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THIRD DIVISION
May 28, 2003

The plaintiff, as guardian of her disabled adult daughter,is seeking financial support from her ex-husband's estate. Twojudges in the trial court dismissed four counts of her complaint. Three were dismissed because they were not timely filed pursuantto the nonclaim statute of the Probate Act, and one was dismissedbecause another case was pending in California for the samecause. The plaintiff appeals the trial court's dismissal of herclaims. We affirm the dismissals.

FACTS

Marilyn D. Epsteen, now known as Marilyn D. Zalud (Marilyn),was divorced from Peter Epsteen (Peter) on August 14, 1973, inCook County, Illinois. Jill Ann Epsteen (Jill) was born toMarilyn and Peter on July 16, 1961. Jill is mentally disabledwith an I.Q. of 58. She was adjudicated a disabled person andmade a ward of the court by the Circuit Court of Cook County onJuly 8, 1991. Marilyn was appointed the Plenary Guardian ofJill's estate and person.

According to a Supplemental Judgment for Divorce enteredDecember 21, 1973, Peter was required to pay $300 per month inchild support for Jill. The judgment also required that Peter:

"i) *** pay and defray in their entirety the costs andexpenses of providing for JILL ANN EPSTEEN, minor child ofthe parties hereto, subject to further order of this courtor agreement of the parties hereon, such special therapy andeducation as may from time to time be requisite for thecure, treatment, alleviation or palliation of the conditionof mild mental retardation and perceptual learningdifficulties which the said JILL ANN EPSTEIN experiencesregardless of the attainment by her of the age of majority. It is further ordered that the parties hereto join in themaking of an application to competent authority of the Stateof Illinois, or any political subdivision thereof, for agrant or grants of funds in aid of the treatment or specialeducation of the said JILL ANN EPSTEEN, and that to theextent that any such funds may be derived, the same shall bedelivered to, and shall be and remain the property of[Peter]."

Peter was required to pay the premiums on two life insurancepolicies. One policy was for $100,000, and the other was for$35,000. Marilyn was the primary beneficiary of both policies. The judgment forbade Marilyn or Peter from doing anything whichwould effectuate any diminution in the face value of the lifeinsurance policies.

According to both parties, after the divorce Peter moved toCalifornia and resided there until his death.

On July 15, 1992, Marilyn filed a petition asking for "theaward of a sum of money from the property of Peter Epsteen forthe support of Jill Ann Epsteen." In an agreed order dated July30, 1993, the court, among other things, ordered Peter to pay$725 per month to Marilyn for Jill's support. Marilyn's July 15petition was continued and set for status. In the sameparagraph, the order stated: "[t]he parties stipulate and agreethat the estate plan shall take effect upon Peter's death and notduring his lifetime."

Peter died on December 8, 1997, in Palm Springs, California,leaving an estate with an estimated value of $650,000. Mary B.Epsteen (Mary), Peter's wife, was appointed executrix of hisestate. His will provided: "From a prior marriage, I have four(4) children now living, namely DEBRA PETTIT, JAMES EPSTEEN, JILLANN EPSTEEN, and CINDY EPSTEEN and one (1) deceased child, namelyLORI ANN EPSTEEN. *** I have intentionally and with fullknowledge omitted to provide for my children from my priormarriage and all other persons not mentioned in this instrument."

California Proceedings

On March 10, 1998, Mary filed a Petition for Probate of Willand for Letters Testamentary with the Superior Court ofCalifornia, County of Riverside. Peter's will was admitted toprobate on April 13, 1998. On August 7, 1998, Marilyn, asguardian of Jill's person and estate, filed a creditor's claimfor $11 million against Peter's estate. In an attachment, shecontended the cost of maintaining Jill was approximately $80,000per year, and Jill's life expectancy was 78 years, of which 41years were remaining. Jill lived in a community living facilityin Illinois and was a public charge. On October 5, 1998, Maryfiled a rejection of the creditor's claim.

