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FOURTH DIVISION

DECEMBER 19, 2002

1-00-2869

JUSTICE HARTMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal arises out of two petitions for adjudication ofwardship filed by the State requesting the adjudication of bothC.W. (born March 23, 1989) and K.O. (born December 1, 1990) aswards of the court and temporary removal from custody of theirparents, Winfred O., the respondent, and Charlotte O.⁽¹⁾ Respondentis C.W.'s step-father and K.O.'s biological father. Charlotte isthe biological mother of both children. After an adjudicatoryhearing, the circuit court found that respondent neglected bothminors due to an injurious environment and that C.W. was sexuallyabused by respondent. The court subsequently found Charlotte fit,willing and able to care for the minors and respondent unfit,unwilling and unable to maintain custody. The court grantedCharlotte's motion to close the case. Respondent appeals.

The issues presented for review include whether: (1) thecircuit court abused its discretion by denying respondent acontinuance for the adjudication hearing; (2) the circuit court'sfindings of neglect and/or abuse of C.W. and K.O. were against themanifest weight of the evidence; and (3) respondent was denied afair trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel.

On December 17, 1997, the State filed petitions foradjudication of wardship on behalf of both C.W. and K.O., allegingthat both girls were abused and neglected due to a substantial riskof physical injury and injurious environment. The petition forC.W. alleged she suffered sexual abuse, specifying that, for theprevious two years, respondent would take her into his bedroom;tell her to get into his bed and take off her underwear; remove hispants and force her to kneel down; and rub his penis on her vaginaand ejaculate on her.

At a temporary custody hearing on the same date, withoutrespondent present, the parties stipulated that if Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS) Child Protection InvestigatorSharon Dorfman were called to testify, she would state thatrespondent abused C.W. sexually for two years, has been convictedof child pornography in 1988⁽²⁾ and aggravated criminal sexualassault in 1990 and is registered as a sex offender. Thestipulation also stated that Charlotte was aware that respondentwas a registered sex offender; she had married him two years ago;and she allowed him to babysit the minors while she was at work. The circuit court awarded temporary custody of the minors to DCFS. On March 31, 1998, the circuit court appointed attorneyPatrick Schlee to represent respondent in the abuse and neglectproceedings. At that time, respondent was in custody at the CookCounty Correctional Center awaiting trial in relation to criminalproceedings in this matter.

On August 4, 1998, respondent moved to compel the children totestify at the adjudication hearing. The circuit court denied themotion after considering the minors' ages, the statutorycorroboration requirement, the possibility of in camera testimonyand respondent's pending criminal trial.

Thereafter, the adjudication hearing was set for August 19,1999, but was continued three times: on August 16, 1999, on theState's motion; on October 15, 1999, on respondent's motion; and onDecember 7, 1999, on the Public Guardian's motion.

Prior to the adjudication hearing on February 3, 2000,respondent moved to continue the proceeding in order to subpoenaseveral witnesses, claiming that he had not been present at thelast court date, was unaware of the adjudication date and wasprepared inadequately because "he needed to know that [February 3,2000] was a definite trial date." The circuit court deniedrespondent's motion, stating that it was in the best interests ofthe minors that the case proceed to trial and that it wasrespondent's duty to keep track of his case, even when representedby an attorney.

At the adjudication hearing, Dorfman testified that this casefirst came to her attention when a mandated reporter called atelephone hotline stating that C.W. had made an outcry of sexualabuse by respondent. She spoke with Charlotte on December 15, 1997regarding the allegations of sexual abuse. She asked Charlotte,who was aware of respondent's prior sex offense convictions, why hewas allowed into her home. Charlotte answered that respondent toldher he had completed therapy and she believed him even though henever presented any documentation. Charlotte was unaware that C.W.was being abused sexually.

Dorfman testified that she was present at C.W.'s victimsensitive interview. Dorfman stated that there was no physicalevidence linking respondent to the offense, but K.O. told her thatshe saw respondent and C.W. on top of each other, "in acompromising position," and heard C.W. say "I won't tell mom," or"mom won't know."

Dorfman also performed a background check on respondent anddiscovered that he had previous convictions of child pornography,aggravated criminal sexual assault and failure to register as a sexoffender.

