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THIRD DIVISION
May 9, 2001

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

We are told Hindu ceremonies are composed of traditions --thousands of years old -- which ordinarily take several hours toperform. A tradition consistent among the several Hindudenominations is the bride and groom walking in a circle aroundAgni (fire), tied together, seeking blessing for the fourfoldattainments: Dharma (religious-merit), Artha (wealth), Kama(pleasure), and Moksha (salvation). Here, after a Hindu ceremonyand a later civil ceremony in Chicago, the marriage of SanjeevHasabnis and Shabnum Parti came to an end. It left behind issuesof maintenance and attorneys' fees that we address in thisappeal.

INTRODUCTION

Sanjeev and Shabnum were married in a Hindu ceremony inAtlanta, Georgia, on May 11, 1996, and in a civil ceremony inChicago, Illinois, on July 16, 1996. Approximately 16 monthslater, Sanjeev and Shabnum separated. They attempted toreconcile in January and February 1998, but on May 29, 1998,Sanjeev, the husband, filed a petition for dissolution ofmarriage.

The trial court entered a Judgment of Dissolution ofMarriage on July 23, 1999. In this appeal Sanjeev raises issuesconcerning maintenance and attorney fees. He contends the trialcourt (1) abused its discretion when it awarded Shabnum $96,000in non-modifiable maintenance in gross, and (2) incorrectlyinterpreted section 503(j) of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act (IMDMA) (750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West1998)) when it ordered Sanjeev to contribute $55,000 -- for atotal fee award of $90,000 toward Shabnum's attorneys' fees --without allowing Sanjeev to review Shabnum's attorneys' timerecords or to present evidence of the "reasonableness andnecessity" of her attorneys' fees. We affirm the trial court.

FACTS

The trial on Sanjeev's Petition for Dissolution of Marriagebegan on November 30, 1998. At the time of trial, Sanjeev was 34years old, Shabnum was 30 years old, and they did not have anychildren (adopted or otherwise). The facts of this case are notin dispute.

Sanjeev Hasabnis

Sanjeev is from Illinois and a doctor of osteopathicmedicine. Just after Sanjeev and Shabnum's marriage in June1996, they moved to Evanston. During Sanjeev and Shabnum'smarriage, from June 1996 through June 1999, Sanjeev was aresident at Evanston Hospital. Sanjeev completed his residencyat Evanston Hospital in 1999, and in July 2000 he began a three-year fellowship in cardiology at Tulane University in NewOrleans. Until his fellowship is complete, Sanjeev's annualsalary is, and will be, about $30,000.

Sanjeev's non-marital property, which is income-producing,is significantly greater than Shabnum's. Although Sanjeev andShabnum had little marital property, Sanjeev's non-marital estateat the time of trial was about $1,000,000. As of July 7, 1999,Sanjeev's trust at Mellon Bank held $250,000, and his gift ofstock in a Putnam Voyager Fund from his parents - held in a PaineWebber account - had grown to $900,000.

Shabnum Hasabnis

Shabnum is from Georgia and is a licensed optometrist. In1994 she graduated from optometry school at the University ofAlabama and moved back home to Atlanta, Georgia. Shabnumobtained her optometrist license in Georgia, and from April 1995to November 1995 she worked with an ophthalmologist. In January1996, Shabnum started working for Pearl Vision, earning an annualsalary of about $80,000.

In March 1996, Shabnum left Pearl Vision in anticipation ofher marriage to Sanjeev in May 1996. After marrying Sanjeev, andmoving to Illinois, Shabnum obtained an Illinois optometristlicense. From January 1997 to October 1997, Shabnum worked part-time for LensCrafters, earning about $30.00/hour.

In October 1997, Sanjeev and Shabnum separated. FromOctober 1997 to May 1998, Shabnum was unemployed for reasonsrelated to their separation, e.g., Sanjeev demanded Shabnum leaveIllinois for six weeks in November and December 1997 as acondition of his attending marital counseling. Sanjeev filed thepetition for dissolution of marriage after the couple failed toreconcile.