On October 19, 1998, in Riverside County, California,Marilyn filed a Petition for Family Allowance, seekingenforcement of the $725 monthly support payments which had ceasedafter Peter's death in December 1997. Mary filed an Objection tothe Petition for Family Allowance, contending Jill had received$550 per month in social security benefits, which should beapplied to offset any obligation the estate might have. TheObjection also stated Marilyn had received life insuranceproceeds in excess of $100,000, from a life insurance policymaintained by Peter for Jill's benefit, the proceeds to be usedfor Jill's support and maintenance.

On December 24, 1998, in Riverside County, California,Marilyn filed a Complaint for Support of Disabled Person and forQuasi-Specific Performance and Imposition of Constructive Trust,requesting an award equal to the cost of supporting andmaintaining Jill for the remainder of her life, estimated at$80,000 per year and in excess of $10 million over Jill'slifetime. The complaint set out three causes of action: (1) thatthe defendants--Mary, as executrix of Peter's estate and trusteeof the Epsteen Family Trust, and David Roth, as co-trustee--wereliable for the support of Jill as a disabled adult child; (2)that Peter's estate was in violation of the divorce judgment andthe agreed order, by failing to pay child support, failing to paythe premiums of the two life insurance policies, and failing toprovide for Jill's support in the estate plan; and, (3) that aconstructive trust be imposed upon the property of the probateestate and the Epsteen Family Trust in order to provide forJill's support. The complaint also sought an award ofmiscellaneous costs incurred in caring for Jill prior to Peter'sdeath, in the amount of $13,243.24. The awards were to come fromPeter's estate, and then from the Epsteen Family Trust. Mary filed a motion for summary judgment, contending theState of Illinois had exclusive jurisdiction over the courtorders arising from the dissolution of marriage. She contendedthe California court had no power to change or modify theIllinois order; at best, the court could enforce the existingorder of $725 per month in incidental support. According toMary, this amount had been paid monthly since Peter's death.

On May 17, 2000, the Superior Court of California, County ofRiverside, entered an order staying the action to determinewhether a suit had been filed by Marilyn in Illinois for Jill'sfinancial support. Marilyn filed the instant complaint inIllinois on April 10, 2000. While the case was pending inIllinois, the California court lifted the stay and granted Mary'smotion for summary judgment. Marilyn appealed. The Court ofAppeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District,issued an unpublished opinion on December 23, 2002. The courtreversed summary judgment on Counts I and II of the complaint butaffirmed summary judgment on Count III, the claim for quasi-specific performance. Marilyn was granted costs for the appeal.

Illinois Proceedings

On April 10, 2000, Marilyn filed her Complaint to EnforceSupplemental Judgment of Divorce of December 21, 1973, in theCircuit Court of Cook County, Domestic Relations Division. Therelevant counts for purposes of this appeal are Counts IIIthrough VI. Count III sought restitution against the estate forPeter's failure to pay premiums on the two life insurancepolicies, causing one policy to be terminated and the otherdiminished in value. Count IV sought modification of the $725monthly support payments for Jill, pursuant to section 510 of theIllinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, based on thediscovery of decedent's large estate. Count V sought financialsupport for Jill in the amount of expenses paid by the State ofIllinois, pursuant to section 513 of the Act. Count VI soughtenforcement of an estate plan which was to have includedprovisions for Jill's support.

Mary brought a 2-619 motion to dismiss Counts IV, V, and VI,contending: (1) the complaint was time-barred, pursuant tosection 510 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of MarriageAct and section 18-12 of the Probate Act, requiring a claim to bebrought within two years of the decedent's death (750 ILCS 5/510(West 2000); 755 ILCS 5/18-12 (West 2000)), and (2) the complaintwas an improper splitting of an action between California andIllinois, based on section 2-619(a)(3) of the Illinois Code ofCivil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(3) (West 2000)) (anotheraction pending between the same parties for the same cause). In a January 5, 2001, order, Judge Edmund Ponce de Leongranted the motions to dismiss and for judgment on the pleadingsas to Counts IV, V, and VI. The court held Counts IV and V werenot commenced within the time limited by law (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 2000)), and Count VI was a split action, based onsection 2-619(a)(3) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(3) (West 2000)). Marilyn filed an amended motion to reconsider on February 5,2001. The motion was denied. On April 2, 2002, Judge Nancy Katzgranted Mary's motion to dismiss Count III of the complaint,finding it was time-barred under section 510 of the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Judge Katz agreed withJudge Ponce de Leon's ruling on the timeliness of this action. Whether she believed she was bound by it is not clear from therecord. Her order of dismissal is based on section 2-619(a)(5). Marilyn has appealed both judges' orders, which were consolidatedon appeal.

