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SIXTH DIVISION
June 27, 2003

JUSTICE O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the opinion of the court:

The instant case presents two issues of first impression: (1) whether as applied to respondentJ.R., a juvenile sex offender, the Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law(Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2000)) violates substantive or procedural dueprocess; and (2) whether as applied to respondent J.R., the Sex Offender Registration Act(Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)) violates procedural due process.

Respondent J.R., born October 10, 1982, was charged as a delinquent minor under theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2000)), with criminal sexual abuse. After a pretrial conference, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402), a stipulatedbench trial was conducted. After the stipulation on May 15, 2001, the trial judge entered a findingof delinquency and required respondent to serve two years' probation and 30 days in the JuvenileDetention Center, undergo therapy and a sex offender evaluation, and have no unlawful contact withchildren under 12 years of age. The trial judge heard arguments regarding whether respondent wasrequired to register pursuant to the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2000)), andwhether respondent was required to submit a blood sample pursuant to section 5-4-3 of the UnifiedCode of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2000)). The trial judge ruled that respondentmust register as a sex offender and must submit a blood sample. The trial court stayed its orderpending appeal.

Respondent now appeals, challenging the trial court's orders requiring him to register as a sexoffender and submit blood samples and contending the delinquency finding should be vacated. Inhis appeal, respondent raises the following arguments: (1) respondent is not required to register asa sex offender because the Registration Act does not apply to juvenile sex offenders; (2) theRegistration Act and corresponding Notification Law violate due process guaranteed by the UnitedStates Constitution; (3) both statutes violate confidentiality provided by the Juvenile Court Act; (4)barring expungement under section 5-4-3 of the Code violates the separation of powers doctrineprovided for in the Illinois Constitution, thereby rendering the blood sample submission provisionunenforceable; and (5) the stipulated bench trial was equivalent to a guilty plea, which deprivedrespondent of procedural due process because the trial court failed to admonish him of theconsequences of the stipulated bench trial.

BACKGROUND

In the context of the stipulated bench trial, the parties stipulated that, if called to testify, thevictim, P.V., would testify that on July 1, 1999, she was 12 years old. While at respondent's house,on July 1, 1999, respondent put his hand under her underwear and digitally penetrated her vagina. Respondent put his penis in her vagina, but because he could not penetrate, he pulled his penis outand ejaculated. Later that same day P.V. went to St. Alexius Hospital and was examined by a doctor. Her underwear was sent to the Illinois State Police crime lab for analysis.

The parties further stipulated that, if called to testify, Carla Cluck, a forensic scientist for theIllinois State Police crime lab, would state that she received a blood standard from the victim, P.V.,and she received the semen stain from the underwear that was inventoried by Officer Ruthenberg. She also received a blood standard from respondent. After conducting DNA analysis, she concludedthat the semen identified in the semen stain from the victim's underwear was consistent with havingoriginated from respondent.

Streamwood police sergeant Hart would testify that he interviewed respondent onJuly 1, 1999, after "Mirandizing" him. Respondent stated that he knew P.V. was 12 years old; thingsgot out of hand and he could not stop when P.V. told him to stop. Respondent stated that he gotfrustrated because he could not get his penis all the way in and it was getting close to being time forhim to go to work. He stopped trying to put his penis all the way in P.V.'s vagina. He ejaculated onthe bed cover. Respondent said he heard P.V. saying no, she did not want him to do this, but hecould not stop. We note the record reflects the sexual act in the instant case was not consensual.

It was stipulated that P.V. and Sergeant Hart would both identify respondent in open court.Respondent, born October 10, 1982, was 16 years old on July 1, 1999, the date of the incident in theinstant case.

The trial court accepted the stipulations and entered a finding of delinquency for criminalsexual abuse.

ANALYSIS

I. Registration Act Applies to Juvenile Sexual Offenders

Respondent first contends that the trial court's order requiring him to register as a sexoffender must be reversed because he does not qualify as a "sex offender" under the Registration Act.

Section 3 of the Registration Act requires "sex offenders" to register with their local policedepartment or sheriff within 10 days of the entry of the sentencing order. 730 ILCS 150/3(a), (c)(3)(West 2000). Section 7 of the Registration Act requires respondent "to register for a period of 10years after conviction or adjudication." 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2000). Registrants may befingerprinted and must provide identification and documented proof of residence as well as a writtenstatement and photograph. 730 ILCS 150/3(c)(5), 150/8 (West 2000).

