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THIRD DIVISION
November 19, 2003

JUSTICE SOUTH delivered the opinion of the court:

These consolidated appeals arise from two orders of the circuit court of Cook Countydated January 31, 2002, and June 20, 2002, finding respondent, Nancy A., to be a person subjectto involuntary admission and ordering her to be hospitalized and rehospitalized, respectively, atMadden Mental Health Center for a period of up to 90 days.

The pertinent facts are as follows: On January 7, 2002, Antonia U., respondent'sdaughter, filed a petition seeking to have her mother involuntarily admitted to a mental healthfacility on the grounds that she was mentally and physically ill and would not leave the house toget help. Pursuant to that petition respondent was admitted to Madden Mental Health Center(Madden). The matter was set for a hearing on January 10, 2002. Prior to that date respondentfiled a motion to dismiss the petition. On January 10, 2002, the State requested and was granteda continuance to January 17, 2002, in order to have time to prepare a response to the motion todismiss and for the hospital to further evaluate respondent. On January 17, 2002, the Statemoved to voluntarily dismiss the petition for involuntary admission on the basis that it wasdefective due to the insufficiency of the allegations. The petition merely alleged that respondentwas mentally confused and refused to leave the house to get medical attention or groceries, andthat respondent believed the petitioner, Antonia, was working with the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) and trying to kill her. The court granted the State's motion to dismiss thepetition and entered an order discharging respondent. The State immediately thereafter requestedan order for respondent's detention for further psychiatric evaluation and a new admission toMadden Mental Health Center, and an ex parte hearing on that request was conducted off therecord. Respondent's counsel requested to participate in that hearing, but that request was deniedby the court. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order for respondent'sdetention and further psychiatric evaluation.

While at Madden, respondent was evaluated by Drs. Frank G. Russo and Sudha Agrawal,who completed and filed physicians' certificates on January 18, 2002. A hearing on the new casewas set for January 24, 2002, but on that date the State requested a one-week continuance, whichthe court granted to January 31, 2002.

On January 31, 2002, a hearing was conducted on the new petition for involuntaryadmission, wherein James Osta, a social worker at Madden, Dr. Russo, and respondent's daughtertestified.

Antonia, respondent's daughter, testified that up until four years prior thereto she had beenliving with respondent and paying her rent and other bills. One day her mother demanded that sheleave and pulled a knife on her. On January 3, 2002, when they were discussing the possibility ofher being evicted by her landlord, respondent again pulled a knife on her daughter. During thelast four years respondent has also thrown things at Antonia, slapped her and poked her withpens. Antonia testified that she continued to provide for all of respondent's needs even after shemoved out.

Antonia further testified that respondent had refused to allow workmen to enter herapartment to repair the water pipes because she believed they were FBI operatives. In Decemberof 2002, respondent would not let Antonia buy her groceries because she believed that she wasconspiring with the FBI to poison her and that her apartment was being bugged.

Antonia also testified that her mother was diagnosed with a fibroid condition but refusedfollow-up treatment. Even though she complained almost on a daily basis about abdominal pains,respondent refused to leave her apartment, which she left only once in 1992 and once in 1994.

The next State witness was Dr. Frank G. Russo, a psychiatrist, who testified thatrespondent was suffering from a longitudinal history of delusional disorder and that she believedher daughter, landlord and others were conspiring against her and that the FBI infected her withsyphilis in 1993. Dr. Russo opined that respondent would be unable to care for her basic needs ifshe were discharged based upon the facts that she was refusing food from her daughter andtreatment for her medical needs, and that she had no specific plan if she were discharged. He alsotestified that she was a risk to others since she suffers from persecution ideation and might attacksomeone in what she believed would be a defensive measure. He based that opinion uponrespondent's prior attacks on her daughter.

