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SECOND DIVISION
October 15, 2002

No. 1-00-3163

Petitioner Rivka Kohl, a resident of Israel, filed a combinedpetition for support under the Uniform Interstate Family SupportAct (750 ILCS 22/100 through 999 (West 1998) (the Uniform Act); andfor rule to show cause against her former husband, respondentMenahem Kohl,⁽¹⁾ a resident of Skokie, Illinois. In her combinedpetition, Rivka alleged that for more than 18 years Menahemwilfully refused to comply with an Israeli court's order to paychild support for their four children. Menahem moved fordismissal, citing section 607(a)(1) of the Uniform Act (750 ILCS22/607(a)(1) (West 1998)), which indicates that registration andenforcement of a foreign support order may be opposed on the basisof the foreign court's lack of personal jurisdiction. Afterreviewing the evidence of service that the Israeli court reliedupon in entering a default judgment against Menahem, the circuitcourt found that Menahem had not been served and dismissed the ruleto show cause proceedings. The court subsequently denied Rivka'smotion for reconsideration.

Rivka appeals those orders, arguing that it was improper forthe circuit court to consider Menahem's arguments, because thesupport order was confirmed by operation of law when he failed tocontest its registration and enforcement in Illinois within 20 daysof being served with the Illinois petition, as required by section606 of the Uniform Act. 750 ILCS 22/606 (West 1998). She alsoargues that the record established that Menahem was personallyserved in the Israeli proceedings on December 23, 1981, and that hegenerally appeared four years later by sending a letter to theNetanyah, Israel, "Execution Bureau" objecting to the sale of thefamily apartment in partial satisfaction of the accumulatingsupport arrearage. Her third contention is that personaljurisdiction was or could have been litigated in the Israeliproceedings, and, therefore, res judicata prevents Menahem fromraising the issue now. Finally, Rivka argues that comity requiredthe circuit court to respect the Israeli court's finding ofpersonal jurisdiction and to enforce its order.

The record shows the following. Rivka and Menahem weremarried in Israel and had four children together between October 7,1972 and August 5, 1981. On October 23, 1981, Rivka filed apetition in a Tel Aviv, Israel, district court seeking childsupport and "alimony" from her husband. She alleged that Menahemhad abandoned the family and was in hiding; and she submittedconfirmation from the border police that Menahem left Israel onAugust 30, 1981, and had not returned. She sought permission toserve Menahem in Equador, indicating that she had discovered hisaddress from two letters he had sent to one of the children. TheIsraeli district court, Judge Berman, authorized the foreignservice of process, to "be executed by registered mail with aconfirmation of delivery and also by means of the IsraeliRepresentative in the State of Ecuador," at the following address: "M. Kol, Pedro Carbo 809 Y Ballen, Gayaquil, Ecuador." JudgeBerman did not explain the implications of the phrase "and also bymeans of the Israeli Representative in the State of Ecuador," andthere is no further mention of this phrase in any other Israelicourt document in the record filed in this appeal.

Judge Berman received confirmation that a person signing "M"to a postal receipt had accepted registered mail addressed to M.Kol at an address on "Pedro Carlo [sic]" in Gayaquil, Ecuador.Menahem does not dispute that he was residing in "Guayaquil [sic],"Ecuador, in 1981, and admits that his business address was "PedroCarbo 809, Guayaquil, Equador," but he denies that he was served onDecember 23, 1981, and he contends that the date stamped on thepostal receipt is not even decipherable. Further, Rivka andMenahem disagree over whether the handwritten address appearing onthe receipt shows a street address of "Pedro Carlo 809 Y Ballen" or"Pedro Carlo 8094 Ballen."

On February 25, 1982, Judge Berman entered a decision againstMenahem, stating in pertinent part:

"The respondent is summoned to appear in courtand was duly served outside the jurisdictionby venue of foreign postal service on December23, 1981. Owing to the fact that thesignature of the recipient is hard todecipher, nevertheless, since the time spanhas not exceeded that allowed by law, thecourt must accept it and since there was nocounter claim submitted and the defendantnever showed up, there lies no alternativeother than to give a final decision in thismatter, albeit in the absence of the defenseand without appearance."