We note that both the Registration Act and the Notification Law have been subject tonumerous legislative revisions and modifications since their respective enactments. Acomprehensive discussion of these various changes is contained in People v. Logan, 302 Ill. App.319, 323-25 (1998) and People v. Guillen, 307 Ill. App. 3d 35, 36-37 (1999). The version of theRegistration Act applicable in the instant case defines sex offenders to include, among othercategories of offenders, "any person who is *** charged *** with a sex offense set forth insubsection (B) of this Section *** and *** is convicted of such offense." 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(1)(a)(West 2000). Subsection (B) lists various offenses, including criminal sexual abuse. 730 ILCS150/2(B)(1) (West 2000). The Registration Act further defines "juvenile sex offender" to include"any person who is adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as the result of the commission of *** aviolation set forth in item (B) ***." 730 ILCS 150/2(A-5) (West 2000). Subsection (A-5) indicates" 'convicted' shall have the same meaning as 'adjudicated' ". 730 ILCS 150/2(A-5) (West 2000). Unless considered a sexual predator, usually a juvenile sex offender would be required to registerfor a period of 10 years after adjudication. 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2000).

Relying on In re Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d 497 (2001), respondent argues that "juvenilesex offenders" are not required to register as sex offenders under the Registration Act. In NicholasK., the appellate court held that the Registration Act does not apply to juveniles who are adjudicateddelinquent for having committed sex crimes, reasoning that "juvenile sex offenders" are a categoryof offenders separate from "sex offenders." Nicholas K., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 500.

On February 21, 2003, after respondent filed his opening brief in the instant case, the IllinoisSupreme Court overruled Nicholas K. in In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 65 (2003), and held that juvenilesex offenders are required to register as sex offenders under the Registration Act. The supreme courtconcluded as follows:

"Although section 3 of the Registration Act does not specifically referto juvenile sex offenders, section 3 does provide that sex offendersand sexual predators shall register. [Citation.] Without addressingwhether J.W. would be required to register in any event because heis a sexual predator, we note that a juvenile sex offender is a sexoffender, albeit a specific category of sex offender. Juvenile sexoffenders therefore are included within the larger category of sexoffenders required to register." (Emphasis in the original.) J.W., 204Ill. 2d at 65.

Respondent, in the instant case, was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent as a result ofcommitting criminal sexual abuse and, therefore, qualified as a "juvenile sex offender" under theapplicable statutory definition. See 730 ILCS 150/2(A-5) (West 2000). Juvenile sex offenders areincluded within the larger category of sex offenders subject to the Registration Act. J.W., 204 Ill.2d at 65. Accordingly, following the supreme court's holding in J.W., we conclude that respondent qualified as a "sex offender" subject to the requirements of the Registration Act.

II. Due Process Under Registration Act and Notification Law

Respondent alternatively contends the trial court's order requiring him to register as a sexoffender must be reversed because the Registration Act and the corresponding Notification Law(730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2000)) violate the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendmentto the United States Constitution (U.S. Const. amend. XIV).

"It is well settled that statutes are presumed constitutional and that a party challenging theconstitutionality of a statute has the burden of establishing its invalidity." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 62. We review de novo a statute's constitutionality. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 62. When interpreting a statutewe must identify and give effect to the intent of the legislature in enacting that statute. J.W., 204 Ill.2d at 62, citing Collins v. Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d103, 110 (1993). Examination of statutory language is the most reliable indicator of legislativeintent. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 62, citing In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 211 (2002). "[A] statute must beread as a whole, and no word or paragraph should be interpreted so as to be rendered meaningless." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 63, citing Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111.

We recognize several Illinois cases have reviewed constitutional challenges to theRegistration Act and Notification Law based on various theories, including due process, and haveupheld their constitutionality. See People v. Marsh, 329 Ill. App. 3d 639, 643-44 (2002). None ofthose cases addressed whether those statutes violated due process when applied to juveniles. However, the Illinois Supreme Court in J.W. addressed a substantive due process challenge to theRegistration Act as it applied to a juvenile sex offender and we find that case instructive. See J.W.,204 Ill. 2d at 66-72.

Respondent argues that the Registration Act violates due process because it does notcondition registration upon a finding that the offender will be a continuing danger to society, butinstead requires all offenders who commit certain sex offenses to register. Respondent further arguesthat the Notification Law violates due process because it "does not mandate a judicial finding thatdisclosure is required for public safety, *** fails to afford the juvenile an opportunity to be heard onthe issue of his danger to the community before disclosing his registry information to the public, ***[and provides] no assurance that the public disclosure bears any reasonable relationship to theprotection and safety of the public."