Skokie Police Detective Thomas Nelis testified that heinterviewed C.W. on December 15, 1997. During that conversation,she related that when she was at home and her mother was at work,respondent "would have her get into the bed with him and pull hispants down, and make her get on her knees, and he would be behindher and would rub his private part on her butt." C.W. also toldNelis that when respondent would do this, she saw "pee which wassticky and yellow," with a "white-like stream."

Nelis stated that he was unaware of any scientific evidence ofthe abuse, but understood that DCFS had been trying to conduct amedical exam. During the investigation, respondent told Nelis towrite down whatever C.W. said in writing and he would sign it. When Nelis requested respondent's side of the story, he refused.

Following Nelis' testimony, the State entered two exhibitsinto evidence. The first exhibit, C.W.'s medical assessment,stated that the "[e]xamination does not rule out sexual abuse," and"confirmed the history of stepfather laying on top of her with his -- his or her clothes off and rubbing his penis over her vaginaalmost every night ***."⁽³⁾ The second exhibit was a certified copyof respondent's indictment and conviction of predatory criminalsexual assault of C.W. The State and Public Guardian then restedtheir cases-in-chief.

Respondent testified on his own behalf against the advice ofcounsel. He stated that he never sexually abused C.W. Heacknowledged that a jury found him guilty of criminal chargespertaining to this matter.

The circuit court found that C.W. was abused sexually, placedat a substantial risk of physical injury and subjected to aninjurious environment. Respondent was named the perpetrator of theabuse. The court further held that K.O. was subjected to aninjurious environment due to the abuse of her sister. The courtbased its findings on witness testimony, medical records and respondent's certified copy of his criminal conviction.

Following the adjudication, the circuit court proceeded to adisposition hearing, where it heard testimony from a DCFScaseworker and the children's therapist. The court found thatCharlotte was fit, willing and able to care for the children, andclosed their cases. Respondent was found unable, unwilling andunfit to care for C.W. and K.O.

On August 21, 2000, the circuit court heard argument onrespondent's motions for a new trial and appointment of othercounsel and pro se addenda. With respect to respondent'sineffective assistance of counsel claims, the court found thatthere was "very effective assistance of counsel here." Accordingto the court, Schlee "presented each and every motion and sometimesI questioned why he was doing it, but every possible, I think,issue that could have been visited here ***." The court noted thatsome of the arguments respondent raised involved strategy limitedto counsel's decision and, regardless of counsel's performance, theoutcome of his case would not have been different. The court foundthe evidence was overwhelming and denied the motions. Respondenttimely appeals.

Respondent, citing In re Moore, 87 Ill. App. 3d 1117, 409N.E.2d 435 (1980) (Moore), first asserts that the circuit courtabused its discretion by not granting a continuance for theadjudication hearing in violation of his due process rights. Heargues that, because he missed the previous court date, he wasuncertain of the February 3, 2000 adjudication hearing and,therefore, was unable to subpoena key witnesses or securetranscripts from the criminal trial for impeachment purposes. According to respondent, if he initially had been apprised of hisrights for the adjudication hearing, he would have understood hisresponsibilities and would have been prepared for trial better.

The State and Public Guardian respond that the circuit courthad no duty to continue the adjudication hearing at respondent'srequest and, notwithstanding duty, the denial of a continuance didnot result in prejudice sufficient to warrant the reversal of thehearing. Further, they contend that the court was within itsdiscretion to deny the continuance because the interests of thevarious parties were weighed and the court found that it was in thebest interest of the minors to proceed.

Illinois recognizes that "serious delay in the adjudication ofabuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to theminor ***." 705 ILCS 405/2-14 (West 2000). There is no absoluteright to a continuance. In re D.P., 327 Ill. App. 3d 153, 158, 763N.E.2d 351 (2001). It is within the juvenile court's discretionwhether to grant or deny a continuance motion and the court'sdecision will not be disturbed absent manifest abuse or palpableinjustice. In re K.S., 203 Ill. App. 3d 586, 596, 560 N.E.2d 1380(1990); Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicagov. Eastern Illinois Water Co., 31 Ill. App. 3d 148, 157, 334 N.E.2d96 (1975). The denial of a request for continuance is not a groundfor reversal unless the complaining party has been prejudiced bysuch denial. In re M.R., 305 Ill. App. 3d 1083, 1086, 713 N.E.2d1241 (1999).

