In re Governing Board of the Special Education District

Case Date: 06/19/2002
Court: 1st District Appellate
Docket No: 1-01-3767 Rel

THIRD DIVISION

June 19, 2002






No. 1-01-3767

 

In the Matter of:  ) Petition for Review
) of Order of the
GOVERNING BOARD OF THE SPECIAL ) Illinois Educational
EDUCATION DISTRICT OF LAKE ) Labor Relations Board.
COUNTY, )
)
          Petitioner-Appellants,  )
)
               v. )
)
SEDOL TEACHERS' UNION, LAKE )
COUNTY FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, ) IELRB No. 2001-CA-0023-C
LOCAL 504, IFT-AFT, AFL-CIO, )
)
               and )
)
THE ILLINOIS EDUCATIONAL LABOR )
RELATIONS BOARD, )
)
          Respondents-Appellees. )

 

JUSTICE WOLFSON delivered the opinion of the court:

On October 10, 2000, the Special Education District of LakeCounty Teachers Union, Lake County Federation of Teachers, Local504, IFT-AFT, AFL-CIO (Union) filed an unfair labor practicecharge against the Special Education District of Lake County(SEDOL), alleging SEDOL violated Sections 14(a)(5) and 14(a)(1)of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (the Act), 115ILCS 5/1, et seq. (West 2000), by refusing to bargain over amandatory subject of bargaining: the wages, hours, and workingconditions of teachers serving on Local Professional DevelopmentCommittees (LPDCs).

After conducting an investigation of the charge, theexecutive director of the Illinois Educational Labor RelationsBoard (IELRB) issued a complaint and notice of hearing onNovember 6, 2000. On January 22, 2001, both parties appeared ata hearing in Chicago, Illinois.

On May 4, 2001, an administrative law judge (ALJ) of theIELRB issued a Recommended Decision and Order (the ALJ's Order). The ALJ concluded SEDOL had violated Sections 14(a)(5) and14(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with the Union aboutthe wages, hours, and working conditions of teachers serving onLPDCs. On August 31, 2001, the IELRB issued an Opinion and Orderaffirming the ALJ's Order.

On appeal, we are required to determine whether the IELRB'sdecision that SEDOL violated Section 14(a)(5) and, derivatively,Section 14(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to bargain over themileage, release time, and stipends of teachers serving on theLPDCs was clearly erroneous. We affirm.

FACTS

The Parties

SEDOL is an educational employer as defined in Section 2(a)of the Act (115 ILCS 5/2(a) (West 2000)). The Union is anemployee organization as defined in Section 2(c) of the Act (115ILCS 5/2(c) (West 2000)), and the exclusive representative, asdefined in Section 2(d) of the Act (115 ILCS 5/2(d) (West 2000)),of a unit consisting of all certified classroom and itinerantteachers and educators, speech therapists, prevocationalcoordinators, social workers, educational diagnosticians, nurses,and psychologists employed by SEDOL.

The Certificate Renewal Act -- The Creation of LPDCs

On July 12, 1999, the process by which Illinois teacherswere granted renewal of their teaching certificates was amendedby Public Act 91-102 ("Certificate Renewal Act"). See 105 ILCS5/21-14 (West 2000). The Certificate Renewal Act was enacted inan effort to enhance the knowledge, skills, and professionalismof Illinois teachers. 105 ILCS 5/21-14(e) (West 2000).

The Certificate Renewal Act provides that teachers who renewtheir teaching certificates after February 15, 2000, will beissued a standard certificate valid for only five years. Astandard certificate may be renewed for additional five-yearperiods, but only after teachers create and submit a "certificaterenewal plan" that explains how those teachers plan on engagingin professional development and continuing education over thenext five years. See 105 ILCS 5/21-14(b), 21-14(e) (West 2000).

The Certificate Renewal Act requires Illinois schooldistricts and their respective collective bargainingrepresentatives to establish "Local Professional DevelopmentCommittees" to review and approve teachers' certificate renewalplans. Each LPDC must consist of at least three classroomteachers, selected by the collective bargaining representative,and two non-classroom teachers, selected by the school district. See 105 ILCS 5/21-14(f) (West 2000).

The law provides that each school district "shall be paid anannual amount of not less than $1,000 for administrative costsassociated with conducting the meetings of the [LPDC]." 105 ILCS5/21-14(k) (West 2000).

The Illinois State Board of Education ("ISBE") issuedproposed rules implementing the Certificate Renewal Act in March,2000. The ISBE issued final rules, effective on August 14, 2000.

Bargaining over the Certificate Renewal Act

Before the effective date of the ISBE rules, beginning inabout September 1999, the Union made several requests that SEDOLbargain over the working conditions of the teacher-members of theLPDC. Initially, SEDOL refused to bargain, pending adoption ofthe final rules by the ISBE.