Cross-Appeal: Motion for Sanctions

After Marilyn filed her motion to reconsider, Mary brought amotion for Supreme Court Rule 137 sanctions. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. Mary does not provide a citation to the record for this motion,and we are unable to find a copy of the motion in the record. OnMay 4, 2001, Judge Ponce de Leon entered an order denyingMarilyn's motion for reconsideration and denying Mary's motionfor sanctions. Marilyn's Notice of Appeal was filed May 31,2001. Mary filed a notice of cross-appeal on June 8, 2001,appealing the denial of sanctions.⁽¹⁾

DECISION

I. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(3)

Judge Ponce de Leon dismissed Count VI of Marilyn'scomplaint because, pursuant to section 2-619(a)(3) of the Code ofCivil Procedure, there was another action pending between thesame parties for the same cause. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(3) (West2000). In his memorandum opinion, Judge Ponce de Leon held:"MARILYN, as guardian of the estate of JILL, has previously filedclaim against the estate of PETER in the State of California, onOctober 15, 1998 and December 24, 1998, requesting similarrelief, which would have been the proper place to bring such aclaim, since it is in the State of California that PETER'S estateaction has been opened. It is there that a claim must be filed. MARILYN is attempting to split the cause of action, which ispiecemeal and duplicative. The purpose of 2-619(a)(3) is tofurther judicial economy by avoiding duplicative litigation.[Citation.] Thus, enforcement of a claim, if any exist, is forthe California Courts to determine, and not Illinois, and CountVI should be dismissed."

Count VI contended that in the agreed order entered July 30,1993, Peter represented to the court that he would providesupport for Jill by way of an estate plan, and he failed to makesuch an estate plan. The relevant paragraph in the agreed orderstates: "5. That the 'Petition for Establishment for the Award ofa Sum of Money from the Property of Peter Epsteen for the Supportof Jill Ann Epsteen' filed by Marilyn on the 15th day of July,1992 is continued and set for STATUS on the ___ day of July, 1993at 9:30 p.m. in Courtroom 703 at 1340 S. Michigan Avenue,Chicago, Illinois without further notice to the parties. Theparties stipulate and agree that the estate plan shall takeeffect upon Peter's death and not during his lifetime." Count VIprayed for an order of the court enforcing an estate plan againstPeter's estate to provide for the care, maintenance, and welfareof Jill, for her remaining life expectancy.

In the California complaint, the Second Cause of Actioncontended: "the provisions of Peter Epsteen's Last Will and TheEpsteen Family Trust were not amended thereafter to provide forJill's support and maintenance, that Jill is not a beneficiaryunder the Epsteen Family Trust or any other entity established byPeter Epsteen and, accordingly, that Peter Epsteen's estate plandid not provide for the support of Jill, contrary to the AgreedOrder in the Divorce Proceeding and the representations made byand on Peter Epsteen's behalf in connection therewith." Thecomplaint contended that the estate was liable for the supportand maintenance of Jill, or if the estate was inadequate, thedefendants as trustees were liable. The Third Cause of Action inCalifornia alleged the same basis and asked for the remedies ofquasi-specific performance and the imposition of a constructivetrust on the assets of the estate for Jill's support andmaintenance.

Section 2-619(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure allows adefendant to move for a dismissal or a stay when there is"another action pending between the same parties for the samecause." 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(3) (West 2000). The purpose of thesection is to avoid duplicative litigation. However, a trialcourt is not required to dismiss a proceeding under section 2-619(a)(3) even when the "same cause" and "same parties"requirements are met. Zurich Insurance Co. v. BaxterInternational, Inc., 173 Ill. 2d 235, 243, 670 N.E.2d 664 (1996). Rather, the decision to grant or deny the motion is discretionarywith the trial court. Kellerman v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,112 Ill. 2d 428, 447, 493 N.E.2d 1045 (1986). We review thetrial court's decision by applying an abuse of discretionstandard. Doutt v. Ford Motor Co., 276 Ill. App. 3d 785, 789,659 N.E.2d 89 (1995).