The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitutionprovides that certain substantive rights - life, liberty and property - cannot be deprived exceptpursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures; the categories of substance and procedure aredistinct. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494, 503,105 S. Ct. 1487, 1493 (1985). Respondent relies on principles of both procedural and substantivedue process in support of his arguments that the Registration Act and Notification Law areconstitutionally infirm.. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that respondent has failed toestablish either procedural or substantive due process violations under the Registration Act andNotification Law.

A. Substantive Due Process

"When confronted with a claim that a statute violates the [substantive] due processguarantees of the United States and Illinois Constitutions, courts must first determine the nature ofthe right purportedly infringed upon by the statute." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 66. "Where the statute doesnot affect a fundamental constitutional right, the test for determining whether the statute complieswith substantive due process is the rational basis test." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 67. "To satisfy this test,a statute need only bear a rational relationship to the purpose the legislature sought to accomplishin enacting the statute." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 67. "Pursuant to this test, a statute will be upheld if it'bears a reasonable relationship to a public interest to be served, and the means adopted are areasonable method of accomplishing the desired objective.' " J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 67, quoting Peoplev. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d 381, 390 (1991).

Registration Act Does Not Violate Substantive Due Process

The supreme court's recent decision in J.W. addressed the very issue which respondentnow raises - whether an order entered pursuant to the Registration Act requiring a juvenile sexoffender to register as a sexual offender violates substantive due process. The supreme courtheld that the registration requirement did not violate substantive due process, and its holding iscontrolling in the instant case. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72.

In J.W., the supreme court first noted that the respondent did not argue, and it did notfind, that the Registration Act affected a fundamental right. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 67. Accordingly,the court analyzed the statute using the rational basis test. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 67. The courtfound, "The intent of the legislature in enacting the Registration Act was 'to create an additionalmethod of protection for children from the increasing incidence of sexual assault and sexualabuse.' " J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 67, quoting People v. Adams, 144 Ill. 2d at 387. The courtrecognized that the public interest to be served by both the Registration Act and the NotificationLaw was "the protection of the public from sex offenders" (J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 68, citing Peoplev. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 420 (2000)), and noted that the Registration Act served the publicinterest "by providing police officers ready access to information on known juvenile sexoffenders." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 68.

In analyzing J.W.'s claim that the Registration Act violated substantive due process, thecourt indicated that "The conclusion that juvenile sex offenders are required to register is furthersupported by examining the Registration Act in conjunction with the corresponding Sex Offenderand Child Murderer Community Notification Law." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 66. The court recognizedthat although the Notification Law expressly includes juvenile sex offenders, (J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at66, citing 730 ILCS 152/105, 120(e) (West 2000)), it "strictly limits the availability ofinformation with regard to juvenile sex offenders." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 71. The court notedsection 120(e) of the Notification Law provides that law enforcement agencies in possession ofregistration information may provide, at their discretion, certain information about the juvenileoffender (i.e., the offender's name, address, date of birth, offense) "to any person when thatperson's safety may be compromised for some reason related to the juvenile sex offender." J.W.,204 Ill. 2d at 71, citing 730 ILCS 152/120(e) (West 2000). The court indicated: "We find,therefore, that the extremely limited dissemination of information concerning juvenile sexoffenders supports a finding that the registration of juvenile sex offenders is a reasonable meansof protecting the public." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72. The court held that the Registration Act did notviolate substantive due process. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72. In support of its holding, the courtreasoned:

"Clearly there is a rational relationship between the registration ofjuvenile sex offenders and the protection of the public from suchoffenders. Requiring the registration of juvenile sex offenders,even where the offender is only 12 years old and the duration ofregistration is for life, is reasonable in light of the strict limitsplaced upon access to that information. Whether there are bettermeans to achieve this result, such as limiting the duration ofregistration for all juvenile sex offenders including juvenile sexualpredators, is a matter better left to the legislature." J.W., 204 Ill. 2dat 72.

Mindful of the principles stated by the supreme court in J.W., we reject respondent'sclaim that the Registration Act violates substantive due process. A juvenile sex offender is a sexoffender and, therefore, is included within the larger category of sex offenders required to registerunder the Act. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 65. The registration requirement under the Act does notviolate substantive due process because there is a rational relationship between the registration ofjuvenile sex offenders and the protection of the public from juvenile sex offenders. J.W., 204 Ill.2d at 72.