On June 1, 2000, the Union filed an unfair labor practicecharge against SEDOL, alleging its refusal to bargain constituteda violation of Sections 14(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. On July 5,2000, the executive director dismissed that charge. See SpecialEducation District of Lake County, Case No. 2000-CA-0071-C, 16PERI 1070 (Executive Director's Recommended Decision and Order,July 5, 2000).

On October 26, 2000, the IELRB affirmed the dismissal,finding the results of bargaining conducted before the adoptionof final rules by the ISBE would be of uncertain validity, andmight have to be renegotiated. See Special Education District ofLake County, Case No. 2000-CA-0071- C, 16 PERI 1086 (IELRBOpinion and Order, October 26, 2000). The IELRB concluded SEDOLdid not violate the Act because bargaining was not possiblebefore issuance of the ISBE's final rules.

After the final rules became effective, in August andSeptember of 2000, SEDOL and the Union exchanged correspondenceabout scheduling a meeting to discuss development of the LPDCs. On October 10, 2000, the Union filed a second unfair laborpractice charge alleging SEDOL: "[o]n August 24, 2000, and at alltimes thereafter, refus[ed] to bargain over teacherrecertification."

On October 16, 2000, the parties met to negotiate teacherrecertification issues. The Union presented four proposals. Thefirst proposal was a statement of mutual understanding that theparties would negotiate over the other three proposals. Thesecond proposed four LPDCs and described the teachers they wouldserve. The third suggested the Union president appoint to eachLPDC three classroom teachers who would serve one-year terms.

The fourth and final proposal concerned the workingconditions and terms of employment of LPDC members. The Unionproposed the teacher LPDC members receive mileage at the ratespecified in the collective bargaining agreement for othertravel, up to six days of release time that may be taken inhalf-day increments, and a $250 annual stipend as compensationfor work performed outside of the work day. This final proposalis the center of the dispute between the parties.

SEDOL's Director of Human Resources responded to the Union'sfirst three proposals. He said he would discuss the fourthproposal, but would not offer a counter-proposal or negotiateover it. He gave two reasons for his refusal to bargain: theproposal did not affect the terms and conditions of employment ofany SEDOL employees and the "Effect of Agreement" clause in theAgreement waived any bargaining obligations over this issue ifone otherwise existed. Only the first reason is relevant to thisappeal.

The Union refused to bargain further on anything unlessSEDOL agreed to negotiate the Union's fourth proposal. At theend of the meeting, SEDOL's Director of Human Resources told theUnion of the statutory requirement for the SEDOL Executive Boardto convene the first LPDC meeting by November 1, 2000. He gavethe Union the names of the Administrative Representative andAt-Large Representative appointed by SEDOL. However, the Unionrefused to assign any Union representatives to the LPDCs untilfurther negotiations took place.

In a letter dated October 25, 2000, SEDOL notified the Unionthat if the Union did not appoint its volunteer members to theLPDC by the first LPDC meeting on November 1, 2000, SEDOL wouldinform certificate renewal applicants that, pursuant to ISBEguidelines, lack of any action by the LPDC would constitute adenial of their applications. The individual teachers could thenappeal to the Regional Professional Developmental ReviewCommittee if they so chose.

On November 1, 2000, SEDOL's Executive Board convened thefirst LPDC meeting, as required by Section 5/21-14 of theIllinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/21-14 (West 2000)), but took noaction because the Union had not appointed its volunteer members.

Although SEDOL has since requested on several occasions thatthe Union appoint its members to the LPDC, the Union hascontinued to refuse to do so.

The Administrative Proceedings

On May 4, 2001, the ALJ found SEDOL violated Sections14(a)(5) and 14(a)(1) of the Act by refusing to bargain with theUnion about the terms and conditions of employment of teachersserving on the LPDCs.

In deciding whether SEDOL violated the Act, the ALJ firstdetermined whether the time and expense teacher-members incurredwhile serving on LPDCs constitute a mandatory subject ofbargaining. To answer that question, the ALJ looked to theIllinois Supreme Court decision in Central City Education Ass'nv. IELRB, 149 Ill. 2d 496, 599 N.E.2d 892 (1992).

Central City set forth a three-part balancing test todetermine whether a given issue must be bargained. The firstpart of the test examines whether the matter concerns "wages,hours and terms and conditions of employment." Central City, 149Ill. 2d at 523.