Dr. Russo concluded that the hospital would be the least restrictive alternative forrespondent because she would continue to refuse to seek medical treatment and was refusing allhelp, money and food from her daughter. A report on an alternative treatment setting, apsycho/social assessment, a psychiatric evaluation and a treatment plan were admitted intoevidence.

Respondent called James Osta as her witness. He is her social worker and a member ofher treatment team. He testified that a less restrictive placement would be inappropriate forrespondent because she is "floridly psychotic," penniless and homeless and requires 24-hour care. Following closing arguments, the trial court found that the State had proven by clear andconvincing evidence that respondent was mentally ill and unable to provide for her basic physicalneeds and ordered that she be involuntarily confined for a period of up to 90 days.

Respondent was hospitalized at Madden for the next 90 days, and on May 8, 2002, agreed to remain there on a voluntary basis. However, on May 30, 2002, respondent submitted awritten request for discharge. The Madden staff responded by filing another petition for involuntary admission along with two supporting physicians' certificates.

Pursuant to the new petition for involuntary admission, another hearing was conducted onJune 20, 2002. At that hearing, Antonia, Dr. Russo and James Osta all testified again, and theirtestimony was essentially the same as it was in January of 2002.

Antonia testified that in May of 2002, while she was at Madden and having a conversationwith her mother about where she would go and what she would do if she were released,respondent became very angry and threatened to kill her when she was released. She also spat inher daughter's face and told her that she was going to burn down her house. Antonia testifiedagain that over the last four years respondent had slapped her, poked her with a pen and thrownthings at her.

Dr. Russo testified that he was not respondent's treating psychiatrist at Madden but wascovering for Dr. Agrawal, who had been called out of the country. Dr. Russo observedrespondent on the unit on a regular basis and reviewed her medical records. Dr. Russo completeda physician's certificate on January 17, 2002. He also evaluated respondent on January 28, 29 and30, 2002, and had conversations concerning her with hospital staff and Antonia, in addition toattending staff meetings concerning her treatment.

Dr. Russo testified that upon respondent's admission to Madden, she neededencouragement to bathe, dress and eat. She was inconsistent in accepting her medical treatment. While she generally took her thyroid medication and asked for and accepted treatment forindigestion, she refused tests and treatment after complaining of chest and abdominal pains andrefused to be examined regarding her uterine fibroid.

Dr. Russo opined once again that respondent suffered from a longitudinal history ofdelusional disorder. He testified that respondent had a basis in reality for this disorder because agentleman friend of hers was investigated by the FBI in the 1990s and federal agents approachedher to testify against him. Based on that event, however, she developed a conspiracy theorywhich included her daughter, landlord and others. He also testified that respondent believes thatthe FBI infected her with syphilis in 1993.

Dr. Russo testified that respondent needed to be treated as an inpatient and that Maddenwould be the least restrictive alternative for her because she would not be able to care for herbasic needs if she were discharged, since she was refusing food from her daughter and treatmentfor her medical needs. He further testified that her daughter's home or independent living wouldbe an inappropriate setting because respondent had "no insight" and was refusing all help from herdaughter anyway, which included food and money. Dr. Russo opined that respondent's delusionswould probably interfere with her eating outside of the hospital setting because she was still underthe belief that someone was poisoning her food. He also testified that respondent was a risk toothers and might attack someone as a defensive measure because she suffered from persecutionideation, although he admitted that while at Madden she had not attempted to harm anyone orbeen involuntarily medicated, secluded or restrained.

Osta testified that he was responsible for investigating alternatives to hospitalization andmethods of obtaining governmental benefits to pay for an alternative treatment setting. Alternative treatment settings provide 24-hour care and afford residents more freedom thanhospitals. There are at least 50 alternative treatment settings in the Chicago area.

Osta testified that governmental benefits could not be obtained for respondent unless shesigned the necessary forms herself or was declared incompetent and her court-appointed guardiansigned the necessary forms. He stated that respondent refused to sign the forms, and although theprocess for obtaining a guardian for her had begun, no petition for guardianship had been filed asyet. He also testified that respondent could not be forced against her will to go to an alternativetreatment setting, nor could an alternative treatment setting be forced to accept her.

