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                                                                                                                                                                                   Fifth Division
                                                                                                                                                                                   December 23, 2005

JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the opinion of the court:

STATEMENT OF FACTS

L.W. was born October 21, 1996, and Sandra W. is L.W.'s biological mother. Immediatelyafter her birth, L.W. tested positive for cocaine and a sexually transmitted disease. In addition, L.W.has a seizure disorder, asthma, and is "mentally retarded." On November 6, 1996, while in thecustody of her mother, L.W. was taken into custody by the Department of Children and FamilyServices (DCFS).

On November 8, 1996, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship against SandraW. The original petition for adjudication of wardship listed L.W.'s father as "unknown." Atemporary custody hearing was held and the trial court found probable cause that L.W. was abusedand neglected, and that it was a matter of immediate and urgent necessity to remove her fromSandra W.'s care pending an adjudicatory hearing. The court entered a temporary custody orderthat granted temporary custody of L.W. to the guardianship administrator of DCFS.

On January 7, 1997, Oscar H. appeared in court and the trial court entered an order findingthat Oscar H. had admitted in open court that he was L.W.'s biological father. All the partiesstipulated that Oscar H., a 67-year-old man, was a noncustodial parent at the time of L.W.'s birth.The trial court appointed the Public Defender of Cook County (Public Defender) to representOscar H. On February 25, 1997, the petition for adjudication of wardship was amended to nameOscar H. as L.W.'s father.

On February 25, 1997, at an adjudicatory hearing, Sandra W. and Oscar H. stipulated tothe following facts: (1) that on October 21, 1996, L.W. was born at 34 weeks gestation; (2) thatSandra W. told Judith Kilpatrick, a social worker with the Cook County Hospital, that she had usedcocaine three weeks prior to L.W.'s birth and that she wished to give up custody of L.W.; (3) that at thetime of L.W.'s birth, Sandra W.'s eight other children were in DCFS custody and she had not completedany drug treatment services; and (4) that Oscar H. was a noncustodial parent at the time of L.W.'sbirth. Following the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered an adjudication order finding that L.W.was abused in violation of section 2-3(2)(ii) (substantial risk/physical injury) of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987 (Act). 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 1996).

On April 29, 1997, following a dispositional hearing, the trial court entered a disposition orderthat found Oscar H. and Sandra W. were "unable for some reason other than financial circumstances aloneto care for, protect, train or discipline" L.W. L.W. was placed in the custody of the guardianshipadministrator of DCFS. The trial court also entered an order of protection allowing Oscar H. unsupervisedday visits with L.W., but the order did not permit unsupervised contact between L.W. and Sandra W.

On May 13, 1997, Oscar H. filed an emergency motion which asked the court to vacate thepreviously entered placement orders and requested that L.W. be placed in his custody. Oscar H. arguedthat he was fit, willing, and able to care for L.W., and that it was in the best interest of L.W. to bereturned to her father. On June 9, 1997, a hearing was held on Oscar H.'s emergency motion, andOscar H. appeared at the hearing, but Sandra W. was not present. The court entered an agreedpermanency order establishing a goal of returning L.W. home to Oscar H. within 12 months. Theorder stated that Oscar H.'s unsupervised visits were going well, that he had been steadilyemployed for 22 years, and that he was cooperating.

The record establishes that from 1998 to 2001, four permanency hearings were held. Ateach permanency hearing, the trial court entered a permanency order maintaining the goal ofreturning L.W. home to Oscar H. The record also contains DCFS service plans for L.W. thatcontain information about her siblings. There are DCFS client service plans in the record thatprovide the names and some case numbers for L.W.'s siblings: (1) the November 27, 2000, serviceplan for L.W. (96JA5810) and S.H. (98JA346); (2) the May 18, 2001, service plan for L.W.; (3)the November 19, 2001, service plan for L.W.; (4) the May 14, 2002, service plan for L.W.; and(5) the November 26, 2002, service plan for L.W. The aforementioned service plans also providethe birth dates and medical backgrounds for L.W. and her siblings: (1) that O.W. was born on July24, 1993; J.W. was born March 12, 1995; L.W. was born on October 21, 1996; T.H. was born onJanuary 22, 1998; and S.H. was born on May 20, 1999; (2) that O.W. and J.W. both tested positivefor syphilis at birth, like L.W., and were placed in temporary custody; (3) that T.H. was bornpremature and exposed to cocaine, like L.W., and was placed in temporary custody; and (4) thatS.H. was born drug exposed and placed in temporary custody. The May 1, 2000, CatholicCharities reunification services progress report provides the dates that Oscar H. was given custodyof L.W.'s siblings by the juvenile court: (1) Oscar H. obtained custody of O.W. and J.H. on August7, 1998; and (2) Oscar H. obtained custody of T.H. on February 25, 2000. Finally, a May 18,2001, service plan indicates that Oscar H. obtained custody of S.H. on April 23, 2001.