Before the ALJ, SEDOL contended the matter did not involvewages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment becauseLPDCs are separate entities from the school district. Accordingto SEDOL, service on the LPDC does not impact a teacher's termsand conditions of employment at SEDOL. SEDOL said a teacher'svoluntary service on the LPDC is not controlled or directed bySEDOL and is not directly for the benefit of SEDOL or itsstudents. It is the Union that determines which teachers willserve on the LPDC, said SEDOL.

The ALJ noted the IELRB had considered and rejected SEDOL'scontentions in a prior action where the Union sought aninjunction. The IELRB had concluded "the terms and conditions ofteachers serving of the LPDC clearly constitute 'wages, hours andterms and conditions of employment.' " (Special EducationDistrict of Lake County, Case No. 2001-CA-0023-C, 17 PERI 1006(IELRB Opinion and Order, October 10, 2000)):

"Whether an employee volunteers for a position is irrelevantin determining whether a matter is a mandatory subject ofbargaining. School districts and their unions routinelybargain over pay for those voluntarily serving as clubsponsors and members of important school committees. Infew, if any, of these situations are employees ever requiredto be committee members or club sponsors. Volunteering fora duty does not preclude mileage and/or compensation forthat duty. Employers and employees are free to bargainabout wages, hours and working conditions for these'volunteers.' "

The IELRB then said:

"Although LPDCs do not report directly to their respectiveboards of education, teacher-members of these committees arenonetheless employees serving their employer. Theteacher-members of the LPDC are selected because they areemployees of the respective districts and remain so whilethey undertake the tasks assigned to the LPDC." SpecialEducation District of Lake County, Case No. 2001-CA-0023-C,17 PERI 1006 (IELRB Opinion and Order, October 10, 2000)).

After finding the matter concerned wages, hours, and termsand conditions of employment, the ALJ addressed the second partof the test: "Is the matter also one of inherent managerialauthority?" Central City, 599 N.E.2d at 905.

SEDOL did not contend before the ALJ that the terms andconditions of teachers serving on the LPDC involved matters ofinherent managerial authority. Instead, SEDOL's defense againstthe Union's unfair labor practice charge was that LPDCs areindependent entities SEDOL does not govern or control.

The ALJ found that because the terms and conditions ofemployment of teacher-members of LPDCs are not matters ofinherent managerial policy, the Central City analysis endedthere:

"The subject matter of this dispute constitutes wages, hoursand terms and conditions of employment and does not involvematters of inherent managerial authority -- thus, it is amandatory subject of bargaining."

Because of the ALJ's answers to the first two parts of theCentral City test, there was no need to reach the third part --weighing the benefits bargaining would have for the decision-making process against the burdens bargaining would impose on theemployer's authority. Central City, 149 Ill. 2d at 523.

On August 21, 2001, the IELRB issued an Opinion and Orderadopting the ALJ's findings of fact and affirmed the ALJ's Order. This appeal followed.

DECISION

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Our review of the IELRB's decision is governed by theAdministrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq. (West 2000)). 820 ILCS 405/1100, 2205 (West 2000). The scope of our reviewextends to all questions of law and fact presented by the recordbefore the court. 735 ILCS 5/3-110 (West 2000). The applicablestandard of review, which determines the degree of deference wegive to the agency's decision, depends on whether the questionpresented is one of fact, one of law, or a mixed question of lawand fact. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor RelationsBoard, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204-05, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998).

This case presents a mixed question of law and fact and,pursuant to the supreme court's decision in City of Belvidere,the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review applies.

"[W]hen the decision of an administrative agency presents amixed question of law and fact, the agency decision will bedeemed 'clearly erroneous' only where the reviewing court, on theentire record, is 'left with the definite and firm convictionthat a mistake has been committed.' ([Citation omitted.]) Thatthe clearly erroneous standard is largely deferential does notmean, however, that a reviewing court must blindly defer to theagency's decision." AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. TheDepartment of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395, 763N.E.2d 272 (2001).

We now consider the merits of this appeal.

MANDATORY SUBJECT OF BARGAINING

Section 10(a) of the Act requires educational employers andemployee representatives "to meet at reasonable times and conferin good faith with respect to wages, hours and other terms andconditions of employment." 115 ILCS 5/10(a) (West 2000).

Section 14(a)(1) prohibits educational employers from"[i]nterfering, restraining or coercing employees in the exerciseof the rights guaranteed under this Act." 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(1)(West 2000). In addition, Section 14(a)(5) prohibits educationalemployers from:

"Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith with anemployee representative which is the exclusiverepresentative of employees in an appropriate unit,including but not limited to the discussing of grievanceswith the exclusive representative ***." 115 ILCS 5/14(a)(5)(West 2000).