(2) Notification Law Does Not Violate Substantive Due Process

"The Notification Law provides that the Department of State Police is to establish andmaintain a sex offender database of those persons registered as sex offenders under theRegistration Act." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 66, citing 730 ILCS 152/115 (West 2000). Varioussubsections within section 120 of the Notification Law provide for disclosure of registrationinformation. See 730 ILCS 152/120(a), (a-2), (a-3), (a-4), (b), (c), (d), and (e) (West 2000). Weare mindful in interpreting this statute that we should ascertain and give effect to the intent of thelegislature. Henrich v. Libertyville High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 387 (1998). As previouslynoted, that legislative intent was identified by the Illinois Supreme Court in J.W. as "protection ofthe public from sex offenders." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 68. Moreover, "the statute should beevaluated as a whole; the language within each section of a statute must be examined in light ofthe entire statute." Henrich, 186 Ill. 2d at 387, citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department ofProfessional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91 (1992). "[N]o word or paragraph should beinterpreted so as to be rendered meaningless." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 63, citing Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at111.

The supreme court in J.W. did not directly address the question of whether theNotification Law as applied to a juvenile sex offender complied with substantive due process. Accordingly, this question presents a matter of first impression. We find instructive the court'sdiscussion in J.W. regarding the Notification Law in concluding that the Registration Act did notviolate substantive due process. See J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 71-72. We analyze the Notification Actusing the rational basis test.

As the supreme court stated, the Notification Law serves the same public interest andshares the same purpose as the Registration Act -- "the protection of the public from sexoffenders." See J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 68. The Notification Law serves that purpose, with respect tojuvenile sex offenders, by providing disclosure of information to the public. The supreme courtrecognized that the Notification Law expressly includes juvenile sex offenders. J.W., 204 Ill. 2dat 66. Compilation of sex offender information without a provision for disclosure wouldundermine the purpose of protecting the public, including children, from sex offenders. Thisdisclosure is rationally related to protecting members of the public. See J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72.

Accordingly, based upon the reasoning articulated in J.W., we hold the Notification Law,as applied to respondent and which authorizes disclosure of registration information aboutjuvenile sex offenders, does not violate substantive due process under the fourteenth amendmentof the United States Constitution. There is a rational relationship between the disclosure ofregistration information about juvenile sex offenders and the purpose served by the NotificationLaw, the protection of the public, including children, from such offenders, and we find nothingunreasonable in the statute's method of serving its purpose. Whether there are better means toachieve this purpose, such as further limiting the time frame during which disclosure may occur,is a matter better left to the legislature. See J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72. We therefore rejectdefendant's substantive due process argument.

B. Procedural Due Process

As a preliminary matter, we note that while the respondent in J.W. did not argue to theIllinois Supreme Court that the Registration Act and Notification Law violated procedural dueprocess, two university operated legal clinics, Bluhm Legal Clinic of Northwestern UniversityLaw School and the Edwin F. Mandel Legal Aid Clinic of the University of Chicago Law Schoolraised this argument in a brief which they filed as amicus curiae. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 55, 72. Thesupreme court declined, however, to address their argument, noting that it "need not pass ongrounds of invalidity solely urged by an amicus. [Citations.]" J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 73.Accordingly, as related to a juvenile sex offender, whether the Registration Act and NotificationLaw violate procedural due process are matters of first impression. We address each in turn.

"Procedural due process claims concern the constitutionality of the specific proceduresemployed to deny a person's life, liberty or property." Segers v. Industrial Comm'n, 191 Ill. 2d421, 434 (2000), citing East St. Louis Federation of Teachers, Local 1220 v. East St. LouisSchool District No. 189 Financial Oversight Panel, 178 Ill. 2d 399, 415 (1997). "Procedural dueprocess is meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustifieddeprivation of life, liberty or property." Segers, 191 Ill. 2d at 434, citing East St. LouisFederation of Teachers, 178 Ill. 2d at 415.

In evaluating procedural due process claims, the following three part test is used: (1)resolution of the threshold question of whether there exists a life, liberty or property interestwhich has been interfered with by the State; (2) examination of the risk of an erroneousdeprivation of such an interest through the procedures already in place, while considering thevalue of additional safeguards; and (3) evaluation of the effect the administrative burden wouldhave on the state's interest.  Segers, 191 Ill. 2d at 434, citing East St. Louis Federation ofTeachers, 178 Ill. 2d at 415-16.

