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SECOND DIVISION
September 21, 2004
(Nunc Pro Tunc August 10, 2004)

No. 1-02-3543

PRESIDING JUSTICE BURKE delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent Carmen D. appeals from an order of the circuit court, findingher unfit on the basis that she failed to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of her child, Kenneth J., within the nine-month period followingadjudication of neglect or abuse and/or within any nine-month period thereafterand terminating her parental rights. On appeal, respondent contends that: (1)the petition for termination denied her due process because it failed to identifythe nine-month period at issue; (2) the trial court erred in admitting intoevidence a "Parenting Assessment Report" (Report) as relevant and as a businessrecord; (3) the trial court erred in admitting testimony from case workers; and(4) the trial court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of theevidence. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

Respondent and her children first became involved with child protectionagencies in October 1990. On August 7, 1996, the State filed a petition foradjudication of wardship over respondent's three children, including Kenneth,born February 17, 1996, alleging that Kenneth was abused and neglected on thebases that his two siblings, Michael and Tiffany, had been sexually molested byrespondent's paramour on August 28, 1995, respondent refused services, andrespondent refused to comply with requests, including counseling. On August 8,Patrick Murphy was appointed guardian ad litem (GAL) and temporary custody ofKenneth was granted to his maternal aunt, Wanda, respondent's sister, and herhusband, Derrick.

On February 20, 1997, an adjudication order was entered, finding Kennethabused or neglected based on an injurious environment and substantial risk ofinjury. On May 30, a dispositional order was entered, adjudicating Kenneth award of the court. At all times thereafter, respondent's visits with herchildren were supervised pursuant to court order.

[NONPUBLISHABLE MATERIAL UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 REMOVED HERE.]

On March 4, 1999, the trial court ordered a parenting assessment evaluationto be done of respondent. This assessment was undertaken in late 1999 by membersof a team from Thresholds Mothers' Project, an agency funded by the Departmentof Children and Family Services (DCFS), whose purpose was to assist DCFS and thejuvenile court in evaluating parenting capabilities of mentally ill parents. TheReport, consisting of a summary and four individual evaluations, was subsequentlyentered into evidence at respondent's termination hearing over respondent'sobjection. The Report summary indicated that respondent's case was referred tothe team on May 4, 1999. Respondent and her children were evaluated by KathleenPesek, M.Ed., a child development specialist, on November 8, 1999; Mark Amdur,M.D., a psychiatrist, on October 28; Nycole Bridle, B.A., a case aide, and FrankLani, Ph.D., a psychologist, on October 27; and Barbara White, L.C.S.W.,A.C.S.W., a social worker, on October 25. White's evaluation took place atrespondent's home and the other evaluations took place at the team's office. Thesummary identified the referral questions and the team's subsequent answers as:

"1. Are there any additional services that wouldenable [respondent] to regain custody of herchildren?

[Respondent's] primary areas of difficulty appear to beher limited intellectual resources and her highly abusive,unstable, and traumatic life history. She does not appear tobe suffering from a major mental illness at this time, anddoes not require any specific therapeutic intervention thatwould help remediate her circumstances. While [respondent]may personally benefit from a supportive professionalrelationship, there are no specific services that would enable[respondent] [to] adequately parent her children.

2. With regard to permanency, would a goal of returnhome for [respondent's] children be in her bestinterest?

[Respondent] made it clear that she does not feel thather children should have been removed from her care, and thatshe cares for her children very much and would like for themto return home. However, it does not appear to be in her bestinterest for the children to return home, nor in their bestinterest. [Respondent's] psychiatric conditions are all of thetype that may become particularly problematic under stress. When this occurs, she responds with agitation, disorganizationand threats of self-harm. The special needs of her children -which [respondent] has a poor understanding of - combined withparenting difficulties are likely to result in an increasinglevel of stress that [respondent] has been unable to handle inthe past which would further tax [respondent's] functioning."