Code of Civil Procedure section 2-1007 (735 ILCS 5/2-1007(West 2000)) governs the rules of continuances and provides, "[o]ngood cause shown, in the discretion of the court and on just terms,additional time may be granted for the doing of any act or thetaking of any step or proceeding prior to judgment." Continuancesin juvenile cases may be granted "upon written motion of a partyfiled no later than 10 days prior to hearing, or upon the court'sown motion and only for good cause shown." 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c)(West 2000). The term, "good cause," as applied in the JuvenileCourt Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2000) (Act)), isstrictly construed and must be in accordance with Supreme CourtRules 231(a) through (f). 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c) (West 2000); 134Ill. 2d R. 231(a)-(f) (Rule 231). The court may continue thehearing "only if the continuance is consistent with the health,safety and best interests of the minor." 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c)(West 2000).

Rule 231(a) states that a party moving for a continuance dueto the absence of material evidence must attach an affidavitshowing: (1) "that due diligence has been used to obtain theevidence, or the want of time to obtain it"; (2) "of whatparticular fact or facts the evidence consists"; (3) "if theevidence consists of the testimony of a witness, his place ofresidence, or if his place of residence is not known, that duediligence has been used to ascertain it"; and (4) "that if furthertime is given the evidence can be procured." 134 Ill. 2d R.231(a).

In the instant case, respondent moved for a continuanceimmediately prior to the adjudication hearing, not 10 days inadvance, as required by statute. 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c) (West 2000). Respondent failed to provide the circuit court with an affidavitexplaining the absence of material evidence in contravention ofRule 231 (134 Ill. 2d R. 231(a)).

Respondent also has not established good cause to warrant acontinuance. Although respondent claims the denial of acontinuance prevented him from subpoenaing key witnesses orsecuring transcripts from his criminal trial, he has not explainedand, the record does not show, why this missing evidence ismaterial.

In addition, respondent's reliance upon Moore is misplaced.Here, unlike Moore, respondent is not challenging lack of apprisalregarding the possibility of losing permanent custody of hischildren; rather, he contests the denial of a continuance for thepurposes of securing and presenting material evidence. Under thesecircumstances, the record establishes sufficient apprisal ofrespondent's rights to obtain the necessary evidence. Inrespondent's August 1998 motion to compel children to testify, hepointed out certain discrepancies in the allegations made by C.W.,arguing, "[t]he only way to resolve these discrepancies is to allowthe children to testify." The circuit court, upon denial of themotion, recognized the lack of other evidence in this case. Thereafter, respondent had one year and five months until theadjudication hearing to resolve discrepancies in C.W.'s testimonyby procuring other material evidence, but failed to do so.

Respondent's contention that his missed court date prior tothe adjudication hearing caused him to be unprepared also lacksmerit. Due process requires adequate notice to the minor's parentsin a juvenile proceeding. In re J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129, 134, 485N.E.2d 848 (1985). Although a parent has a right to be present ata hearing to terminate parental rights, it is not mandatory that heor she be present, and the circuit court is not obligated to waituntil he or she chooses to appear. In re C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d770, 778, 706 N.E.2d 123 (1999) (C.L.T.). Neither respondent norhis attorney claimed lack of notice of the February 3, 2000adjudication hearing. Nevertheless, even if respondent had notreceived notice, the record shows counsel was aware of the date. Notice to an attorney is considered notice to the client,notwithstanding whether the attorney actually has communicated suchknowledge to the client. In re B.C., 317 Ill. App. 3d 607, 613,740 N.E.2d 41 (2000). Moreover, respondent had a duty to followthe progress of his case and learn from his attorney the date ofthe adjudication hearing. C.L.T., 302 Ill. App. 3d at 778. Accordingly, respondent's due process rights were not violated.

Further, the petitions for adjudication were filed in December1997. The supreme court has emphasized that keeping a minor'sstatus in limbo for an extended period of time is not in the bestinterests of the child. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 727 N.E.2d990 (2000). Therefore, the circuit court properly focused on thebest interests of the minors in denying respondent's motion forcontinuance. See 705 ILCS 405/2-14(c) (West 2000).

Based on the foregoing, respondent has failed to demonstratean abuse of discretion resulting from the denial of his continuancemotion.

Respondent next argues that the circuit court's findings ofneglect and abuse of C.W. and K.O. were against the manifest weightof the evidence.