Judge Berman compelled Menahem "to pay alimony and childsupport *** in the amount of 9,000 New Israeli Shekel[s] a month,beginning January 16, 1982, and every month thereafter on the 16thof the month," and determined that payments would be adjusted everythree months according to a cost-of-living index. Additionally,Judge Berman ordered Menahem to pay for dental care for two of thechildren in "the amount of 25,000 NIS, which sum shall be linked tothe cost of living index."

Menahem has never complied with the support order. Rivkastates that, as a result, she received welfare payments from theIsraeli National Insurance Institute until 1984, when she beganworking outside the home.

Rivka and Menahem participated in marriage dissolutionproceedings before the rabbinical court of Tel Aviv. This court isdistinct and separate from the civil district court that heardRivka's support petition, and according to Rivka, it is the onlyIsraeli court with authority to grant a divorce. The marriage wasdissolved by a final order of the rabbinical court on July 21,1985.

On September 17, 1986, the "Execution Bureau" in Netanya,Israel, sent Menahem a "Warning," indicating that a certified copyof the district court's support order was attached and that unlessMenahem objected within 21 days of receipt or paid Rivka 48,185 NewIsraeli Shekels, he would face "execution measures according tolaw."

In a letter dated December 24, 1986, addressed to the "NetanyaCourt President" and titled "Appeal," Menahem stated that he hadnot received the warning until December 18, 1986. He stated thatthe judgment had not been "handed" to him and that "[t]he [real]property [to be executed upon, the Kohl family apartment was] notin the jurisdiction of Netanya but in Rishon Le Zion." Menahemasked the "Netanya Court President" to "instruct the NetanyaExecution Office to nullify every process against [him] until [hewas] able to prove [his] claims if and when *** [he was] requestedto do so."

In a letter to Menahem dated January 1, 1987, "TheMagistrate's Court, Netanya," forwarded "a copy of the court'sRegistrar's decision" about Menahem's "petition to cancel theproceedings." The letter stated, "Please notice that according tothe decision of the Chairman of the Execution Bureau 'the argumentsraised by the petitioner - cannot withhold the execution of thejudgment.'"

Subsequently, the family apartment at 19/9 Karl Neter Street,Rishon-Le-Zion, was sold during 1987 for an unspecified amount, andthe National Insurance Institute recouped its welfare payments fromMenahem's half of the proceeds before the remainder was paid toRivka.

On March 18, 1997, with the assistance of the office of theState's Attorney of Cook County, Rivka filed a "Uniform SupportPetition" in the circuit court of Cook County, which was personallyserved on Menahem in Skokie on March 25, 1997. The accompanyingsummons stated that Menahem was required to file an appearance andanswer "on or before 5/28/97 for a hearing on the complaint." Itfurther provided, "If you fail to do so, a judgment by default maybe taken against you for the relief asked in the complaint."

On April 30, 1997, Menahem filed an appearance, and on July 3,1997, Menahem filed a motion to dismiss Rivka's petition on thebasis of the Israeli court's lack of personal jurisdiction. Menahem's motion was supported in part by an affidavit stating thathe "exited Equador on December 20, 1981 for Miami[, Florida]," and"was not served with summons through certified mail on December 23,1981."

Rivka subsequently retained private counsel, and by agreementof the parties, Rivka and Menahem filed new pleadings, which arethe subject of this appeal.

On March 11, 1999, Rivka filed the combined petition forsupport under the Uniform Act and for a rule to show causementioned above. She alleged in part that Menahem had been"validly served with process on December 23, 1981, as found by theIsraeli court," but had "wilfully and contumaciously refused orfailed to comply" with the Israeli support order. Accordingly, shesought imposition of a fine or "imprisonment" if the circuit courtdetermined that Menahem was in contempt of court.

On April 9, 1999, Menahem filed a motion to dismiss, arguingin pertinent part that the combined petition should be dismissedpursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998)) and section 607 of the Uniform Act(750 ILCS 22/607 (West 1998)) because the only evidence of servicein the Israeli proceeding was a signature on a postal receipt whichwas "not decipherable" as Menahem's. In a supporting affidavit,Menahem stated that he had departed from Equador for Miami,Florida, on December 20, 1981, was not served in Equador onDecember 23, 1981, and that the postal receipt did not contain his"signature." Menahem further argued that Rivka had not compliedwith the procedures to register a foreign support order asspecified in section 602 of the Uniform Act (750 ILCS 22/602 (West1998)) prior to seeking its enforcement through a rule to showcause proceeding. In response, Rivka argued that the Israelijudgment had been properly registered through the petition shefiled on March 19, 1997, with the assistance of the State'sAttorney's office, but she also attached a proposed petition forregistration of a foreign judgment pursuant to the Uniform Act.