Osta testified that he had not contacted any alternative treatment settings to inquire aboutthe appropriateness of respondent's treatment outside of the hospital because it was his belief that alternative treatment settings would not accept clients who were refusing psychotropicmedications, although there was no evidence that respondent was refusing psychotropicmedications. Osta testified once again, however, that a less restrictive placement would beinappropriate for respondent because she is "floridly psychotic," penniless, homeless and needs24-hour care. He also expressed concerns about her medical condition. Further, respondentadmitted to him that she had spat in her daughter's face and threatened to kill her and burn downher house.

The next State witness, Dr. Agrawal, testified that she was respondent's original treatingpsychiatrist and diagnosed her as suffering from a delusional disorder. Dr. Agrawal opined thatrespondent was reasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon herself or her daughterin the near future and was unable to provide for her basic physical needs.

Respondent testified on her own behalf that she had not cooperated with Osta regardingher social security income benefits because she does not believe that she has any type of mentaldisability, and she believes that the Justice Department owes her funds because the FBI poisonedher in June of 1993.

After closing arguments, the court found that respondent was mentally ill and unable tocare for her basic physical needs. During the dispositional phase of the hearing to determine ifthere was a less restrictive alternative to full hospitalization, respondent did not present evidenceor make any arguments.

On appeal, respondent has raised several assignments of error: (1) that the trial courtcommitted reversible error in granting the State's January 24, 2002, request for a continuance; (2)that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State's January 17, 2002, request tovoluntarily dismiss the first petition; (3) that the trial court's January 31, 2002, order forrespondent's involuntary admission must be reversed because the petition was neither preparednor filed prior to the proceeding for the January 17, 2002, order for detention and evaluation; (4)that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting respondent's counsel from participating inthe January 17, 2002, hearing for an order for detention and evaluation; (5) that the trial court'sJanuary 31, 2002, order must be reversed because respondent was denied her statutory right to averbatim transcript of the January 17, 2002, hearing for the order for detention and evaluation; (6)that the trial court's finding on January 31, 2002, that respondent was unable to provide for herbasic physical needs, requiring involuntary inpatient admission, was manifestly erroneous; (7) thatthe trial court's finding on June 20, 2002, that respondent was unable to provide for her basicphysical needs, requiring involuntary inpatient admission, was manifestly erroneous; and (8) thatthe exception to the mootness doctrine applies to this case.

Initially, we shall address the last issue, whether this case falls within the mental healthexception to the mootness doctrine, since both parties agree that the exception does apply.

As a general rule, courts of review in Illinois do not decide moot questions, renderadvisory opinions, or consider issues where the result will not be affected regardless of how thoseissues are decided. In re Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491, 702 N.E.2d 555, 559 (1998). A mootquestion is one that existed but because of the happening of certain events has ceased to exist andno longer presents an actual controversy over the interest or rights of the party. Johnson v.Quern, 90 Ill. App. 3d 151, 155, 412 N.E.2d 1082, 1085 (1980). The appellate court hasrecognized an exception to this rule for mental health cases. Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, 702N.E.2d at 559. Where a case involves an event of short duration that is capable of repetition, yetevading review, it may qualify for review even if it would otherwise be moot. Barbara H., 183 Ill.2d at 491, 702 N.E.2d at 559.

To receive the benefit of this exception, the complaining party must demonstrate that (1)the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation; and (2)there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the sameaction again. Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, 702 N.E.2d at 559. The exception to the mootnessdoctrine is of particular importance where commitment orders may have collateral legalconsequences that survive the expiration of the order under review. People v. Nunn, 108 Ill. App.3d 169, 173, 438 N.E.2d 1342, 1344 (1982). Even in the context of absolute discharge, collaterallegal consequences may exist if the respondent was committed several times before, for at somepoint the number of commitments may make his reputation irredeemable. Nunn, 108 Ill. App. 3dat 173, 438 N.E.2d at 1344.

