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                                                                                                       FOURTH DIVISION
                                                                                                       FILED: 8/31/00

No. 1-98-2859

Respondent Renee R. appeals from the trial court's judgmentterminating her parental rights as to her five children afterfinding respondent an unfit parent and finding it in thechildren's best interest to terminate her rights. On appeal,respondent contends that her right to be present and her dueprocess rights were violated when the trial court conducted theparental fitness and termination hearings in her absence.

In her appeal, respondent does not challenge the evidencepresented at the termination hearing or argue that the trialcourt's decision was against the manifest weight of that evidence, and we therefore briefly review the facts that werepresented to the trial court. On June 9, 1998, the date of thetermination hearing, respondent's counsel informed the trialcourt that respondent was in the hospital and under psychiatriccare, and counsel requested that the hearing be continued. Respondent's counsel further informed the trial court that thelength of respondent's hospital stay was "unknown" and thatcounsel was "ready to go forward." The trial court denied therequest for a continuance, noting that respondent was "ablyrepresented by counsel."

The court heard testimony from a psychiatrist and threecaseworkers from the Department of Children and Family Services(DCFS) and Lutheran Social Services. Respondent's case was firstreferred to DCFS immediately after the birth of her first child,M.R., in March 1985. Later that year, DCFS was awarded custodyof M.R. following a determination that the child would beendangered if left in respondent's care. This court affirmed,stating that respondent had not progressed in controlling herreactions to everyday stresses. The court also notedrespondent's personality disorder, drug abuse and violentbehavior. In re M.R., No. 1-86-2162 (1988) (unpublished orderunder Supreme Court Rule 23). A second child, C.R., was born in1986 and removed from respondent's care at birth but was laterreturned to respondent. Respondent gave birth to a third child,D.R., in 1987, followed by twins, M.R. and M.R., in 1990.

The testimony established that since 1973 respondent hadbeen admitted to psychiatric hospitals approximately 23 times andhad been diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder andschizophrenia, for which respondent was prescribed severalmedications that she sometimes failed to take. Respondent'sconditions caused her to be delusional, have hallucinations andexhibit unstable moods and periods of depression. Between 1987and 1993, respondent lived in at least 20 different locations. Respondent had minimal participation with parenting servicesoffered to her, often starting programs but failing to completethem. The testimony established that respondent would havedifficulty caring for her children in the future due to herconfused speech and thought processes and her often erraticbehavior.

The trial court found respondent unfit as to the State'sallegations that respondent (1) failed to maintain a reasonabledegree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the minors'welfare; (2) desertion of the children for more than threemonths; (3) habitual drunkenness or addiction to drugs for atleast one year immediately prior to the commencement of theunfitness proceeding; (4) failure to make reasonable efforts tocorrect the conditions that were the basis of the removal of thechildren or to make reasonable progress toward the return of thechildren within nine months after the adjudication; and (5)inability to discharge parental responsibilities due to mentalimpairment, illness or retardation beyond a reasonable timeperiod. After the best interest phase of the terminationhearing, the trial court terminated respondent's parental rights.

On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court's actsof finding her unfit and terminating her parental rights in herabsence violated her "statutory right to be present" and her dueprocess rights. Respondent argues that she had been hospitalizedfor a psychiatric condition and that her attorney was aware thatshe wanted to be present and wanted the case to be continued.

We initially address the State's contention thatrespondent's appeal should be dismissed because she challengesthe denial of her request that the termination hearing becontinued. The State argues that the denial of a motion tocontinue is not a final and appealable order. However, accordingto the notice of appeal, respondent's appeal was taken from thejudgment of "termination of parental rights." Moreover,respondent's brief addresses alleged violations of her statutoryand constitutional rights. We therefore find respondent's appealproperly before this court and will address its merits.

Respondent contends that, as the parent whose rights werebeing determined, she had a statutory right to be present at thetermination hearing, citing section 1-5(1) of the Juvenile CourtAct of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998)). However, althoughrespondent has such a right, her presence is not mandatory. SeeIn re C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d 770, 778 (1999).