Following Sanjeev and Shabnum's separation, Shabnum resumedworking at LensCrafters on a part-time basis - May through June1998. On June 15, 1998, six months before trial and afterSanjeev moved out of their Evanston apartment, Shabnum producedan asset disclosure statement setting forth her 1998 gross incomeof $6,619 and net income of $4,925. Averaged out for the year,her net monthly income was $988 and her monthly living expenseswere $5,085 (a shortfall of about $4,000).

In September 1998, Shabnum moved back to her parent's homein Atlanta, Georgia. At the time of trial, Shabnum wasunemployed. However, she did find work on a day-by-day basis asan independent contractor earning about $30.00/hour.

The Parents

Sanjeev and Shabnum's parents were very involved in thecouple's meeting, courtship, and marriage. Their parents hadseveral conversations, without Sanjeev and Shabnum, regardingSanjeev and Shabnum's finances and the extent to which Sanjeev'sparents would financially assist the couple while Sanjeev pursuedhis fellowship and residency. Consequently, Sanjeev's parentsprovided significant financial assistance to Sanjeev and Shabnumduring their three-year marriage.

During the course of Sanjeev and Shabnum's courtship andmarriage, they received various gifts from their parents,including a car (a Lexus worth $31,000), money ($26,400 for rent,$6,500 cash, and $3,500 for credit card payments), jewelry andclothing (worth $21,000 in total), and rugs. In addition,Sanjeev and Shabnum acquired various items of marital property,including furniture, furnishings, another automobile, bankaccounts, and individual retirement accounts (IRA).

The Trial Court's Memorandum Opinions

The trial court, after considering all the evidence,testimony, and arguments, entered its Judgment of Dissolution ofMarriage. Attached were three detailed Memorandum Opinions: (1)a Memorandum Opinion on March 23, 1999, containing the trialcourt's findings and rulings; (2) a Supplemental MemorandumOpinion on May 21, 1999, modifying the prior Memorandum Opinion;and, (3) a Memorandum Opinion on July 23, 1999, containing thetrial court's findings and rulings on the issue of Sanjeev'scontribution to Shabnum's attorneys' fees.

MARCH 23, 1999, MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court, after considering the factors set forth insection 504(a) of the IMDMA (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 1998),found:

"-Sanjeev has a considerable non-marital estate;

-Shabnum is currently unemployed and has no income withwhich to meet her daily needs;

-Shabnum's earning capacity has been impaired, at least on atemporary basis, by her marriage. Shabnum was required tochange her employment positions on at least two occasions inorder to accommodate Sanjeev's career (i.e., the move toEvanston) and to placate Sanjeev's demands on their marriage(i.e., Sanjeev's demand that Shabnum leave the State ofIllinois for six weeks in November, 1997);

-the parties enjoyed a very comfortable lifestyle during thecourse of their marriage; and,

-Shabnum made significant contributions to the domesticduties of the marriage and to the support of Sanjeev'scareer." Mem. Op. at 6 (March 23, 1999)

Sanjeev contended Shabnum was not a candidate formaintenance because she had the ability to work. He claimedShabnum intentionally delayed securing full-time employment inanticipation of the trial court's decision. The trial courtdisagreed.

The court said: "Sanjeev considerably underestimates thenegative impact this marriage has had on the progress ofShabnum's career and her employment opportunities." The courtthen awarded Shabnum $4,000 per month in non-modifiablemaintenance, retroactive to June 1988 through May 2000, withSanjeev to receive credit for the maintenance payments he hasmade.

Sanjeev was awarded the following non-marital property(totaling over $900,000 as of the date of trial):

(1) the account held at Mellon Bank with a balance of about$173,000 (about $250,000 as of July 7, 1999);

(2) the furniture and furnishings in his possession (about$25,000), which were purchased with funds from hisMellon Bank account;

(3) the Paine Webber account into which the Putnam Gift wastransferred with a balance of $778,722.87 (about$900,000 as of July 7, 1999); and,

(4) the First Chicago account in his name (about $1,700).