Here, the January 31 and June 20, 2002, orders for respondent's involuntary admission,which both expired within 90 days of their being entered, were too short to be fully litigated priorto their cessation. Further, there was a reasonable expectation that respondent would besubjected to the same action again. See Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 491, 702 N.E.2d at 559. Respondent may also suffer collateral consequences from the trial court's orders. See Nunn, 108Ill. App. 3d at 173, 438 N.E.2d at 1344. For these reasons, we find that the exception to themootness doctrine applies to this case.

We shall now turn our focus to the remaining issues. The first assignment of error is theorder of the trial court on January 24, 2002, granting the State's request for a continuance toJanuary 31, 2002.

The applicable statute is section 3-800 of the Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities Code (Code), which states in pertinent part:

"(b) If the court grants a continuance on its own motion orupon the motion of one of the parties, the respondent may continueto be detained pending further order of the court. Suchcontinuance shall not extend beyond 15 days except to the extentthat continuances are requested by the respondent." (Emphasisadded.) 405 ILCS 5/3-800 (West 2000).

The Code's procedural safeguards are not mere technicalities. Rather, they are essential tools tosafeguard the liberty interests of respondents in mental health cases. In re George O., 314 Ill.App. 3d 1044, 1046, 734 N.E.2d 13, 16 (2000). The need for strict compliance with the statutoryrequirement is compelling in mental health cases since commitment is involuntary and libertyinterests are involved. In re Lanter, 216 Ill. App. 3d 972, 974, 576 N.E.2d 1219, 1220 (1991). Because involuntary admission proceedings pose a grave threat to an individual's liberty interests,the Code's procedural safeguards should be strictly construed in favor of the respondent. GeorgeO., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 1046, 734 N.E.2d at 16. Any noncompliance with the statutorilyprescribed involuntary commitment procedures renders the judgment entered in such a causeerroneous and of no effect. George O., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 1049, 734 N.E.2d at 17; Lanter, 216Ill. App. 3d at 974, 576 N.E.2d at 1220.

A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is a discretionary matter, andthis court will not set aside the trial court's determination unless it amounts to an abuse ofdiscretion. People v. Hillsman, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1110, 1118, 769 N.E.2d 1100, 1107 (2002). Adecisive factor in determining the propriety of the trial court's exercise of its discretion in rulingon a motion for a continuance is whether the party applying for a continuance has shown a lack ofdue diligence in proceeding with the cause. Lipke v. Celotex Corp., 153 Ill. App. 3d 498, 510,505 N.E.2d 1213, 1221 (1987).

Here, the State filed its first petition for involuntary admission on January 7, 2002, andrespondent filed a motion to dismiss. On January 10, 2002, at the hearing on the petition theState requested a continuance to respond to the motion to dismiss and for further evaluation ofrespondent. On January 17, 2002, the State withdrew its petition when it realized it was defectiveand requested a hearing to obtain an order of detention. The trial court granted the State'svoluntary dismissal and discharged respondent. After the hearing, the court entered an order ofdetention requiring respondent to be transported back to the hospital for a court-orderedevaluation. The State then filed another petition for involuntary admission on January 17, 2002,and the two physicians' certificates on January 18, 2002. The new hearing was set for January 24,2002, and on that date the State sought a continuance for further evaluation, which the trial courtgranted to January 31, 2002.

Based upon these procedural facts, we find the lower court did not abuse its discretion incontinuing the case from January 24, 2002, until January 31, 2002. Section 3-800 of the Codeprovides that a continuance shall not extend beyond 15 days, and clearly the seven-daycontinuance from the 24th of January to the 31st of January did not violate this time period. Asthe State has pointed out in its appellate brief, there were eight days left for continuances on thefirst petition. The first petition, which was filled out by Antonia, was legally insufficient, andclearly the State needed time within which to file a petition that contained legally sufficientallegations. There is nothing to suggest that the State was being dilatory or attempting tocircumvent the statutory requirements. In fact, to the contrary, the State was making everyattempt to see that respondent's fundamental right to due process was upheld. For these reasons,we find that the court's decision to grant the State the one-week continuance was not an abuse ofdiscretion.