1. Registration Act Does Not Violate Procedural Due Process

Respondent contends the Registration Act violates procedural due process because it failsto afford juvenile offenders the opportunity to be heard on the issue of their continuing danger tothe community before requiring them to register. In support of this argument, respondent reliesupon Doe v. Department of Public Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. granted,535 U.S. 1077, 152 L. Ed. 2d 1020, 122 S. Ct. 1959 (2002). In Doe, the United States Court ofAppeals addressed the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute which required those convictedof certain sex offenses to register with the State upon their release from prison and authorizeddisclosure of information gathered through the registry. Doe, 271 F.3d at 47-60. In Doe, theUnited States Court of Appeals held that a sex offender registration and disclosure statute similarto the Illinois statutes failed to accommodate the constitutional rights of persons formerlyconvicted of a wide range of sexual offenses who were categorized as likely to be currentlydangerous offenders. Doe, 271 F.3d at 41-42.

The Connecticut statute, similar to the Registration Act and Notification Law at issue inthe instant case, required persons convicted of sexual offenses to register with the ConnecticutDepartment of Public Safety upon their release into the community and required the Departmentof Public Safety in turn to compile and publicize information submitted by the sex offenderregistrants. Doe, 271 F. 3d at 43-44. On March 5, 2003, after respondent in the instant case filedhis opening brief, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision in Doein Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 103, 123 S.Ct. 1160, 1163 (2003). In the instant case, as in Doe, respondent argues that the Registration Actdeprives him of a liberty interest without providing him an opportunity to be heard therebyviolating procedural due process.

The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether in the context of procedural dueprocess, respondent was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing in Connecticut Department ofPublic Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 104-05, 123 S. Ct. at 1164-65. In reversing theSecond Circuit's decision in Doe, the Supreme Court held that procedural due process did notentitle a convicted sex offender to a hearing to establish that he was not currently dangerousbecause current dangerousness was not material under the Connecticut registration statute inquestion. Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 104-05,123 S. Ct. at 1164-65. The Supreme Court further noted that the respondent in Doe did notcontend that the statute in question violated substantive due process, and accordingly it declinedto address this issue. Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at105, 123 S. Ct. at 1165.

Similar to the Connecticut statute, in Illinois the Registration Act requires sex offenders,including juvenile sex offenders, to register not based on dangerousness, but based upon the factthe offender was adjudicated delinquent or convicted of a sex offense. See 730 ILCS 150/2(A),2(A-5), 3 (West 2000). Accordingly, following the Supreme Court's decision in ConnecticutDepartment of Public Safety, we conclude that the Registration Act does not violate respondent'sright to procedural due process. Respondent has failed to establish that procedural due processentitles respondent, a juvenile found delinquent of committing a sex offense, to a hearing todemonstrate that he was not currently dangerous, when current dangerousness is not relevant ormaterial to the duty to register as required by the Registration Act.

2. Notification Law Does Not Violate Procedural Due Process

Respondent contends that the Notification Law as it applies to juvenile sex offendersviolates procedural due process. Respondent contends the Notification Law violates his right toprocedural due process because it authorizes the disclosure of registration information about himwithout giving him notice prior to that disclosure or the opportunity to contest the disclosure.

Both the Registration Act and Notification Law are based on previous convictions oradjudications, and are thereby offense based, rather than offender based. We note thatrespondent's counsel in his brief recognizes this fact by stating, "the Registration and NotificationActs are offense-based, rather than offender-based. That is, rather than classifying offenders onthe basis of their danger to the community and providing for different levels of publicnotification depending on the level of their danger to the community, Illinois law requiresregistration and public disclosure by all offenders who commit the 'sex offenses' listed in thestatute." In the context of that type of classification, respondent has failed to demonstrate thatdue process entitles the juvenile sex offender to a hearing to establish a fact that is not relevant ormaterial under Illinois law. A juvenile offender who asserts a right to a hearing under the DueProcess Clause must demonstrate that the facts to be established in that hearing are relevantunder the statutory scheme. See Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155L. Ed. 2d at 105, 123 S. Ct. at 1165.