The summary also identified significant risk factors, includingrespondent's primary difficulty as being her extremely limited intellectualcapacity. According to the Report, respondent had no clear understanding of whyher children were taken away and disagreed with the decision to do so. As such,the Report indicated that respondent's "lack of insight suggests low probabilitythat problematic issues would change." The Report further noted that respondentwas driven by her need for the children or how they made her feel and not bytheir needs. She tended toward role reversal and held unreasonably highexpectations of her children. The Report continued that respondent'sunderstanding of child development was deficient and that she was "in significantpsychological distress." As a result of this, her relationships with otherstended to be "unrewarding or difficult." The Report also indicated thatrespondent's social support network was very limited. The Report recommendedthat, given respondent's difficulties, there were "no additional services thatwould sufficiently increase her parenting capability to an acceptable level."⁽¹⁾

[NONPUBLISHABLE MATERIAL UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 REMOVED HERE]

On May 30, 2001, the State filed a supplemental petition to appoint aguardian with the right to consent to adoption. The petition alleged thatrespondent was unfit under section (1)(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (Act), failureto maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility, and undersection (1)(D)(m), in that she "failed to make reasonable effort to correct theconditions which were the basis for the removal of the children from [her] and/or[has] failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the children to[her], within 9 months after the adjudication of neglect or abuse *** and/orwithin any 9 month period after said finding." 750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2002).

Hearings on the termination petition began on May 15, 2002.

[NONPUBLISHABLE MATERIAL UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 REMOVED HERE]

After hearing the evidence and the arguments of the parties, the courtfound respondent unfit only with respect to section (1)(D)(m)(iii) of the Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2002). Following an immediate best interests hearing,the court concluded that it was in Kenneth's best interests to appoint a guardianwith the right to consent to adoption. On October 15, 2002, the trial courtentered a termination hearing order, finding respondent unfit with respect toreasonable progress. The trial court also entered a permanency order terminatingrespondent's parental rights and stating that the goal was adoption. This appealfollowed.
 

Respondent first contends that the State's petition for terminationviolated her due process rights because it did not identify the nine-month periodin which she allegedly failed to make reasonable progress. Respondent arguesthat it is impossible to determine from the petition which nine-month period, ofthe five different nine-month periods existing, the State was going to litigateand, thus, she did not have sufficient notice as required by due process. Respondent maintains that the law requires the State to set forth a specific anddistinct time period. Respondent further argues that her failure to raise theissue in the trial court did not waive it for review because the failure to statea cause of action, as is the case here, can be raised at any time.

The Guardian contends that respondent waived review of this issue becauseshe failed to object to it in the trial court and give the State an opportunityto cure any alleged defect, that the petition did not deny respondent due processbecause the State is not required to set forth a specific nine-month time period--the State is only required to allege respondent's unfitness and the statutoryground for same--and, alternatively, even if the State was required to do so,respondent suffered no prejudice and failed to demonstrate how she was surprisedor prejudiced by the petition. The Guardian relies on several cases to supporthis position that the State need not allege a specific time frame.⁽²⁾ The Statepresents essentially the same arguments.

Section 1(D)(m) of the Act sets forth the following bases for thetermination of parental rights:

"Failure by a parent (i) to make reasonableefforts to correct the conditions that were the basisfor the removal of the child from the parent, or (ii) tomake reasonable progress toward the return of the childto the parent within 9 months after an adjudication ofneglected or abused minor under Section 2-3 of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent minor underSection 2-4 of that Act, or (iii) to make reasonableprogress toward the return of the child to the parentduring any 9-month period after the end of the initial9-month period following the adjudication of neglectedor abused minor under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile CourtAct of 1987 or dependent minor under Section 2-4 of thatAct." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2002).

It is well-settled that "pleading defects must be raised at trial so theymay be remedied; otherwise they are forfeited." In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill. App.3d 1041, 1045, 796 N.E.2d 1175 (2003). However, in some circumstances, justicerequires relaxation of the forfeiture rule. As such, "courts have relaxed therule when the State's termination petition fails to state a cause of action." In re J.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d 310, 315, 794 N.E.2d 414 (2003). In connection withpetitions for termination, "[t]he requirement of pleading with specificity doesnot require more than setting forth the specific statutory grounds of unfitness." In re Andrea D., 342 Ill. App. 3d 233, 242, 794 N.E.2d 1043 (2003). The questionon appeal then is whether the alleged defects in the State's petition resultedin a failure to state a cause of action. In re J.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 316. When a challenge is raised to the sufficiency of a pleading, it is an issue oflaw, which we review de novo. In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 1045; 735ILCS 5/2-612(c) (West 2002).