As to the State's request for a continuance on January 17, 2002, the trial court granted theState's motion to voluntarily dismiss and discharged respondent on that case. The court foundthat the second petition was a new cause of action and acted well within its discretion to allow theState a 15-day continuance in the second case. For the reasons stated above, we find no abuse ofdiscretion by the trial court.

We also consider whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State'sJanuary 17, 2002, request to voluntarily dismiss the first petition.

A plaintiff is generally entitled to voluntarily dismiss his or her case at any time before trialor hearing begins. Winn v. Mitsubishi Motor Manufacturing of America, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d1054, 1058, 721 N.E.2d 819, 822 (1999). Plaintiffs have an almost absolute right to take avoluntary dismissal absent an unequivocal conflict between a specific rule of the supreme courtand section 2-1009 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-1009 (West 2000);Winn, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1058, 721 N.E.2d at 822. When plaintiffs move for voluntary dismissal,trial judges have discretion to hear a previously filed motion that, if ruled upon favorably by thecourt, could result in a final disposition of the case. Winn, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1058, 721 N.E.2dat 822-23. Absent such a circumstance, the trial judge generally has no discretion to deny themotion to voluntarily dismiss. Winn, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 1058, 721 N.E.2d at 823.

In granting the State's voluntary dismissal without considering respondent's motion todismiss, the court noted that on January 10, 2002, the State could have, upon receivingrespondent's motion to dismiss, asked for leave to file an amended petition or taken a nonsuit atthat time, but because the State only had 15 days and its attorneys are overworked, it was goingto allow the State to take a nonsuit on the petition. The trial court's decision to grant a plaintiff'smotion for voluntary dismissal without considering a potentially dispositive defense motion willnot be reversed unless there was abuse of discretion. Bochantin v. Petroff, 145 Ill. 2d 1, 7, 582N.E.2d 114, 117 (1991). We find no such abuse.

We next consider whether the trial court's January 31, 2002, order for respondent'sinvoluntary admission should be reversed because the petition was neither prepared nor filed priorto the proceeding for the January 17, 2002, order for detention and evaluation.

Involuntary commitment proceedings involve a person's liberty interests and, thus, thestatutory sections of the Code should be construed strictly in favor of the respondent. In reDemir, 322 Ill. App. 3d 989, 992, 751 N.E.2d 616, 618 (2001). Inherent in the civil commitmentproceeding are the distinct interests of providing patients with necessary treatment as well asprotecting society from dangerous conduct. Demir, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 992, 751 N.E.2d at 618. The procedural safeguards in place are not mere technicalities to be sidestepped. Rather, thelegislature created them to protect people from the deprivation of a liberty interest. Demir, 322Ill. App. 3d at 994, 751 N.E.2d at 619. The failure to timely file the petition is an error thatcannot be waived or considered harmless. Demir, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 994, 751 N.E.2d at 620. Section 3-611 of the Code creates a bright-line test with which the facility director must strictlycomply. Demir, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 994, 751 N.E.2d at 620.

On January 17, 2002, after the State voluntarily dismissed the defective petition forinvoluntary admission, the court signed an order discharging respondent, and the State requesteda hearing for an order of detention requiring the Madden staff to take respondent to the hospitalfor a psychiatric evaluation and a new admission. An ex parte hearing was held off the recordwhich resulted in the court signing an order for the detention and evaluation of respondent which,along with the petition for involuntary admission, was filed with the clerk of the court on January17, 2002. On January 31, 2002, the hearing on the petition for involuntary admission was held,and the court ordered that respondent be involuntarily confined for up to 90 days because she wasmentally ill and unable to provide for her basic physical needs.

