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No. 1-00-3639                                                                                                                                           First Division

PRESIDING JUSTICE COHEN delivered the opinion of the court:

The State filed petitions pursuant to section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)) seeking termination of respondent'sparental rights to five of her children. Following a hearing on the State's petitions, the trial courtterminated respondent's parental rights as to her two youngest children, G.L. and K.A. Respondentappeals, arguing that termination of her parental rights to G.L. and K.A. was against the manifestweight of the evidence where the trial court did not terminate respondent's parental rights to herremaining children.

BACKGROUND

On November 20, 1995, respondent's son G.L., born August 15, 1993, was adjudicatedneglected and respondent's daughter K.A., born December 23, 1994, was adjudicated abused. Bothchildren (along with their siblings A.L., L.B. and J.P.) were made wards of the court on January 11,1996. On November 23, 1999, the State filed petitions pursuant to section 2-29(2) of the JuvenileCourt Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)) seeking termination of respondent's parental rightsand appointment of a guardian with the right to consent to adoption as to respondent's five youngestchildren: J.P., L.B., A.L, G.L., and K.A.

In its petitions seeking termination of respondent's parental rights as to G.L. and K.A., theState alleged that respondent was unfit in that she: (1) "failed to maintain a reasonable degree ofinterest, concern or responsibility as to the child[ren]'s welfare" (see 750 ILCS 50/1 (D)(b) (West1998)); (2) "deserted the child[ren] for more than three months next preceding the commencementof these termination proceedings" (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(c) (West 1998)); (3) "failed to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for removal of the child[ren] * ** and/or failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child[ren]" (see 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1998))⁽¹⁾; and (4) "evidenced an intent to forgo [her] parental rights as manifestedby her failure for a period of 12 months to (i) visit the child[ren], (ii) to communicate with the childor agency, although able to do so * * *, and/or (iii) to maintain contact with or plan for the future ofthe child[ren]" (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(n) (West 1998)). The petitions further alleged that G.L. andK.A. were each residing with foster parents who wished to adopt them and that termination ofrespondent's parental rights was in the best interests of each child. On September 29, 2000, the trialcourt held a two-stage hearing to address the State's petition.

During the first stage, the trial court considered whether respondent was unfit within themeaning of section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)). See 705 ILCS405/2-29(2) (West 1998) (trial court may terminate parental rights after finding parent unfit asdefined in section 1 of the Adoption Act). The State called Derryl Bolden as a witness. Boldentestified that in July 1998 he was employed by Reaching the Mark⁽²⁾ and was assigned as thecaseworker for respondent's family. Bolden wrote to respondent, introducing himself and informingrespondent that she should contact him to arrange for services and visitation. Bolden first spoke withrespondent in September or October of 1998. In that conversation, respondent told Bolden that shehad phoned him on prior occasions. Bolden testified that he had never received any message thatrespondent had called. Bolden and respondent then "tentatively set up visits" between respondentand her children. Respondent "was supposed to actually get back in contact with [Bolden] becauseshe didn't have a phone at that time " but "she didn't follow up with the time [she and Bolden] setaside" for visitation.

Bolden described his subsequent contact with respondent as "sporadic." Because respondentdid not have a phone, Bolden asked her to call him on specific dates and at specific times. Respondent "usually wouldn't call" Bolden at the scheduled time and "would either try and followup maybe two or three weeks later or the next time [Bolden] saw her in court." Bolden testified thatbetween July 1998 and June 2000 he arranged for four visits between respondent and her children,but respondent attended "two at the most." Of those four visits, "the majority * * * were set up afterDecember 1999."

