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Nos. 1-99-4165 and 1-99-4405 (consol.).                                                                                    FIRST DIVISION
May 20, 2002

Respondents, Catherine P. and Thomas P, the natural parents of minors, J.P. and T.P., appeal separately from: (1) the trial court's June 8, 1999 adjudication order, finding T.P.neglected and abused, being subject to an injurious environment and at substantial risk ofphysical harm, as defined in sections 2-3 (1)(1)(b) and 2-3 (2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3 (1)(1)(b), 2-3(2)(ii) (West 1999)), and (2) the trial court's November 30,1999 dispositional order finding respondents unable or unwilling to care for or protect T.P.,adjudging T.P. a ward of the court and placing T.P. in the custody of the DCFS (Department ofChildren and Family Services) Guardianship Administrator with the right to place him, pursuantto section 2-27 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-27(West 1999). Thomas also separately appeals thetrial court's November 30, 1999 modified dispositional order changing the goal for J.P. to privateguardianship. Catherine P.'s appeal (No. 1-99-4165) and Thomas P.'s appeal (No. 1-99-4405) were consolidated for purposes of review. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

The record indicates J.P. was born on August 23, 1990. T.P. was born on January 17,1998. Catherine P. (Catherine) and Thomas P. (Thomas) are their parents. On December 4,1990, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of J.P., alleging J.P. was neglectedand subject to an injurious environment. A temporary custody hearing was held on December 18,1990, at the conclusion of which, the trial court entered an order of protection ordering Catherineand Thomas to: (1) provide all necessary care, including proper medical care, for the well beingof J.P., (2) submit to psychological and drug evaluations, (3) enter and complete marriagecounseling, (4) notify DCFS of any change of address, cooperate with all reasonable requests ofDCFS, and give DCFS caseworkers full home access at reasonable times. Thomas was furtherordered not to abuse Catherine mentally or physically. On November 4, 1991, DCFS filed apetition for supplemental relief alleging that Thomas violated the order of protection by notproviding all necessary care for J.P.'s well being, not cooperating with DCFS's reasonablerequests, not submitting to psychological and drug evaluations and by continuing to abuseCatherine. The court thereafter entered an order of protection ordering Thomas to have nocontact with J.P., Catherine, or Catherine's family. On May 8, 1992, the trial court entered anadjudication order finding that J.P. was neglected and subject to an injurious environment. Thetrial court found the conditions in respondents' household to be violent and chaotic, and thatCatherine was subject to domestic violence by Thomas. On October 2, 1992, the court entered anorder of protective supervision ordering that Catherine provide all necessary care for the well-being of J.P., cooperate with all reasonable requests by DCFS, continue in counseling andparticipate in parent/child development classes, and not to allow any unsupervised contactbetween Thomas and J.P. On March 17, 1993, the DCFS filed a motion to vacate the order ofprotective supervision on the basis that Catherine violated the protective order by allowingunsupervised contact between Thomas and J.P. On March 25, 1993, the trial court issued ajuvenile arrest warrant for J.P. The warrant was extended through August 24, 1995. OnNovember 4, 1996, the warrant was quashed and recalled and temporary custody was taken ofJ.P. On November 15, 1996, a supplemental protective order for supervised visitation wasentered allowing Catherine and Thomas supervised visitation with J.P. in the presence of DCFS,prohibiting respondents from attempting unsupervised contact with J.P., and orderingrespondents to cooperate with all reasonable requests of DCFS, including undertaking parentingclasses and substance abuse assessments.

On January 17, 1998, T.P. was born. On February 22, 1998, T.P. was taken intoprotective custody at Cook County Hospital. On February 24, 1998, the State filed a petition foradjudication of wardship of T.P. alleging (1) injurious environment, in that a finding of abuseand neglect had previously been entered with respect to T.P.'s sibling, J.P., and respondents hadnot been compliant with recommended services, including psychiatric and mental healthtreatment and (2) physical abuse and substantial risk of physical injury, in that T.P. was admittedto the hospital on February 17, 1998 for rectal bleeding and a swollen stomach, the cause ofwhich was suspected trauma, and respondents had threatened the hospital staff and attempted toremove T.P. from the hospital against medical advice. On February 24, 1998, the court entered atemporary custody order that T.P. be removed from respondents' custody and that respondents beallowed supervised visitation. On February 4, 1999, the trial court entered a plenary order ofprotection, ordering that Thomas refrain from physical abuse, harassment, stalking, exploitation,neglect, willful deprivation or intimidation of T.P. or T.P.'s guardian, and ordering Thomas not tocome within 100 yards of T.P.'s home or remove T.P. from Illinois.