The Connecticut statute addressed by the United States Supreme Court in ConnecticutDepartment of Public Safety, similar to the statutes at issue in the instant case, included not onlya registration requirement, but also authorized disclosure of the information gathered through theregistry. Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 103, 123 S.Ct. at 1163. In the context of registration and disclosure, the Supreme Court noted that "dueprocess does not entitle [respondent] to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under theConnecticut statute." Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at104, 123 S. Ct. at 1164. The fact that respondent sought to prove-that he is not currentlydangerous-is of no consequence under the Connecticut statute. Regarding the Connecticutstatute, the Supreme Court recognized that "the law's requirements turn on an offender'sconviction alone-a fact that a convicted offender has already had a procedurally safeguardedopportunity to contest." Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed.2d at 105, 123 S. Ct. at 1164. Those asserting a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause"must show that the facts they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the statutoryscheme." Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 105, 123S. Ct. at 1165. In addressing the Connecticut statute, which contained both registration anddisclosure provisions, the Supreme Court held that due process did not entitle a convicted sexoffender to a hearing to establish that he was not currently dangerous because currentdangerousness was not material under the Connecticut registration and disclosure statute inquestion. Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 104-05, 123S. Ct. at 1164-65.

Similar to the Connecticut statute, in Illinois the Notification Law allows disclosureregarding the adjudicated, or convicted sex offender. In the instant case, the fact respondentseeks to prove in a hearing - that he is not currently dangerous - is of no consequence under theNotification Law. In the instant case, a prerequisite for disclosure under the Notification Law isa prior adjudication of delinquency for the offense of criminal sexual abuse. The NotificationLaw's requirements turn on the adjudication of delinquency, a fact that the juvenile offender hasalready had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to challenge in Juvenile Court. Respondenthas failed to demonstrate that procedural due process entitled him to a hearing to establish that hewas not currently dangerous because current dangerousness is not material under the NotificationLaw.

Respondent relies on Paul v. Davis in support of his argument that the failure of theNotification Law to provide a pre-deprivation hearing before disclosure violates procedural dueprocess. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976). The SupremeCourt in Connecticut Department of Public Safety rejected a similar argument. The court foundit unnecessary to address the argument of whether respondent established deprivation of a libertyinterest under Paul "because even assuming, arguendo, that respondent has been deprived of aliberty interest, due process does not entitle him to a hearing to establish a fact [currentdangerousness] that is not material under the Connecticut statute." Connecticut Department ofPublic Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 123 S. Ct. at 1164. For the reasonspreviously discussed, we need not address the question of whether respondent establisheddeprivation of a liberty interest. However, even assuming that respondent has establisheddeprivation of a liberty interest, due process does not entitle the respondent to a pre-deprivationhearing to establish that he was not currently dangerous because current dangerousness is notrelevant or material under the Notification Law. See Connecticut Department of Public Safety,538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 104, 123 S. Ct. at 1165.

Moreover, respondent has failed to demonstrate deprivation of a protected liberty interest. In Paul, the Supreme Court held that in order to state a claim for violation of due process, therespondent must demonstrate the following: (1) the utterance of a statement about him or that issufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved false, andthat he or she claims is false; and (2) some tangible and material state imposed burden oralteration of his or her status or of a right in addition to the stigmatizing statement. Paul, 424U.S. at 710-12, 47 L. Ed. 2d at 419-20, 96 S. Ct. at 1165-66

Respondent argues "the publication of the undifferentiated information required by theIllinois Sex Offender Registration Act implies that each person listed is more likely than theaverage person to be currently dangerous, and that implication stigmatizes every person listed onthe registry." Regarding this "stigma" argument, we note in the instant case the informationcompiled and disclosed is not false, but provided by respondent and court records. TheRegistration Act compiles truthful, accurate information. Disclosure under the Notification Lawclearly communicates truthful, accurate information about the offender to the public. Any stigmathat may occur is a result of the offender's status as being adjudicated as a delinquent sexoffender and not as a direct result of the notification. See Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 330.

Regarding the "plus" factor, respondent challenges not the provisions of the NotificationLaw but, rather, the imposition by the Registration Act of a new set of legal duties, that ifdisregarded subject him to felony prosecution. Respondent argues the new set of legal duties,namely registration, constitutes a "change of status" which qualifies as a plus factor under theprinciples articulated in Paul. For the reasons previously discussed, we have found respondentfailed to demonstrate the Registration Law violates either substantive or procedural due process.

Moreover, we note the requirements of the Registration Act and Notification Law aretriggered by prior conviction or, in the instant case, prior adjudication of delinquency. Suchconviction or adjudication was obtained as the result of proceedings which provided substantialprocedural safeguards including proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding the burden placedon respondent, we note the registration requirements have not been demonstrated to be undulyburdensome. See Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 329 ("the registration process is a de minimusadministrative requirement").