Respondent relies on two cases in support of her argument that she did notwaive review of this issue because the State's petition failed to state a causeof action, which she may raise at any time: Rauch v. Griffin, 45 Ill. App. 3d784, 359 N.E.2d 894 (1977), and In re J.P.S., 198 Ill. App. 3d 633, 556 N.E.2d268 (1990). Neither case supports her position. In Rauch, the State's petitionfor termination of the parents' rights did not contain any allegations that theparents were unfit or the statutory grounds for same. Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d at787. After stating that the failure to state a cause of action can be raised atany time, the Rauch court noted that the Act "requires the petition to state thatthe parent is unfit and the grounds therefore." Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 788. According to the court, these allegations are material and are essential elementsof a petition. Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 788. The Rauch court then concluded:

"Under the circumstances presented in this case, thefailure to allege the unfitness of respondents and thegrounds therefore, as required by the Adoption Act,rendered the petition fatally defective and the causemust be reversed." Rauch, 45 Ill. App. 3d at 789.

Instead of supporting respondent's position here that the petition failed tostate a cause of action, Rauch supports the conclusion that the petition did, infact, under the directives of Rauch, state a cause of action. Unlike thepetition in Rauch, the State's petition in the instant case alleged thatrespondent was unfit and the grounds therefore, i.e., that she failed to maintaina reasonable degree of interest in her children, failed to make reasonableefforts to correct conditions, and failed to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of her children in the nine-month period following adjudication or anynine-month period thereafter.

In In re J.P.S., the State's petition sought termination of the mother'sparental rights on the basis that the minor was adjudicated abused and the motherfailed to make reasonable efforts to correct the condition under which the childwas removed. In re J.P.S., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 635. The trial court entered afinding of unfitness and terminated the respondent's parental rights. In reJ.P.S., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 634. The appellate court reversed, concluding thatthe statutory ground, based on the specific language of the statute at that time,for finding unfitness based on a failure to make reasonable efforts, applied onlyto neglected and dependent minors, not to abused minors. In re J.P.S., 198 Ill.App. 3d at 635. Although the court noted that the legislature had subsequentlyamended the statute to include abused minors, it found that this amendment didnot "save" the case before it. In re J.P.S., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 635. Becausethe statute did not include abused minors, the court further concluded that theState's petition failed to state a cause of action, which the respondent couldchallenge for the first time on appeal. In re J.P.S., 198 Ill. App. 3d at 634-35. Again, this case does not support a finding in the instant case that theState's petition failed to state a cause of action. In re J.P.S. involved asituation where the nature of the adjudication was not covered by the terminationstatute. Clearly, if a situation is not covered by the statute, the State cannotstate a cause of action. This is simply not the case here.

Since we have found that the State's petition here did not fail to statea cause of action, the rule allowing a respondent to challenge the petition forthe first time on appeal is not applicable. Further, because respondent failedto object to the State's petition in the trial court or request that the Stateprovide specific dates, she forfeited review of this issue. See In re Jaronz Z.,348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 255, 810 N.E.2d 108 (2004) (concluding that the respondentforfeited review of her due process challenge to section (iii) of the Act becauseshe failed to object in the trial court or raise any issue at trial in connectionwith section (iii)); In re Dominique W., 347 Ill. App. 3d 557, 565, 808 N.E.2d21 (2004)(holding that the respondent waived review of her challenge to thesufficiency of the State's termination petition because she failed to raise itin the trial court); In re J.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 316 (same and concludingthat where the State's petition "clearly stated what action it sought the trialcourt to take, and the legal grounds that justify that action[,]" it did not failto state a cause of action).