The State submitted several client service plans prepared by respondent's caseworkers, whichwere admitted into evidence. The service plan for the period January through June 1998 wasprepared by Reaching the Mark caseworker Carolyn Robinson. In this service plan, Robinson ratedrespondent "unsatisfactory" as to both services and visitation. The plan indicated that respondenthad not contacted Robinson since February 1998 despite messages and letters from the caseworker,and further indicated that respondent had discontinued her therapy sessions in March 1998. TheJanuary through June 1998 service plan also indicated that respondent had not visited with herchildren since either February or April 1998. Bolden prepared service plans covering the periodfrom January 29, 1999, through July 29, 1999, and from July 29, 1999, through January 20, 2000. Each of Bolden's plans notes respondent's failure to contact him and failure to participate in services. Bolden rated respondent "unsatisfactory" as to services and visitation in both plans prepared byBolden. In contrast, both caseworkers rated G.L.'s and K.A.'s foster mothers "satisfactory" in theircare for the children.

Respondent testified on her own behalf. According to respondent, she called Bolden twodays after receiving his letter, but he was unavailable. Respondent was not able to reach Bolden untilaround September 1998 and denied scheduling a visit during the September 1998 phone call. Respondent testified that during the two-year period that Bolden was her caseworker, she called ortried to call Bolden twice a week on average, but "sometimes * * * would skip a couple weeks." Respondent testified that four visits had been scheduled since July 1998. Respondent's eldest son(not a subject of the proceedings below) was present at the first scheduled visit; however, Bolden"never showed up with the [remaining] children." Respondent testified that she was told that Boldenwas "out sick" that day. According to respondent, Bolden cancelled a second scheduled visit dueto "an emergency court case." Respondent testified that Bolden scheduled a third and fourth visit,but only between respondent and her daughters J.P. and A.L. Respondent did not testify whetherthese two visits actually took place.

Respondent further testified that she attended an administrative case review on January 12,2000. During that review, respondent submitted a statement complaining of difficulties with Bolden. Respondent's statement was included in the record as part of the client service plan for July 20, 1999,through January 20, 2000, and states as follows:

"I have attempted to contact [Reaching the Mark] worker andschedule meetings in order to obtain custody of the children. I havebeen disregarded by Darryl Bolden and [Reaching the Mark] as anunfit parent. I have done beyond the reasonable amount of footworkto obtain visitation and return home. Court cases have been the onlytime (besides on face to face at his office before we went to court) Ihave been in contact with him is in court [sic]. Mr. Bolden hasrefused me visitation rights. He also refuses to cooperate with me inorder to obtain a return home goal.

He is purposely being unavailable so that he may obtain a nocontact assumption between parent * * * and children.

My allegations are that in order for someone to be assessedthey have to have something to be assessed about. He has never seenme interact with my children and he has not done sib visits.

I request that this man be removed from my children's casebecause I don't really feel he has their best interest at heart."

Finally, respondent submitted certain certificates and diplomas, which were admitted intoevidence demonstrating that respondent had participated in certain services in an effort to regaincustody of her children. For example, in November 1994, respondent completed a parenting class. She completed a "residential rehabilitation program" and a GED class in December 1995. Respondent completed a second parenting class in February 1996 and completed an "intensiveoutpatient substance abuse program" in March 1996.

The trial court found respondent unfit as to each of the five children based on "the extendedperiod that the mother had no contact with the children." In reaching this conclusion, the trial judgenoted that "[t]here was willfully [sic] inadequate evidence that the mother was somehow beingdenied visits." The judge further noted that the client service plans admitted into evidence "supportthat the mother just stopped visiting her children."

The matter next proceeded to the second stage to determine whether termination of parentalrights would be in the children's best interests. At the second stage, Joseph Bracy testified that hewas employed by Reaching the Mark and was the current caseworker for the family, having beenassigned to all five cases on August 25, 2000. Bracy testified that he had visited with each of thechildren at their respective foster homes and had spoken with each of the children about thepossibility of adoption. L.B., J.P., and A.L. all expressed a desire to remain in their respective fosterhomes, but also wanted to be able to continue to see their mother. Bracy testified that G.L. and K.A.,ages seven and five, were not able to understand adoption.

Bracy testified that he found each of the children's foster homes to be safe and appropriate. Bracy testified that G.L. was receiving special education services for attention deficit hyperactivitydisorder (ADHD) and was "a grade behind" and that G.L.'s special needs were being met by hisfoster mother.

