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No. 1-99-0508 

First Division
June 25, 2001

JUSTICE COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

Article XI-A of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/11a-1 et seq. (West 1998)) (ProbateAct) empowers the courts of this state to appoint plenary guardians of the person for adults wholack the ability to care for themselves and manage their own lives. Kenya C. was adjudicateddisabled under the above article. On March 25, 1993, the probate court appointed a plenaryguardian over Kenya's person. In 1996, Kenya gave birth to a child, K.C. The State filed apetition for wardship and temporary custody of K.C., which was granted. The State later filed apetition for the termination of Kenya's parental rights and the appointment of a guardian with thepower to consent to K.C.'s adoption, which was also granted. At each dispositional hearingdescribed above, the juvenile court judge was advised that the plenary guardian of Kenya wasneither named in the petitions nor served with notice of motion. The juvenile court judge choseto proceed with the hearings resulting in K.C. becoming a ward of the court and Kenyasubsequently having her parental rights terminated.

The issue: whether the plenary guardian of a person adjudicated disabled under theProbate Act is a necessary party under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq.(West 1998)) (Juvenile Court Act) when the disabled person's parental rights are at stake. Thiscourt's answer is the only answer consistent with constitutional guarantees, Illinois law, thepurposes of plenary guardianship and the dictates of common sense. The plenary guardian of adisabled parent whose parental rights are the subject of proceedings under the Juvenile Court Actis a necessary party under the Act and must be named as a party respondent and served notice ofall such proceedings.

The judgments of the juvenile court judge are reversed. 

1. Background 

The record reflects that respondent Kenya C. was adjudicated disabled in the probatedivision of the circuit court of Cook County under section 11a-3 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS5/11a-3 (West 1998)). The letter of office issued by the probate court on March 25, 1993, states:"THE OFFICE OF THE STATE GUARDIAN has been appointed plenary guardian of theperson of KENYA [C.], a disabled person, and is authorized to have under the direction of thecourt the custody of the ward and to do all acts required by law." (Emphasis added.)

On February 3, 1996, Kenya gave birth to a son, K.C. K.C. tested positive at birth for thepresence of both serum cocaine metabolites and syphilis antibodies. On February 16, 1996, theState filed a petition for adjudication of wardship and a motion for temporary custody withrespect to K.C., alleging both neglect (predicated on both injurious environment and drugexposure) and abuse (predicated on substantial risk of physical injury). 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b),(1)(c), (2)(ii) (West 1998). The State's petition further alleged that K.C. was dependent, statingthat the "mother is diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and refuses to take medication; [the]mother is unable to care for [the] child due to hospitalizations and [the] father is unknown." 705ILCS 405/2-4 (West 1998). Notice of the disposition hearing was served on Kenya by substituteservice: the unknown father was served by publication, as allowed under section 2-15 of theJuvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-15 (West 1998)). Kenya's plenary guardian of the personwas not served. After a disposition hearing, the trial court adjudged K.C. (who was representedin that hearing by appointed bar attorney Martin J. Wilson as guardian ad litem) a ward of thecourt and granted temporary custody of K.C. to D. Jean Ortega-Piron, the Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS) guardianship administrator. 705 ILCS 405/2-27 (West1998).⁽¹⁾

On November 5, 1997, the State filed a petition for the termination of Kenya's parentalrights to K.C. and the appointment of a guardian with the power to consent to K.C.'s adoption. 705 ILCS 405/2-29 (West 1998). Notice of the hearing on the petition was served personally onKenya, Ortega-Piron, and K.C. (in care of Ortega-Piron). The unknown father was served bypublication. Kenya's plenary guardian of the person was not served. In her answer to the State'spetition, Kenya disputed that termination of her parental rights would be in K.C.'s best interests.