When Menahem's motion to dismiss was heard on August 6, 1999,Rivka was given leave to file her proposed petition forregistration of the foreign judgment, and she did so at theconclusion of the hearing.

In an order dated February 4, 2000, the circuit courtdetermined that it would not simultaneously rule on Rivka's requestfor support pursuant to the Uniform Act and Rivka's request for arule to show cause, because the issue of support and the issue ofindirect civil contempt were sufficiently different to warrantseparate treatment. The circuit also determined the following:

"In the ordinary case, the [Illinois] courtmust accept the [foreign] court's declarationof jurisdiction, but the transcript availablein this matter sheds important light on thematter.

There was no personal service of noticeto [Menahem] in Equador. The court could notascertain from the return postal receiptwhether [Menahem] signed for the letterbearing notice of the proceedings or not.[Menahem] did not submit to the jurisdictionof the court by filing an appearance.

* * *

The court finds, therefore, that thematter of jurisdiction is dispositive of [thepetition for rule to show cause].

***

*** [T]he Petition for Rule to Show Causeis dismissed accordingly."

On August 23, 2000, Rivka's motion for reconsideration of thedismissal was denied, and the circuit court indicated that therewas no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order. OnSeptember 15, 2000, Rivka filed this timely appeal.

Before reaching Rivka's contentions on appeal, we will firstconsider a motion that was taken with the case. Menahem is movingto strike attachments to Rivka's reply brief, specifically,evidentiary material that was never filed in the circuit court andthat is not part of the record on appeal. These attachments arephotocopies of a street map of Guayaquil, Equador, and a documententitled "Selected International Conventions: Convention of theService Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil orCommercial Matters." Rivka offers these materials to support hercontentions that (1) Pedro Carbo and Ballen are intersectingstreets, and, therefore, a person delivering mail to "Pedro Carbo809 Y Ballen" would recognize that "Y Ballen" was superfluousinformation, and that (2) Israel considers registered mail deliveryto be an acceptable form of service. Rivka contends that we maytake judicial notice of this material.

However, the contents of the attachments are not commonly andgenerally known facts that are well established within ourjurisdiction, and therefore, they are not subject to judicialnotice in this jurisdiction. Cook County Department ofEnvironmental Control v. Tomar Industries, 29 Ill. App. 3d 751,754, 331 N.E.2d 196 (1975) (a court may take judicial notice offacts that are a matter of common and general knowledge and thatare well established and known within the jurisdiction of thecourt).

Furthermore, we cannot consider the map, the "convention," orany other material outside the certified record. Harris v. OldKent Bank, 315 Ill. App. 3d 894, 898, 735 N.E.2d 758 (2000)(striking interrogatory answers attached to brief as not properlybefore the reviewing court); Jones v. Police Board, 297 Ill. App.3d 922, 930, 697 N.E.2d 876 (1998) (striking supplemental appendixwhich presented transcript of proceedings).

Finally, Rivka's attempt to introduce new arguments in herreply brief is a violation of Supreme Court Rule 341(g), whichprovides that an appellant's reply brief "shall be confinedstrictly to replying to arguments presented in the brief of theappellee." 177 Ill. 2d R. 341(g).

For these reasons, the map and "convention" attached toRivka's brief are not properly before this court and are thereforestricken.

Pursuant to the Uniform Act, a support order issued in anotherstate is registered when the order is filed in Illinois, and itshall be recognized and enforced in Illinois if the issuingtribunal had jurisdiction. 750 ILCS 22/603(a), (c) (West 1998). The term "state" includes a foreign jurisdiction that has enacteda law or established procedures for issuance and enforcement ofsupport orders which are substantially similar to the proceduresspecified in the Uniform Act, the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act or the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement ofSupport Act (750 ILCS 20/1 et seq (West 1998)). 750 ILCS 22/101(West 1998).