SEDOL contends the IELRB erred in concluding a teacher's"voluntary service" on an LPDC is a term and condition ofemployment with SEDOL. "[V]oluntary service on a non-schooldistrict committee is not a labor issue," says SEDOL, "rather itis one of licensure between the [Union], its members and theSTCB/ISBE as to how the [Union] members intend to comply with theAct." According to SEDOL, it did not violate the Act by refusingto negotiate in good faith because a teacher's voluntary serviceon a non-SEDOL committee is not a mandatory subject ofbargaining.

The IELRB disagrees. It says the Union's fourth proposalrequesting mileage, release times, and stipends for teachersserving on the LPDC is a mandatory subject of bargaining becauseit concerns wages, hours, and other terms and conditions ofemployment. Affirming the ALJ, the IELRB also relied on CentralCity.

Here, as it did before the IELRB, SEDOL puts all its eggs inone basket: the first part of the three-part Central City test. SEDOL says a teacher's service on the LPDC does not affect ateacher's terms and conditions of employment as a SEDOL employeebecause: (1) LPDCs are a separate entity from school districts;(2) service on LPDCs is voluntary; (3) the LPDC is not controlledor directed by SEDOL; (4) the functions of the LPDC involve ateacher's licensure and are not directly for the benefit of SEDOLor its students; and (5) the teachers are selected for service onthe LPDC by the Union, not by SEDOL.

SEDOL does not address the second and third parts of theCentral City test. Nor will we.

We agree with the IELRB. Although LPDCs do not reportdirectly to the school districts or cooperatives they serve, theteacher-members of an LPDC retain their roles as employees ofthat school district or cooperative while serving on an LPDC. That is because the school district and cooperatives are requiredto create, establish, and implement LPDCs using three of theirown employees/teachers. See 105 ILCS 5/21-14(f) (West 2000)(each LPDC must consist of at least three classroom teachers,selected by the collective bargaining representative, and twonon-classroom teachers, selected by the school district).

We also conclude the IELRB was correct when it found "thelicensure issues with which SEDOL's LPDC will deal are limited tothose concerning SEDOL's teachers." See 105 ILCS 5/21-14(e)(4)("A certificate renewal plan must initially be approved by thecertificate holder's [LPDC]"). Thus, said the IELRB, "an LPDC isan outgrowth of the school district or cooperative that itserves." By serving on an LPDC, teachers perform a function thatbenefits their specific employer and allows that employer tofulfill its statutory obligations. Consequently, "service on anLPDC is a function of teachers' employment."

With regard to SEDOL's contention "[V]oluntary service on anon-school district committee is not a labor issue," the IELRBcorrectly found that whether an employee volunteers for aposition is irrelevant in determining whether a matter is amandatory subject of bargaining. Teachers volunteering for aduty do not preclude mileage and/or compensation for that duty. Employers and employees are free to bargain about wages, hours,and working conditions for these "volunteers." See, e.g., WestChicago School Dist. 33 v. Illinois Educational Labor RelationsBoard, 218 Ill. App. 3d 304, 578 N.E.2d 232 (1991) (pay forteachers' extracurricular activities constitutes wages, hours,and terms and conditions of employment).

Simply put, recertification is a term and condition of ateacher's employment. Without recertification, there is noemployment. The statutory scheme sets out a system for ensuringrecertification is accomplished in ways consistent with theState's educational mission. The purpose of recertification isto enhance the knowledge, skills, and professionalism ofteachers. 105 ILCS 5/21-14(e) (West 2000). We do not see how itcan be said, as SEDOL does, there is no direct benefit to schooldistricts that employ the recertified teachers.

Our review of the entire record does not leave us with thedefinite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. See AFM Messenger Service, 198 Ill. 2d at 395. We agree with theIELRB: Under the first part of Central City, "The mileage,release time, and stipends received by teachers who serve onLPDCs are matters of wages, hours and terms and conditions ofemployment."

"Determination of whether specific issues are mandatorilybargainable or not is best left to the [IELRB], which has theknowledge and experience to balance the equities in a givencase." Central City, 149 Ill. 2d at 522. Considerable deferencemust be given to the IELRB because of its expertise ineducational labor matters. Decatur Federation of Teachers v.Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 199 Ill. App. 3d 190,197, 556 N.E.2d 780 (1990); Decatur Board of Education, DistrictNo. 61 v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 180 Ill.App. 3d 770, 775, 536 N.E.2d 743 (1989). To do otherwise wouldtransform appellate review into trial de novo. Such a resultwould substitute the court's general knowledge for the expertiserequired of IELRB members. Decatur Board of Education, 180 Ill.App. 3d at 775.

We hold the IELRB was not clearly erroneous in finding themileage, release time, and stipends received by teachers servingon LPDCs constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the IELRB's decision.

Affirmed.

HALL, P.J., and CERDA, J., concur.