Sanjeev was awarded the following marital property (totalingabout $9,100):

(1) the Bank One checking account in his name (about$1,600);

(2) the IRA in his name (about $2,000);

(3) the 1993 Acura automobile in his possession (about$13,000); and,

(4) the MBNA credit card debt in his name (about $7,500).

Shabnum was awarded the following non-marital property:

(1) the jewelry and clothing given her by Sanjeev's parents(about $21,000);

(2) all furniture and furnishings in her possession, ownedby her prior to marriage.

(1) two checking accounts in her name in the State ofGeorgia (about $3,000);

(2) the IRA in her name (about $2,000);

(3) the 1995 Lexus in her possession (about $17,100); and,

(4) all other furniture and furnishings within herpossession and control.

On March 29, 1999, after the Memorandum Opinion of March 23,1999, Sanjeev filed a notice to produce for reproduction pursuantto Illinois Supreme Court Rule 214. The notice to producerequested Shabnum's attorneys produce their billing records inconnection with their representation of Shabnum from the case'sinception.

On April 6, 1999, Shabnum filed objections to Sanjeev'snotice to produce.

On April 12, 1999, Sanjeev filed a motion to reopen proofsto permit examination of Shabnum's employment and income sinceshe moved back to her parent's home in Georgia. On April 16,1999, Shabnum filed a motion to strike Sanjeev's motion to reopenproofs, which the trial court granted on April 26, 1999.

MAY 21, 1999, SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION

The trial court modified three aspects of the MemorandumOpinion of March 23, 1999: (1) Sanjeev's contribution toShabnum's attorneys' fees; (2) the monthly amount, duration, andtax consequences of Shabnum's maintenance award; and, (3) themodifiability of her maintenance award.

Because the court did not find any support for itsunderstanding that the parties agreed to deciding the issue ofcontribution of attorneys' fees contemporaneously with the trial,it vacated the order directing Sanjeev to pay one hundred percentof Shabnum's "reasonable and necessary" attorneys' fees.

Instead, the trial court ordered a contribution hearing tobe held pursuant to section 503(j) (750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West1998)). The court said, "if necessary[,] after the contributionhearing, the court will conduct a hearing on the reasonablenessand necessity of the attorneys' fees."

The court also acknowledged that the March 23, 1999,Memorandum Opinion failed to address income tax consequences ofShabnum's maintenance award. Accordingly, it modified the March23, 1999, Memorandum Opinion as follows:

"The court *** determines that Shabnum's marriage hasdisrupted her life, her career and negatively impacted heremployment opportunities. Therefore, the court awardsShabnum, pursuant to Section 504 of Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act and In re Marriage of Schlosser,241 Ill. App. 3d 49 (3d Dist. 1993), maintenance in gross inthe sum of $96,000 which is to be non-modifiable, except inthe event of Shabnum's death. The maintenance in grossshall be made in equal monthly payments of $2,666.67retroactive to June, 1998 with the last payment to be madein May, 2001. Sanjeev shall receive credit for thosemaintenance payments he has made pursuant to the temporaryorders." Mem. Op. at 2 (May 21, 1999)

On June 11, 1999, Sanjeev presented the trial court with hisrequest for approval of letters rogatory. Shabnum's father,Surinda Parti, in an engagement agreement between Shabnum and hercounsel, guaranteed payment of Shabnum's attorneys' fees in theevent Shabnum failed to pay her counsel. As such, Sanjeev soughtto take the deposition of Surinda Parti, in Georgia, on the issueof a guarantee of payment. On June 11, 1999, the court deniedSanjeev's request for approval of letters rogatory.