Respondent argues that the court improperly entertained the State's "oral" request forrelief and ignored the Code's requirement that a "written" petition must be prepared and filed priorto the hearing.

Section 3-701 of the Code states in pertinent part:

"(a) Any person 18 years of age or older may execute apetition asserting that another person is subject to involuntaryadmission. The petition shall be prepared pursuant to paragraph (b)of Section 3-601 and shall be filed with the court in the countywhere the respondent resides or is present." 405 ILCS 5/3-701(West 2000).

Section 3-611 of the Code states in pertinent part:

"Within 24 hours, excluding Saturdays, Sundays andholidays, after the respondent's admission under this Article, thefacility director of the facility shall file 2 copies of the petition, thefirst certificate, and proof of service of the petition and statement ofrights upon the respondent with the court in the county in which thefacility is located. Upon completion of the second certificate, thefacility director shall promptly file it with the court. *** Upon thefiling of the petition and first certificate, the court shall set a hearingto be held within 5 days, excluding Saturdays, Sundays andholidays, after receipt of the petition." 405 ILCS 5/3-611 (West2000).

In the case at bar, the record demonstrates that a written petition was filed within 24 hoursof respondent's admission to Madden. On January 17, 2002, the first petition was nonsuited andrespondent discharged, and then a hearing was conducted off the record on the State's motion orrequest for an order for detention and a psychiatric evaluation. Prior to that hearing, a newpetition was drafted and signed by the petitioner. An order of detention was also drafted, whichthe trial court signed at the conclusion of the hearing. We find that the State complied withsection 3-611 of the Code. While the petition was drafted but not filed prior to the hearing, thereis no requirement in section 3-701 which requires that it be filed prior thereto. What is clear,however, is that a written petition was filed within 24 hours of respondent's admission inaccordance with sections 3-611 and 3-701 of the Code.

We next consider whether the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting respondent'scounsel from participating in the January 17, 2002, proceeding for an order for detention andevaluation.

Under section 3-701(b), "the court may inquire of the petitioner whether there arereasonable grounds to believe that the facts stated in the petition [for involuntary admission] aretrue and whether the respondent is subject to involuntary admission. The inquiry may proceedwithout notice to the respondent only if the petitioner alleges facts showing that an emergencyexists such that immediate hospitalization is necessary." 405 ILCS 5/3-701(b) (West 2000).

Involuntary commitment hearings conducted pursuant to the Code are civil matters subjectto the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2-101 (West 2000); 405 ILCS 5/6-100 (West2000); In re Lawrence S., 319 Ill. App. 3d 476, 482, 746 N.E.2d 769, 774 (2001). Theconstitutional rights to which a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled do not adhere to arespondent in a commitment hearing. However, because the State seeks to curtail therespondent's liberty in an involuntary commitment hearing, the supreme court has held thatprocedural due process does guarantee certain protections to civil commitment respondents. Lawrence S., 319 Ill. App. 3d at 482-83, 746 N.E.2d at 775. The Code provides that everyrespondent alleged to be subject to involuntary admission shall be represented by counsel. 405ILCS 5/3-805 (West 2000); In re Click, 196 Ill. App. 3d 413, 419, 554 N.E.2d 494, 497 (1990).

On January 17, 2002, the lower court stated that it found no provision in the Code thatwould allow counsel to participate in an ex parte hearing because there was no lawsuit pendingas yet. Under the Code, a hearing is set within five days and notice is then given to the patientand his attorney once that patient is evaluated and admitted. This was an emergency hearing foran order of detention. Normally, due to their emergency nature, detention hearings are conductedon an ex parte basis. Here, the trial court informed counsel that there was no lawsuit pending,and if there is no lawsuit pending, she did not have a client and did not represent anyone. Whether or not respondent's counsel could have participated in that hearing since she was presentwas within the discretion of the trial court. We find that the court did not abuse its discretion inprohibiting respondent's attorney from participating.

