 680 N.E.2d 509 (1997), the appellate courtheld that the Parentage Act did not incorporate section 607 ofthe Marriage Act. The court said:

"The reference in section 14(a)(1) of theParentage Act to the factors set forth in the MarriageAct to determine the best interest of the child is areference to section 602 of the Marriage Act[citation], not to section 607 of the Marriage Act[citation]. The section 14(a)(1) reference to'relevant standards' makes it clear that not every rulea court would apply to a parent in a dissolution ofmarriage case applies with equal force to a parent in aparentage case. [Citation]. There is no presumptionthat it is in the best interest of a child to havevisitation with a biological father who has had nothingto do with the child for eight years. In fact, theparental rights of an unmarried father may beterminated where he does not seek to establishpaternity or pay birth expenses or provide support. [Citation.] It would be inconsistent to legislativelymandate visitation for a biological father whoseparental rights could be terminated if a petitionseeking that relief were filed.

We hold the burden of proof in these cases is onthe noncustodial parent seeking visitation." (Emphasisomitted.) Gagnon, 288 Ill. App. 3d at 428.

The court cited no statutory authority for the shift in theburden of proof. We cannot accept the court's strainedconstruction of the phrase "relevant standards." The MarriageAct sets out the factors for custody determinations in section602 (750 ILCS 5/602 (West 1996)), and those factors guide custodydeterminations under the Parentage Act because they are the"relevant standards" for determining custody. 750 ILCS 45/14(a)(West 1996). The Marriage Act sets out the factors for jointcustody determinations in section 602.1(c) (750 ILCS 5/602.1(c)(West 1996)), and those factors guide joint custodydeterminations under the Parentage Act because they are the"relevant standards" for determining joint custody. 750 ILCS45/14(a) (West 1996). The standards stated in section 602.1incorporate by express reference the standards announced insection 602. The Marriage Act sets out the factors fordetermining visitation privileges in section 607(a) (750 ILCS5/607(a) (West 1996)), and those factors guide visitationdeterminations under the Parentage Act because they are the"relevant standards" for determining visitation privileges. 750ILCS 45/14(a) (West 1996).

We see no inconsistency between the provisions forterminating the parental rights of unmarried fathers and thestatutory presumption in favor of visitation. When a courtdetermines that a parent is an unfit person and termination ofparental rights would serve the best interests of the child, thecourt should terminate those rights. See In re Adoption of D.A.,222 Ill. App. 3d 73, 75, 583 N.E.2d 612 (1991). The parent thenwould no longer have the benefit of the presumption favoringvisitation under the Marriage Act and the Parentage Act, becausethe right to visitation is one of the legal rights terminated. 750 ILCS 50/17 (West 1996). Until the court sees evidence ofgrounds to terminate parental rights, the presumption in favor ofvisitation applies.

The court in Gagnon stated policy grounds for notincorporating the Marriage Act's standards for visitation intothe Parentage Act. But the arguments concerning what thelegislature should have done cannot change the express languageof the statute incorporating "the relevant standards" of theMarriage Act for determining visitation and "the relevantfactors" of the Marriage Act for modifying visitation. In lightof the arguments presented in Gagnon the legislature might preferto change the Parentage Act. But we must enforce the lawsenacted by the legislature, not the laws the legislature ought tohave enacted. See Kozak v. Retirement Board of the Firemen'sAnnuity & Benefit Fund, 95 Ill. 2d 211, 220, 447 N.E.2d 394(1983).

"[R]egardless of the court's opinion regarding thedesirability of the results surrounding the operationof the statute, the court must construe the statute asit is and may not, under the guise of construction,supply omissions, remedy defects, annex new provisions,substitute different provisions, add exceptions,limitations, or conditions, or otherwise change the lawso as to depart from the plain meaning of the languageemployed in the statute." Toys "R" Us, Inc. v.Adelman, 215 Ill. App. 3d 561, 568, 574 N.E.2d 1328(1991).

The language of the Parentage Act constrains us to hold thatit incorporates the factors specified in section 607(c) of theMarriage Act for modification of visitation. That is, the courtmay modify visitation whenever the modification would serve thechild's best interests, but the court should not restrict thenoncustodial parent's visitation "unless it finds that thevisitation would endanger seriously the child's physical, mental,moral or emotional health." 750 ILCS 5/607(c) (West 1996). Thereference in section 607(c) to the child's best interestsincorporates the factors stated in section 602 for determiningthose interests. Therefore, the court considering a petition tomodify visitation under either the Parentage Act or the MarriageAct must look to the factors applicable to custodydeterminations. See R.M.F., 275 Ill. App. 3d at 50. Like thecourt in R.M.F., we find that the distinctions between theParentage Act proceedings and Marriage Act proceedings have noadverse effect on the rights of children born out of wedlock. R.M.F., 275 Ill. App. 3d at 51-52.

Although the Marriage Act uses exceptionally strong languagelimiting the power of the court on a petition to restrictvisitation, courts under the Marriage Act have the power topermit the custodial parent to move with the child away fromIllinois. 750 ILCS 5/609 (West 1996). The Parentage Act doesnot incorporate section 609 of the Marriage Act. R.M.F., 275Ill. App. 3d at 50. However, cases decided under section 609provide guidance for determining when the child's interests maywarrant moving him out of state, even though the move willadversely affect the noncustodial parent's visitation. See Tyslv. Levine, 278 Ill. App. 3d 431, 437, 662 N.E.2d 915 (1996).

We vacate the injunction preventing either parent fromremoving Bremen from Illinois, because the Parentage Act does notconfer on the court the power to impose such an injunction. Thetemporary order for custody, support and visitation remains ineffect pending final determination of the parties' rights underthe parentage petition. Section 16 of the Parentage Act permitsHall to petition for modification of visitation either before orafter the final disposition of the parentage petition, and shecould seek a modification that would permit her to leave thestate. If she files such a petition the court should apply thefactors, stated in section 607(c) of the Marriage Act, relevantto petitions to modify visitation; the reference therein to thebest interests of the child incorporates the factors of section602. See In re Petition of Padin, 193 Ill. App. 3d 554, 558, 550N.E.2d 276 (1989). The court may also look for guidance to casesin which courts applying the Marriage Act have allowed a party tomove out of state with the child, despite the reduction in thenoncustodial parent's visitation.

On petition for rehearing Hall asserts that subsequentorders regarding visitation have superseded the orders discussedin the opinion. If, after moving to Vermont, Hall will be ableto comply fully with the court's visitation orders currently ineffect, she need not petition to modify visitation before movingout of state.

Vacated and remanded.

COUSINS, P.J., and McBRIDE, J., concur.