Adjudication Hearing

On March 16, 1999 an adjudication hearing was held in T.P.'s case. Lilliana Morfin(Morfin), a caseworker, testified on behalf of the State and the Guardian. Morfin represented thatJ.P.'s case first came into the system in 1990 and she was assigned to the case in 1997. The caseplan in 1997 allowed respondents monthly supervised visits with J.P. Morfin stated that thereason the visits were supervised was because two juvenile arrest warrants were previouslyissued in 1993 and 1996, when respondents and J.P. could not be located. When contact withrespondents was reestablished in 1997, Morfin referred respondents for services. Prior to 1997,referrals had been made for parenting classes, a psychological evaluation, and a drug and alcoholassessment, but respondents ignored the referrals. In September and October of 1997 Morfinreferred Thomas for parenting classes, a psychological assessment, a drug and alcohol evaluation,and counseling, but Thomas did not attend scheduled appointments or pursue the referrals.Morfin also referred Catherine for parenting classes, a psychological assessment, a drug andalcohol evaluation, and counseling in August, September and October of 1997, but Catherineignored the referrals. At the end of 1997, the goal for J.P. was changed from return home totermination of parental rights because respondents would not comply with the referrals. Morfinstated that in December of 1997, she met with respondents in court, at which time bothrespondents acted belligerently and indicated that they would not utilize any services. Thomaswas rude, loud and aggressive towards Morfin, and at one point, threatened her that if anyoneadopted J.P., he would kill that person and anyone who had helped in the adoption. In Novemberof 1997, Morfin visited respondents' home and Catherine informed her that she was 7 monthspregnant. Following a court appearance on December 12, 1997, Morfin advised Catherine of thetasks expected of her under the administrative case review, including prenatal checkups andmedical checkups to monitor her pregnancy. Catherine at that time denied that she was pregnant.Between December and January, Catherine did not attend visits with J.P., although Thomasattended visits and kept in regular contact with Morfin. On January 20, 1998, during a visit withJ.P., Thomas made Morfin aware that Catherine had given birth on January 17, 1998 to T.P. Thomas told Morfin that the reason Catherine had not attended the visits with J.P. was that shewas at home with T.P. Morfin thereafter made an unannounced visit to respondents' residence tocheck on T.P., but no one was at home. Morfin subsequently called to the DCFS hotline, and thejuvenile court took temporary custody of T.P. Morfin stated she repeatedly advised respondentsof the importance of following through with the services in order to get their children back, butrespondents refused to comply. On the State's motion, the trial court admitted into evidence andtook judicial notice of a 1996 juvenile arrest warrant entered in J.P.'s case.

On cross-examination, Morfin admitted that the referrals she gave for services wereoffered prior to the time of T.P.'s birth. Morfin also represented that at some point prior to 1997,she believed respondents had submitted to psychological evaluations, although Morfin had notread the evaluations. Morfin admitted that Thomas had never struck her or physically intimidatedher. Morfin represented she made only one unannounced visit to respondent's residence, whichoccurred shortly after January 20, 1998.

Kari Blackmore (Blackmore), a caseworker employed by Aunt Martha's Youth Centeralso testified on behalf of the State and the Guardian at the adjudication hearing. Blackmorestated that in February of 1997 she was assigned to J.P.'s case, at which time, she referredThomas and Catherine for psychological, psychiatric, alcohol and drug assessments and referredCatherine to a battered woman's counseling group, which respondents ignored. Blackmore scheduled an appointment for March 24, 1997 for Thomas and Catherine to undergo apsychological evaluations and alcohol and drug assessments, but respondents did not attend.Blackmore referred respondents for the same services the following week, but respondents againdid not comply with the services. For the next four months, Blackmore referred Catherine forservices, but Catherine would not comply with any service referrals. As part of the service plan,respondents were provided with weekly supervised visits with J.P., but respondents did not visitweekly. Blackmore stated that between March and April of 1997 difficulties arose regarding thelocation of the supervised visits, as Thomas expressed dissatisfaction with the chosen locationbecause of the ethnicity of the neighborhood . On April 29, 1997, Blackmore and Thomasresolved this problem by finding a new location for visitation, but respondents attended thescheduled visitation only sporadically. Sometimes, the visits went very well and Thomas wasvery good with J.P., at other times, Thomas acted in an inappropriate manner, and the visitswould have to be terminated. Blackmore recounted that on one occasion, in May of 1997, a visitwas terminated when Thomas and Catherine told J.P. that his foster parents had taken him awayfrom them illegally, that the judge had done this to hurt respondents, and that it was a game andJ.P. was supposed to fight back. When Blackmore attempted to terminate the visit, Thomas andCatherine became very angry, J.P. began crying, and a chair was knocked over. Security wascalled, and from that point on Blackmore brought an additional case aide worker to visits. Blackmore stated that a similar incident occurred with respondents on February 27, 1997 in acourt conference room. Blackmore was attempting to engage respondents in services whenThomas became extremely angry, began yelling at Blackmore, and followed her out of theconference room when she left. Thomas threatened Blackmore that if J.P. was not returned tohim, everyone involved in the case, both past and present, would be killed. The Sheriff wascalled and Blackmore was taken to the Guardian's office until Thomas left the building.Blackmore testified that she repeatedly advised Thomas it was necessary for him to engage inservices in order to be reunited with his children and to show DCFS that he was an adequateparent. Blackmore stated that Thomas expressed no interest in services, was uncooperative, andindicated to her that he did not have to complete the services because he had not done anything. Blackmore testified that she sent Thomas letters by both regular and certified mail regarding theneed for services, but Thomas told her to stop sending him letters. Blackmore represented thatthe last time she spoke to Thomas and referred him for services was in June of 1997, and at thattime, neither Thomas nor Catherine had complied with any of the services offered.