Under the Notification Law, Illinois allows public disclosure of information aboutoffenders who commit the sex offenses listed in the statute. That requirement is not based oncurrent dangerousness, but is based upon the fact the offender was convicted or adjudicateddelinquent of a sex offense. We reject respondent's claim that the Notification Law violatesprocedural due process because there is no material connection between his current level ofdangerousness and the Notification Law.

For the reasons previously discussed, respondent failed to demonstrate that proceduraldue process entitled him to a pre-deprivation hearing to determine current dangerousness becausecurrent dangerousness is not relevant or material to the Notification Law. We also find no dueprocess violation because respondent failed to demonstrate the Notification Law deprived him ofa liberty interest. III. Registration Act and Notification Law Do Not Violate

Confidentiality Provided By Juvenile Court Act

Respondent argues that his adjudication proceeding was governed by the Juvenile CourtAct and the records are subject to the strict guidelines provided by that Act regardingconfidentiality. For the reasons previously discussed, based on the clear expression by thelegislature requiring juvenile sex offenders to register in compliance with the Registration Act,we find no violation of the confidentiality provided by the Juvenile Court Act. 730 ILCS152/120(e) (West 2000). Such registration is reasonable in light of the limits placed upon accessto that information and the purpose served by the Registration Act. As noted by the supremecourt in J. W., "We find, therefore, that the extremely limited dissemination of informationconcerning juvenile sex offenders supports a finding that the registration of juvenile sexoffenders is a reasonable means of protecting the public." J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 72.

Respondent further argues that the Notification Law, which allows public access to theinformation required by the Registration Act, does not apply to juvenile offenders as it violatesthe public policy, as expressed in the Juvenile Court Act, that juvenile records must be keptconfidential. The Notification Law requires the Department of State Police to maintain a sexoffender database (730 ILCS 152/115(a) (West 2000)) and authorizes it and law enforcementagencies to disclose, at their discretion, the name, address, date of birth, and offenses for whichthe registrant has been convicted.

Respondent argues that, "[w]ithout restriction, this information is available for publicinspection at local police stations and via the internet." Respondent incorrectly interprets theNotification Law. The court in J.W. addressed a similar argument in the context of the claim thatthe Notification Law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 50. Regarding whether the Notification Law should be interpreted as providing widespreaddissemination of information concerning juvenile sex offenders, the supreme court in J.W. notedas follows:

"The Notification Law specifically addresses juvenile sex offendersand provides that information concerning juvenile sex offenders isnot available on the Internet and public access to informationconcerning juvenile sex offenders is limited to those whose safetymight be compromised for some reason related to the juvenile sexoffender. See 730 ILCS 152/120(e) (West 2000)." J.W., 204 Ill.2d at 74.

A statute must be read as a whole and no word or paragraph should be interpreted so as tobe rendered meaningless. J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 63, citing Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111. Therefore,limitations on disclosure must be read in conjunction with the entire statute. Reading theNotification Act as whole, taken in context with the legislative intent to protect the public fromsex offenders and assist law enforcement in doing so, we find no confidentiality violation.

IV. Submission of Blood Sample

After respondent was adjudicated delinquent on the charge of criminal sexual abuse ahearing was conducted on the issues of sex offender registration and respondent's submission ofblood samples. The trial court ordered that respondent submit a blood sample pursuant to section5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 (West 2000)). That order wasstayed pending respondent's appeal. Respondent argues that section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code ofCorrections, which requires him to submit blood samples to the State Police, is unconstitutional. Respondent does not argue that the specific portion of that section requiring him to submit bloodsamples (See 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(a)(1.5) (2000)) is unconstitutional. Rather, he argues that theportion of that section barring expungement of previously submitted blood specimens (See 730ILCS 5/5-4-3(f) (West 2000)) is unconstitutional, thereby rendering the blood sample submissionprovision unenforceable.

Section 5-4-3(a)(1.5) of the Unified Code of Corrections provides:

"Any person convicted of, found guilty under the Juvenile

Court Act of 1987 for, or who received a disposition of courtsupervision for, a qualifying offense *** shall, regardless of thesentence or disposition imposed, be required to submit specimensof blood to the Illinois Department of State Police *** providedsuch person is:

***

(1.5) found guilty or given supervision under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 for a qualifying offense ***. "730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(a)(1.5) (West 2000).

Section 5/5-4-3(f) provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other statutory provision to the contrary,all information obtained under this Section shall be maintained in a single State database *** andmay not be subject to expungement." 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(f) (West 2000).