A hearing was scheduled on the State's petition for March 31, 1998, but was subsequentlycontinued. On March 31, 1998, the court entered an order appointing Mr. Patrick Schlee asguardian ad litem for Kenya.⁽²⁾

After nine more continuances of the matter, an order was finally entered setting the case forhearing on January 28, 1999, on the petition for termination of parental rights.

On January 25, 1999, Kenya's attorney, assistant public defender Nancy Joslyn, filed onKenya's behalf a motion to dismiss the termination proceedings. The motion stated that Kenyawas disabled, had been under adult guardianship since 1993 and that both the fact of Kenya'swardship and the identity of Kenya's adult guardian, Ms. Patricia Young, had been available tothe State. The motion argued that because Kenya was a necessary party to the terminationproceedings, and because Kenya's guardian "stands in, in effect, by operation of law" for herward, the guardian was therefore a necessary party as well. The motion also noted that nowherein the Juvenile Court Act is the plenary adult guardian of an otherwise necessary party totermination proceedings exempted from service. The motion concluded that failure to serve theplenary guardian with proper notice of motion should result in the dismissal of the State'spetition.

The record on appeal contains no written response from the State to Kenya's motion todismiss. The trial court addressed the merits of the motion on January 28, 1999, when the partiesappeared for the scheduled termination hearing. In discussing the matter of Kenya's adultguardian, the trial court engaged in the following dialog with Mr. Schlee, whom the court hadpreviously appointed as guardian ad litem for Kenya:

"THE COURT: The situation is this: It's clear from the pleadings andfrom the causes in front of me concerning [K.C.] *** that the mother in fact had aguardian appointed for her and that guardian preceded your appointment, counsel. And actually Ms. Joslyn, who is the public defender appointed for the mother, hasapplied in a pleading before this court that the office of the State Guardian hasbeen appointed as the plenary guardian of Kenya [C.] on March 25, 1993. So shehas a guardian.

MR. SCHLEE: Okay, Judge.

THE COURT: I think it gets confusing, and I'm not exactly certain of allthe intricacies of the law on this, but sometimes it's just a matter of course that aperson in like circumstance such as the mother has a state guardian and comesinto court and has a legal representative of the public defender and anotherguardian appointed. And it strikes me as being somewhat excessive because I justdon't understand how many people it takes to do this when there's an order alreadyin effect. So with all due respect.

MR. SCHLEE: No problem, Judge."

The court then allowed without objection Mr. Schlee's oral motion to withdraw as Kenya'sguardian ad litem, leaving Kenya without a guardian of any kind present in court for theupcoming termination hearing.

The trial court then asked the State for its position with respect to Kenya's motion todismiss. The assistant State's Attorney argued that because Kenya had filed a response to thetermination petition and appeared generally before the court with respect to K.C.'s case (asopposed to filing a special appearance, as formerly required by section 2-301 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 1996) (now, as amended, 735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 1998))while represented by appointed counsel, Kenya had waived any objection to the court'sjurisdiction. The assistant public defender replied that "[w]hether or not [Kenya] personallyappears here has nothing to do with whether or not the guardian of the disabled mother was givennotice of the proceeding. She was not given proper notice of the proceedings and therefore thiscourt is deprived of jurisdiction." The assistant public defender further stated that the appearancewas filed on behalf of Kenya herself, and not on behalf of Kenya's guardian. The trial court thenasked:

"THE COURT: So how can you now say [Kenya] is not properly beforethe court when you entered an appearance on behalf of her?"

MS. JOSLYN: Because the guardian has never had service of summonsand [it] was never waived.

THE COURT: You waived it.

MS. JOSLYN: I never waived it. *** The point is that there is noindication that this guardian of this disabled person was ever present or notifiedand we can not [sic] assume proper jurisdiction. ***

THE COURT: We have a personal service document that was served uponthe mother and that is [in] the court file. You were appointed, you filed an answeron the mother's behalf, never raising jurisdiction; you engaged in discovery; you seta trial date; you participated in a forensic services order that required the mother togo in and be interviewed extensively. There is alot [sic] of discovery that has goneforward here. And as a result you have, I believe according to the law, waivedanything with regard to [K.C.] insofar as jurisdiction. Your motion with regard to[K.C.] will be denied.

