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SIXTH DIVISION
JUNE 30, 2004

JUSTICE TULLY delivered the opinion of the court:

In this case we granted Respondent, Deborah D., leave to appeal pursuant to SupremeCourt Rule 306(a)(5) (166 Ill.2d R. 306(a)(5)) from an order of the circuit court affecting the careand custody of respondent's minor son. For the reasons which follow, we have now determinedthat respondent's appeal is untimely and that we are without jurisdiction to consider it. Theappeal shall therefore be dismissed.

Respondent, Deborah D., sought leave to appeal from the trial court's November 14,2002, order changing the permanency goal for her minor son from return home to substitute carepending court determination of termination of parental rights. Respondent filed a motion toreconsider arguing that the trial court "overlooked" certain facts and erred in its application ofexisting law. On February 10, 2003, the trial court denied respondent's motion to reconsider.

On March 11, 2003, respondent filed a "Motion for Leave to Appeal and/or Motion for anExtension of Time to File an Amended Motion for Leave to Appeal". This court allowed theextension of time to file an Amended Petition for Leave to Appeal. On May 1, 2003, respondentfiled a second motion for extension of time which this court granted. On June 2, 2003,respondent filed her Petition but failed to file the Record on appeal. Thus, on August 13, 2003,on the court's own motion, the appeal was dismissed for want of prosecution. On August 25,2003, respondent filed a petition to vacate the dismissal and on September 9, 2003, this courtwithdrew the dismissal order and allowed the Amended Petition for Leave to Appeal.

The merits of the appeal have now been briefed. Both the State and the minor-respondentmaintain that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this appeal because respondent's petition forleave to appeal was not filed within thirty days of the trial court's order.

According to her jurisdictional statement, respondent bases this court's jurisdiction tohear her appeal on Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (166 Ill.2d R. 306(a)(5)). Supreme Court Rule306(a)(5) states:

"(a) Orders Appealable by Petition. A party may petition for leave to appeal to the AppellateCourt from the following orders of the trial court:

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(5) from interlocutory orders affecting the care and custody of unemancipated minors, if theappeal of such orders is not otherwise specifically provided for elsewhere in these rules[.]" 166Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5).

The Rule further provides:

"(b) Petition. The petition shall contain a statement of the facts of the case, supported byreference to the supporting record, and of the grounds for the appeal. An original and threecopies of the petition *** shall be filed in the Appellate Court *** within 30 days after entry ofthe order.

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(e) Extensions of Time. The above time limits may be extended by the reviewing court or ajudge thereof upon notice and motion, accompanied by an affidavit showing good cause, filedbefore expiration of the original or extended time." 166 Ill. 2d. R. 306(b), (e).

Supreme Court Rule 306 is specific in its requirement that, in order to vest the appellatecourt with jurisdiction, the petition for leave to appeal must be filed within 30 days after entry ofthe trial court's order or within such extension of time as may be granted by the reviewing court. The thirty-day time limit under Rule 306 is jurisdictional. Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 112 Ill. 2d223, 236, 492 N.E.2d 1327 (1986).

The petition here did not meet this requirement. The record makes clear that respondentdid not file a request for an extension of time until March 11, 2003, almost four months after thetrial court entered the order concerning the permanency goal. The respondent did file her requestfor an extension within thirty days of the trial court's ruling on her motion to reconsider. However, this is not sufficient to vest jurisdiction in this court.

Illinois courts have held that a motion for reconsideration directed against aninterlocutory order will not toll the running of the 30-day deadline for the filing of the appealunder Supreme Court Rule 306. See Law Offices of Jeffrey M. Leving, Ltd. v. Cotting, 345 Ill.App. 3d 495, 801 N.E.2d 6 (2003); National Seal Co. v. Greenblatt, 321 Ill. App. 3d 306, 308,748 N.E.2d 333, 335 (2001); Buckland v. Lazar, 145 Ill. App. 3d 436, 438, 495 N.E.2d 1254,1256 (1986).

Respondent contends that these cases can be distinguished because none of them involvedthe review of an order concerning a permanency goal and the care and custody of a minor. Respondent correctly points out that none of the cases cited above concern subsection (a)(5) ofRule 306. However, we find this distinction irrelevant as the timeliness requirement insubsection (b) of Rule 306 applies to all petitions filed pursuant Rule 306. In other words, if amotion to reconsider will not toll the running of the 30-day deadline for petitions filed pursuantto 306(a)(1), (2) and (4), then a motion to reconsider will not toll the running of the deadline fora petition filed pursuant to 306(a)(5).

Respondent further contends that her Motion to Reconsider is an independentlyappealable order under Rule 306. She asserts that at the hearing on the motion to reconsider onFebruary 10, 2003, the trial court made additional findings and "the permanency order was not 'afinal order' until February 10, 2003 when the trial court made all of its findings with regard to thepermanency goal entered for the minor." We disagree.

A review of the record shows that the motion to reconsider did not present any new factsor new law. All of the facts and the reports submitted in support of the motion to reconsiderwere before the trial judge when he entered his original permanency order.

Respondent was obligated to file her petition for leave to appeal within 30 days ofNovember 14, 2002. She should not have delayed until after the trial court's disposition of themotion to reconsider. Because of this delay, we have no jurisdiction to hear the case, andrespondent's appeal must be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, respondent's appeal is dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

GALLAGHER, and FITZGERALD SMITH, JJ., concur.