On February 19, 2002, following a permanency hearing, the hearing officer recommendeda goal of substitute care pending court determination on the State's petition to terminate parentalrights. On March 15, 2002, Oscar H. filed an objection to the hearing officer's February 19, 2002,permanency recommendation goal of terminating his parental rights. Oscar H. argued that the goalshould be to return L.W. home within five months because her siblings resided with him; he hadproven his ability to care for L.W. and her siblings; and it would be in L.W.'s best interest to bereturned to her father.

On April 19, 2002, the court entered a proposed permanency order establishing a goal ofprivate guardianship. The court provided the following reasons for selecting the goal of privateguardianship and for rejecting the goal of returning L.W. home: (1) that L.W. had been in fostercare for five years; (2) that Sandra W. was not working toward reunification; (3) that Oscar H. hadnot made reasonable progress toward reunification; and (4) that the foster parent would like tobecome L.W.'s private guardian and would allow continued contact with L.W.'s biological family. The court entered an order with a goal of private guardianship.

On June 3, 2002, the Public Guardian filed a motion to approve L.W.'s out-of-stateplacement in Kansas with her foster parent. On July 10, 2002, the trial court granted the motionand entered an order allowing L.W.'s foster parent to move her out of state to Kansas.

On December 6, 2002, following a permanency hearing, at which both parents werepresent, the trial court entered a "proposed" permanency order which established a goal of substitute carepending court determination of the State's petition for termination of parental rights. The orderstated that Oscar H. and Sandra W. had not made substantial reunification with L.W. and that her fosterparent would like to be her private guardian. The order stated that L.W.'s foster parent would allowcontinued contact with her biological family. In conjunction with the hearing, the Public Guardian fileda staffing summary from Melissa Frank, a clinical placement reviewer in DCFS's HELP unit. Frank statedin her summary that private guardianship was not an appropriate goal for L.W. because she would not be eligible for a subsidy through DCFS to address her medical needs; therefore, it was in L.W.'s best interestto be adopted by her foster parent.

On March 3, 2003, the State filed a supplemental petition for appointment of a guardian withthe right to consent to adoption (supplemental adoption petition). The supplemental adoptionpetition alleged that Oscar H. and Sandra W. were unfit parents and that Sandra W. and Oscar H.violated two of the same sections of the Act and that Sandra W. also violated two additionalsections of the Act.⁽²⁾ Specifically, the petition alleged that Oscar H.: (1)"failed to maintain areasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's (L.W.'s) welfare, in violationof 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) and 705 ILCS 405/2-29"; and (2) failed to "make reasonable efforts to correctthe conditions which were the basis for the removal of the child from them and/or have failed to makereasonable progress toward the return home of the child to them within 9 months after the adjudicationof neglect or abuse *** or after an adjudication of dependency *** and/or within any 9 monthperiod after said finding *** in violation of 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) and 705 ILCS 405/2-29."

On August 15, 2003, a termination of parental rights hearing was held. Prior to thecommencement of the hearing, the Public Guardian made an oral motion in limine to excludeevidence concerning the "dispositions" entered at the conclusion of Oscar H.'s parental fitness hearingfor L.W.'s siblings. The Public Guardian cited In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d 792 (1990), as authority forhis position. Oscar H. objected arguing that the court should hear evidence concerning his care of L.W.'ssiblings because it was relevant to show his fitness as a parent. During the hearing, the State withdrewits counts based on sections 1(D)(g)(failure to protect the child from conditions within his environmentinjurious to the child's welfare) and 1(D)(k)(habitual drunkenness or addition to drugs, other than thoseprescribed by a physician, for at least one year immediately prior to the commencement of the unfitnessproceeding) of the Adoption Act from its supplemental petition, and proceeded on the counts based onsections 1(D)(b) and 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/ 1(D)(b), (D)(g), (D)(k), (D)(m) (West1996). Finally, the trial court continued the hearing until August 19, 2003, for a ruling on the PublicGuardian's oral motion in limine.