Assuming, arguendo, that respondent had not forfeited her challenge, wewould find her argument unpersuasive. Although no case has directly addressedwhether the State's petition must identify the specific nine-month period atissue, several cases offer instruction in this regard. In In re Jaronz Z., theState filed a petition to terminate parental rights under section (1)(D)(m) ofthe Act, alleging that the respondent failed to make reasonable progress towardreturn of her child within nine months after the adjudication hearing or withinany nine-month period thereafter. In re Jaronz Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 245. Therespondent filed a demand for particulars, asking the State to identify the"exact dates" of the nine-month period at issue. The State moved to strike thisdemand, which the trial court granted. In re Jaronz Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 245. After the State had rested, but before the respondent began her case-in-chief,the respondent moved for a directed finding. In re Jaronz Z., 348 Ill. App. 3dat 247. At this time, the court inquired of the State as to which nine-monthperiod it was examining. In re Jaronz Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 247. The Stateresponded that it was March to December 2000. During closing argument, the Stategave an alternative period of May 31, 2000, to February 2001. The trial court,in deciding the matter, stated that it could look at the first nine-month periodor any other nine-month period thereafter. It determined that it would take intoconsideration the period from March 15 to December 15, 2000. In re Jaronz Z.,348 Ill. App. 3d at 249. On appeal, the respondent argued that section(1)(D)(m)(iii) was unconstitutional because it violated due process incircumventing the State's burden of proof since

"the State's ability to choose any nine-month timeperiod after the initial nine months following anadjudication of neglect in which to examine a parent'sfitness *** affords no notice to the parent regardingwhich nine-month period she will be evaluated on and,accordingly, reduces the State's burden of proof indemonstrating the parent's unfitness." In re Jaronz Z.,348 Ill. App. 3d at 255.

Although concluding that the respondent forfeited review of the issuebecause of her failure to raise it in the trial court, the In re Jaronz Z. courtconcluded that even assuming the issue was reviewable, the respondent's argumentwas without merit because section (iii) provides merely an additional ground toprove unfitness, but does not change the State's burden of proof, i.e., thesection does not change the quantum of evidence needed to prove unfitness, onlythe type. In re Jaronz Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 256-57. Ultimately, the courtconcluded:

"In our view, the section is clear with respect to theapplicable time: a parent's actions for a fitnessdetermination may be examined in light of any nine monthincrement of time beginning following the expiration ofthe first nine month period after the adjudication ofneglect. [Citation.]" (Emphasis added.) In re JaronzZ., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 258.

In re K.H., 346 Ill. App. 3d 443, 804 N.E.2d 1108 (2004), is alsoinstructive, although we note that the respondent there did not challenge thesufficiency of the State's petition. In In re K.H., the minor was adjudicatedneglected on October 7, 1999. On April 2, 2002, the State filed a petition fortermination of parental rights on the basis that the mother had failed to makereasonable progress during both the initial nine-month period and any nine-monthperiod thereafter. In re K.H., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 445. At the hearing on theState's petition, the court heard evidence spanning from December 1999 to atleast March 2002. In re K.H., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 446-52. The trial courtconcluded that the respondent was unfit in that "she failed to make reasonableprogress toward the goal of returning K.H. home in a nine-month period after theinitial nine-month period that followed the adjudication of neglect." In reK.H., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 452. The appellate court affirmed, stating:

"Simply put, a parent is required to make reasonableprogress during a nine-month period. *** The trialcourt had an adequate basis to find that the Stateproved by clear and convincing evidence that respondentfailed to make reasonable progress in a nine-monthperiod after the nine-month period that followed theadjudication of neglect." In re K.H., 346 Ill. App. 3dat 455.

Not once in this decision was any specific nine-month period identified. Clearly, the cases discussed above demonstrate that the State need not identifythe specific nine-month period in its petition for termination.⁽³⁾

In In re Dominique W., which we granted the State leave to file asadditional authority in the instant case, the respondent was found unfit undersection 1(D)(b) of the Act (failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare). In re Dominique W., 347Ill. App. 3d at 558. On appeal, the respondent contended that the State'spetition was legally insufficient because it merely recited the statutorylanguage without alleging any specific facts of misconduct on her part. In reDominique W., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 565. The court first concluded that therespondent waived review of the issue because she failed to raise it in the trialcourt. In re Dominique W., 247 Ill. App. 3d at 565. Waiver aside, the courtconcluded that the respondent's argument was without merit, finding here that theState's petition was sufficient because it set forth the specific statutoryground supporting unfitness, section 1(D)(b), which, according to the court, wasall the State was required to plead and that the petition sufficiently apprisedthe respondent of the charge against her. In re Dominique W., 347 Ill. App. 3dat 565. This case, although addressing a different statutory ground, furthersupports a finding here that the State need not allege the specific nine-monthperiod because it, too, held that the State need only allege unfitness and therelevant statutory ground.