On June 23, 1999, in compliance with a June 17, 1999, courtorder, Shabnum filed answers to interrogatories that disclosedShabnum's employment and income since she moved back to herparent's home in Georgia, and produced her pay stubs from March3, 1999 through June 16, 1999. She disclosed that in January 1999, she made $1,775.00; in February 1999, shemade $1,500.00; in March 1999, she made $6,900.00; in April 1999, she made $7,635.00; in May 1999, she made$7,670.00; in June 1999, she made $3,465.00 (through June 16, 1999). Shabnum also said she was still living with her parents and shedetailed her monthly living expenses, which totaled about $1,220.

JULY 23, 1999, MEMORANDUM OPINION

On July 29, 1998, September 24, 1998, and May 21, 1999, thecourt had entered Orders requiring Sanjeev to pay a total of$35,000 in interim attorneys' fees to Shabnum's counsel. On June30, 1999, Shabnum owed an outstanding balance of $76,392.01 toher lawyer. On July 7, 1999, the court held a contributionhearing pursuant to section 503(j) (750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West1998)).

Following the contribution hearing, the court made findingswith respect to contribution:

"Pursuant to the Memorandum Opinion issued on March 23, 1999and the Supplemental Memorandum Opinion issued on May 21,1999, the court previously identified the factors pursuantto Section 504 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act that justify the award of maintenance in grossin this case. With respect to the factors set forth inSection 503(d) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution ofMarriage Act, the court makes the following findings:Shabnum made significant contributions during the parties'brief marriage; Sanjeev dissipated marital assets; Sanjeevhas significant non-marital assets; Shabnum hasinsignificant non-marital assets; and the assets of themarital estate are insignificant, consisting primarily of anautomobile given to the parties by Sanjeev's parents.

Given the court's consideration of the facts of this caseand the factors set forth in Sections 503 and 504 of theIllinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the courthereby orders Sanjeev to contribute the additional sum of$55,000 toward the outstanding balance of attorneys' feesand costs incurred by Shabnum ***." Mem. Op. at 3 (July 23,1999)

Sanjeev contended Shabnum should be responsible for herlegal fees because she refused to settle the case. In support ofhis argument, Sanjeev asked the trial court to consider In reMarriage of Mantei, 222 Ill. App. 3d 933, 583 N.E.2d 1192 (1991)and In re Marriage of Auriemma, 271 Ill. App. 3d 68, 648 N.E.2d118 (1995).

The court found the cases cited by Sanjeev were notapplicable to its consideration of contribution. The court said,

"First, the court finds that Shabnum was not extremelylitigious in this case. In fact, Shabnum and counsel forShabnum were extremely cooperative in accommodatingSanjeev's request to place this case "on the fast track." Between June and December, 1998, Shabnum did not present amyriad of motions for consideration by the court. Shabnumcooperated with discovery and stipulated to the grounds forthe dissolution of marriage. Throughout the pendency ofthis case, Shabnum and [her counsel] have confined theissues in the case to the characterization of the PutnamGift, support for Shabnum and the payment of attorneys'fees. At no time did Shabnum present irrelevant orsuperfluous issues to the court.

Sanjeev filed his petition for dissolution for marriage inJune, 1998, discovery was conducted, and the case was triedin December, 1998. Given that this case was tried withinsix months from the date that the petition for dissolutionof marriage was filed, the court strongly disagrees withSanjeev's assertion that the case, and the litigants, werecompletely out of control[,] as was the case in Auriemma.

Second, the court disagrees with Sanjeev that Shabnum bearsthe responsibility for the parties' failure to settle thecase. Based upon the testimony at the hearing on theContribution Petition, the court finds that neither theparties nor their counsel engaged in any settlementnegotiations. Moreover, the court does not considerShabnum's refusal to acquiesce to Sanjeev's position to betantamount to an unwillingness to compromise[,] as waspresent in Mantei. If the refusal to acquiesce to thedemands of the other party is the measure of unwillingnessto settle[,] then Sanjeev is just as responsible as Shabnumfor the parties' failure to settle the case. Indeed, itwould be difficult for the court to determine which of thetwo parties was more recalcitrant in their position." Mem.Op. at 2 (July 23, 1999)

This appeal followed from the Judgment of Dissolution ofMarriage entered on July 23, 1999.