On August 19, 2003, at the continuation of the termination of parental rights hearing, OscarH. argued that the facts in In re M.C. were distinguishable and its holding inapplicable becausein L.W.'s case, he had already successfully demonstrated his fitness as a parent for her siblings.Oscar H. also argued that if "bad evidence" regarding other children was admissible at atermination of parental rights hearing, then "good evidence" should also be admissible regardingthe parent and other children. The trial court, before ruling on the motion, made the following statement:

"What we are talking about is [L.W.] and talking only about [L.W.] inthis case. We are not talking about the other children home with Mr. H. andhis fitness as to those children. Each case stands on its own, and each one is anindividual case. [L.W.] is her own case."The trial court then granted the Public Guardian's motion in limine holding:

"[E]vidence of Mr. H.'s or evidence of his fitness as to other children,I am going to exclude that, that evidence, because we are going to dealspecifically with [L.W.]."

Bifurcated hearings were held regarding the issues of unfitness and the best interest of thechild. The termination of parental rights hearing proceeded in two parts: first, a determination ofOscar H.'s and Sandra W.'s fitness to be parents based on sections 1(D)(b) and 1(D)(m) of theAdoption Act; and second, a determination of the best interests of L.W. During the fitness portionof the proceedings, the State called Mary Henderson, a case supervisor with Catholic Charities, asits only witness. At the conclusion of the fitness portion of the proceedings, the trial court found thatthe State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Oscar H. or Sandra W. had notmaintained a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility toward L.W.'s welfare undersection 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act. However, the trial court found that Oscar H. and Sandra W.were unfit under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act by clear and convincing evidence becauseboth parents failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that necessitated L.W.'sremoval. On August 20, 2003, following a best-interest-of-the-child hearing, the parental rightsof Oscar H. and Sandra W. were terminated. On September 18, 2003, Oscar H. filed his notice ofappeal in case No. 1-03-2835 and presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the trial court erredwhen it granted a motion in limine and excluded evidence of L.W.'s siblings' dispositions; and (2)whether the trial court's finding of parental unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidencein light of the fact that Oscar H. was found fit to care for four of L.W.'s siblings, some of whomsuffer from the same or similar medical problems as L.W. On September 24, 2003, the PublicGuardian filed a notice of cross-appeal, and presents the following issue for our review: whether thetrial court erred in failing to find Oscar H. and Sandra W. unfit under section 1(D)(b) of theAdoption Act.

ANALYSIS

THE UNFITNESS FINDINGS

We note that in the supplemental adoption petition Oscar H. and Sandra W. were initiallycharged with being unfit pursuant to four sections of the Adoption Act: 1(D)(b), 1(D)(g), 1(D)(k)and 1(D)(m). 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(b), (D)(g), (D)(k), (D)(m) (West 1996). We also note that the Statedismissed its unfitness counts predicated on sections 1(D)(g) and 1(D)(k) of the Adoption Act. 750ILCS 50/1(D)(g), (D)(k) (West 1996). In order to find that a parent is unfit under section 1(D)(b)of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 1996)), the trial court must find by clear andconvincing evidence that the parent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, orresponsibility as to the child's welfare. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d 255, 273-74 (1990); seeIn re Paul, 101 Ill. 2d 345, 352 (1984), citing In re Brown, 86 Ill. 2d 147, 152 (1981). We note withspecial interest that the trial court found that the State failed to prove that Oscar H. violated section1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b)(West 1996). Therefore, the trial court determinedthat Oscar H. maintained a reasonable degree of interest and concern for L.W.

In order to find that a parent is unfit under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act, the trialcourt must find clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to make "reasonable progress"toward the return home of his or her child. In re H.C., 305 Ill. App. 3d 869, 874 (1999); 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1996). "Reasonable progress" exists when a parent shows a minimum measurableor demonstrable movement toward the return of his or her child and a court should not make afinding of reasonable progress unless the evidence shows the parent's conduct is improving and willsoon comply with the ordered directives. In re H.C., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 875. During the fitnesshearing, it is the parent's past conduct in the then-existing circumstances that is under scrutiny. Paul,101 Ill. 2d at 352-53.