Moreover, the language of section (iii) of the Act itself does not supporta conclusion that the State need identify a specific nine-month period. Thestatute uses the term "any." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(iii) (West 2002). It does notstate "an or any identified" or "a or any specified" nine-month period after theinitial nine-month period. "Any" means "one, no matter what one," or "any part,quantity, or number." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 97 (1993). Respondent asks this court to add language to the statute that the legislaturedid not include.

Lastly, as the Guardian argues, respondent has not demonstrated how she wasprejudiced by the failure to identify a specific nine-month period. Respondenthas not identified what additional evidence she would have offered or alternativearguments she would have made to the court that would have changed the outcomeof this case. See In re Jaronz Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d at 258 (noting that"respondent failed before the trial court, and fails now on appeal, to state howshe was prejudiced, if at all, by the application of section 1(D)(m)(iii) to hercause. *** She made no offer of proof at trial, nor does she assert a basisbefore us, regarding what different evidence she would have presented or argumentshe would have made that would have changed the outcome here"); In re J.R., 342Ill. App. 3d at 317 (concluding that because the respondent failed to allege, andthe court was not able to ascertain from the record, "any way in which thealleged defect affected respondent's rights or interests," her claim would faileven assuming it was not waived).

Based on the foregoing, we find that the State's petition did not fail tostate a cause of action and, therefore, because respondent did not challenge thepetition in the trial court, she cannot do so now. Further, were we to addressrespondent's challenge substantively, we would find that relevant case law, aswell as the language of section (iii) itself, does not mandate a conclusion thatthe State must identify a specific nine-month period in its petition fortermination. Accordingly, we would find respondent's challenge unpersuasive.

Respondent next contends that the trial court erred in admitting the Reportbecause it was irrelevant to the issue of her fitness and it was not a businessrecord.

A. Relevancy

Respondent first maintains that the Report was not relevant to the issueof her fitness, but rather only to the best interests analysis, and, thus, it wasinadmissible. In this regard, respondent argues that compliance with serviceplans is the touchstone of reasonable progress and the Report had no relevanceto her reasonable progress or whether she made progress in correcting theconditions that resulted in the adjudication in the first instance.

The Guardian maintains that the Report was relevant because it wasprimarily concerned with respondent's services and was completed for the expresspurpose of determining whether there were any services available to respondentto assist her in having Kenneth returned to her. According to the Guardian, theReport directly related to respondent's ability to regain custody of Kenneth andthe core of the evaluation was respondent's ability to parent. The Guardianfurther argues that the Report was created for the same purpose as service plansare created--as a social service tool--and not for litigation. The Guardian alsomaintains that the Illinois Supreme Court has rejected the view that reasonableprogress determinations are limited to correcting circumstances occurring whenthe case started.

The State presents arguments that are the same as the Guardian's. Inaddition, the State argues that respondent ignores the first stated goal of theReport and misquotes the second. According to the State, the first goal clearlyaddresses issues relevant to reasonable progress.

The cases relied upon by respondent in support of her position that theReport is only admissible with respect to a best interests hearing, In re D.T.,338 Ill. App. 3d 133, 788 N.E.2d 133 (2003), and In re C.B., 248 Ill. App. 3d168, 618 N.E.2d 598 (1993), do not aid her. In In re D.T., although a teamparenting assessment was undertaken of the respondent and two of the doctorsinvolved in the assessment testified, there was no evidence that the reportcreated by the team was admitted as evidence, nor was there any question raisedas to its admissibility. As such, In re D.T. does not address the question posedby respondent here: the admissibility of the Report. More importantly, therespondent in In re D.T. was alleged unfit based on her " '[f]ailure to protectthe child from conditions within his environment injurious to the child'swelfare.' [Citation.]" In re D.T., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 145. Evidence of therespondent's conduct after removal of her child was not relevant to this groundof unfitness. In re D.T., 338 Ill. App. 3d at 145. Rather, only evidence of therespondent's conduct before the child was removed was relevant. In re D.T., 338Ill. App. 3d at 146. Therefore, any testimony, including that from the twodoctors involved in the parenting assessment, that related to the respondent'sconduct after removal, was not relevant to the question of fitness. In theinstant case, we are not dealing with that ground of unfitness, limiting relevantevidence to respondent's conduct prior to removal of her children. As such, Inre D.T. is inapplicable.