Citing section 606 of the Uniform Act (750 ILCS 22/606 (West1998)), Rivka argues that Menahem was barred from contesting thevalidity or enforcement of the Israeli order in Illinois when hefailed to request a hearing within 20 days of being personallyserved with the Illinois petition she filed in 1997 with theassistance of the State's Attorney's office. Section 606 provides:

"(a) A nonregistering party seeking tocontest the validity or enforcement of aregistered order in this State shall request ahearing within 20 days after the date ofmailing or personal service of notice of theregistration. The nonregistering party mayseek to vacate the registration, to assert anydefense to an allegation of noncompliance withthe registered order, or to contest theremedies being sought or the amount of anyalleged arrearages pursuant to Section 607.

(b) If the nonregistering party fails tocontest the validity or enforcement of theregistered order in a timely manner, the orderis confirmed by operation of law." 750 ILCS22/606 (West 1998).

Menahem responds that Rivka failed to notify him of the 20-daytime limit, as required by section 605 of the Uniform Act (750 ILCS22/605 (West 1998)), and therefore section 606 does not apply. Weagree. Section 605 states:

"(a) When a support order *** issued inanother state is registered, the registeringtribunal shall notify the nonregisteringparty. The notice must be accompanied by acopy of the registered order and the documentsand relevant information accompanying theorder.

(b) The notice must inform thenonregistering party:

(1) that a registered order isenforceable as of the date of registration inthe same manner as an order issued by atribunal of this State;

(2) that a hearing to contest thevalidity or enforcement of the registeredorder must be requested within 20 days afterthe date of mailing or personal service of thenotice;

(3) that failure to contest thevalidity or enforcement of the registeredorder in a timely manner will result inconfirmation of the order and enforcement ofthe order and the alleged arrearages andprecludes further contest of that order withrespect to any matter that could have beenasserted; and

(4) of the amount of any allegedarrearages." 750 ILCS 22/605 (West 1998).

The record includes Rivka's 1997 petition and the accompanyingsummons, which were served on Menahem on March 25, 1997. There isno section 605 language in either of these documents, and therecord does not disclose a separate section 605 notice. Thesummons in the record indicates that Menahem was required to filean appearance and answer by May 28, 1997, approximately two monthsafter he was served. He appeared on April 30, 1997, and filed amotion to dismiss on July 3, 1997, without any apparent objectionfrom Rivka. The summons did not state that the Israeli order isenforceable in Illinois in the same manner as an order issued by anIllinois court; it did not state that Menahem must request ahearing within 20 days and that his failure to do so would bar himfrom ever doing so, and it did not state a specific amount ofarrearages. Furthermore, the petition generally sought "collectionof arrears," rather than a specific amount of arrears. Based onthe language of section 605 and this record, we conclude that noneof the documents served on Menahem in 1997 met the requirements ofsection 605. Thus, we find that section 606 was never triggered. Therefore, the record does not support Rivka's contention thatMenahem was barred from contesting the registration and enforcementof the Israeli order in Illinois due to his failure to request ahearing within 20 days of service in 1997. See State of Washingtonv. Thompson, 339 Ark. 417, 6 S.W.3d 82 (1999) (indicating thatservice of documents which did not clearly notify defendant of theneed to request a hearing within 20 days did not bar defendant fromsubsequently presenting any defense allowed under section 607).

In his motion to dismiss, Menahem asserted section 607(a)(1)of the Uniform Act (750 ILCS 22/607(a)(1) (West 1998)) and section2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9)(1998)).

Section 607 of the Uniform Act provides that thenonregistering party may contest the validity or enforcement of aregistered order or seek to vacate the registration of the order byproving one or more enumerated defenses, including the defense thatthe issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over thecontesting party. 750 ILCS 22/607(a)(1) (West 1998).

"A section 2-619 motion to dismiss provides a means fordisposing of issues of law or easily proved issues of fact at theoutset of the case." Lang v. Silva, 306 Ill. App. 3d 960, 969, 715N.E.2d 708 (1999). When ruling on a section 2-619 motion, thecourt may consider pleadings, affidavits and depositiontranscripts. Lang, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 969. If evidentiary factsasserted in an affidavit filed in support of a motion to dismissare not refuted by a counteraffidavit, the court will take thosefacts as true (Lang, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 969-70), notwithstandingcontrary unsupported allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings(Pryweller v. Cohen, 282 Ill. App. 3d 899, 907, 668 N.E.2d 1144(1996)). When reviewing a dismissal pursuant to section 2-619, weconduct a de novo review and determine whether a genuine issue ofmaterial fact exists and whether the defendant is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law. Lang, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 970.