MS. JOSLYN: Judge just for the record. I don't believe that as a publicdefender I could waive her constitutional right as to inquiring as to her capacity towaive. She has no capacity to waive it.

THE COURT: Madam, you are appointed her attorney and you came in onevery court date and you filed as on behalf of your client thereby waiving thejurisdictional issue. *** So I don't see that the jurisdiction is an issue. I truly don't."

The court next ruled that it lacked jurisdiction with respect to the separate petition for thetermination of Kenya's parental rights to K.C.'s sister, A.C., stating: "So as the mother stands beforeme *** she is a disabled person and she does not have counsel and she has not entered an appearanceand she has not entered an answer and so, therefore, I believe that there is no jurisdiction." Inresponse to the assistant State's Attorney's argument that the mother had appeared generally withrespect to A.C. by being in court, the court answered: "Well, now wait a second. You know, let'sbe serious now, she is a disabled person." The court then proceeded with the termination hearingas to K.C. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order finding Kenya an unfit parent,terminating her parental rights to K.C. and appointing Ortega-Piron as guardian of K.C. with thepower to consent to his adoption.

On appeal, Kenya challenges the order of the circuit court terminating her parental rights andappointing a guardian with the power to consent to K.C.'s adoption.

2. Analysis

We first address the trial court's determination that Kenya had waived any objection to thejurisdiction of the trial court predicated on the failure to name and serve notice upon her plenaryguardian of the person as a necessary party with respect to the termination proceedings. The trialcourt appeared to conclude that because Kenya's appointed counsel had filed a general appearanceon Kenya's behalf, Kenya had thereby waived any further jurisdictional objection under the formerspecial appearance statute. 735 ILCS 5/2-301 (West 1996). Had Kenya's objection related to thecourt's jurisdiction over her own person (and had she not been adjudicated disabled and been underplenary guardianship), we would agree: the filing of a general appearance under the statute then ineffect would have resulted in the waiver of further objection to personal jurisdiction. Ahart v.Young, 194 Ill. App. 3d 461, 463-65 (1990). However, the failure to name and serve a necessaryparty in a juvenile proceeding (in this case Kenya's plenary guardian of the person) raises thequestion not of personal jurisdiction over that party, but of the subject matter jurisdiction of thecourt. People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 83 (1983) ("A pleading that does not name and notify anecessary respondent in a juvenile proceeding fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and therebyrenders its orders void"); In re A.H., 195 Il. 2d 408, 423-24 (2001); In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263,271-72 (1994); In re J.L.S., 188 Ill. App. 3d 815, 816 (1989). Such an objection cannot be waivedand may be raised at any time. Segers v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. 2d 421, 427 (2000); Geise v.Phoenix Co. of Chicago, Inc., 159 Ill. 2d 507, 515 (1994). Neither Kenya's presence in court nor theappearance of Kenya's attorney could have resulted in the waiver of such an objection, and the trialcourt erred in so ruling.

Kenya does not appeal the adjudication of wardship of K.C., but only the termination of herparental rights to K.C. and the appointment of a guardian with the power to consent to K.C.'sadoption. It is axiomatic, however, that "[c]ourts, at every level, have an obligation to raise the lackof jurisdiction sua sponte." People v. Wright, 189 Ill. 2d 1, 34 (1999) (Freeman, C.J., speciallyconcurring). We therefore consider whether the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate K.C. a wardof the court prior to its termination of Kenya's parental rights.⁽³⁾

"The basic requirements of due process and fairness must be satisfied in juvenile courtproceedings." People v. D.J., 175 Ill. App. 3d 491, 493 (1988), citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18L. Ed. 2d 527, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967); People v. R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 81 (1983). "In a juvenileproceeding adequate notice to the minor and his parents is a requirement of due process." In reJ.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129, 135 (1985). The question before us -- whether the plenary guardian of theperson of an adult parent must be named and served as a necessary party to juvenile courtproceedings for the adjudication of the adult ward's minor child to himself become a ward of thecourt -- is one of statutory construction, which we consider de novo. Village of Mundelein v. Franco,317 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517 (2000).