Under section 1(D)(m)of the Adoption Act, the failure of a parent to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child to the parent within nine months after an adjudication that theminor is neglected or abused under section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 is grounds for thecourt to find that person unfit to have a child. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1996). Section 2-3(2)(ii)of the Act, the section allegedly violated by Oscar H., provides that an abused minor includes anyminor under 18 years of age whose parent creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such minorby other than accidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement, impairment ofemotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 1996). According to section 2-21(1) of the Act, the section under which abuse and neglect is determined,if the court finds that the minor is abused, neglected or dependent, the court shall then: (1) determineand put in writing the factual basis supporting its determination that the abuse, neglect or dependencyis the result of physical abuse to the minor inflicted by the parent; and (2) include the findings in theorder of the court. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 1996).⁽³⁾

THE TEMPORARY CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS

In order to address the issue presented in this case, we must examine the procedural history. The record establishes that when L.W. was taken into custody on November 6, 1996, she was in thesole custody of her mother. The record also establishes that when a temporary custody hearing washeld on November 8, 1996, the trial court found probable cause that L.W. was abused and neglected.In the November 8, 1996, temporary custody order, the trial court found that it was a matter ofimmediate and urgent necessity to remove L.W. from Sandra W.'s care pending an adjudicatoryhearing. The temporary custody order only applied to Sandra W. because Oscar H. had not beennamed as a party to the proceedings.

THE ADJUDICATION OF WARDSHIP PROCEEDINGS

The February 25, 1997, petition for adjudication of wardship initially named Sandra W. asL.W.'s parent and stated that L.W. was neglected because Sandra W. created an injuriousenvironment based upon the following: (1) her whereabouts were then unknown; (2) she admittedto a DCFS investigator that she used cocaine three weeks prior to L.W.'s birth; and (3) she failed tocomply with the services offered by a private agency follow-up worker. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b)(West 1996). The petition for adjudication of wardship also stated that L.W. was neglected becauseSandra W. posed a threat of "substantial risk/physical injury" because: (1) she had a history ofinadequate supervision of L.W.'s siblings; and (2) L.W.'s minor siblings were sexually molested andone sibling sustained a fractured arm due to physical abuse. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 1996).

On February 25, 1997, the trial court entered an order to amend the identifying informationon the petition for adjudication of wardship and Oscar H.'s name was added to the petition. Afterthe amendment adding Oscar H.'s name, the petition for adjudication of wardship was still predicatedexclusively on the acts of physical abuse or neglect of Sandra W. Nowhere in the petition foradjudication of wardship does it mention an act of physical abuse inflicted by Oscar H. that causedL.W. to be abused, neglected or dependent. Therefore, the petition for adjudication of wardship wasnot directed against Oscar H., and we cannot infer joint responsibility for neglect since both parentsdid not reside with the child. See In re K.S., 343 Ill. App. 3d 177, 186 (2003).

A. The Proceedings Pursuant to Section 2-21(1) of the Act

At the adjudicatory hearing, Oscar H. stipulated to the fact that he was a noncustodial parentat the time of L.W.'s birth. Following the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court entered an adjudicationorder finding that L.W. was abused in violation of section 2-3(2)(ii) (substantial risk/physical injury) ofthe Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii) (West 1996). Section 2-21(1) of the Act required the court to specifyin writing the factual basis for its determination that Oscar H. and Sandra W. inflicted physical abuse thatformed the basis of its finding that L.W. was abused, neglected, or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1)(West 1996). Our review of the adjudication order reveals that it fails to indicate if it is the adjudicationorder for Sandra W. or for Oscar H. Second, our review of the adjudication order reveals that the trialcourt failed to comply with the mandate of section 2-21(1) of the Act by stating in writing the factualbasis supporting its determination that Oscar H. inflicted the physical abuse that caused the court to findthat L.W. was abused, neglected, or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 1996). We find that thecourt did not comply with the mandate of section 2-21(1) of the Act when its adjudication order failedto delineate in writing the factual basis supporting its determination that acts of physical abuse by OscarH. caused the court to find that L.W. was abused, neglected, or dependent. Therefore, we hold that thetrial court did not comply with section 2-21(1) of the Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 1996).