Rivka argues that the record established that Menahem waspersonally served by certified mail delivery in Equador on December23, 1981. Although Rivka and Menahem have spent considerableeffort questioning whether the handwritten address on the postalreceipt shows delivery was made at "Pedro Carlo 809 Y Ballen" or"Pedro Carlo 8094 Ballen," we do not consider it necessary todecipher the address, because regardless of where deliveryoccurred, Menahem's uncontroverted affidavits show that he was notproperly served.

The only evidence of service is the postal receipt signed withthe initial "M." Rivka argues that Menahem is not denying that hesometimes signs with this single initial; however, nothing in therecord establishes that in 1982 Menahem was using this singleinitial as his signature. Furthermore, in the affidavit dated July3, 1997, Menahem affirmatively stated that he "was not served withsummons through certified mail on December 23, 1981." In hisadditional affidavit, dated April 7, 1999, Menahem affirmativelystated that he "was not served with summons through certified mailor through any other service of process on December 23, 1981." Menahem also stated in both affidavits that he left Equador forMiami on December 20, 1981, three days before the purported servicein Equador on December 23, 1981, and he provided passport pagessupporting this claim.

Rivka's unsupported allegation that Menahem was "validlyserved with process on December 23, 1981," was negated by hissubsequent affidavits. Pryweller, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 907; Lang,306 Ill. App. 3d at 969-70. She did not file a counteraffidavitrefuting his factual assertions; therefore, his factual assertionsare taken as true. Pryweller, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 907; Lang, 306Ill. App. 3d at 969-70. Thus, the postal receipt establishing that"M" received certified mail in Equador on December 23, 1981, doesnot establish that Menahem received certified mail in Equador onDecember 23, 1981. We therefore find that Rivka failed to createa genuine issue of material fact over whether Menahem waspersonally served in the Israeli proceedings.

Rivka also argues that Menahem generally appeared before theIsraeli district court by sending a letter to the "Netanya CourtPresident" in response to the "Execution Bureau's" warning ofimminent execution of the support order. She cites numerousIllinois decisions indicating that a party waives any objection topersonal jurisdiction by filing a general appearance or byacknowledging that a case is properly in court by arguing themerits of the case rather the limited issue of personaljurisdiction or by subsequently accepting the benefits of thecourt's judgment. See, e.g., Community Bank & Trust Co. ofEdgewater v. Pavlich, 84 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 406 N.E.2d 164 (1980).

We reject Rivka's conclusion, because the record does notsupport it. Menahem addressed his letter to the "Court President,"and the record shows that the letter was reviewed and rejected by"the court Registrar" and the "Chairman of the Execution Bureau." In contrast, the original support proceedings were adjudicated inthe Tel Aviv district court before "Judge Berman." There is noevidence that the court president, the court registrar or theexecution bureau chairman is a judge, rather than, as each titlesuggests, a government administrator. There is also no evidencethat the execution bureau is an Israeli court, rather than, as itstitle suggests, a collection arm of the Israeli government.

As Menahem points out, Rivka's argument about the effect ofhis letter is also unpersuasive because she has not cited any caselaw indicating that interacting with a government administrator oragency is a submission to the jurisdiction of a court. Many of thecases that Rivka relies upon are distinguishable because they referto active participation in courtroom proceedings, which did notoccur here. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buchanio, 262 Ill. App.3d 910, 635 N.E.2d 980 (1994) (where mother initiated proceedingsto modify visitation arrangements, father's motion to dismissasserting that foreign court had made determinations of visitationand support was consent to court's personal jurisdiction); Weiermanv. Wood Landscaping, Inc., 259 Ill. App. 3d 300, 630 N.E.2d 1298(1994) (motion to vacate default judgments and requesting leave tofile an answer or otherwise plead was submission to court'spersonal jurisdiction); In re Estate of Zoglauer, 229 Ill. App. 3d394, 397, 593 N.E.2d 93 (1992) ("limited special appearancechallenging jurisdiction" coupled with active participation inproceedings amounted to general appearance); In re Marriage ofLenhardt, 176 Ill. App. 3d 429, 531 N.E.2d 123 (1988) ("special andlimited appearance" challenging merits of domestic violenceproceeding was general appearance); Rock Island Bank & Trust Co. v.Stauduhar, 59 Ill. App. 3d 892, 902, 375 N.E.2d 1383 (1978)(judgment was rendered without personal jurisdiction butvoluntarily appearing in court in judgment release proceedings gavecourt jurisdiction over person).