" 'In the exercise of statutory construction, our primary task is to ascertain andeffectuate the intent of the legislature. In interpreting a statute we may consider thereason and necessity for the law, the evils it was intended to remedy, and its ultimateaims. Also, we must assume that the legislature did not intend an absurd or unjustresult. However, our inquiry must always begin with the language of the statute,which is the surest and most reliable indicator of legislative intent. The language ofthe statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning, and where the statutorylanguage is clear and unambiguous, we have no occasion to resort to aids ofconstruction. Nor, under the guise of statutory interpretation, can we "correct" anapparent legislative oversight by rewriting a statute in a manner inconsistent with itsclear and unambiguous language. [Citations.]' " Franco, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 517,quoting People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000).

Section 1-5 of the Juvenile Court Act specifies the rights of parties to proceedingsthereunder:

"[T]he minor who is the subject of the proceeding and his parents, guardian, legalcustodian or responsible relative who are parties respondent have the right to bepresent, to be heard, to present evidence material to the proceedings, to cross-examine witnesses, to examine pertinent court files and records and also, althoughproceedings under this Act are not intended to be adversary in character, the right tobe represented by counsel." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998).

(There is a narrow constraint on the rights of parties to wardship proceedings with respect to theinspection of court documents. 705 ILCS 405/2-22 (West 1998). However, that constraint is notpertinent to our inquiry.) As K.C.'s parent, Kenya was clearly entitled to exercise the rights specifiedin section 1-5(1). Kenya, however, mentally ill, had already been adjudicated totally disabled andwas under the protection of a plenary adult guardian. The fact is that plenary guardians of adultparents are not themselves expressly named in section 1-5(1) which, as in the instant case, couldserve to vitiate the guardians' entitlement to exercise such rights on behalf of their wards under thelanguage of this section. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998). The issue to be decided is whetherKenya was provided sufficient due process protection in the exercise of her guaranteed rights in lightof the failure to name Kenya's guardian as a party respondent and serve her guardian with notice ofall relevant proceedings in accordance with section 2-15 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-15(1) (West 1998)).

Analysis must begin with an exploration of the nature of the protection the court intendedfor Kenya when the court appointed a plenary guardian of the person over her. Guardianship ofdisabled adults is controlled by the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 1998)). "[T]he courtmay adjudge a person to be a disabled person and may appoint (1) a guardian of his person, ifbecause of his disability he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicateresponsible decisions concerning the care of his person, or (2) a guardian of his estate, if because ofhis disability he is unable to manage his estate or financial affairs or (3) a guardian of his person andof his estate." 755 ILCS 5/11a-3(a) (West 1998). The legislature has imposed an explicit limitationon the power of the courts to appoint guardians for disabled adults. "Guardianship shall be utilizedonly as is necessary to promote the well-being of the disabled person, to protect him from neglect,exploitation, or abuse, and to encourage development of his maximum self-reliance andindependence. Guardianship shall be ordered only to the extent necessitated by the individual's acutemental, physical and adaptive limitations." (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/11a-3(b) (West 1998).

"If the respondent is adjudged to be disabled and to be totally without capacity as specifiedin Section 11a-3, and if the court finds that limited guardianship will not provide sufficientprotection for the disabled person *** the court shall appoint a plenary guardian for the respondent'sperson." 755 ILCS 5/11a-12(b) (West 1998). "Plenary" is defined as "complete in every respect." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1739 (1986). Representatives of the office of the stateguardian have the "same powers and duties as a private guardian" under the Probate Act. 20 ILCS3955/32 (West 1998).