Respondent relies on In re C.B. for the proposition that a bondingassessment, and thus here, the parenting assessment, is relevant only to a bestinterests determination. Again, this case does not support respondent'sposition. In In re C.B., the question of which of two individuals, neither ofwhom was the natural mother of the minor, should be awarded permanent custody wasat issue. In re C.B., 248 Ill. App. 3d at 169. The resolution of this questionrevolved entirely around a best interests determination. In re C.B., 248 Ill.App. 3d at 176. While it is true that a bonding assessment was done and theexpert concluded that the child was attached to one person over the other (In reC.B., 248 Ill. App. 3d at 173), the appellate court found that the assessment wascompletely inadequate (In re C.B., 248 Ill. App. 3d at 178), and ruled that thetrial court erred in unreasonably relying on the expert's conclusion simplybecause it was uncontradicted. In re C.B., 248 Ill. App. 3d at 178-79.

First, respondent does not explain or argue how the parenting assessmenthere is akin to the bonding assessment in In re C.B. or why the two clearlydifferent types of assessments should be treated the same. More importantly,however, In re C.B. is clearly inapplicable to the instant case. It did notinvolve a question of the fitness of a natural parent, unlike the instant case. Moreover, the question of the admissibility of the bonding assessment report ortestimony in connection with same was not at issue. Lastly, the assessment andreport were clearly inadequate. As such, In re C.B. does not aid respondent, northis court, in determining whether the Report here, which respondent does notcontend is inadequate, was admissible in connection with her fitness.

The question in the instant case ultimately revolves around whetherrespondent made reasonable progress toward the return of her children. "Theadmission of evidence is within the discretion of the circuit court and itsruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. [Citation.] Allevidence must be relevant to be admissible. [Citation.] Evidence is relevant ifit tends to prove a fact in controversy or render a matter in issue more or lessprobable." Smith v. Silver Cross Hospital, 339 Ill. App. 3d 67, 76, 790 N.E.2d77 (2003). With respect to "reasonable progress," the case of In re C.N., 196Ill. 2d 181, 752 N.E.2d 1030 (2001), relied upon by the Guardian, is instructiveon what evidence is relevant to this determination. In In re C.N., the courtfirst noted that the statute fails to set forth how progress is measured and"does not explain what steps are necessary to reach the goal of 'the return ofthe child.' " In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 211. Our supreme court noted that theappellate court was not in agreement as to the appropriate "benchmark" to use tomeasure a parent's progress. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 212. Some courts "havemeasured progress by looking at the degree to which a parent has corrected thesituation which triggered the minor's initial removal or the conditions existingat the time custody [was] taken." In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 212. Other courts"have held that once the court, or an authorized agency like DCFS, decides whatsteps a parent must take to achieve the return of the child, subsequent inquiryinto a parent's progress should focus on the parent's compliance with the DCFSservice plan, the court's directives, or both." In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 212. Still other courts have taken a middle ground. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 212. The In re C.N. court rejected the narrow view "that a court may only lookto the situation that triggered the minor's initial removal, or the conditionsexisting at the time custody [was] taken." In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 213. Inthis regard, the court stated that this view "erroneously assumes that thecondition which triggered removal of the child is the only condition a parentneed ever address in order to achieve the goal of reunification." (Emphasis inoriginal.) In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 213. According to the supreme court,"[t]he parent-child relationship, the environment in the home, and the preciseconditions which triggered State intervention do not remain static over time." In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 213. Additionally, "other serious conditions *** maybecome known only after removal, following further investigation of the child,parent and family situation." In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 214. According to thecourt, "[t]he necessity of considering other conditions that later come to lightis reflected in the broad scope of the investigation authorized under theJuvenile Court Act." In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 214. Specifically, the courtnoted that service plans are not limited to addressing those conditions thattriggered removal, but "must reasonably relate to 'remedying a condition orconditions that gave rise or which could give rise to any finding of child abuseor neglect.' [Citation.]" (Emphasis in original). In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at214. The In re C.N. court also rejected the narrow view that focus should solelybe on the parent's compliance with service plans. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at214. However, the court did note that compliance with service plans is"intimately tied to a parent's progress toward the return of the child." In reC.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17.