Factors a court should consider in deciding whether todismiss a case under 2-619(a)(3) include: comity; the preventionof multiplicity, vexation, and harassment; the likelihood ofobtaining complete relief in the foreign jurisdiction; and theres judicata effect of a foreign judgment in the local forum. Kellerman, 112 Ill. 2d at 447-48. The court also must weigh theprejudice to the nonmovant if the motion is granted against thepolicy of avoiding duplicative litigation. Kapoor v. FujisawaPharmaceutical Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 780, 785-86, 699 N.E.2d 1095(1998).

The section refers to the "same cause," not the "same causeof action." Actions are "for the same cause" when "relief isrequested on substantially the same set of facts." Skolnick v.Martin, 32 Ill. 2d 55, 57, 203 N.E.2d 428 (1964). The "sameparties" requirement is met where the litigants' interests aresufficiently similar, even though the litigants differ in name ornumber. Doutt, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 788.

We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion indismissing Count VI under section 2-619(a)(3). The parties arenot identical but are sufficiently similar to meet the "sameparties" requirement. The Illinois proceeding names asadditional defendants National Life Insurance Company a/k/aNational Life of Vermont, Lori Ann Epsteen, Cynthia MarieEpsteen, Debra Ann Epsteen, and James Alvin Epsteen. Thelitigants' interests are similar to those in the Californialawsuit; in both suits, Marilyn contends that Peter's estate planfailed to provide for Jill's support and maintenance, and sheseeks financial relief from the estate and the family trusts. The "same cause" requirement is similarly satisfied, as the twosuits arise from the same set of facts and issues.

It appears that the trial court applied the proper analysisin balancing the policy of avoiding duplicative litigationagainst the interests of the plaintiff. California has a greaterinterest in litigation over an interest in Peter's estate sincethat is where the estate is located and where Epsteen's will wasadmitted to probate.

Marilyn does not respond to the contention that the lawsuitsin Illinois and California involve the same parties and the samecause. Rather, she contends the dismissal of Count VI as a splitaction improperly rewards legal maneuvering by the defendants. According to Marilyn, she was forced to pursue her action againstthe estate in California because the Illinois courts lackedsubject matter jurisdiction over the estate.

Most of Marilyn's claims live on in the Californialitigation. See Zalud v. Epsteen, No. E031075 (Cal. Ct. App.December 23, 2002). In the unreported California appellateopinion, the court first held the trial court did not err ingranting Mary's motion for summary judgment as to the claim forquasi-specific performance. Marilyn had asked for quasi-specificperformance of Peter's agreement in the 1993 Agreed Order toprovide for Jill's future support as part of his estate plan. The court held there was no such agreement created by thelanguage of the agreed order. Second, the court reversed summaryjudgment as to the claim for incidental support of $725 permonth. That portion of the Agreed Order was not, as the trialcourt held, already being enforced by the probate court order forfamily allowance. The instant action sought permanent childsupport for the rest of Jill's expected life, not temporaryfamily allowance. Finally, the court reversed summary judgmentas to the claim for "primary support," the special therapy andeducation required to treat Jill's mental retardation andlearning disabilities. The court held this claim was not seekingto "modify" the existing support order, but only to estimate thecost of primary support for the remainder of Jill's life andenforce the Illinois court's 1973 order.

Whether one cause of action was disposed of through summaryjudgment is irrelevant to our 2-619(a)(3) analysis. Looking atthe complaints themselves, it is clear that they involve the sameparties and the same cause.

II. 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5)

Judge Ponce de Leon dismissed Counts IV and V, and Judge Katz dismissed Count III, as time-barred under section 2-619(a)(5). Count IV was brought pursuant to section 510 of theIllinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, and Count Vwas brought pursuant to section 513. Judge Katz found thatsection 510 applied to Count III because it was in the nature ofenforcement. We examine these dismissals by applying a denovo standard of review. Carver v. Nall, 186 Ill. 2d 554, 557,714 N.E.2d 486 (1999).