The precise scope of the powers and duties of a guardian of the person is set forth in section11a-17. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17 (West 1998). "An order appointing a limited guardian of the personunder this Article removes from the ward only that authority provided under Section 11a-17 whichis specifically conferred on the limited guardian by the order [of appointment]." 755 ILCS 5/11a-14(a) (West 1998). A plenary guardian, on the other hand, is vested upon appointment with theentirety of the authority provided under section 11a-17. 755 ILCS 5/11a-14(d) (West 1998).

The decision-making authority of a plenary guardian of the person under section 11a-17 isexceedingly broad. In re Adoption of Savory, 102 Ill. App. 3d 276, 278 (1981).

"To the extent ordered by the court and under the direction of the court, the guardianof the person shall have custody of the ward and the ward's minor and adultdependent children; shall procure for them and shall make provision for their support,care, comfort, health, education and maintenance, and professional services as areappropriate *** . *** The guardian shall assist the ward in the development ofmaximum self-reliance and independence." 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 1998).

See generally In re Guardianship of Mabry, 281 Ill. App. 3d 76, 87 (1996). The practical effect ofthis section is that the plenary guardian of the person, under the direction of the court, makes alldecisions and exercises all legal rights on behalf of the ward that impact the exercise of theguardian's statutory authority. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 1998). With respect to Kenya, ourinquiry therefore narrows to whether the exercise of Kenya's rights under section 1-5(1) of theJuvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998)) was properly within the scope of thestatutory authority of Kenya's plenary guardian under section 11a-17 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS5/11a-17(a) (West 1998)).

In considering the nature of the rights at issue, we find it both self-evident and irrefutable thata parent's right to be a parent is of "deep human importance." In re K.B., 314 Ill. App. 3d 739, 748(2000). "[T]he United States Supreme Court [has] stated that the interest of natural parents in thecare, custody, and management of their children is a fundamental liberty interest protected under thefourteenth amendment." In re B.C., 247 Ill. App. 3d 803, 806 (1993), citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455U.S. 745, 747-48, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 603, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391-92 (1982); In re Enis, 121 Ill. 2d124, 128-29 (1988). It is this fundamental liberty interest that the due process rights of the parentenumerated in section 1-5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act were codified to protect. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998).

While nowhere does section 11a-17 of the Probate Act grant a plenary guardian of the personthe express authority to exercise on a ward's behalf the rights enumerated in section 1-5(1), theIllinois Supreme Court recently examined the implied authority of a plenary guardian of the personof a disabled adult under section 11a-17. In In re Marriage of Burgess, 189 Ill. 2d 270, 271 (2000),the court considered whether such a guardian had standing to continue a dissolution of marriageaction filed by the ward prior to both the adjudication of the ward's disability and the guardian's ownappointment. In deciding whether an express grant of statutory authority was necessary in such acase, the Burgess court noted that "[i]n other cases involving guardians' authority to make personaldecisions on behalf of a ward, Illinois courts have held that the guardians may make such decisionsunder section 11a-17 even though the power to do so is not specifically enunciated." Burgess, 189Ill. 2d at 273.

The types of decisions that Illinois courts have found to be impliedly supported by section11a-17 have been of an intensely personal nature and have related to the most intimate issues of theward's family and health. For example, guardians may decide on behalf of a ward to withdrawartificial nutrition and hydration, potentially resulting in the death of the ward (In re Estate ofLongeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 45-46 (1989); In re Estate of Greenspan, 137 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (1990)), toconsent to the adult ward's own adoption (In re Adoption of Savory, 102 Ill. App. 3d 276, 277-78(1981)), and to consent to an abortion on behalf of a disabled ward (In re Estate of D.W., 134 Ill.App. 3d 788, 791 (1985)).