Ultimately, the court stated that "the overall focus in evaluating aparent's progress toward the return of the child remains, at all times, on thefitness of the parent in relation to the needs of the child." In re C.N., 196Ill. 2d at 215. The court concluded:

"[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's progressunder section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act must take intoaccount the dynamics of the circumstances involved; thereality that the condition resulting in removal of thechild may not be the only, or the most severe, conditionwhich must be addressed before custody of the child canbe returned to the parent; the appropriate role ofservice plans in addressing these conditions; and theoverriding concern that a parent's rights to his or herchild will not be terminated lightly." In re C.N., 196Ill. 2d at 216.

Accordingly, the court held:

"[T]he benchmark for measuring a parent's 'progresstoward the return of the child' under section 1(D)(m) ofthe Adoption Act encompasses the parent's compliancewith the service plans and the court's directives, inlight of the condition which gave rise to the removal ofthe child, and in light of other conditions which laterbecome known and which would prevent the court fromreturning custody of the child to the parent." In reC.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 216-17.

Based on In re C.N., relevant evidence with respect to reasonable progressincludes: evidence in connection with compliance with service plans and courtdirectives; evidence in connection with correction of the conditions leading toremoval; and evidence in connection with any other conditions that may bedisclosed through subsequent investigation that a parent must address inachieving the goal of return. Contrary to respondent's argument here, the solefocus is not on compliance with service plans or correction of the conditionsresulting in removal. Rather, evidence relevant to the reasonable progressanalysis includes other conditions that may become known that require correctionor addressing. The Report here certainly falls within the ambit of this. TheReport, although it does contain information and conclusions in connection withthe best interests of the children, extensively addresses conditions orcircumstances of respondent that relate to her fitness in relationship to theneeds of her children. Certainly, the Report tends to prove a fact incontroversy, respondent's fitness, i.e., whether there are any conditions thatwould prevent the court from returning her children to her. As such, we concludethat the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Report asrelevant.

B. Business Record

Respondent next maintains that the Report was not admissible as a businessrecord because it was prepared for litigation. Specifically, respondent arguesthat it was prepared by a team of experts to assist in litigation and was doneat the request of the trial court. As such, respondent argues that it is not abusiness record. Respondent also maintains that the Report contained expertopinions that were not subject to cross-examination. According to respondent,expert opinions must be given by live testimony.

The Guardian contends that the Report was properly admitted as a businessrecord since it is similar to services plans in nature and purpose. The Guardianfurther contends that the current trend of authority allows opinions to beadmitted as part of business records, authority that respondent ignores. In thisregard, the Guardian maintains that the Report in fact did not contain expertopinions because none of the authors were qualified as experts. The State againpresents arguments similar to the Guardian's.

Section 18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act provides:

"Any writing, record, photograph or x-ray of anyhospital or public or private agency, whether in theform of an entry in a book or otherwise, made as amemorandum or record of any condition, act, transaction,occurrence or event relating to a minor in an abuse,neglect or dependency proceeding, shall be admissible inevidence as proof of that condition, act, transaction,occurrence or event, if the court finds that thedocument was made in the regular course of the businessof the hospital or agency and that it was in the regularcourse of such business to make it, at the time of theact, transaction, occurrence or event, or within areasonable time thereafter." 705 ILCS 405/2-18(4)(a)(West 2002).