Respondent contends that section 5-4-3, by "barring expungement[,] violates theseparation of powers doctrine, because it conflicts with provisions in the Juvenile Court Actwhich give the court discretion in determining whether to expunge all law enforcement recordsexcept those based upon first degree murder and felony-grade sex offenses." See 705 ILCS405/5-915(2) through (4) (West 2000).

Respondent's argument is premature because he has made no effort to expunge theinformation required by section 5-4-3(a). Respondent cannot petition to expunge his lawenforcement records until he can demonstrate that he has had no convictions for any crime sincehis seventeenth birthday, and that he has attained the age of 21 years of age or that 5 years havepassed since the termination of all juvenile court proceedings relating to him or since hiscommitment to the Juvenile Department of Corrections has been terminated whichever is later.705 ILCS 405/5-915(2) (West 2000).

V. Stipulated Bench Trial Did Not Violate Procedural Due Process

Respondent contends that his stipulated bench trial was "the functional equivalent *** ofa guilty plea," that the trial court was thus required to admonish him of the consequences of hisalleged guilty plea, and that its failure to do so denied him procedural due process. In addition,respondent argues that "defense counsel failed to object to the 'stipulated bench trial,' or the lackof admonishments," and that defense counsel's actions thus constituted ineffective assistance ofcounsel.

The supreme court adopted the rule that a stipulated bench trial procedure is proper andnot tantamount to a guilty plea where defendant presented and preserved a defense. People v.Horton, 143 Ill. 2d 11, 22 (1991). A stipulated bench trial allows the parties to proceed with thebenefits of a guilty plea while avoiding the waiver rule. People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill. App. 3d 533,536 (1979). If defendant does not present a defense and also stipulates that the evidence wassufficient to convict him of the crime charged, the proceeding is tantamount to a guilty plea andhe is entitled to the protections provided by Supreme Court Rule 402 (177 Ill. 2d R. 402). People v. Bellmyer, 199 Ill. 2d 529, 538-39 (2002).

Applying these principles to the instant case, we note that counsel for respondent in noway stipulated that the evidence was sufficient to convict respondent. The record does not reflectthat respondent's stipulated bench trial was tantamount to a guilty plea. Rather, the State washeld to its burden of proof, the trial judge was called upon to decide the issue of guilt orinnocence and the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence was preserved for appeal. The failureof the court to provide Supreme Court Rule 402 admonishments did not violate procedural dueprocess. Furthermore, because respondent was not entitled to admonishments, his failure toobject to the lack of admonishments did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Therecord reflects no legal basis for objection to the lack of admonishments or for objection to thestipulated bench trial, and thus no prejudice to respondent. See People v. Albanese, 125 Ill. 2d100, 106 (1988) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires showing that counsel'srepresentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and was prejudicial tocomplaining party).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons previously discussed, we affirm respondent's adjudication of delinquencyfor criminal sexual abuse and affirm the juvenile court's ruling that respondent is required toregister as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration Act and provide a blood specimenunder section 5-4-3 of the Unified Code of Corrections. The respondent qualifies as a "sexoffender" subject to the registration requirements of the Registration Act. Respondent has failedto establish that application of the Registration Act and Notification Law to him has violatedeither procedural or substantive due process. Respondent has failed to establish that theRegistration Act and Notification Law violated confidentiality as provided by the Juvenile CourtAct.

"Sex offenders are a serious threat in this Nation. *** [w]hen convicted sex offendersreenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for anew rape or sex assault." Connecticut Department of Public Safety, 538 U.S. at ___, 155 L. Ed.2d at 103, 123 S. Ct. at 1163, citing McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 153 L. Ed. 2d 47, 122 S. Ct.2017 (2002). Illinois has responded to this threat by enacting the Registration Act andNotification Law to protect the public, including children, from sex offenders and to assist lawenforcement in apprehending recidivist sex offenders. Application of the Registration Act andthe Notification Law is triggered by an offender's conviction, a fact that a convicted offender hasalready had a procedurally safeguarded opportunity to contest.

Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the party challenging thestatute has the burden of clearly demonstrating invalidity. People v. Lindner, 127 Ill. 2d 174, 178(1989). The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of rebutting thepresumption of constitutionality and demonstrating a constitutional violation. Arangold Corp. v.Zehnder, 187 Ill. 2d 341, 351 (1999). We do not believe respondent has met his burden ofdemonstrating that the Registration Act or Notification Law, as applied to respondent, a juvenilesex offender, violated procedural or substantive due process.

Affirmed.

O'BRIEN, P.J., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.