On cross examination, Blackmore admitted that she had no personal knowledge ofwhether respondents complied with any service referrals prior to 1997. Blackmore denied thatThomas expressed reservations about going to the initial visitation location because he hadproblems with gang members in that area. Blackmore agreed that the second visitation locationwas closer to respondents' residence. Blackmore stated that between April and July of 1997,quite a few of the scheduled visits with J.P. had to be cancelled because respondents failed to calland confirm 24 hours in advance, as required. Blackmore agreed that respondents called toconfirm the visits in advance approximately 50% of the time. Blackmore represented that whenthe visits went well, respondents would play with J.P. and when the visits did not go wellrespondents would talk with J.P. about the case.

Sharon Wolford (Wolford), a DCFS investigator, testified on behalf of the State and theGuardian. Wolford stated that on February 17, 1998, she received a call from Morfin on theDCFS hotline indicating that T.P. was at risk of physical harm. Wolford went to respondents'home to investigate, and spoke to a neighbor, but she could not locate respondents. Subsequently,Wolford learned that T.P. had been admitted to Cook County Hospital and had been taken intoprotective custody.

Over the objection of Thomas' counsel, the court allowed into evidence a certified halfsheet indicating that an order of adjudication was entered in J.P.'s case on May 8, 1992, with afinding of neglect and injurious environment. Also admitted into evidence was a certifieddispositional order entered in J.P.'s case on October 2, 1992, adjudging J.P. a ward of the court.On the State's motion, and without objection, the court allowed into evidence T.P.'s medicalrecords from his admission to the hospital on February 17, 1998. The information contained inthe records and published at trial was as follows.

On February 17, 1998, Catherine took T.P. to the hospital because he had blood in hisstool on three occasions. T.P. was admitted. A social worker consultation report dated February19, 1998 indicated:

" 34 day old white male admitted *** During history and physicaldiscovered that Mom has [a] son living with aunt for 1 year. DCFS was notified.Father had several episodes of being extremely frustrated with baby crying athospital. Please see attending's note about specific concerns and abnormalbehavior of both parents. *** Brought in by Mom and Dad with blood in stool x3. ***Per mom, baby cries a lot at home. Per Mom, Dad tries to keep him quiet-not to bother the neighbor-but she won't let him do this anymore. Mom refuses totell how he tries to quiet the baby. Per Dad, if baby comes home and bleed[s] perrectum again, "there is gonna be trouble." *** Per Dad -demanded repeatedly on2/17/98 to give baby something to knock the child out and get him ear plugsbecause he's going crazy from the child crying. [Assessment] Child At Risk:Sibling placed by DCFS with Aunt; Mom refusing to let DCFS follow up withbaby; Parents statements very scary; Unknown etiology rectal bleed/ abdominaldistension- Rule out Trauma.*** October 1990- Dad hit mom while holding[J.P.]. Head Injury. March 1993- Hid child. Violated protective order. J.P. placedwith aunt by DCFS for 1 year. Mom doesn't miss him."

A resident's note dated February 19, 1995 indicated:

"Conference with father [Thomas] and [social worker] Brenda***[Thomas] appeared very angry and trying to restrain himself from lashing out. Inhis own words, ' I usually act first and ask questions later but this time I am givingyou the courtesy of asking questions first.' ***[Thomas] repeatedly insisted that,'Your only goal should be to find out what the baby's problem is, treat it and sendthe baby home.' He said, ' His past is not anyone's business and everyone shouldstop voicing their opinions or he will start giving his opinion.'*** In a very hostilemanner he said that 'when his wife gets upset he gets upset and something will bedone about it.' ''

Progress notes entered in T.P.'s chart by Dr. Denetra Soter on February 20, 1998 indicated:

"Child Protective Service. Contacted follow up agency, Aunt Martha's, tolet [them] know [the] family is angry that we know about the other child beingtaken away. [Thomas] expressed tremendous hostility against DCFS and AuntMartha's. Contacted Dr. Ziring and Annette Ford about our concerns about child'ssafety and our safety. Contacted Security to let them know family is allowed tovisit, but situation may deteriorate.**** Accompanied ophthalmologist for examand then to discuss findings with father. Father immediately became hostile andsuspicious***ophthalmologist felt threatened and asked if security had beencalled about him and voiced concerns about safety. "

A discharge planning note entered on February 20, 1998 by social worker Brenda Chevalierindicated:

"***Father [Thomas] ***states [he is] upset because [the] medical staff isnot talking to him and there is some concern of possible abuse.*** Father alsostated that in the past he has threatened DCFS, police, and a judge presiding overhis son's case. Father also stated that if he is not treated with respect in the CookCounty Hospital, he will/can become violent. Father upset, however, [he was]pleasant and cooperative with this worker. Behavior unstable, i.e. angry, smiling,threatening, appears concerned about his son and his well- being. Equals[psychological] problems. Note: if Father is agitated, he may become violent. "

A consultation order and report entered by Dr. Soter on February 20, 1998 indicated:

"Case began in 1990 when Mother [Catherine] told [the] doctor that Father[Thomas] had hit her while she was holding J.P. and J.P.'s head was injured.Relatives also called the hotline. Mom was offered services. Both have historiesof mental illness, but will not take medication and refuse services. ***Everythingavailable clearly indicates the unstable, explosive nature of the relationship of theparents, risk of physical injury, physical neglect, emotional neglect and trauma to[the] child. Child must be removed if parents are not cooperative."

Progress notes entered on February 22, 1998 at 12:15 p.m. and signed by Dr. Soter indicated:

" Dr. Shuja (senior resident) and I met with [the] Mother and Father ofpatient, T.P. regarding parents requesting to take the patient home today. Weinformed [the] parents that we can not discharge the patient today as we do notknow the cause of the rectal bleeding. Father [Thomas] during this discussion wasvery hostile, raising his voice and stating that we have cured the patient of hismedical problem and he will take the patient home today and sign forresponsibility. He demanded that we remove the I.V. and give him [the] papers tosign now and threatened that we have one hour before he calls the police to reportCook County Hospital for kidnaping his child. One half hour after [the] familymeeting, [the] police did show up. Officer Reppen spoke with our on-call teamregarding the case. He also spoke with Dr. Soter over the phone. He informed[the] father of the patient that if [the] parents did not cooperate, protective custodymay need to be taken."

Progress notes entered on February 22, 1998 at 2:00 p.m. and signed by Dr. Soter and SocialWorker, Brenda Chevalier, indicated:

"Social worker was called to intervene in an altercation with the fatherattempting to take the patient out of the hospital. The Chicago Police Departmentand the Cook County Hospital police were present on the ward***With the fatherand mother discussions were held [with] the officers and the ODA about thehostile nature of the parents. Threats were made at other times by the fatheragainst the staff.*** Patient will remain in Cook County Hospital undertemporary custody taken by Dr. Shuja or until the parents agree to find a doctor atanother hospital willing to accept the patient. Cook County Hospital will then do adirect transfer. Under the current medical condition of the patient, [the] doctor feltpatient is not to be allowed to leave AMA. ***The parents were escorted off theward by the Cook County Hospital police."

Progress notes entered on February 22, 1998 at 2:30 p.m. and signed by Dr. Shuja and Dr. Soterindicated:

"Parents of the patient, very agitated and angry, came and demanded thatthe patient be released now because he has been cured. He [Thomas] was veryangry that the security person on the 1^st floor said that the baby has DCFS hold.He insisted that no matter what the doctor feels or believes he will sign AMA[against medical advice] and take full responsibility for the child. He then calledthe police to investigate why his child is being held here without his consent.***Security came to the floor along with [the] social worker who investigated thesituation and barred visitation for today due to his hostile behavior. Afterdiscussing the situation with Dr. Soter, protective custody of patient was taken."

Following the submission of T.P.'s records, the State and the Guardian rested. The courtheld that the evidence of the protective warrant entered in 1993 in J.P.'s case would not beconsidered, but the evidence of the warrant entered in 1996 would be considered. The courtentered a finding of neglect, injurious environment, and abuse, substantial risk of injury as toT.P. In reaching this determination, the court found that the evidence demonstrated thatrespondents refused to participate in any services, acted with tremendous hostility towards thecaseworkers and the hospital personnel treating J.P., culminating in death threats by Thomasagainst two caseworkers, attempted to remove T.P. from the hospital against medical advice, andrefused to allow T.P. to be transferred to another hospital for continued medical treatment.