Thus, there is ample precedent to support the implied authority of a plenary guardian of theperson to make personal decisions on a ward's behalf under section 11a-17. Where courts haverequired an express grant of statutory authority, on the other hand, that requirement has been basedon policy reasons and has been "premised on the personal nature of the decision [at issue]." Burgess,189 Ill. 2d at 275. For example, although a guardian must have express authority under section 11a-17 in order to institute dissolution of marriage proceedings on a ward's behalf (In re Marriage ofDrews, 115 Ill. 2d 201, 205 (1986)), the Burgess court held that the implied authority of the plenaryguardian under section 11a-17 was sufficient to allow the guardian to maintain dissolutionproceedings that had already been filed by the ward prior to the adjudication of the ward's disability. Burgess, 189 Ill. 2d at 277. The appellate court in Drews expressed concern about the absence offacts in the record before it that would have indicated that the ward intended to dissolve his marriage,as well as the attendant risk that the guardian might be acting against the ward's wishes by initiatingdissolution proceedings. In re Marriage of Drews, 139 Ill. App. 3d 763, 775-76 (1985). In Kenya'scase, however, the question is not whether one spouse might intend to dissolve an otherwisevoluntary relationship with another, but whether a parent would choose to fight to keep her childrenwhen faced with the prospect of their removal by the State, especially where such a removal mightlead to the termination of parental rights. Because Kenya gave birth to K.C. after the court foundher disabled and appointed for her a plenary guardian of the person, there had been no clearexpression on Kenya's part of her intent to contest such a removal prior to that time. However, giventhe nature of the issue, we hold that no such prior expression of Kenya's intent was necessary underthese circumstances. Absent facts (or a competent waiver) to the contrary, we may presume that anyparent would contest such a removal to the limit of that parent's resources and abilities.⁽⁴⁾

The question of whether, either before or after a determination of the parental fitness of theward, a plenary guardian of the person may consent to the adoption of the ward's minor children isnot before us, and we do not reach it here. However, the matter of such consent does provide auseful comparison: "While the risk that a guardian may be acting contrary to a ward's wishes may[potentially] support [a] rule that a guardian's power to [consent to the adoption of the ward's minorchildren] must be specified by the legislature, this policy consideration does not justify requiringexpress statutory authority for a guardian to [contest on the ward's behalf the adjudication of theward's children as wards of the court]." Burgess, 189 Ill. 2d at 276.

We therefore hold that the authority of a plenary guardian of the person to exercise the rightsgranted to that guardian's adult ward in section 1-5(1) of the Juvenile Court Act need not beexpressly stated in section 11a-17 of the Probate Act. 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1) (West 1998); 755 ILCS5/11a-17(a) (West 1998). As to whether such authority may be implied from that which is expresslygranted in section 11a-17, we examine the language of the statute, with a view to giving effect to theintention of the legislature. Burgess, 189 Ill. 2d at 277. We find it beyond dispute that a ward'sstatus as a parent profoundly affects the ward's "support, care, comfort, health" and "developmentof maximum self-reliance and independence." 755 ILCS 5/11a-17(a) (West 1998). We thereforefind that the authority of Kenya's guardian to exercise Kenya's rights under section 1-5(1) isencompassed within the broad grant of the guardian's authority in section 11a-17. Burgess, 189 Ill.2d at 277.

Although Kenya was able to make known to the trial court her desire to retain her parentalrights to K.C., it fell to Kenya's plenary guardian of the person to raise on Kenya's behalf the shieldof due process, as embodied in the rights of a parent set forth in section 1-5(1). 705 ILCS 405/1-5(1)(West 1998). To argue that these rights were adequately protected by Kenya's appointed attorneyis insufficient: such an argument ignores the statutory obligation of the guardian as protector of theward. 755 ILCS 5/11a-17 (West 1998).