To be admissible as a business record under this section, the State mustestablish that the writing was "(1) made as a memorandum or record of the event,(2) made in the ordinary course of business, and (3) made at the time of theevent or within a reasonable time thereafter." In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227,236, 719 N.E.2d 348 (1999).

We find that the trial court did not err in admitting the Report as abusiness record. First, the case relied upon by respondent in support of herargument, Kelly v. HCI Heinz Construction Co., 282 Ill. App. 3d 36, 668 N.E.2d596 (1996), involved admission of evidence under Supreme Court Rule 236, whichis not applicable to Juvenile Court proceedings. See In re A.B., 308 Ill. App.3d at 234-35. As such, the ruling in that case is not applicable here. Moreimportantly, the requirements for admission under section 18(4)(a) of theJuvenile Court Act were met. Evidence was presented during the hearing that thisdocument was prepared in the agency's regular course of business and it wasclearly made contemporaneously with the events the Report recorded.

With respect to respondent's argument that the Report was prepared forlitigation and, therefore, is not a business record, we disagree. First, it hasbeen noted that "[s]imply because they [client service plans] are used in anadversarial-type proceeding is of no consequence." In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3dat 236. Accordingly, because the Report was used in this termination proceedingand, in fact, was requested by the trial court itself, does not control whetherit is a business record. Moreover, under the Juvenile Court Act, agencies arerequired to " 'assist a Circuit Court during all stages of the court proceedingin accordance with the purposes of *** the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 byproviding full, complete, and accurate information to the court.' " In re A.B.,308 Ill. App. 3d at 236. Clearly, the Report serves this purpose. It certainlyprovides additional information to the court, necessary for the court to renderits decision on respondent's fitness. The Report was created with familypreservation and the best interests of all parties in mind. More importantly,the Report was "created as a direct result of the ongoing juvenile proceeding andrelate[d] to a condition which [was] also directly related to that proceeding." In re M.S., 210 Ill. App. 3d 1085, 1095-96, 569 N.E.2d 1282 (1991).

Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in admitting theReport as a business record.

[NONPUBLISHABLE MATERIAL UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 REMOVED HERE]

[NONPUBLISHABLE MATERIAL UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 REMOVED HERE]

We agree with the State's argument that respondent forfeited review of thisissue on appeal by failing to object to the testimony in the trial court. Accordingly, we decline to address respondent's challenge.
 

[NONPUBLISHABLE MATERIAL UNDER SUPREME COURT RULE 23 REMOVED HERE]

We have carefully reviewed the record and find that the State proved byclear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to make reasonable progressin any nine-month period after the adjudication and that an opposite conclusionis not clearly evident. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court's findingthat respondent was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of CookCounty.

Affirmed

CAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.

1. Due to page restrictions, the four individual evaluation reports are notincluded in the published portion of this opinion, but are detailed in theunpublished portion.

2. We note that all of these cases were decided prior to January 1, 2000,when section (iii) of the Act became effective. Accordingly, they can have nobearing on the issue presented to this court since they clearly could not haveinterpreted this section.

3. Also enlightening is the following comment made by Senator Karpiel of theIllinois General Assembly regarding the addition of section (iii):

"SENATOR KARPIEL: *** House Bill 1298 amends theAdoption Act. It amends the grounds of parentalunfitness to include failure to make reasonable progresstoward the return of a child to the parent during anynine-month period after the end of the initial nine-month period following the adjudication of the child asneglected, abused or a dependent. At present under theAdoption Act, they--the court can only use evidence inthe nine-month period from the adjudication to thefiling period of termination. And since the terminationhearing sometimes isn't till maybe a year later, thecourt would really like to hear--be able to hearevidence during the other--the rest of the period. Thiscan be good or bad for a--a parent. Sometimes thatfirst nine-month period, perhaps they don't really gettheir act together too well, and then they--at thetermination hearing, the court can only use a badevidence of--of their fitness for being a parent, or itcan be that they start out good and then they start--start to slowly go back to their old bad ways and that'snot so good for the kids. So either way, but the courtwould like to be able to use the entire time, look atthe evidence during that entire period. And that's allthe bill does." (Emphasis added.) 91st Ill. Gen.Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 6, 1999, 37-38(statements of Senator Karpiel).