Dispositional Hearing

On November 30, 1999, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing in T.P.'s case.Eddie Ramos (Ramos), a social worker employed by Lutheran Child and Family Servicestestified on behalf of the State and the Guardian. Ramos stated that he was assigned to the caseon March 26, 1999, and at that time, scheduled a psychological evaluation for Catherine for June21, 1999. Catherine was reminded of the appointment prior to the date, but she failed to attendthe appointment. Ramos also scheduled a psychological evaluation for Thomas for June 21,1999, but he failed to attend the appointment as well. On May 19, 1999, Ramos spoke withThomas on the telephone and explained to him that a psychological evaluation was imperative indetermining what services were appropriate for him, and further services could not be offereduntil the evaluation was completed. Thomas responded that he was not going to comply with anyservices because he needed to make a living. Ramos stated that because neither Thomas norCatherine would avail themselves of psychological evaluations, he was unable to offer furtherservices. Ramos stated that respondents had weekly supervised visits with T.P., and that everyother week, J.P. was also present during the visits. Between March and September, Catherinecame for the visits, but Thomas did not. The first visit Thomas came to was on September 21,1999. Ramos stated that on September 28, 1999, an unusual incident occurred when Catherineand Thomas came for a visit. On that date, Ramos received a phone call from a Department ofChild Protection investigator that Thomas and Catherine had searched T.P.'s body, found markson the back of his waistline and the palm of his hand, and voiced concern that the marks werecigarette burns. As a result of respondents' allegations, a hotline call was placed, and the fosterparents were asked to take T.P. to the emergency room. Ramos stated that the emergency roomdoctor determined that the marks were insect bites and T.P.'s foster parent indicated to Ramosthat she was reprimanded by the emergency room physician for wasting the emergency room'stime. Ramos stated that another unusual incident occurred on October 12, 1999 during a visit.On that date, respondents arrived for the visit at 11:30 a.m, although the visits were alwaysscheduled from 11a.m. to 12p.m. When Ramos informed respondents that they were late, andthat visits were to begin at 11a.m., respondents insisted that visits began at 11:30 a.m. pursuant tocourt order. At 12p.m., Ramos informed respondents that the visit was over. Catherineresponded , "you are not going to do this, over my dead body," and had the DCFS legalrepresentative paged. While respondents and Ramos were waiting for the DCFS representative, acase aide gave T.P. a cracker and T.P. called the aide "mommy." Catherine became upset, toldthe case aide that it was not appropriate, challenged the case aide to a fight and called the caseaide a profanity. Ramos told Catherine that her behavior was unacceptable and she would haveto calm down, asked the case aide to step outside, and paged the sheriff. When the sheriff andthe DCFS legal representative arrived, it was approximately 12:30 p.m. and respondents wereasked to leave. Ramos testified that when he would go to pick up T.P. for visits with respondents,T.P. would cling to his foster parents and cry for 15 to 20 minutes on the way to the visit. Ramosstated that although T.P. ordinarily did not suck his thumb, on days of scheduled visits withrespondents, he would.

On cross- examination, Ramos stated that respondents very specifically stated they wouldnot cooperate with any services offered. Thomas stated to Ramos that he would not comply withany services because he needed to make a living and Catherine indicated that she didn't have timefor services because she was looking for a job. Ramos admitted that he was not present duringthe September 28, 1999 visit which led to T.P.'s emergency room visit. Ramos stated that sinceSeptember, Thomas had visited T.P. regularly, as did Catherine, although she did not show upfor a few visits. Ramos admitted that after June 21, 1999, he did not make any further attemptsto enroll Catherine for a psychological evaluation. Ramos stated that T.P. had strongly bondedwith his foster parents.

On re-direct examination, Ramos represented that during visits with T.P. and J.P.,Catherine directed most of her attention towards J.P. Ramos stated that during one visit,Catherine made an inappropriate comment to J.P. in T.P.'s presence. J.P. had been given a snackby an aide and Catherine told J.P. he had to be careful because there were people who were tryingto poison him, just like there were people trying to poison respondents. Ramos recommendedthat a guardian be appointed to T.P. with the right to place him because respondents had notcomplied with any services. Following the submission of Ramos' testimony, the State andGuardian rested.

Catherine testified on her own behalf at the dispositional hearing. Catherine stated thatwith respect to the October 12, 1999 incident, the following exchange occurred. Catherine andThomas arrived approximately 15 minutes late for the visit that day. At approximately 12:10p.m., Ramos told respondents that the visit was over because the case aide, Latrice, was in ahurry to get T.P. back to his foster parents. Catherine went to check on the time because shedidn't believe the visit was over. When she returned she told Latrice that she was going to sitthere until the end of the visit because it was their allotted court time. The case aide begandressing T.P. to go, and Catherine protested. The case aide then dangled some food in front ofT.P. to get T.P. to come to her and leave early, and Catherine told the aide not to use food tocontrol her child. The case aide told Catherine they should talk about it with Ramos. WhenCatherine went to find a DCFS legal representative, she heard the case aide say to Ramos, "Holdme back, hold me back." Catherine told the aide not to hold back, and to do whatever she wasgoing to do to her.