The Public Guardian asserts that respondent has not providedthe reviewing court with a complete record on appeal illustratingthat the circuit court erred. Although respondent filed asupplemental record containing his certified indictment andconviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of C.W., he didnot include the medical records from C.W.'s evaluation followingher outcry of sexual abuse.

To support a claim of error on appeal, the appellant has theburden to present a sufficiently complete record. Foutch v.O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92, 459 N.E.2d 958 (1984) (Foutch). Absent a record, the order entered by the circuit court is presumedto be in conformity with the law and supported by a sufficientfactual basis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

Here, although C.W.'s medical records are missing from therecord, the report corroborating the allegations of abuse, which respondent challenges on appeal as ambiguous, was read intoevidence verbatim and can be found in the report of proceedings. Therefore, the merits of respondent's contention that the circuitcourt's findings were against the manifest weight of the evidencewill be reviewed.

The proceedings in the present case are civil in nature;therefore, a finding of abuse need be supported only by apreponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 2000). A preponderance of evidence is that amount of evidence that leadsa trier of fact to find that the fact at issue is more probablethan not. In re C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d 207, 215, 586 N.E.2d 498(1991) (C.C.). The circuit court's determination of neglect willnot be disturbed on appeal unless contrary to the manifest weightof the evidence. In re A.D.W., 278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 482, 663N.E.2d 58 (1996). A finding is against the manifest weight of theevidence where the record clearly demonstrates that the oppositeresult would be proper. In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062,574 N.E.2d 893 (1991). The court is afforded broad discretion whendetermining the existence of abuse because it is in the bestposition to observe and weigh witness credibility. C.C., 224 Ill.App. 3d at 215.

Respondent initially contends that hearsay statementsregarding C.W.'s sexual abuse were not sufficiently corroborated byother reliable evidence pursuant to section 2-18(4)(c) (705 ILCS405/2-18(4)(c) (West 2000) (section 2-18(4)(c))) of the Act. Respondent avers this testimony was unreliable because he could notcross-examine C.W. with respect to the allegations. He alsoasserts that C.W.'s medical records do not meet the burden of prooffor admissible hearsay statements under section 2-18(4)(c).

Generally, out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay;however, the Act provides an exception for the admission of out-of-court statements made by minors that pertain to incidents of abuseor neglect. Section 2-18(4)(c) states:

"Previous statements made by the minorrelating to any allegations of abuse orneglect shall be admissible in evidence. However, no such statement, if uncorroboratedand not subject to cross-examination, shall besufficient in itself to support a finding ofabuse or neglect." 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(c)(West 2000).

In In re A.P., 179 Ill. 2d 184, 196, 688 N.E.2d 642 (1997)(A.P.), the only evidence of the father's sexual abuse of the minorwas the minor's hearsay statements to adult witnesses. The A.P.court noted that the underlying purpose of section 2-18(4)(c) is"to provide a means of proving abuse or neglect in cases where theminor is reluctant or unable to testify. To require that the minorbe subject to cross-examination, that is, to testify, in order forthe minor's statements to support an abuse or neglect finding wouldentirely defeat that purpose." The court construed section 2-18(4)(c) as requiring either cross-examination of the minor whomade the statement or corroboration of the minor's hearsaystatement. A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 196.

The A.P. court stated that, in the context of section 2-18(4)(c), corroborating evidence of the abuse or neglect requiresindependent evidence which would support a logical and reasonableinference that the alleged acts described in the hearsay statementoccurred. 179 Ill. 2d at 199. The court defined corroboratingevidence as "evidence that makes it more probable that a minor wasabused or neglected." A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 199. Sufficientcorroboration of evidence under section 2-18(4)(c) is determined ona case-by-case basis. A.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 198.

In the case sub judice, hearsay testimony of C.W.'s sexualabuse was corroborated by respondent's indictment and convictionfor predatory criminal sexual assault of C.W., and C.W.'s medicalassessment, which did not rule out sexual abuse, and "confirmed thehistory of stepfather laying on top of her with his -- his or herclothes off and rubbing his penis over her vagina almost everynight ***." This assessment is not merely a "catch phrase," asrespondent notes.⁽⁴⁾ Any alleged ambiguity in the assessment cannotbe determined by this court because respondent failed to include itin the record on appeal. The circuit court's reliance upon C.W.'smedical records in its findings of neglect and abuse is presumed tobe in conformity with the law and supported by a sufficient factualbasis. Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392.