We find that the petition, which was amended by the court entering an order that added Oscar H.as one of L.W.'s parents, was predicated exclusively on the neglect and the acts of physical abuse inflictedby Sandra W. We find that nowhere in the amended petition for adjudication of wardship, to whichOscar H. was added as a named party, does it mention an act of physical abuse which Oscar H. inflictedthat caused L.W. to be abused, neglected or dependent. We find that the trial court's adjudication orderfailed to state the factual basis supporting its determination that Oscar H. inflicted the physical abuse thatcaused the court to find that L.W. was abused, neglected, or dependent. Neither the State's amendedpetition for adjudication of wardship nor the trial court's adjudication order provided Oscar H. with noticeof the acts of physical abuse he inflicted that caused the court to find that L.W. was abused, neglected,or dependent. Therefore, since Oscar H. was never informed in the amended petition or in theadjudication order about the acts of physical abuse he inflicted that caused the court to find that L.W. wasabused, neglected, or dependent, we find that he did not have notice of the conditions that required L.W.to be placed in the care of DCFS.

B. The Proceedings Pursuant to Section 2-21(2) of the Act

Finally, section 2-21(2) of the Act provides that if the court determines and puts in writing thefactual basis supporting the determination that the minor is either abused or neglected or dependent, "thecourt shall then set a time *** for a dispositional hearing." 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 1996). Section2-21(2) of the Act makes it clear that a condition precedent to setting L.W.'s case for a dispositional ortermination hearing was a written determination stating the factual basis for the court's finding that L.W.was either abused, neglected or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(2) (West 1996). The trial courtdetermined that Oscar H. was unfit but its adjudication order failed to state the factual basis supportingits determination that acts by Oscar H. caused the court to find that L.W. was abused, neglected, ordependent. We find that since the trial court failed to comply with section 2-21(1) of the Act by statingin writing the factual basis supporting its determination that L.W. was abused and neglected by Oscar H.,the termination hearing for Oscar H. should not have taken place. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1) (West 1996). Consequently, this case must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with thisopinion. 705 ILCS 405/2-21(1),(2) (West 1996).

THE MOTION IN LIMINE

In the event another petition for adjudication of wardship is filed, another adjudication order isentered, and another termination hearing is held on remand, we feel compelled to address an evidentiaryruling made by the trial court and an issue raised by Oscar H. that may arise at a second termination ofparental rights hearing. Before the hearing on the termination of parental rights began, the PublicGuardian made an oral motion in limine to exclude evidence of L.W.'s siblings' dispositions. The PublicGuardian cited In re M.C. as authority for his position. In re M.C., 201 Ill. App. 3d at 798. Oscar H.argued that evidence of his ability to care for L.W.'s four siblings established his parental fitness andability to care for L.W. The trial court granted the Public Guardian's oral motion in limine and held that evidence of Oscar H.'s parental fitness and ability to care for L.W.'s four siblings would be excludedbecause the court "was going to deal specifically with  [L.W.]."

First, the State argues that Oscar H. waived this issue. We note that the rule of waiver is anadmonition to the parties and not a limitation on the jurisdiction of this court. Illinois State Chamber ofCommerce v. Filan, 100197, slip op. at 8 (October 6, 2005); In re W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 323 (1995). "Areviewing court may, in furtherance of its responsibility to provide a just result and to maintain a soundand uniform body of precedent, override considerations of waiver that stem from the adversarial natureof our system." Filan, slip op. at 9; Dillon v. Evanston Hospital, 199 Ill. 2d 483, 504-05 (2002). We, likethe court in Filan, believe it appropriate to address the parties' arguments on the merits; accordingly, wedecline to find waiver. Filan, slip op. at 9; Central Illinois Light Co. v. Home Insurance Co., 213 Ill. 2d141, 152 (2004).

Second, the State argues that Oscar H. made no offer of proof at trial with evidence to establishhis parental fitness in order to preserve the issue for review. The State cites In re Jaber W., 344 Ill. App.3d 250, 257 (2003), in support of its position arguing that Oscar H. failed to make an offer of proof asto the excluded evidence, thereby, failing to preserve the issue for review. In Jaber W., a teacher madea child abuse hotline report that she suspected that her student was neglected and abused. A DCFScaseworker testified that Jaber stated that his father hit him in the face. On cross-examination, the trialcourt in Jaber W. sustained the State's objections to the respondent-mother's questions regarding theDCFS caseworker's use of medication or whether she was presently under any medical care. Jaber W.,344 Ill. App. 3d at 257. The Jaber court found that the respondent-mother failed to make an offer of proofin order to establish what the testimony would have shown had it been allowed or that the DCFScaseworker's investigation would have been affected if she were on medication or under the care of aphysician. Jaber W., 344 Ill. App. 3d at 257.