On rebuttal, Catherine admitted that she was uncertain how often she visited T.P. TheState introduced into evidence and published a court order entered August 4, 1998, whichprovided that visits between respondents and T.P. would occur weekly at 11a.m. Catherineadmitted she was uncertain about the scheduled time of the visits, but stated that many visits hadbegun at 11:30 a.m.. Catherine agreed that during the altercation with the case aide on October12, 1999, she had called the case aide a profanity.

At the close of evidence, the State and the Guardian requested that D. Jean Orteg-Piron beappointed guardian of T.P., with the right to place him, and that the court find Catherine andThomas unwilling and unable to care for and protect T.P. The court found respondents unableor unwilling to care for or protect T.P., that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent the needfor removal of T.P. from the home but had been unsuccessful, and in the best interests of theminor, adjudged T.P. a ward of the court. In reaching its determination, the court noted thatrespondents were offered services before and after the adjudication order was entered, hadrefused to participate in any services, and Thomas had failed to attend any visits with J.P. forseven months.

Immediately following the dispositional hearing on T.P., the court held a permanencyplanning hearing in J.P.'s case. At the hearing, Ramos testified that J.P. was nine years old, hadbeen placed with his maternal aunt, and that the placement was safe and appropriate. Ramosstated that he had been assigned to the case since March 26, 1999, and since that timerespondents had not complied with any services. Ramos stated that based on his review of thecase file, he did not believe respondents had complied with any services since J.P.'s case cameinto the system in 1990. Ramos recommended private guardianship for J.P. because respondentshad not made reasonable efforts towards reunification. On the State's motion, the service plan forJ.P. was entered into evidence. Following the submission of this evidence, the trial court entereda modified dispositional order, finding the appropriate goal for J.P. was private guardianship, theservices contained in the service plan were appropriate and reasonably calculated to achieve thegoal, and that respondents had refused all services provided.

On December 3, 1999, Catherine filed a notice of appeal from the November 3, 1999dispositional orders as to T.P. and J.P. On December 17, 1999, Thomas filed a notice of appealfrom the June 8, 1999 adjudication order and the November 30, 1999 dispositional orders enteredwith respect to J.P. and T.P.

DISCUSSION

Adjudication Order

The first issue raised on appeal concerns the propriety of the trial court's adjudicationorder. Respondents, Catherine and Thomas, both argue that the court's finding of abuse andneglect as to T.P., in being subject to an injurious environment and at substantial risk of physicalinjury, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Thomas specifically argues that inreaching its determination, the trial court: (1) improperly relied on incompetent evidence of afinding of neglect in J.P.'s case to find T.P. abused and neglected, and (2) improperly relied onthreatening statements made by Thomas to caseworkers and hospital personnel where there wasno evidence that Thomas' temper was ever directed at T.P. or that T.P. was physically injured.Catherine similarly argues that the evidence of respondents' anger towards third parties did notsupport as finding of abuse and neglect, as there was no evidence connecting respondents'displays of temper to their care of T.P.

Before addressing the merits of these arguments, we note that the notice of appeal filed byCatherine specifies that appeal is taken solely from the November 30, 1999 dispositional order. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(2) (155 Ill.2d R. 303(b)(2)) requires a notice of appeal to"specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from thereviewing court." When an appeal is taken from a specified judgment, the appellate courtacquires no jurisdiction to review other judgments or parts of judgments not specified or fairlyinferred from the notice. Alpha Gamma Rho Alumni v. People ex rel. Boylan, 322 Ill. App. 3d 310, 313 (2001). Because Catherine's notice of appeal does not specify appeal is taken from thecourt's June 8, 1999 adjudication order, we are without jurisdiction to consider her claims withrespect to this order. See In re J.J., 316 Ill. App. 3d 817, 826 (2000), appeal allowed, 193 Ill. 2d587 (2001); In Interest of Lakita B., 297 Ill. App. 3d 985, 991 (1998). Accordingly, we dismissthat portion of Catherine's appeal pertaining to the adjudicatory order. However, we do addressThomas' claims pertaining to the adjudicatory order, which claims, in any event, are largelyduplicative of Catherine's claims.