K.O. further corroborated instances of abuse throughstatements that were consistent with C.W.'s account. Anotherhighly probative fact was C.W.'s ability to describe semen. Aneight year old child would not have been able to describe semenunless she had seen it, which is unlikely unless the events C.W.described had actually taken place. See C.C., 224 Ill. App. 3d at214. The record shows that C.W. suffered from symptoms of sexualabuse, including chronic bed wetting, a strong fear of men andsignificant behavior problems at school and home. In addition,respondent told Nelis to write down whatever C.W. said in writingand he would sign it, but when Nelis requested his side of thestory, respondent refused to answer.

With respect to K.O., a finding of abuse of one siblingestablishes a prima facie case of neglect based upon an injuriousenvironment to another. In re Z.R., 274 Ill. App. 3d 422, 427, 654N.E.2d 255 (1995).

Moreover, the totality of the circumstances surrounding themaking of C.W.'s statements indicates sufficient reliability tosupport a finding of abuse. C.W.'s statements to Dorfman and Nelisthat she was sexually abused by respondent were consistent as toboth the act and the identity of the accuser and, as discussedabove, were corroborated by K.O., who witnessed the abuse. SeeA.P., 179 Ill. 2d at 201.

In light of the foregoing factors, respondent's contentionthat C.W.'s statements of sexual abuse were not sufficientlycorroborated under section 2-18(4)(c) is rejected.

Respondent next contends that the circuit court's findingswere against the manifest weight of the evidence due to theadmission of a certified copy of his criminal conviction.

The State and Public Guardian argue that respondent'sconviction for predatory criminal sexual assault of C.W. was notonly admissible, but prima facie evidence of the abuse, and couldhave been used to collaterally estop respondent from denying theabuse.

In In re McMullen, 29 Ill. App. 3d 284, 287, 331 N.E.2d 403(1975) (McMullen), the court found a prior conviction admissiblewhere the conviction was "directly relevant on the question ofparental fitness, and was obtained in a proceeding between the sameparties involved in the custody proceeding, and was not appealed." In its decision, the McMullen court noted the findings in Smith v.Andrews, 54 Ill. App. 2d 51, 203 N.E.2d 160 (1964) (Smith), a caserelied upon by respondent, which held that defendant's convictionfor rape properly was admissible in a parental fitness case asprima facie evidence that he committed a forcible rape. In Smith,the court recognized that defendant was a party to a previousproceeding in which certain facts were adjudicated against himunder conditions considerably more favorable, in terms ofprocedural safeguards and the quantum of evidence required, thanthose afforded in any later civil proceeding. 54 Ill. App. 2d at60. The Smith court held that defendant's convictions for robberyand rape were admissible in a parental fitness proceeding if theywere relevant to some issue involved in the proceeding. 54 Ill.App. 2d at 62.

Here, like defendants in McMullen and Smith, respondent wasafforded all procedural safeguards and a higher burden of proof inhis criminal trial and a jury found him guilty of predatorycriminal sexual assault of C.W. It follows that this convictionwas admissible at the adjudication hearing because it was relevantto whether respondent sexually abused and neglected C.W. Moreover,respondent's criminal conviction was prima facie evidence that hedid, in fact, sexually abuse C.W. See Smith, 54 Ill. App. 2d at61.

In addition, the supreme court recently has held that adefendant may be estopped from challenging the effect of a priorcriminal conviction in a subsequent civil case. American FamilyMutual Insurance Co. v. Savickas, 193 Ill. 2d 378, 387, 739 N.E.2d445 (2000) (Savickas). In the instant case, respondent meets thethree threshold requirements for the application of the estoppeldoctrine: (1) the conduct at issue decided in the prioradjudication is identical with the one presented in the civilproceeding; (2) respondent's criminal conviction was a finaljudgment on the merits⁽⁵⁾; and (3) estoppel is asserted againstrespondent, who was a party in the prior adjudication. SeeSavickas, 193 Ill. 2d at 387. Therefore, respondent is estoppedfrom challenging the admission of his prior conviction forpredatory criminal sexual assault.

Accordingly, the circuit court's findings of neglect and/orabuse of C.W. and K.O. were not against the manifest weight of theevidence.