Other cases that Rivka relies upon are distinguishable becausethey involve persons who actively benefitted from a judge'sdecision, and there is no indication in the record that Menahemever attempted to do the same. For example, in In re Marriage ofPaulius, 131 Ill. App. 3d 343, 475 N.E.2d 1006 (1985), a formerhusband, who had remarried and enforced child visitation rightsrecited in a divorce decree, could not move to vacate and expungethe divorce decree. Similarly, in Lord v. Hubert, 12 Ill. 2d 83,86, 145 N.E.2d 77 (1957), although a contingent remainderman wasnot served and did not appear in farmland partition proceedings, heacknowledged and attempted to benefit from the partition byinitiating separate proceedings to obtain the sale proceeds, and hewas therefore prevented from disputing the validity of thepartition.

Therefore, we reject Rivka's unsupported claim that Menahem'spostjudgment correspondence to the "Court President" constituted ageneral appearance before the Israel courts, and we agree with thecircuit court's conclusions in this regard. Rivka did not createa genuine issue of material fact over whether Menahem generallyappeared before the Israeli court.

Rivka cites Morey Fish Co. v. Rymer Foods, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d179, 632 N.E.2d 1020 (1994), and Baldwin v. Iowa State TravelingMen's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 75 L. Ed. 1244, 51 S. Ct. 516 (1931),and argues that the principle of res judicata prevents Menahem from"relitigating" the issue of personal jurisdiction. Menahem respondsthat the issue of personal jurisdiction was never "litigated," andwe agree.

The doctrine of res judicata is based on the principle that acause of action, "once adjudicated by a court of competentjurisdiction, should be deemed conclusively settled between theparties and their privies, except in a direct proceeding to reviewor set aside such adjudication." Drabik v. Lawn Manor Savings &Loan Ass'n, 65 Ill. App. 3d 272, 276, 382 N.E.2d 333 (1978). "Thebasis of the doctrine of res judicata is that the party againstwhom the doctrine is raised has litigated or had an opportunity tolitigate the same matter in a former action." Drabik, 65 Ill. App.3d at 277. "A former judgment is deemed conclusive not only as toall matters litigated and determined, but all matters which mighthave been presented to support or defeat a claim." Drabik, 65 Ill.App. 3d 277. The doctrine of res judicata prevents repetitivelitigation in an effort to obtain judicial economy and to protectlitigants from the burden of retrying an identical cause of actionwith the same party or privy. Pedigo v. Johnson, 130 Ill. App. 3d392, 394, 474 N.E.2d 430 (1985). "Res judicata is premised on thenotion that the law affords every man his day in court along withthe opportunity to present his case on the issues involved." Pedigo, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 395.

However, it is essential that a defendant actually be affordedthe opportunity to appear, present his case, and be heard. MoreyFish, 158 Ill. 2d at 187. If a court proceeds to judgment withoutpersonal jurisdiction, the defendant need not abide by that court'sdetermination on the issue. Morey Fish, 158 Ill. 2d at 187-89,quoting Baldwin, 283 U.S. at 524-26, 75 L. Ed. at 1247 51 S. Ct. at517-18. "A court which does not have jurisdiction over a party maynot create that jurisdiction by judicial fiat" (Morey Fish, 158Ill. 2d at 189), and a judgment rendered without personaljurisdiction is void regardless of whether the defendant had actualknowledge of the proceedings (State Bank of Lake Zurich v. Thill,113 Ill. 2d 294, 308, 497 N.E.2d 1156 (1986). Accordingly, "ajudgment rendered by a court which fails to acquire jurisdictionover either the parties or the subject matter of the litigation maybe attacked and vacated at any time or in any court, eitherdirectly or collaterally." Morey Fish, 158 Ill. 2d at 186-87,citing Thill, 113 Ill. 2d at 309.