Section 510 provides:

"(d) *** When a parent obligated to pay support oreducational expenses, or both, dies, the amount ofsupport or educational expenses, or both, may beenforced, modified, revoked or commuted to a lump sumpayment, as equity may require, and that determinationmay be provided for at the time of the dissolution ofthe marriage or thereafter.

(e) The right to petition for support or educationalexpenses, or both, under Sections 505 and 513 is notextinguished by the death of a parent. Upon a petitionfiled before or after a parent's death, the court mayaward sums of money out of the decedent's estate forthe child's support or educational expenses, or both,as equity may require. The time within which a claimmay be filed against the estate of a decedent underSections 505 and 513 and subsection (d) and thissubsection shall be governed by the provisions of theProbate Act of 1975, as a barrable, noncontingentclaim." 750 ILCS 5/510(d),(e) (West 2000).

Section 513 provides:

"(a) The court may award sums of money out of theproperty and income of either or both parties or theestate of a deceased parent, as equity may require, forthe support of the child or children of the parties whohave attained majority in the following instances:

(1) When the child is mentally or physically disabledand not otherwise emancipated, an application forsupport may be made before or after the child hasattained majority." 750 ILCS 5/513(a) (West 2000).

The parties agree that section 18-12 of the Probate Actdefines the limitations period for purposes of sections 510 and513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Section 18-12 states:

"(a) Every claim against the estate of a decedent,except expenses of administration and survivingspouse's or child's award, is barred as to all of thedecedent's estate if:

(1) Notice is given to the claimant as provided inSection 18-3 and the claimant does not file aclaim with the representative or the court on orbefore the date stated in the notice; or

(2) Notice of disallowance is given to theclaimant as provided in Section 18-11 and theclaimant does not file a claim with the court onor before the date stated in the notice; or

(3) The claimant or the claimant's address is notknown to or reasonably ascertainable by therepresentative and the claimant does not file aclaim with the representative or the court on orbefore the date stated in the published notice asprovided in Section 18-3.

(b) Unless sooner barred under subsection (a) of thisSection, all claims which could have been barred underthis Section are, in any event, barred 2 years afterdecedent's death, whether or not letters of office areissued upon the estate of the decedent." 755 ILCS5/18-12(a),(b) (West 2000).

Here, Peter died on December 8, 1997, and Marilyn filed herpetition on April 10, 2000, more than two years after the date ofdeath. Section 18-12 was adopted to facilitate the earlysettlement of estates. In re: The Estate of Harold Beider, 268Ill. App. 3d 1094, 1096, 645 N.E.2d 553 (1994). The filing of aclaim within the statutory period is mandatory, and "no exceptionto the filing period may be engrafted by judicial decision." Inre Estate of Hoheiser, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1081, 424 N.E.2d 25(1981). A statute providing for a claim against an estate withina prescribed period is a grant of jurisdiction, not a generalstatute of limitations. In re Estate of King, 91 Ill. App. 2d342, 349, 235 N.E.2d 276 (1968), aff'd, 41 Ill. 2d 412, 243N.E.2d 236 (1968). The court has no power or jurisdiction toentertain a petition against an estate after the statutory periodhas passed. King, 91 Ill. App. 2d at 349. We affirm the trialcourt's rulings that Marilyn's claims were barred under section18-12 because they were filed more than two years after Peter'sdeath.

Marilyn contends her claim is not barred by section 18-12because: (1) she filed a timely claim in California underCalifornia law; (2) the timely filing of her California claim isentitled to full faith and credit by Illinois courts; (3) theCircuit Court of Cook County has continuing jurisdiction overchild support; (4) the limitations period should be tolledbecause of Jill's disability; and, (5) the limitations periodshould be tolled because of an absent defendant.

We disagree with Marilyn's contention that her filing aclaim in California within two years of Peter's death issufficient to satisfy the limitations period in Illinois. Sheargues that the executor had notice of her claim by virtue of thefact that it was filed in California. She cites no authority insupport of that proposition. Nor could we find any. We concludesection 18-12 of the Probate Act cannot be satisfied by thefiling of an action in some other state. Certainly, mere noticeto the executor is irrelevant if the claim is not timely filed inIllinois. A failure to file a claim within the statutory periodis a bar to the claim, even if the executor had personalknowledge of the claim. Beider, 268 Ill. App. 3d at 1096.