The trial judge found that termination of respondent's parental rights would not be in the bestinterests of L.B., J.P., or A.L., as each of those minors had expressed a desire to continue to see theirmother. The trial judge, however, found that termination of respondent's parental rights was in thebest interests of G.L. and K.A. Respondent appeals.

ANALYSIS

Proceedings for the termination of parental rights may be initiated by the filing of a petitionpursuant to section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 1998)). In reD.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 417 (2001). Section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act provides that a parent'srights may be terminated upon proof by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit as thatterm is defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 417. When decidinga parent's fitness, the court is not to consider the best interests of the child but, rather, must focus onwhether the parent's conduct falls within one or more of the several "grounds of unfitness" describedin section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 417. A court's determination that clearand convincing evidence of a parent's unfitness has been shown will not be disturbed on reviewunless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 417.

Both the State and the public guardian suggest that respondent has not challenged the trialcourt's finding of unfitness and that our review is thus limited to whether termination was in theminors' best interests. We note that respondent argues only that "termination of the mother's rights* * * was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence." (Emphasis added.) As noted above,termination of parental rights requires: (1) a finding of parental unfitness; and (2) a finding thattermination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child. By arguing that termination wasimproper, respondent does not clearly indicate whether she contests the finding of unfitness, the bestinterests determination, or both. Because respondent claims that the court erred in reaching adetermination as to G.L. and K.A. which was different from that reached as to the older children andbecause the trial court found respondent unfit as to all five children, we agree with both the State andthe public guardian and construe respondent's appeal as limited to a challenge of the best interestsdetermination.

Nonetheless, even were we to review the trial court's finding that respondent was unfit, wewould find no error. Evidence of a single statutory ground is sufficient to support a finding ofparental unfitness. In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 268 (2001). Section 1(D)(n) of the AdoptionAct provides that a parent may be found unfit if she "[e]vidence[d] an intent to forgo * * * herparental rights, * * * as manifested by * * * her failure for a period of 12 months: (i) to visit thechild[ren], (ii) to communicate with the child[ren] or agency, although able to do so * * *, or (iii)to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child[ren]." 750 ILCS 50/1(D) (n) (West 2000). Evidence was presented that respondent had not visited either G.L or K.A. since February or April1998, more than two years prior to the September 2000 termination hearing. Although respondentattempted to explain her lack of visitation by asserting that Bolden had denied respondent hervisitation rights, the trial judge found the evidence on this point "willfully [sic] inadequate." Thetrial judge is in the best position to make factual findings and credibility assessments. In re D.L.,326 Ill. App. 3d at 269. We defer to those findings here and will not reweigh evidence or reassessrespondent's credibility on appeal. In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 269. Consequently, the findingthat respondent was unfit was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

Once the trial court has made a finding of unfitness, all considerations must yield to the bestinterests of the child. In re M.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1003 (1999). In determining the best interestsof a child in proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act, the court is required to consider a numberof factors "in the context of the child's age and developmental needs." 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(West 1998). Among the factors to be considered are the development of the child's identity, thechild's sense of attachments, the child's need for permanence (which includes the child's need forstability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings and other relatives), and theuniqueness of every family and child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 1998). The question of whatis in the best interests of the child should not be treated lightly. In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d 592, 599(1996).

The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review to be applied in this case. Respondent asserts that we should reverse the trial court's determination that termination of parentalrights was in the children's best interests if that determination was against the manifest weight of theevidence. This standard of review has been applied by the fourth and fifth divisions of the FirstDistrict of the Appellate Court (In re C.M., 319 Ill. App. 3d 344, 360 (2001); In re Sheltanya S., 309 Ill. App. 3d 941, 955 (1999)) as well as by the Fourth District (In re S.H, 284 Ill. App. 3d 392, 401(1996)). The State and the public guardian assert that reversal is warranted only if the trial courtabused its discretion. The abuse of discretion standard has been applied by the second, third, andsixth divisions of the First District (In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 271; In re B.S., 317 Ill. App. 3d650,664 (2000); In re Jason U., 214 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (1991)), by the Second District (In reM.S., 302 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1003 (1999)) and by the Third District (In re D.J.S., 308 Ill. App. 3d 291, 295 (1999)).