Here, the Israeli court did not hear arguments from bothparties on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Although theIsraeli court made a determination of personal jurisdiction, it didso on the basis of Rivka's arguments alone, and the record does notestablish that Menahem was properly served and therefore given theopportunity to appear, present his arguments, and be heard on thisissue. Menahem never litigated or had an opportunity to litigatethe issue of personal jurisdiction before the Israeli court;therefore, the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable to thatcourt's ex parte determination of personal jurisdiction. Drabik,65 Ill. App. 3d at 276; Morey Fish, 158 Ill. 2d at 187-89.

Rivka also argues that the Israeli default order is entitledto recognition in Illinois, due to the doctrine of comity.

Comity has been defined as the "recognition which one nationallows within its territory to the legislative, executive orjudicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to theinternational duty and convenience and to the rights of its owncitizens who are under the protection of its laws." Clubb v. Clubb,402 Ill. 390, 399-400, 84 N.E.2d 366 (1949), citing Hilton v.Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164, 40 L. Ed. 95, 108, 16 S. Ct. 139, 143(1895)). Under the doctrine of comity, Illinois courts may chooseto recognize support orders issued by foreign courts, althoughrecognition may be withheld where the foreign court lackedjurisdiction over the cause and the parties. Hager v. Hager, 1Ill. App. 3d 1047, 1051, 274 N.E.2d 157 (1971) (in personamjudgment of Greek court that did not have personal jurisdictionwill not be enforced in Illinois); Ransom v. A.B. Dick Co., 289Ill. App. 3d 663, 669, 682 N.E.2d 314 (1997) (comity is to beaccorded to an act of a foreign court as long as that court is ofcompetent jurisdiction and the laws and public policy of the forumstate are not violated). A decision by the circuit court to grantor deny comity will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 699-700.

Because the circuit court correctly found that the Israelicourt lacked personal jurisdiction over Menahem, the circuitcourt's decision to withhold comity was not an abuse of itsdiscretion. Ransom, 289 Ill. App. 3d at 699-700.

Based on the preceding analysis, we conclude that there was nogenuine issue of material fact as to whether the Israeli courtobtained personal jurisdiction over Menahem, whether hesubsequently generally appeared, or whether the doctrine of resjudicata or comity warranted enforcement of the Israeli court's exparte judgment. As there was no genuine issue of material fact,Menahem was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and thecircuit court properly granted Menahem's section 2-619(a)(9) motionto dismiss Rivka's petition for rule for show cause. Lang, 306Ill. App. 3d at 970; 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 1998).

Rivka is also appealing the denial of her motion to reconsiderthe dismissal. Rivka has waived this issue. Supreme Court Rule341(e)(7) provides that the appellant must provide argument andcitation to authority and that points not argued are waived. 134Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7). Mere contentions, without argument orcitations of authority, do not merit consideration on appeal. Inre Tally, 215 Ill. App. 3d 385, 390-91, 574 N.E.2d 1262 (1991). Rivka refers to the court's reconsideration ruling in her appellatebriefs but has not presented any argument about this particularruling and has not cited any authority on the subject ofreconsideration rulings. Rivka has not met the requirements ofRule 341(e)(7) (134 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)), and has waived thisissue (Tally, 215 Ill. App. 3d at 390-91).

Furthermore, based on our analysis determining that the motionto dismiss was properly granted, we further conclude that thecircuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rivka'smotion to reconsider the dismissal. Kaiser v. MEPC AmericanProperties, Inc., 164 Ill. App. 3d 978, 987, 518 N.E.2d 424 (1987)(purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court'sattention changes in the law, errors in the court's previousapplication of existing law, or newly discovered evidence which wasnot available at the time of the hearing the motion); AmericanNational Trust Co. v. Kentucky Fried Chicken of SouthernCalifornia, Inc., 308 Ill. App. 3d 106, 120, 719 N.E.2d 201 (1999)(decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is withinthe discretion of the court, and will not be reversed absent anabuse of that discretion).

The judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GORDON and BURKE, JJ., concur.

1. The spelling of respondent's first and last names isinconsistent in the record. His first name is spelled "Menahem" or"Menachem;" and his last name is spelled "Kohl" or "Kol."