At an adjudicatory hearing, the trial court's first responsibility is to determine whether theminor is abused, neglected, or dependent. 705 ILCS 405/2-18(1) (West 1999). It is the State'sburden to prove the neglect or abuse alleged in any wardship petition by a preponderance of theevidence. In re B.T., 204 Ill. App. 3d 277, 280 (1990). Preponderance of the evidence is thatamount of evidence that leads a trier of fact to find that the fact at issue is more probable thannot. In Interest of K.G.,288 Ill. App. 3d 728, 735 (1997). A trial court's determination of aneglect or abuse issue is entitled to great deference and will not be disturbed on appeal unlesscontrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re A.D.W., 278 Ill. App. 3d 476, 482 (1996). A trial court's finding is deemed "against the manifest weight of the evidence" only if a review ofthe record clearly demonstrates that the opposite result is proper. K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 735.

The concept of "neglect" is not static, it has no fixed and measured meaning, but draws itsdefinition from the individual circumstances presented in each case. K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at736. Neglect based on "injurious environment" is a similarly amorphous concept not readilysusceptible to definition. In re S.D., 220 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502 (1991). However, as a generalrule neglect is "the failure to exercise the care that circumstances justly demand and encompassesboth wilful and unintentional disregard of parental duty." In Interest of M.K., 271 Ill. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995). Under the Act, "proof of the abuse, neglect or dependency of one minor shallbe admissible evidence on the issue of abuse, neglect or dependency of any other minor forwhom the respondent is responsible." 705 ILCS 405/2-18(3) (West 1999). Sibling abuse may beprima facie evidence of neglect based upon an injurious environment. In re S.S., 313 Ill. App.3d 121, 127-28 (2000). However, this presumption is not permanent; it weakens over time andcan be rebutted by the introduction of other evidence. S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d at 128. There is noper se rule of anticipatory neglect in Illinois, and each case concerning the adjudication of minorsmust be reviewed according to its own facts. In re Edricka C., 276 Ill. App. 3d 18, 31 (1995). Todetermine whether a finding of anticipatory neglect is appropriate, the trial court should considerthe current care and condition of the child in question and not merely the circumstances thatexisted at the time of the incident involving the child's sibling. Edricka C, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 28. In this case, the trial court concluded T.P. was neglected as defined under the Act basedon a finding of "injurious environment." In making its determination that T.P. was neglected,the trial court took into consideration the finding of neglect entered in J.P.'s case, the childprotective warrant issued in J.P.'s case , and respondents refusals to engage in any services inJ.P.'s case, leading up to the time of T.P.'s birth. As respondent points out, the specific factualbasis underlying the finding of neglect as to J.P. was not before the court, as the court waspresented only with a certified half sheet showing that a general finding of neglect, injuriousenvironment, was entered in J.P.'s case. However, it is clear from the trial court's extensivefindings in the record that the court did not focus primarily on the neglect of J.P. to find T.P.neglected. Rather, the court specifically indicated that it considered the history of J.P.'s case as acontextual backdrop of events leading up to T.P.'s birth and his removal from the home, as wellas evidence of respondents' unabated pattern of rejecting reunification services. Contrary torespondent's assertion, it is evident from the trial court's findings, specifically the court'sconcentration upon respondents' conduct in attempting to remove T.P. from the hospital, that thecourt's determination of neglect was premised upon consideration of T.P.'s current care andcondition, not solely the past finding of neglect as to T.P.'s sibling, J.P.

Respondent additionally contends that the evidence of respondents' statements tocaseworkers and hospital personnel did not support a finding of neglect and injuriousenvironment. Respondent posits that the facts of the instant case are similar to those in, In reN.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338 (2000), wherein the Illinois Supreme Court held that evidence of arespondent-mother's angry outburst was insufficient to demonstrate an injurious environment.

We find the facts of the present case to be distinguishable. In N.B., the evidence whichthe court found insufficient to support a finding of injurious environment consisted of a single,isolated temper tantrum by a homeless respondent- mother which occurred when she was deniedredemption of milk coupons for her infant at a health facility. N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 351. Thecourt there concluded no proof was adduced at the adjudicatory hearing to support the inferentialleap that "when respondent loses her temper she becomes blinded to the well-being of herchildren" and there was also testimony that respondent's level of frustration was consistent withany parent's reactions to a three year old. N.B., 191 Ill. 2d at 351. By contrast, in the instantcase, the evidence of respondents' loss of temper was not confined to a single, isolated instance.Rather, the evidence indicated a pattern of behavior by respondents, consisting of extremedisplays of aggression and hostility, some of these displays occurring in the presence of theirchildren. Caseworkers, Morfin and Blackmore both testified regarding respondents' hostilebehavior towards DCFS, including death threats made by Thomas against the two caseworkers.Hospital records provided further testament to the degree of respondent's aggression, showingthat Thomas threatened hospital staff, attempted to remove T.P. from the hospital against medicaladvice, and refused to allow T.P. to be transferred to a different hospital for treatment. In sum,unlike in N.B., the evidence in this case demonstrated a connection between respondents' angerand the well being of T.P. Unlike in N.B., there was evidence of respondent's anger operating toblind him to the well-being of his child, as evidenced by Thomas' attempt to remove T.P. fromthe hospital, his refusal to allow the transfer of T.P., and respondents' adamant refusals to engagein any services. Considering the totality of the evidence, we cannot say that the court's finding ofneglect, injurious environment, as to T.P., was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Contrary to respondent's assertions, we also find the evidence was sufficient to support a finding of abuse, based on a "substantial risk of physical injury." The definition of "abusedminor" under the Act provides:

"(2) Those who are abused include any minor under 18 years of age whoseparent or * * * any individual residing in the same home as the minor, or aparamour of the minor's parent

(ii) creates a substantial risk of physical injury to such minor by other thanaccidental means which would be likely to cause death, disfigurement,impairment of emotional health, or loss or impairment of any bodily function." 705 ILCS 405/2-3(2)(ii)(West 1998).

As set forth in detail above, the record in this case contains numerous examples of respondentsacting with disproportionate aggression and extreme hostility to the detriment of T.P. Although,as Thomas points out, his anger was ostensibly directed towards DCFS and Cook Countyhospital personnel, a connection was demonstrated between this anger and his actual treatment ofT.P. A substantial risk of physical harm to T.P. was clearly evidenced by respondent's attempt toremove T.P. from the hospital against medical advice and his refusal to allow T.P.'s transfer toanother hospital for treatment. Again, considering the totality of evidence, we do not find that thecourt's finding of abuse, based on a substantial risk of physical harm, was against the manifestweight of the evidence. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's June 8, 1999 adjudicationorder.

Dispositional Order

Respondents, Catherine and Thomas also contest the trial court's dispositional order, and contend that the court's finding that respondents were unable or unwilling to care for or protectT.P. was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, respondents contend that thecourt's determination that respondents had failed to undertake any reunification services waserroneous because the evidence of whether services had been offered was conflicting. Thomasalso separately asserts that the modified dispositional order entered in J.P.'s case was withoutevidentiary support.

Although we address the merits of respondents' claims concerning the dispositional orderin T.P.'s case, we will not address Thomas' claim concerning the modified dispositional orderentered as to J.P. Respondent does not reference the record or cite to pertinent authority, and hisargument consists essentially of the bare assertion of the issue sought to be raised. Under thecircumstances, we are well within our discretion to decline review of the issue. See In Interest ofS.J.K., 149 Ill. App. 3d 663, 671 (1986).

Section 2-27 of the Act governs dispositional hearings, and provides in pertinent part:

" (1) If the court determines and puts in writing the factual basis supporting thedetermination of whether the parents * * * of a minor adjudged a ward of thecourt are unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstancesalone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so,and that it is in the best interest of the minor to take him from the custody of hisparents, * * * the court may at this hearing and at any later point:

* * *

(d) commit him to the Department of Children and Family Services for care and service.

* * *

(1.5) In making a determination under this Section, the court shall alsoconsider whether, based on the best interests of the minor, appropriate servicesaimed at family preservation and family reunification have been unsuccessful inrectifying the conditions that have led to a finding of unfitness or inability to carefor, protect, train, or discipline the minor, or whether, based on the best interestsof the minor, no family preservation or family reunification services would beappropriate." 705 ILCS 405/2-27 (West 1999).

Upon review of the record, we find the trial court's findings were adequately supported bythe evidence and the dispositional order selected by the court was appropriate. Althoughrespondents contend the evidence regarding the offering of services was conflicting, the recordundermines this contention.

At the dispositional hearing, caseworker Ramos testified he advised Thomas that apsychological evaluation was imperative in order to determine what further services were needed,but Thomas and Catherine explicitly refused services, and represented that they did not have timefor services because of their work obligations. Ramos further testified that he made appointmentsfor respondents to undergo a psychological evaluations on June 21, 1999, but neither respondentattended. Ramos also related that Thomas failed to attend any visits with T.P. between Marchand September of 1999, and that Catherine acted inappropriately during two visits with T.P. Ramos additionally observed that T.P. cried and sucked his thumb on the days he was scheduledto visit respondents, and that T.P. had bonded well with his foster parents.

In light of the above testimony, we cannot say that the trial court's determinations thatrespondents were unable or unwilling to care for or protect T.P., that reasonable efforts weremade but have been unsuccessful, and that it was in T.P.'s best interests to be adjudged a ward ofthe court were against the manifest weight of the evidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the the trial court's June 8, 1999 adjudication order andNovember 30, 1999 dispositional orders are affirmed, and appeal, No. 1-99-4165, is dismissed inpart for want of jurisdiction.

Appeal No. 1-99-4165, dismissed in part, affirmed in part.

Appeal No. 1-99-4405, affirmed.

McNULTY and COUSINS, JJ., concur.