Jaber W. is distinguishable from the facts in L.W.'s case (1) because Jaber W. involvestestimonial evidence and L.W.'s case involves documentary evidence, and (2) because the trial court knewwhat documentary evidence was being excluded and what the evidence would have shown had it beenallowed. We note that the Public Guardian made a motion in limine specifically to exclude evidence ofL.W.'s siblings' dispositions. Black's Law Dictionary defines "disposition" as a final settlement ordetermination or the court's disposition of the case. Black's Law Dictionary 484 (7th ed. 1999). Section2-23(1)(a) of the Act, which explains the different kinds of dispositional orders, provides that an orderor disposition must be entered to restore a minor to the custody of his parent. 705 ILCS 405/2-23(1)(a)(West 1996); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-28(4) (West 1996). When the Public Guardian referred to L.W.'ssiblings' dispositions, according to the Act, the Public Guardian was referring to the dispositions or orders (hereinafter, the disposition orders) entered in L.W.'s siblings' cases. 705 ILCS 405/2-23(1)(a) (West1996); see also 705 ILCS 405/2-28(4)(West 1996). Moreover, the trial court knew that L.W.'s siblings'disposition orders contained the evidence being excluded because it granted the Public Guardian's motionto exclude the evidence.

We note that the DCFS service plans in the record establish that Oscar H. was awarded custodyof L.W.'s siblings. Additionally, since the Act requires a finding in the order that the parent is fit to carefor the minor before restoring custody of the children to the parent (705 ILCS 405/2-23(a)(West 1996);see also 705 ILCS 405/2-28(4)(West 1996)), we know that the evidence in the four disposition orderswould have shown that Oscar H. had been found to be a fit parent on four different occasions and wasawarded custody of L.W.'s four siblings twice in 1998, in 2000 and in 2001, during the same years(1996-2003) that L.W.'s case was pending in the juvenile court. It is clear that the fitness findings in L.W.'s siblings' disposition orders was the evidence that was excluded and that the fitness findings in theorders would have been used to support Oscar H.'s claim that he was a fit parent. Therefore, since amotion in limine was specifically made to exclude L.W.'s siblings' disposition orders and, since the trialcourt knew that the fitness findings in L.W.'s siblings' disposition orders was the evidence being excludedand excluded it, no offer of proof was required in this case. Dillon, 199 Ill. 2d at 495 (an offer of proofis unnecessary where the court understands the nature and character of the evidence sought to beintroduced).

Next, we must address the standard of review to be used to consider the evidentiary issue in thiscase. When the trial court granted the Public Guardian's oral motion in limine and excluded the fitnessfindings in L.W.'s siblings' disposition orders which would support Oscar H.'s claim of parental fitness,the trial court made an evidentiary ruling. A motion in limine is a pretrial motion that seeks an orderexcluding inadmissible evidence and prohibiting questions concerning such evidence, without thenecessity of having the questions asked and objections thereto made in front of the jury. People v.Williams, 188 Ill. 2d 365, 368 (1999). Generally, evidentiary motions, such as motions in limine, areaddressed to the trial court's inherent power to admit or exclude evidence, and reviewing courts will notdisturb a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at369, citing People v. Holman, 257 Ill. App. 3d 1031, 1033 (1994), People v. Jordan, 205 Ill. App. 3d 116, 121 (1990), People v. Escobar, 168 Ill. App. 3d 30, 43 (1988), and People v. Williams, 60 Ill. App. 3d529, 532-33 (1978); see also People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 392 (2004). However, a trial court mustexercise its discretion within the bounds of the law. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 75 (2003); Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369. Where the question presented is one of law, a reviewing court determinesit independently of the trial court's judgment. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 75; Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369,quoting In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996). In this case, whether the prior disposition ordersfinding Oscar H. fit and awarding him custody of L.W.'s siblings were admissible to determine hisparental fitness to care for L.W. is a question of law, therefore, our review is de novo. Moore, 207 Ill.2d at 75; Williams, 188 Ill. 2d at 369.