Respondent next argues that he was denied a fair trial due toineffective assistance of counsel. He asserts a litany of errorsby trial counsel, claiming that the totality of these errorsresulted in such prejudice that there is a reasonable probabilitythe results would have been different.⁽⁶⁾

The State and Public Guardian respond that Schlee'srepresentation of respondent was objectively reasonable underprevailing standards and that respondent has not shown that, butfor Schlee's ineffective representation, the results of theadjudication hearing would have been different.

In Illinois, ineffective assistance of counsel is establishedwhen a defendant shows that counsel's representation fell below anobjective standard of reasonableness and that, but for counsel'sshortcomings, the outcome of the proceeding would have beendifferent. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed.2d 674, 698, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984) (Strickland). Respondenthas the same right to effective assistance of counsel as adefendant in a criminal proceeding. In re KR.K., 258 Ill. App. 3d270, 279, 631 N.E.2d 449 (1994); In re R.G., 165 Ill. App. 3d 112,127, 518 N.E.2d 691 (1988). The Strickland standard requires "areasonable probability of a different result, not merely apossibility." People v. Gacy, 125 Ill. 2d 117, 129-30, 530 N.E.2d1340 (1988). Both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfiedbefore defendant can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistanceof counsel. People v. Eddmonds, 143 Ill. 2d 501, 511, 578 N.E.2d952 (1991). If the ineffectiveness claim can be disposed ofbecause defendant did not suffer sufficient prejudice, a court neednot consider whether counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at2069.

In the present case, the alleged errors claimed by respondentare unsupported by record evidence. Respondent has providedneither legal authority nor evidence demonstrating sufficientprejudice resulting in an outcome of the adjudication hearing thatwould have been different. Instead, the record supports Schlee's"very effective assistance of counsel," as noted by the circuitcourt. Schlee filed numerous motions prior to the adjudicationhearing and, at the hearing, he argued that respondent did notneglect or abuse C.W. and K.O., cross-examined witnesses, respectedrespondent's wishes to testify on his own behalf, delivered aclosing argument and continued to represent respondent at thedispositional hearing. In addition, Schlee filed and arguedrespondent's post-trial motions. The record shows no instance ofsubstantial prejudice depriving respondent of a fair trial.Respondent's ineffective assistance of counsel claims are withoutmerit.

Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court of Cook Countyfinding that respondent abused and/or neglected C.W. and K.O.,perpetrated sexual abuse against C.W. and was an unfit parent, isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

THEIS, P.J., and GREIMAN, J., concur.

1. Neither Charlotte nor C.W.'s natural father, who also wasfound to be an unfit parent, are part of this appeal.

2. Although the stipulation states that respondent was convictedof child pornography in 1988, the record elsewhere indicates thatthe guilty finding for that crime actually occurred in 1998.

3. The documentation of the medical assessment is not includedin the record.

4. Respondent cites In re Alba, 185 Ill. App. 3d 286, 540 N.E.2d1116 (1989) (Alba) in support of his argument that the medicalassessment was not sufficient corroboration of sexual abuse, notingthe insufficiency of a psychologist's testimony. In Alba, however,the psychologist twice stated that he could not conclude the minorhad been sexually abused. 185 Ill. App. 3d at 289. Here, themedical assessment did not rule out sexual abuse and provided ahistory of sexual contact between respondent and C.W. Therefore,Alba is inapplicable to the present case.

5. Respondent's criminal conviction for predatory criminalsexual assault was affirmed on direct appeal. See People v.Oliver, No. 1-00-2089 (2002) (unpublished order under Supreme CourtRule 23).

6. Respondent asserts that trial counsel failed to: (1)interview or call 20 witnesses from his criminal trial; (2) acquireany transcript from the corresponding criminal trial; (3) providerespondent with written notice of his rights as required by section1-5(1) (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 2000)) of the Act; (4) preparerespondent adequately for his testimony during the adjudicationhearing; (5) subpoena relevant documents pertaining to this case,including prison records detailing respondent's rehabilitation andsex offender counseling; (6) interview or call Dr. Iwashita,respondent's therapist, who testified at the criminal trial; (7)investigate or develop any defense; (8) visit respondent in prisonduring the 26-month pendency of this case; and (9) produce fourletters that respondent mailed regarding questions and concernsabout defense strategy.