Additional Issues Raised On Appeal

In addition to appealing Shabnum's award of maintenance in-gross and contribution to her attorneys' fees, Sanjeev contendsthe trial court erred: (1) when it sustained Shabnum's objectionsto Sanjeev's notice to produce Shabnum's attorneys' time records;(2) when it granted Shabnum's motion to strike Sanjeev's motionto reopen proofs to discover Shabnum's earnings after her returnto Georgia; and, (3) when it denied Sanjeev's request forapproval to issue letters rogatory to take the out-of-statediscovery deposition of Shabnum's father who had guaranteedpayment of Shabnum's attorneys' fees.

DECISION

Maintenance

Sanjeev contends the trial court abused its discretion inawarding maintenance to Shabnum in the amount of $96,000 in non-modifiable maintenance in gross -- to be made in equal monthlypayments of $2,666.67 retroactive to June 1998 with the lastpayment to be made in May 2001. Sanjeev appeals (1) Shabnum'sright to maintenance, (2) the amount and duration of themaintenance award, and (3) its "in gross" nature.

He also contends the trial court erred in granting Shabnum'smotion to strike and dismiss Sanjeev's motion to reopen proofswhich sought to allow evidence of Shabnum's employment and incomefollowing her return to Georgia in September 1998.

The propriety, amount, and duration of a maintenance awardlie within the sound discretion of the trial court and will notbe disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In reMarriage of Gattone, 317 Ill. App. 3d 346, 355, 739 N.E.2d 998(2000). An abuse of discretion occurs where no reasonable personwould take the view adopted by the trial court. In re Marriageof Grunsten, 304 Ill. App. 3d 12, 20, 709 N.E.2d 597 (1999).

We find no abuse of discretion in the amount or nature ofthe trial court's award of maintenance.

[Nonpublishable material under Supreme Court Rule 23omitted here]

Attorney Fees

On July 7, 1999, before the Judgment of Dissolution ofMarriage, the trial court held a contribution hearing pursuant tosection 503(j) (750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 1998)). Following thecontribution hearing, the court ordered Sanjeev, in"consideration of the facts of this case and the factors setforth in Sections 503[(d)] and 504[(a)] of the Illinois Marriageand Dissolution of Marriage Act," to contribute an additional$55,000 toward the outstanding balance of Shabnum's attorney'sfees (bringing the total to $90,000).

Sanjeev contends: (1) the trial court committed error byinterpreting section 503(j) as not requiring a determination ofthe "reasonableness and necessity" of Shabnum's attorneys' fees;(2) the court erred in sustaining Shabnum's objections to theproduction of her attorneys' billing records on the grounds ofattorney-client privilege and standing; (3) the court abused itsdiscretion in failing to review Shabnum's attorneys' billingrecords; (4) the court erred in denying Sanjeev's request forapproval of letters rogatory to depose Shabnum's father withrespect to his guaranty of her attorneys' fees; and, (5) thecourt abused it discretion in requiring Sanjeev to contribute$90,000 in toto toward Shabnum's attorneys' fees, in light of herability to pay her own attorneys' fees through her earned incomeand the guaranty signed by her father.

SECTION 508(a) AND SECTION 503(j) OF THE IMDMA

Before June 1, 1997, section 508 of the IMDMA governed theaward of attorney fees and final fee petitions (i.e., whetherattorney fees are reasonable and necessary) in dissolution cases. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 1994). Former section 508(a) provided:

"The court from time to time, after due notice andhearing, and after considering the financial resources ofthe parties, may order any party to pay a reasonable amountfor his own costs and attorney's fees and for the costs andattorney's fees necessarily incurred *** [by the opposingparty]." (Emphasis added) 750 ILCS 5/508(a) (West 1994).

Effective June 1, 1997, the legislature amended the IMDMA bysubstantially changing section 508 and adding section 503(j)(1997 Amendments) (see Pub. Act. 89--712,