Marilyn contends she could not have filed a claim inIllinois because the courts lacked subject matter jurisdictionover Peter's estate. However, her claim was not made under theProbate Act, but pursuant to the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act. The Illinois courts havejurisdiction over the case because the divorce was granted inIllinois. As Judge Ponce de Leon stated in his memorandumopinion and order, "Section 510 does not require that there be apending Illinois Probate Estate in order for the section toapply. It merely states that if one is to bring a claim under510 for relief, it must be done timely. And, the measurement oftime used is that proscribed by the Illinois Probate Act of 1975,and that act says that the Petition must be within two (2) yearsafter the death of the decedent."

Marilyn next contends the Illinois court failed to give fullfaith and credit to her timely claim filed in California. Wefind this argument was waived because it was never raised in thetrial court. See Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 201 Ill.2d 403, 413, 775 N.E.2d 951 (2002). If we were to entertain thisargument, we would find the full faith and credit clause of theUnited States Constitution does not apply to the timeliness of aclaim, but to a judgment by another state court. The full faithand credit clause requires Illinois courts to give the judgmentof a sister state at least the res judicata effect that thesister state rendering the judgment would give to it. Morris B.Chapman & Associates v. Kitzman, 193 Ill. 2d 560, 565, 739 N.E.2d1263 (2000).

Marilyn next contends the Illinois court erred when findingit had no jurisdiction to hear the case. She contends hercomplaint sought enforcement and modification over an existingcourt order, not a new claim for support, as defined by theProbate Act. Her claims, however, were not based on the ProbateAct, but on sections 510 and 513 of the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act, which provide for enforcement,modification, revocation, or commutation of child support. Thesesections are governed by the timeliness limitations of section18-12 of the Probate Act.

Marilyn's final contention is that the statute oflimitations should be tolled, either for a person withdisabilities, pursuant to section 13-211 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 2000)), or due to an absentdefendant, pursuant to section 13-208 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/13-208 (West 2000)). As we have said,section 18-12 of the Probate Act is not a general statute oflimitations subject to tolling. Section 18-12 is a nonclaimstatute with no exception or tolling for people withdisabilities. Pratt v. Baker, 48 Ill. App. 2d 442, 444-45, 199N.E.2d 307 (1964). Because the purpose of the statute is theearly and final settlement of estates, an exception fordisabilities would destroy the object of the nonclaim statute byprolonging the administration of estates indefinitely. Pratt, 48Ill. App. 2d at 444.

Even if section 18-12 were subject to tolling, section 13-211 would not apply. Section 13-211, which tolls the statute oflimitations for persons with disabilities, is expressly limitedto the actions listed in sections 13-201 through 13-210, none ofwhich apply to this case. 735 ILCS 5/13-211 (West 2000).

For the reasons we have given, we conclude the two trialcourt judges correctly dismissed counts III, IV, V, and VI. Wenote that Judge Ponce de Leon also granted Mary's Motion ForJudgment on the Pleadings as to counts IV, V, and VI. BecauseMarilyn's complaint presents a material issue of fact, thatmotion should have been denied. See Howard v. County of Cook,145 Ill. App. 3d 538, 540, 495 N.E.2d 1166 (1986). We reversethe order granting judgment on the pleadings.

III. Cross-Appeal: Motion for Sanctions

Mary's motion for sanctions is not in the record. It is theappellant's burden to present a sufficiently complete record onappeal. Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d958 (1984). Absent a complete record, we presume the orderentered below conforms with the law and had a sufficient factualbasis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. We affirm the trial court'sdenial of sanctions.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the rulings of the trial court dismissing CountsIII through VI of the complaint. We reverse the trial court'sorder granting judgment on the pleadings as to counts IV, V, andVI. We affirm the trial court's denial of sanctions on thecross-appeal.

No. 1-01-2695--Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

No. 1-02-0925--Affirmed.

SOUTH, P.J., and HOFFMAN, J., concur.

1. Mary raises issues concerning Marilyn's notice of appealand her authority to pursue an appeal. We find no merit to thesecontentions.