This division has also applied the abuse of discretion standard. In re D.H., 323 Ill. App. 3d1, 13 (2001). Because a finding that is against the manifest weight of the evidence constitutes anabuse of the trial court's discretion (Technology Innovation Center, Inc. v. Advanced MultiuserTechnologies Corp., 315 Ill. App. 3d 238, 244 (2000)), both of the asserted standards of review arein fact applied. Thus, a trial court's decision that termination of parental rights is in a child's bestinterests will be reversed if the trial court's findings were contrary to the manifest weight of theevidence or if the trial court otherwise abused its discretion. Cf. In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 425(2001) (trial court's determination of the best interests of a child in temporary custody proceedingsunder the Juvenile Court Act will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion or wherethe judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence).

A trial court abuses its discretion if the trial court acts arbitrarily without conscientiousjudgment, exceeds the bounds of reason, or ignores recognized principles of law, so that substantialprejudice results. Kaden v. Pucinski, 263 Ill. App. 3d 611, 615 (1994). A decision is against themanifest weight of the evidence if the facts clearly demonstrate that the court should have reachedthe opposite result. In re N.B., 191 Ill. 2d 338, 346 (2000).

Respondent contends that termination of her parental rights to G.L. and K.A. was contraryto the manifest weight of the evidence because the trial court did not terminate her parental rightsto the three older children and "virtually the same evidence was presented as to the two youngerchildren." In cases involving the termination of parental rights, each case is sui generis and must bedecided based on the particular facts and circumstances presented. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 422. Because each termination of parental rights case is unique, factual comparisons to other cases areinappropriate. In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 240 (1999). Indeed, in determining whether thetermination of parental rights is in a child's best interest, the court must consider "the uniqueness ofevery family and child." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(h) (West 1998). Clearly, thetrial court's decision not to terminate respondent's parental rights as to G.L. and K.A.'s siblings doesnot compel an identical disposition with respect to G.L. or K.A. Indeed, the decision to terminaterespondent's parental rights as to G.L. and K.A. requires consideration of the best interests of G.L.and K.A. as unique individuals. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(h) (West 1998).

The record reflects that G.L. had been in foster care for six of his seven years of life and hadbeen cared for by his foster mother since at least January 1998.⁽³⁾ G.L.'s foster mother properlyattended to his special developmental needs and wished to adopt him. The record indicates thatrespondent had not visited with G.L. at all from February or April 1998 until the September 2000termination hearing. In light of this evidence, we do not believe that the decision to terminaterespondent's parental rights as to G.L. was either contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence oran abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the termination of respondent's parental rights as to G.L.

The record further reflects that K.A. was removed from respondent's custody less than twoweeks after birth. K.A. was placed with her foster mother no later than January 1998.⁽⁴⁾ The clientservice plans admitted into evidence at trial indicated that K.A. has a strong attachment to her fostermother and that K.A.'s foster mother wished to adopt her. As with G.L., the record indicates thatrespondent had not visited with K.A. at all from February or April 1998 until the September 2000termination hearing. In light of this evidence, we do not believe that the decision to terminaterespondent's parental rights as to K.A. was either contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence oran abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the termination of respondent's parental rights as to K.A.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court terminating respondent's parentalrights as to G.L. and K.A. is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McNULTY and COUSINS, JJ., concurred.

1. The State withdrew this allegation prior to hearing on the petition.

2. The brief filed by the public guardian explains that Reaching the Mark is a childwelfare agency with which the Department of Children and Family Services had contracted tofacilitate services for respondent's family.

3. The State's petition alleges that G.L. was placed with his foster mother on May 24,1994; however, no evidence was presented at trial as to the initial date of placement. The clientservice plan for January through June 1998 reflects that G.L. had been placed with his fostermother prior to that time.

4. The State's petition alleges that K.A. was placed with her foster mother in May 1995;however, no evidence was presented at trial as to the initial date of placement. The client serviceplan for January through June 1998 reflects that K.A. had been placed with her foster motherprior to that time.