Respondent also argues that she was entitled to a transcript of that proceeding. However,the hearing was conducted off the record so there is no transcript. Furthermore, there is norequirement in the Code that detention hearings be conducted on the record, and respondent hasnot stated how the lack of a transcript has prejudiced her. For these reasons, her arguments mustfail.

We next consider whether the trial court's findings on January 31, 2002, that respondentwas unable to provide for her basic physical needs and required involuntary inpatient admissionwere manifestly erroneous.

A trial court's decision in an involuntary admission proceeding is given great deference andwill not be set aside at the appellate level, even if the reviewing court, after applying the clear andconvincing standard, would have ruled differently, unless it is against the manifest weight of theevidence. In re Bennett, 251 Ill. App. 3d 887, 888, 623 N.E.2d 942, 943 (1993). A judgment isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or whenfindings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence. In re Jakush, 311 Ill.App. 3d 940, 944, 725 N.E.2d 785, 789 (2000). The original trier of fact is in the best positionto weigh the evidence presented and determine the credibility of the testifying witnesses. Bennett,251 Ill. App. 3d at 888, 623 N.E.2d at 943.

Under section 1-119(2) of the Code, a person subject to involuntary admission is a personwith mental illness and who because of her illness is unable to provide for her basic physical needsso as to guard herself from serious harm. 405 ILCS 5/1-119(2) (West 2000); Jakush, 311 Ill.App. 3d at 944, 725 N.E.2d at 788. Generally, the inability to care for oneself so as to guardagainst physical harm is found when the illness substantially impairs one's thought processes,perception of reality, emotional stability, judgment, behavior, or ability to cope with life's ordinarydemands. In re Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d 105, 110, 606 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (1992). In determiningwhether a person's illness renders her unable to provide for her basic physical needs, a courtshould consider whether that person (1) can obtain her own food, shelter, or necessary medicalcare; (2) has a place to live or a family to assist her; (3) is able to function in society; and (4) hasan understanding of money or a concern for money as a means of sustenance. Jakush, 311 Ill.App. 3d at 944, 725 N.E.2d at 788.

Involuntary commitment procedures represent the balance between an individual's libertyinterests and society's dual interests in protecting itself from potentially dangerous individualswhile protecting and caring for those who are unable to care for themselves. In re Luttrell, 261Ill. App. 3d 221, 231, 633 N.E.2d 74, 81-82 (1994). A person may not be confined against herwill merely because she is mentally ill if she is dangerous to no one and can live safely in freedom. In re Winters, 255 Ill. App. 3d 605, 608, 627 N.E.2d 410, 413 (1994). A person may not be heldagainst her will merely to improve her standard of living or because society may find ituncomfortable to see such people on the street. Winters, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 610, 627 N.E.2d at414. In order to commit a person involuntarily to a mental health facility, the State must prove byclear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill and that, as a result of this illness, he isreasonably expected to inflict serious physical harm upon himself or another in the near future, oris unable to protect himself from serious harm. 405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2000); In reTuman, 268 Ill. App. 3d 106, 111, 644 N.E.2d 56, 59 (1994). Proof of mental illness alone is notsufficient to support involuntary admission. Jakush, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 944, 725 N.E.2d at 788. For a medical opinion as to the existence of a mental illness to be clear and convincing, it issufficient if the expert indicates the basis of his diagnosis by having directly observed a respondenton several occasions. Tuman, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 111, 644 N.E.2d at 59-60.