In determining whether the procedures followed in a parentalrights termination proceeding satisfied the constitutionalrequirements of due process, this court must balance threefactors. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 96S. Ct. 893 (1976); In re C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d 461, 465 (1995). The factors outlined in Mathews are: (1) the private interestaffected by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneousdeprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and theprobable value, if any, of additional or substitute proceduralsafeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including thefunction involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens thatthe additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 33, 96 S. Ct. at902-03. Applying the first factor, respondent's liberty interestin maintaining a parental relationship with her five childrencannot be denied. See In re D.R., 307 Ill. App. 3d 478, 483(1999); C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 465.

Regarding the second criterion, it is equally apparent thatthe procedures used by the trial court in this case offeredlittle or no risk of an erroneous deprivation of respondent'sinterest in parenting her children. Although respondent was notpresent at the termination hearing, in light of the testimony asto respondent's psychiatric conditions, respondent's attorneylikely represented the interest of respondent to the best degreepossible. After respondent's counsel requested the continuanceand informed the court that respondent was hospitalized, counselstated that she was nevertheless "ready to go forward." Respondent's counsel fully cross-examined witnesses and arguedrespondent's case to the trial court. Contrary to respondent'sarguments, the parameters of due process do not include aparent's absolute right to be present at a terminationproceeding.

As to the final factor in Mathews, the governmental interestin seeking to adjudicate parental rights also weighs againstadditional delay in the adjudication of this case. Such delayimposes a serious cost on the functions of government, as well asan intangible cost to the lives of the children involved. See Inre D.L., l9l Ill. 2d 1, 13 (2000). When the trial courtinquired, prior to the termination hearing, about respondent'srelease from the hospital, the public guardian stated that it wasa "psych hospitalization" and was "indefinite," to whichrespondent's attorney responded that the time period of herclient's hospitalization was unknown. The court also notedbefore proceeding with the termination hearing that respondent'scase had previously been continued and set for trial at leastonce since 1996. The Mathews balancing test therefore does notsupport respondent's claim of a violation of her due processrights.

Respondent likens her case to C.J., in which the ThirdDistrict Appellate Court held that the trial court violated anincarcerated parent's due process rights by refusing to grant theparent's request to continue the termination hearing forapproximately one year, at which time the parent would be out ofprison. The parent had alternatively requested that the hearingbe continued at the end of the State's evidence so that theparent could review the transcripts and respond to them. C.J.,272 Ill. App. 3d at 463. The parent was represented by counselthroughout the proceedings. C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 464. Theappellate court found that the State would not have been burdenedin allowing respondent a better opportunity to participate in theproceeding, adding that "[t]he exact method of participation isleft to the [trial] judge's discretion." C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3dat 466.

We find C.J. distinguishable from respondent's case. InC.J., when the parent sought a continuance of the terminationhearing to allow her to be present, she requested a continuancefor a specific period of time, i.e., her date of release fromprison, which was set for approximately one year hence. C.J.,272 Ill. App. 3d at 463. Here, contrary to respondent'sassertions, the trial court did inquire how long respondent wouldbe hospitalized, and the public guardian stated that respondentwould be in psychiatric care for an "indefinite" period. We notethat respondent's counsel did not object to this assertion, butinstead added that respondent's status was "unknown at thispoint." In addition, the parent in C.J., when requesting thecontinuance, also suggested an alternative manner by which shecould participate in the proceedings if they were conducted inher absence. C.J., 272 Ill. App. 3d at 463. While respondent inthis case contends that the court should have "provided a meansfor her to participate," respondent's counsel did not proposesuch a method at the time the continuance was requested, nor doescounsel offer such a suggestion on appeal.

Respondent also cites People v. Williams, 312 Ill. App. 3d232 (2000), in which the First District Appellate Court foundthat the trial court abused its discretion in denying a defendantthe right to be present at his discharge hearing. The courtstated that the trial court did not identify evidence to supportits statement that the defendant was "disturbed" and lacked therequisite mental state to be present during the hearing. Williams, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 233.

In contrast to Williams, the record here supports theinference that respondent lacked the capacity to attend thetermination hearing because she was in a psychiatric hospital. Furthermore, as previously discussed, respondent's presence wasnot absolutely required for the termination hearing to proceed.

For all of the foregoing reasons, we therefore find that thetrial court did not violate respondent's due process rights byproceeding in her absence.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HOFFMAN, P.J., and SOUTH, J., concur.