We therefore hold that the plenary guardian of the person of a disabled adult is a necessaryparty to proceedings under section 2-22 of the Juvenile Court Act for the adjudication of the disabledadult's minor child to himself become a ward of the court. The plenary guardian is thus entitled tonotice of such proceedings in accordance with section 2-15 of that Act. 705 ILCS 405/2-15(1), 2-22(West 1998).

A pleading that does not name and notify a necessary respondent in a juvenile proceedingfails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its orders void. In re A.H., 195 Ill.2d at 423-24; In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, 271-72 (1994); In re J.L.S., 188 Ill. App. 3d 815, 816(1989). Kenya's plenary guardian of the person, whom we have determined was a necessary party,was neither named in the wardship petition nor served notice of the proceedings, thereby deprivingKenya of due process in the exercise of her rights under section 1-5(1). The order of the circuit courtadjudicating K.C. a ward of the court is therefore void for lack of jurisdiction.

We turn next to the order terminating Kenya's parental rights and appointing a guardian withthe power to consent to K.C.'s adoption. Due process dictates that Kenya's plenary guardian of theperson was equally a necessary party to the termination proceedings; however, the plenary guardianwas neither named as a party respondent in nor served notice of those proceedings. The orderterminating Kenya's parental rights and appointing a guardian with the power to consent to K.C.'sadoption is therefore similarly flawed. It is also void.

The courts of this state are called upon to administer the Juvenile Court Act "in a spirit ofhumane concern, not only for the rights of the parties, but also for the fears and the limits ofunderstanding of all who appear before the court." 705 ILCS 405/1-2(2) (West 1998). To appointa plenary guardian of the person of a disabled adult and then deny that guardian the opportunity tofully exercise on the ward's behalf the protections of due process that the legislature has seen fit toconfer upon the ward does battle with this guiding principle.

For the foregoing reasons, the orders of the circuit court adjudicating K.C. a ward of thecourt, terminating Kenya's parental rights and appointing a guardian with the power to consent toK.C.'s adoption are reversed.

Reversed.

1. A transcript of the disposition hearing is absent from the record on appeal.

2. The record is confusing regarding Mr. Schlee's status with respect to Kenya. The orderappointing Mr. Schlee is captioned "ORDER APPOINTING ATTORNEY/ GUARDIAN ADLITEM," but fails to indicate the precise role to which Mr. Schlee was appointed. The body ofthe order cites section 11-5 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/11-5 (West 1998)), ostensibly asauthority. Section 11-5, however, relates to the appointment of guardians of the person and theestate for minors and does not apply to Kenya. During the March 31, 1998, hearing, the trialcourt stated, "we are going to appoint a bar attorney as private guardian for [Kenya]." Becauseno proceedings had been instituted under section 11a-20 of the Probate Act (755 ILCS 5/11a-20(West 1998)) for the revocation of the letters of office appointing the office of the state guardianas Kenya's plenary guardian of the person, we can only conclude that the trial court intended thatMr. Schlee act as guardian ad litem for Kenya in the termination proceeding. Irrespective of thetrial court's March 31, 1998, appointment of Mr. Schlee -- in whatever capacity -- because thetrial court excused Mr. Schlee from service (predicated on the previous appointment of Kenya'splenary guardian) prior to commencing the termination hearing, we need not reach the questionof the validity of such concurrent appointments.

3. The waiver provision in section 1-15 of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-15(b)(West 1998)), that any claim of failure to serve a necessary party is waived if not raised prior tothe start of any adjudicatory hearing under the Act, has been held unconstitutional (In re C.R.H.,163 Ill. 2d 263, 273 (1994)) and does not bar us from considering the basis of the jurisdiction ofthe circuit court with respect to the wardship proceedings.

4. In fact, Kenya stated during the termination hearing that she did not wish her rights toK.C. to be terminated and that she wanted the court "[t]o allow [her] to do the necessary thingsthat it takes [sic] for [her] to be with [her] children."