After a court determines that a person is subject to involuntary commitment, the courtmust order the respondent's placement in the least restrictive treatment alternative. 405 ILCS 5/3-811 (West 2000); Long, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 111, 606 N.E.2d at 1264. The court has severaloptions at its disposal: ordering hospitalization, ordering outpatient treatment, or ordering theperson to be placed in the care of a relative or other person willing to care properly for him. 405ILCS 5/3-811 (West 2000); Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 226, 633 N.E.2d at 78. However, thereis a statutory preference for treatment other than hospitalization. Thus, hospitalization may onlybe ordered if the State proves it is the least restrictive treatment alternative. Luttrell, 261 Ill. App.3d at 226, 633 N.E.2d at 78.

The evidence to support these findings that respondent is mentally ill and cannot supportherself must concern the respondent's current condition, and the decision to commit therespondent must be based on a fresh evaluation of her conduct and mental state. Long, 237 Ill.App. 3d at 109, 606 N.E.2d at 1262. The requirement that the State prove hospitalization is theleast restrictive treatment alternative is not met merely because the State's expert opinescommitment is the least restrictive means. The opinion of the expert must be supported by theevidence. Luttrell, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 227, 633 N.E.2d at 78.

Turning to the case at bar, on January 31, 2002, the evidence established through clearand convincing evidence that respondent was mentally ill based upon the testimony of Dr. Russothat respondent suffered from a longitudinal delusional disorder and was paranoid, depressed andpsychotic and Antonia's testimony that respondent was a danger to others. The totality of theevidence relating to respondent's medical illness, delusional behavior and paranoia established thatshe lacked the ability to care for her basic needs, especially since she refused her daughter'sassistance. The evidence also established that since respondent's hospitalization she has shownthat while she can perform basic functions, there is no indication that she can care for herselfoutside of the controlled environment of the hospital due to her extreme paranoia.

Regarding the issue of the least restrictive alternative, there was clear and convincingevidence that no type of intermediate care facility would accept respondent and that respondentcould not meet her basic needs outside of a full-care hospital facility. Antonia testified that she islimited in what she can do to support her mother because she has had to refinance her house andhas "maxed out" her credit cards, and that respondent believed she was being given shots by thedoctor who was conspiring with the FBI.

Dr. Agrawal testified that, as a result of respondent's delusions, she has refused tests andtreatment for her medical condition and is unable to care for her basic needs. Dr. Agrawal opinedthat due to respondent's mental condition she is unable to make rational decisions about hermedical condition and living arrangements, and that all of these were reasons why nointermediate-care facility would accept her and why she did not qualify for less restrictivealternative outside of a full-care hospital facility.

Based upon the facts as presented at the hearings, we find that the trial court's findingsthat respondent was mentally ill and unable to provide for her basic physical needs and that a full-care hospital facility was the least restrictive alternative were not against the manifest weight ofthe evidence.

We next consider whether the trial court's findings on June 20, 2002, that respondent wasunable to provide for her basic physical needs and required involuntary inpatient admission weremanifestly erroneous.

The evidence present at that hearing was essentially the same evidence which had beenpresented at the January 31, 2002, hearing. Respondent argues that she was eating appropriately,was not underweight, was not refusing any essential medical treatment and could find sheltereither by herself or with the assistance of her daughter, and that the State did not file an adequatepredispositional report and failed to prove that inpatient hospitalization was the least restrictivealternative.

The court concluded that the least restrictive alternative at the current time was thehospital in large part because of respondent's lack of cooperation and her delusional behavior. Furthermore, respondent testified that if she were released she did not know where she would goand was comfortable at Madden. The court noted that if respondent was cooperative perhaps aless restrictive alternative could be found, but until then the hospital was the best place for her.

The original trier of fact is in the best position to weigh the evidence presented anddetermine the credibility of the testifying witnesses. Bennett, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 888, 623 N.E.2dat 943. The lower court weighed the evidence and testimony and concluded that respondent wasproperly involuntarily admitted. We find that, based upon the evidence, the trial court's decisionwas not against the manifest weight of the evidence. See In re E.L., 316 Ill. App. 3d 598, 605,736 N.E.2d 1189, 1194 (2000).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and HALL, J., concur.