We must determine whether the fitness findings in L.W.'s siblings' disposition orders (Oscar H.was found fit and awarded custody of L.W.'s four siblings) were admissible in evidence and could be usedto establish Oscar H.'s fitness as a parent and ability to care for L.W. Illinois courts have held that therules of evidence that apply in civil cases also apply to parental rights termination proceedings. In re J.B.,346 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81 (2004). A basic principle of the law of evidence is that what is relevant isadmissible. People v. Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d 317, 321 (1977). The Illinois Supreme Court has adopted Rule401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which defines relevant evidence as evidence having a tendency tomake the existence of a fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable orless probable than it would be without the evidence. People v. Boclair, 129 Ill. 2d 458, 477 (1989);Monroe, 66 Ill. 2d at 322, quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401. Evidence is probative when it tends to prove ordisprove a matter at issue. People v. Nichols, 27 Ill. App. 3d 372, 386 (1975). The fact to be proved inthis case is Oscar H.'s parental fitness and ability to care for L.W.

The trial court predicated its decision to exclude evidence concerning the disposition ordersentered in L.W.'s siblings' cases on In re M.C. 201 Ill. App. 3d at 798. The pertinent facts in In re M.C.are as follows: (1) at M.C.'s mother's termination hearing, the mother testified that her 10-month-olddaughter was living with her; and (2) the trial court sustained the State's objection to defense counsel'squestion that M.C.'s mother's 10- month-old daughter was living with her under a protective order. Inre M.C. 201 Ill. App. 3d at 796. The In re M.C. court held that the trial court properly sustained theobjection and excluded the evidence regarding further questions about the 10-month old child becausetestimony regarding the mother's ability to care for another child was irrelevant to the issue of her fitnessto act as a parent for M.C. In re M.C. 201 Ill. App. 3d at 798.

We elect not to follow In re M.C. because the fitness evidence that Oscar H. intends to profferis relevant since it can be used to prove the fact at issue in this case: whether Oscar H. is a fit parent. Relevant evidence includes the findings in the juvenile court's orders that Oscar H. was fit to parentL.W.'s four siblings. When all relevant evidence of Oscar H.'s fitness is not considered, the courtabandons the goal and purpose of the Act, which is to keep the family together. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1)(West 1996). We hold that the trial court erred when it failed to consider fitness evidence that wasrelevant and would assist the court in determining Oscar H.'s fitness to parent L.W.

In addition, we note that one of the purposes of the Act is to preserve and strengthen the child'sfamily ties whenever possible. 705 ILCS 405/1-2(1) (West 1996). We also note that when a court setspermanency goals, the court is required by the Act to include as a factor in its determination the status ofthe child's siblings. 705 ILCS 405/2-28 (West 1996). Finally, we note that section 1-5(1) of the Actprovides that parents "who are parties respondent have the right *** to present evidence material to theproceedings." 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1996). In light of the preceding, we hold that evidence thatOscar H. has been found fit and given custody of four of L.W.'s siblings is material and relevant and isone factor that should be considered by a court making a determination on the issue of Oscar H.'s parentalfitness and ability to parent and care for L.W., the child who is the subject of these proceedings.

In conclusion, in light of our decision, it is unnecessary to address the other issues presented bythe parties. While it is unnecessary for this court to address the constitutional issue raised in Oscar H.'sbrief in order to make a decision in this case (Trent v. Winningham, 172 Ill. 2d 421, 425 (1996)), if thatissue arises in the trial court on remand, we direct the trial court to consider the constitutional issue inlight of In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289 (2005).

Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's order finding Oscar H. unfit and terminatingOscar H.'s parental rights, and we remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistentwith this opinion.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

GALLAGHER, P.J., and O'BRIEN, J., concur.

1. Sandra W.'s case was affirmed on appeal in a Finley order on November 4, 2004.

2. There were two unfitness allegations in the petition that only applied to Sandra W.: (1)that "[s]he has failed to protect the child from conditions in the child's environment injurious tothe child's welfare, in violation of 750 ILCS 50/1 D(g) and 705 ILCS 405/2-29"; and (2) that"[s]he has been an habitual drunkard and/or addicted to drugs other than those prescribed by aphysician, for at least one year immediately prior to the *** proceeding, in violation of 750 ILCS50/1 D(k) and 705 ILCS 405/2-29."

3. Currently under section 2-21(1) of the Act, the court must state the factual basis for itsdetermination and specify, to the extent possible, both the acts or omissions of each parent thatform the basis of the court's findings.